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This dissertation is concerned with the case study of Algerian 
political Islam in the contemporary era. The central research 
question addressed here is two fold. First, the question of whether 
political Islam constitutes a radical ideological break with the 
Algerian political ljfeworld is asked. The political imagination of 
Algerian Islamism is analysed in its historical and political contexts 
to unearth areas of rupture with dominant forms of political 
imagination, but areas of hybridity and of complicity with such 
formations are also highlighted. Thus, the main contention of this 
thesis is that the discursive relationship between Islamist political 
formation and that of their opponents in the political sphere is 
complex: Islamist political imagination is oppositional to the state, 
but it does not escape the discursive tools for legitimation present in 
the existing ljfeworld. Secondly, the consequences of this argument 
for our understanding of the Algerian Civil War of the 199os are 
addressed. It is argued here that political imagination is one of the 
key loci where political contest has been played out in the 
contemporary Algerian setting. The confrontation between the 
regime and political Islam is the most up to date example of a 
struggle for power that necessitates the monopoly over the 
legitimising tools of history and culture. More importantly, this 
framework questions the notion that the state-Islamist confrontation 
in subsequent years can be explained in a binary fashion (Good vs. 
Evil; Rational politics vs. Irrational theocracy). In fact, this 
confrontation over political power is consistent with existing 
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Foreword 
Even when I remind myself that this is no more than a dark corner of a colonial 
city most people have never heard of, I cannot help the way my thoughts run. I 
cannot help but think about power, about authenticity, and the uselessness of 
being a writer. 
Ronan Bennett The Catastrophist 
The political is in essence philosophical and personal. Writing about democratisation, 
human rights, the politics of identity - or simply about difference, about an always 
problematic "Other" - puts the author's personal beliefs, their experience of life and 
their philosophical outlook on life at the centre of their work. 
I believe that being half-European and half-Middle Eastern has shaped the way I look 
at my subject, and the motivations for doing this project. I also believe that, as a 
French citizen of mixed background, dealing with Algeria, I come with a certain 
amount of baggage - perhaps, it could be argued, too much baggage. But, in contrast 
to the common wisdom pointed out by Alistair Home, a Briton writing about the 
Algerian Independence War, I would like to think that French people can write about 
Algeria in a way that is not 'colonial' or patronising or simply apologetic. There are 
notable exceptions to `Orientalist' writing on Algeria in France. Also, a new 
generation of French scholars (who have neither lived through the war, nor colonial 
defeat) have produced insightful, challenging, and balanced hypotheses on a variety 
of issues concerning a country which they have chosen to study out of interest, not 
hegemonic necessity. 
That being said, the emotional and intellectual gaps between as different cultures as 
the French and the Algerian are noteworthy and their interconnections are complex 
and fraught with ideological pitfalls. My own evolution in this regard is non-typically 
French, but French nonetheless. I remember growing up in a family characterised by 
cultural metissage in a society where people of Middle Eastern background (and 
especially North Africans) are still too often pointed out as undesirables. I remember 
reading about the declaration of human rights and the Enlightenment at school, also 
a typical French experience, and I remember how much it shaped my own beliefs. I 
remember the personal experiences which gave those convictions meaning, and a 
certain 'coming of age' with regards to the contradictions of France, a land of asylum 
and a model of human rights, but also a land burdened by a colonial past and an often 
racist present. 
I cannot pretend I would have written in the same way if I had been a Muslim and/or 
an Algerian, if I had been simply French, or on the whole, if I had lived a different 




At the moment we are seeing an epochal transition. The current conflicts [in North Africa] are no 
longer simply over tactics or various strategies for modernization. There is now a struggle for control 
of the very concepts of political life, for control over the way people think about politics, and the way 
we can talk about polity and society. What we are seeing now in this crisis of authoritarianism is the 
battle for hegemony over discourse. If you can control the words, you can control the polity. 
John Voll'Sultans, Saints and Presidents' 
i. i Introduction: The Research Questions 
It took three passengers jets crashing into the World Trade Centre in New York City 
and the Pentagon in Washington D. C. on 11th September 20011 to bring Islamist 
politics to the forefront of the political agenda of the International Community. By 
comparison, the brutal civil war opposing the Algerian regime to its Islamist 
opposition throughout most of the 199os received little media attention and virtually 
no international pressure from institutions such as the United Nations for a peaceful 
solution to be found. Such a discrepancy can of course be explained in part in terms 
of where the violence took place and who the victims were, demonstrating once again 
the power of the media in shaping our degree of moral attachment to specific events 
in world affairs. More widely though, these differences can be seen to illustrate a 
more subtle point: -that Islamist politics are neither as new, nor as straightforward a 
phenomenon as the recent attacks in the United States seem to suggest. In fact, one of 
the great dangers of `the post-September 11th world', would be that we should to 
translate our sense of moral outrage at the atrocities into a simplification of the 
dynamics and multi-faceted features of Islamism as a new form of `blind terror'. The 
amalgamation of the suspected al-Quaida attacks with wider patterns of Islamist 
political and social behaviour is tempting, but facile. It is tempting because al-Quaida 
attracts citizens from many Middle Eastern states and the Muslim diaspora, and 
because al-Quaida is indubitably one of the faces of contemporary political Islam. 
IA fourth aircraft crashed killing all passengers, crew and hijackers before reaching its 
destination. 
I 
Yet this amalgamation carries clear dangers - for both academics and practitioners. 
For academics, the temptation lies in taking on a political agenda of revenge for the 
11th September attacks and ignoring the primary tasks of the academic endeavour: 
explanation and understanding2. These tasks imply going deeper into accounting for 
Islamist violence than a policy of `eradication' or `liquidation'. Not all Islamist groups 
take on violence and terrorism as their tactics in the political sphere, and those who 
do are unlikely to abate their commitment to violent strategies in an atmosphere of 
retribution. Understanding the logic of violence in the context that it requires 
provides no justification for the violence itself, but it is the pre-requisite to any policy 
that deals effectively with Islamist violence, and that learns to value the political 
contribution Islamist politics makes to Middle Eastern politics aside from violence. 
This goes against the `hawkish' policy of the US and their allies in Europe which 
combines armed attacks on al-Quaida forces and `those who abide them' with the 
demand for support by states in the Islamic world in this `war against terror'. But 
what kind of assistance might this be? Beyond help in locating and dismantling al- 
Quaida cells, lies the question of what to do about Islamism more widely. 
Authoritarian regimes in the region have had the pressure to respect the human and 
political rights of their Islamist opposition effectively removed, and now have a free 
hand to clamp down on Islamist movements at home, and as well as non-Islamist 
forms of opposition. For policy-makers, on the other hand, the added danger of a 
slippery slope into interventionism without restraint in the region is one risk that 
cannot be ignored. September 11th provides a unique opportunity for the United 
States to have-a- free reign in decisively acting on a variety of regional issues (such as 
the fate of Saddam Hussein), but this cannot come without costs3. 
Given this context, now is perhaps not the most convenient time to produce an 
analysis of political Islam that could be interpreted in some quarters as `sympathetic'. 
2 This echoes a statement made by the academics working for the Harvard Centre for Middle 
Eastern Studies in the wake of Sept 11th . They state their shock at the tragedy 
but point out 
that "As scholars and educators, however, we have a responsibility to move beyond the 
passing of moral judgement, and towards a calm and well-informed understanding of the 
causes and conditions which underlie this horrific event. ... we are confident that we 
know 
enough to stress to those in government involved in the ongoing formulation of policy that 
indiscriminate military action by the US and her allies will inevitably result in the deaths of 
more innocent human beings and further escalation; and this will guarantee future terrorist 
attacks rather than prevent them". See CMES statement at http: //www. fas. harvard. edu 
2 
A dissertation concentrating on the complexity of Islamist politics in Algeria -a state 
where Islamists have been implicated in violence - comes at a time where the 
political climate may not welcome an account where the Islamists are not depicted as 
the representatives of simple `Evil'. Is it worth it, or even possible, to resist the voices 
of `eradication' when these have become so dominant and pervasive? Even though the 
research and writing involved in this dissertation began a long time before the attacks 
in the United States took place, the relevance of the type of work produced here is all 
the more salient because of current concerns with political Islam. Arguably, now is 
the most important time to investigate the context and relevance of Islamist politics 
within states, regionally, and globally. More than ever before the questions: "What is 
political Islam? What is it fighting for, and why? " are of prime importance. The 
central research questions addressed here reflect these concerns in a fundamental 
way. 
This dissertation analyses the contemporary forms of political Islam in post-colonial 
Algeria in the context of the Civil War of the 199os. As such, it does not aim to 
provide a full account of the civil war years and explain its mechanics per se. Instead, 
it hopes to recast our current knowledge of such events in a wider historical and 
theoretical perspective to better understand the significance of the confrontation for 
power that has underpinned the Civil War. The main focus of the central research 
questions will be placed on the issue of political imagination as expressed through 
discourse, an area that has often been politically controversial. Here, the analytical 
tools and theoretical stance offered by critical studies in general, and postcolonial 
studies in particular, prove invaluable. The construction of identity in the 
postcolonial setting through the use of history, founding myths of the nation, and 
cultural tools for legitimation help frame the analysis of the place of political Islam in 
wider patterns of political discourse, values and symbolism, the lifeworld. 
First, the question of whether political Islam constitutes a radical ideological break 
with the Algerian political lifeworld is asked. Is political Islam a revolutionary 
movement that threatens the political integrity of the Algerian state? Do its political 
programme and vision for a new society represent a genuine alternative to 
3 This may sound tempting once again, but one can legitimately ask whether such initiatives are really 
likely to reduce the anti-American feeling in the region, or even provide genuine help to the region in 
3 
postcolonial patterns of governance? Does the Islamist political imagination really 
escape the discursive tools for legitimacy present in the existing lifeworld? Islamist 
politics will be differentiated here from the broader phenomenon of Islamic politics 
to refer to a specific set of political and social movements whose principal concerns 
are "temporal and political"4. These movements are oppositional to existing regimes 
in the region insofar as they plan to establish an Islamic State and use the shari'a 
(Islamic Law) as the basis for governance. Yet, their political programmes seldom 
question existing state boundaries and economic principles in place, and as such, 
they "do not uncritically reject modernity; they are trying to reformulate it and 
regulate it, using the discursive terms of the Islamic heritage"5. The political 
imagination of Algerian Islamism is analysed here in its historical and political 
contexts to unearth areas of rupture with dominant forms of political imagination, 
but areas of hybridity and of complicity with such formations are also highlighted. 
Thus, the main research agenda of this thesis is an analysis of the complexity of the 
discursive relationship between Islamist political formations and that of their main 
opponent in the political sphere: the Algerian regime. 
Secondly, the consequences of this line of inquiry for our understanding of the 
Algerian Civil War of the 199os are addressed. If the political imagination of Islamists 
in Algeria is tied to that of established patterns of political imagination, the notion 
that the state-Islamist relationship can be explained in a binary fashion (such as 
Good vs. Evil or Rational politics vs. Irrational theocracy) is undermined. One must 
ask as. a result what the meaning of the Civil War is in this context. Is this 
confrontation over political power consistent with existing patterns of political 
competition in postcolonial Algeria? If this is so, the confrontation between the 
regime and political Islam could be seen as the most up to date example of a struggle 
for power that necessitates the monopoly over the legitimising tools of history and 
culture. 
democratising. 
4 Joel Beinin and Joe Stork. 1997. "Introduction: On the Modernity, Historical Specificity, and 
International Context of Political Islam. In their (eds. ) Political Islam: Essays from Middle 
East Report. London: I. B. Tauris. p. 3. 
5 Joel Beinin and Joe Stork. 1997. "Introduction". P. 4. The full context and problematic 
elements of definitions of political Islam will be dealt with in depth in chapter three. 
4 
These are undoubtedly ambitious questions that a dissertation alone cannot hope to 
fully answer. Still, it is my hope here that this analysis will contribute to the debates 
concerning the Algerian Islamist movements, and more widely, to those on the place 
and meaning of political Islam. With these aims in mind, I now turn to the particulars 
of the research project undertaken here, the main arguments put forward, and a 
consideration of methodology and sources. 
1.2. The Research Project 
In essence, political Islam as a subject of study eludes purely theoretical or empirical 
approaches. On a theoretical level, political Islam sits rather awkwardly with the 
broad concepts of 'religion' and 'politics', because it is, almost by definition, 
necessarily both and strictly speaking neither, as our definition of political Islam, 
developed in chapter three, illustrates. Moreover, it cannot be simply interpreted as a 
nationalist movement in Gellnerian terms6, or amalgamated with observed trends in 
religious revivalism in the post-Cold War world'. While this 'renewal of the politics of 
identity' as a reaction to a particular project of modernity provides an adequate 
starting point for understanding the context of the growth of these movements8, it 
conveys little precise information about political Islam itself, and especially about the 
diversity of its forms. On an empirical level, the information we can gather on the 
evolution of each group in each case throughout the region is immense, but there are 
no obvious, all-encompassing conceptual frameworks through which we can analyse 
and. categorise these trends. Consequently, this dissertation takes as its primary foci 
both the conceptual and the empirical dimensions of political Islam, as it can be 
assumed that both areas can and ought to be researched further. 
6If fact Gellner sees Islamism as a challenge to nationalism in the Arab world - and would 
probably be thus very reluctant to look at political Islam as a nationalist alternative. See 
Ernest Gellner. 1997. Nationalism. London: Phoenix. pp. 83-84. 
7Whether such an assimilation is possible is a debatable fact - but a number of such attempts, 
some more successful than others, exist. For examples of this literature, see Gilles Kepel. 
1991. La Revanche de Dieu. Paris; Seuil Actuels. pp. i7-19. Mark Juergensmeyer. 1993. The 
New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. and David Westerlund (ed. ). 1995. Questioning the Secular State: The 
Worldwide Resurgence of Religion in Politics. London: Hurst and Co. Bruce Lawrence. 
Defenders of God. 
5 
1.2.1. The Parameters of Research: Political Imagination in the Algerian Polity 
The analytical scope of the dissertation is limited one main case study, that of colonial 
and postcolonial Algeria and it places its emphasis on the political processes in which 
Islamist movements partake. The time period under scrutiny starts with the French 
colonial era ending in 1962 and the post-independence era that has ensued, with a 
special focus on the 1988-. 1998 decade. This period features as a `coming of age' for 
many Islamist groups and parties with political ambitions who, through their explicit 
challenge to existing regimes, have had to deal with the political consequences of this 
challenge through democratic processes, bargaining and violent struggle. What 
Martinez has identified as the Algerian 'Civil War' (starting in 1992)9 is a particularly 
confusing period about which analysis is difficult to conduct. Still, the contest 
between Islamists and the Algerian regime constitutes a fascinating expression of 
wider contests over political ideas in the region which are worth examining in detail. 
Within this general frame, this dissertation investigates a very specific facet of the 
Islamist challenge in Algeria. It focuses on the level of political ideas that underpin 
Islamist-state and Islamist-society relations which a special emphasis placed on 
discourse and identity-building10. More precisely, this dissertation aims to look at the 
political imagination of Islamist movements in Algeria. What is meant here by 
political imagination is the sum not only of political themes forming the Islamist 
discourse on politics, or the specific doctrinal slants of each Islamist group, but also 
the underpinning political, religious and cultural values ingrained in Islamist political. 
culture. In this sense, a political imagination is the combination of a political 
memory of the past, its interpretive discourse on the present, and its utopia for the 
future. 
8See, in particular, Gilles Kepel. 1991. La Revanche de Dieu. and Mark Juergensmeyer. 1993. 
The New Cold War? 
9Luis Martinez. 1998. La Guerre Civile en Algerie: 1990-1998. Paris: Karthala. 
10From an anthropologist perspective, Gilbert Grandguillaume argues that Islam is more than 
a religion: it is a form of culture which touches upon the religious, but which also allows the 
believer the shape and give meaning to their socio-political environment, to open up specific 
identity bearings. Gilbert Grandguillaume. 1982. "Islam et Politique au Maghreb" in Olivier 
Carre (ed. ). L'Islam et L'Etat daps le Monde D'Aujourd'hui. Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France. 
6 
It should be remarked early on that both political imagination and political culture 
are essentially contested concepts, for a number of reasons. On the one hand, the 
contest over what these terms mean and how they can be applied make their use 
problematic, albeit often necessary to an understanding of the symbolic, ideological 
and cultural aspects of politics. On the other hand, while these concepts help open a 
window into the world of ideas and values, they also run the risk of narrowing down 
analysis to a purely culturalist argument - where the social and economic causes of 
political outcomes are unnecessarily obscured. More alarmingly however, culturalist 
arguments are easy preys to largely ideological analyses using cultural traits as a 
means to substantiate a view of the Muslim world which oversimplifies complex 
cultural-political ideas and relationships at best", and which presents essentialist and 
pejorative, if not racist, cliches at worst12. There is something inherently problematic 
in presenting a culturalist line of argument which can be summarised as 
Muslim/Middle Eastern/Arab politics are X (unstable, authoritarian, etc. ) because of 
cultural reasons Y and Z (for instance, Islam). No culture - or political culture - lends 
itself to such straightforward explanations, and Middle Eastern political cultures are 
no exception. It is not only essentialist and inaccurate to assume that Middle Eastern 
countries, because of their religious or cultural backgrounds are bound to a small 
range of political outcomes, but is also patronising13 
Still, and despite these risks, the 'political imagination' dimension of political Islam 
and the patterns of political culture it is part of, are essential features of any coherent 
-E_; understanding of such movements. Indeed, while any political movement is ingrained 
11A'better' example of an application of such an approach to the specific context of political 
culture as a vehicle for democratisation is illustrated by Elie Kedourie's Democracy and Arab 
Political Culture, a short treatise attempting to untangle the dominant traits of an Arab 
political Culture. Kedourie attempts to provide a survey of the experience of democratisation 
in region, and concludes that democratic efforts in the region have failed because democracy 
was a foreign import ill-suited to those societies where "autocracy and passive obedience 
prevailed" and because 19th Century "enlightened absolutism", a well-suited import, helped 
reinforce "the native autocratic tradition" (pp. 103-104). Elie Kedourie. 1994" Democracy and 
Arab Political Culture. London: Frank Cass. 
12See for instance the consistently shocking views of Daniel Pipes: "The soul of Islam is a 
battleground. On the one side, one can find the moderate muslims who accepted Western 
rules, who are keen to learn from the outside world, who support the idea of democracy and 
who wish to become integrated in the International Community. On the other side, one finds 
the fundamentalists - who are suspicious, who are the proponents of strong regimes, who 
easily reject foreign influence", in Daniel Pipes. 1995. "L'Islam: L'Option Turque" Politique 
Internationale. 68(summer), p. 271. 
13The Orientalism debate, developed in chapter two, illustrates this problem in relation to 
Middle Eastern studies. 
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in such a web of meanings, political Islam is a particularly salient case of a set of 
social movements articulating cultural, religious and political themes. Thus, the level 
of ideas that underpin political attitudes and events is seen as a dimension of analysis 
which complements a more structural understanding of such developments (such as 
economic, social and policy-related events). In the case of political Islam in Algeria, 
for instance, the development of contemporary Islamist movements has been 
explained as one of the consequences of the growing economic crisis, social tensions 
and political legitimacy crisis experienced since the mid-197os14. By contrast, Nabile 
Fares argues that the current crisis in Algeria is not due to a prolonged socio- 
economic crisis but to cultural problems linked to a distinctive historical baggage15. A 
focus on the political imagination of Islamists allows for these two views to be 
considered in tandem. It helps explain why popular discontent was framed through 
an Islamist resurgence. Without an economic and political crisis, the development of 
contemporary political Islam may have been doubtful; but without the pool of 
symbols and ideas that underpin political Islam, dissent may have grown in a 
different direction, or directions16. It is this facet of Islamism that this dissertation 
concentrates its analysis on. 
Moreover, the complexity of this imagination is an element of analysis worth 
emphasising here on two grounds. First, and given the potential pitfalls outlined 
above, it can be argued that understanding Algerian Islamist movements requires a 
detailed and nuanced analysis of the various ideological, cultural, political and 
religious themes present in the Algerian political-cultural web. Both on the-level of 
doctrine and in the ways that political relationships are acted out, a vast number of 
symbolic representations and ideological strands are not only the means of 
communication among actors, but also the symbolic prize for which those actors 
compete. Second, this approach is seen as useful because the study of Islamist 
movements tends to be approached, not from the perspective of ideas and discourse, 
but either in solely religious terms (through historical-theological studies"), as 
14See Ahmed Rouadja. 199o. Les Freres et La Mosquee . Severine Labat. 1995. Les Islamistes Algeriens: Entre les Urnes et le Maquis. Paris: Seuil. Chapter One. 
12 Nabile Fares. 1998. "Dechirures". In Mohamed Benrabah et al. Les Violences en Algerie. 
Paris: Odile Jacob. p. 186. 
16 As recent riots in Kabylia seem to confirm. 
17See Rudolf Peters. 1979. Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History. 
The Hague: Mouton Publishers. 
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terrorism's, or from a structural perspective (emphasising elements of socio- 
economic or political crisis19). As mentioned above, a consideration of the structural 
underpinnings of political Islam is essential, but only if it is matched by a discussion 
of the ideas that shape the polity in which they evolve. Sole focus on the reactive 
dimension of political Islam obscures the proactive, and ideologically innovative, 
nature of political Islam and the dialectic relationship that characterise the 
communicative exchange between Islamists and the state. In other words, saying that 
political Islam is crisis-born does not imply that it is crisis-bound. As such, political 
Islam and its supporting political imagination are active players in the Algerian 
political-cultural web. 
The first focal point of this dissertation is this Algerian political lifeworld and the 
political imaginations that compete in it. A lifeworld is seen here as a common 
political-cultural web, comprising of myths, discursive forms, ideology, symbols and 
interpretations of culture, religion, historical baggage and policy. This term, 
articulated by Jürgen Habermas in his discussion of the possibilities of 
communicative action among individuals, can be seen as a common conceptual pool 
from which individuals and groups derive the leitmotifs of their political-ideological 
discourse: 
The lifeworld forms a horizon and at the same time offers a store of 
things taken for granted in the given culture from which 
communicative participants draw consensual interpretative 
patterns in their efforts at interpretation20. 
Here, the elements of the lifeworld are common to dominant and alternative forms of 
political imagination - but their meaning and their use remains an area of contest 
among such articulations21. In the context of Algeria, various elements of the political 
18See Amir Taheri. 1987. Holy Terror: The Inside Story of Islamic Terrorism. London: 
Hutchinson. 
19See R. Hrair Dekmejian. 1995. Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World 
(2nd ed. ). New York: Syracuse University Press. 
2OJurgen Habermas. 199o [1985]. The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity: Twelve 
Lectures. Cambridge (Mass. ): MIT Press. P. 298. This term was originally by the philosopher 
Dilthey as social lifeworlds (Lebenswelt). For a context, see Jurgen Habermas. 1976 [1968]. 
Connaissance et Interet (trad. Knowledge and Human Interests). Paris: Gallimard. p. 175 if. 
21Larry Diamond, in discussing political culture also argues for the study of specific 
subcultures as opposed to trying to encompass of the feature of a national political culture. 
See Larry Diamond. 1993. "Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy" in Diamond (ed. ) 
Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
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lifeworld are the underpinning influences to the political and cultural relationships 
that political Islam partakes in. In particular, the symbolic element of political belief 
and action is crucial as it is not only a central political determinants, but also a 
determinant of political identity, itself a central feature of both Islamist politics and 
dominant forms of political discourse. The fact that much of the Islamist critique of 
the state focuses on legitimacy of government and political values articulated in terms 
of a particular claim over Algerian political and ideological history illustrates this 
point22. 
In addition, one should recognise that trying to account for the entire lifeworld of the 
Algerian polity, or even to provide a full picture of the Islamist political imagination is 
conceptually illusory and over-ambitious. As a result, it is not the aim of this 
dissertation to tackle such problems fully but to select specific elements of political 
imagination which have strong explanatory power in the context of Algerian Islamist 
movements so as to open up a new area of investigation in this field. Overall, this 
dissertation attempts to delineate the parameters of the Algerian Islamist political 
imagination by focusing on the historical development of contemporary political 
Islam, its oppositional character, and its ideological, and symbolic undercurrents. 
The research focus of this analysis can be narrowed down to three main tasks: 
" The Context: the historical development of political Islam is delineated and 
framed within the wider framework of the colonial legacy and postcolonial 
developments characterising Algeria. In turn, the economic, social and political 
setting are analysed to give a closer idea of the context in which specific Islamist 
groups have evolved and how these groups interact with other political actors. 
Here the relationship between Algerian Islamist movements and the state is 
defined as an area of ideological contest and confrontation. 
9 Political Imagination and the Contest for Power: the tenets, themes and symbols 
of the main Islamists groups in Algeria is elaborated on to draw an overall 
understanding of what the main themes of an 'Algerian Islamist political 
-This view stems from a belief in the importance of the ideological history of Algerian politics 
-a theme explored in chapter six. For an overview of the contest over historical 'truth' as 
legitimation, see the work of historian Benjamin Stora. A useful summary is provided in 
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imagination' entails. With this delineation in mind, the contest for power between 
Islamists and the state is interpreted in a novel way to integrate the question of 
political discourse as an arena for power struggle. Worth bearing in mind here is 
the protest dimension of Islamist discourse. Additionally, the ways in which 
Islamist and the state communicate with each other symbolically is investigated 
with a special emphasis placed on violence as a means of articulation of the 
contest between Islamists and the state23. 
" Political identity as the linchpin to a common lifeworld: the inherent connection 
between the Islamist identity formation and claims and a broader understanding 
of identity within the polity is closely explored. Starting from an analysis, in 
context, of the historical development of political identity in Algeria with special 
reference to the colonial era and its aftermath, this analysis looks at how Islamist 
identity constructs respond to the requirements of a certain common identity 
framework. The idea of an Islamist political identity is developed not solely in 
religious terms, or in isolation from the 'real' world Islamists experience and 
interpret, but as an intrinsic part of a larger web of identity motifs in which they 
are claimants, challengers and innovators. In other words, this analysis will 
attempt to use the question of identity as a bridge between the Islamist opposition 
and the state whose legitimacy it claims for itself. Thus, areas of hybridity and 
mimicry act as a counterpoint to the previous investigation of the oppositional 
nature of the Islamist political imagination. 
1.2.2. Central Arguments 
This thesis only proposes conclusions concerning Islamist movements in Algeria, its 
case study. However, the questions raised by the analysis of Algerian Islamist 
movements should hopefully inform the discussion of Islamist groups and parties 
elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa - or at least generate debate 
concerning the political and ideological dimensions of political Islam elsewhere. This 
Benjamin Stora. 1998. Algerie: Absence et Surabondance de Memoire". in Mohamed 
Benrabah et al. Les Violences en Algerie. 
23Hamit Bozarslan and Cecile Jolly argue that violence can perform a structuring role on the 
level of identity differentiation from other social groups. See 1997. "Turquie, Egypte, Algerie: 
Violences et Politique" Les Cahiers de I'Orient. 45(1). P. 19. 
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section, in turn, only briefly summarises the main arguments developed in this 
dissertation and does not attempt to substantiate them at this point. 
Firstly, it is argued that Algerian Islamist movements are embedded in political and 
ideological currents of the Algerian polity. As such, Islamism is neither a historical 
aberration nor a set of phenomena divorced from contemporary political, socio- 
economic and cultural developments. Not only does Islamism in Algeria interact with 
other political and cultural actors in the polity through established channels of 
communication, including violence; but it also formulates its political and religious- 
cultural claims within an existing web of symbols, values and practices which are 
historically-based and articulated in ideological, religious and cultural terms and 
reflected in institutions, attitudes and social practice. While Islamism often 
articulates these themes of political imagination in a different way to that of other 
political actors, especially the state, it does not embody a radical ideological break 
from existing articulations of politics - the Algerian political lifeworld. It is only an 
alternative to the dominant political imagination actualised by the state and 
legitimated through nation-building processes since independence. 
Secondly, and in the Algerian context, this political lifeworld, in which different ways 
to imagine politics compete, draws on a specific indigenous set of values, symbols, 
historical precedents, founding myths, norms and practices. These influences, which 
are argued here to function in conjunction with structural causes such as economic 
and social pressures, are the function of a number of social, political and cultural 
processes bound to the Algerian experience of the political, including: 
" The mixed legacy of the French colonial era which affects not only the political 
structures and ideologies of political actors, but also the formation of political and 
moral identity. 
" The legacy of the decolonisation era, a key historical moment acting as the 
generator of founding symbols which are key constituents of nation-building 
processes, and which in turn shape legitimacy and representation patterns, as well 
as broader political relationships. 
" Postcolonial governmental patterns governed by centralisation, populism, army 
control of the state, Arab nationalism and rapid linguistic restructuring through 
forced Arabisation, primarily in the Boumediene era. 
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" An ambiguous relationship towards cultural metissage in relation both to the 
former coloniser and to ethnic/cultural differences within Algeria. 
" Third Worldist themes of postcolonial development, and the political, cultural and 
emotional responses to actual development. 
In turn, the Islamist political imagination articulates these common themes 
according to its interpretations of their significance and of possible solutions to 
perceived political, social and cultural problems or shortcomings. Islamic history, 
holy scripture and jurisprudence are obviously of strong resonance at the level of 
meaning attribution. But other, more contemporary regional and indigenous 
influences are also at play in the way this political imagination is articulated. Suffice it 
to mention here that the ideological input of late 19th and loth Century Islamist 
ideologues - and especially the work of Sayyid Qutb - is reinterpreted for the Algerian 
political and ideological context. Tied to this new discourse is the lived situation of 
individuals in terms of their own experience of the political, be it poverty, repression 
or hope. 
Thirdly, this overlapping lifeworld connecting the Islamist alternative and its 
`opposing' dominant discourse is then argued to put into question a unitary 
understanding of 'Islamism' and 'the state' in this context. The nodes of tension as 
well as commonalties in the political imagination of dominant and alternative 
political-cultural forms point to patterns of exchange and communication as well as 
contest, and suggest that political deuteragonists also have a role to play in the 
formulation of the political imagination. It also refocuses the ideological questions 
raised in this discussion in identity terms for all participants. It is argued that the 
contest between Islamist and the state in Algeria is not simply about political power, 
but it also encompasses its companion: legitimacy - articulated through discourse, 
and a strong signifier of identity for groups and individuals. While this analysis does 
not claim to fully encompass such articulations, it highlights major points of contrast 
and commonalty between the Islamist and state identity claims. 
This analysis allows us to reframe the understanding of the contemporary Algerian 
Civil War in the terms outlined above. Particularly, the symbolic values of various 
moves on the chess board of political struggle for power are outlined as an attempt to 
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overcome the preconception that violence in this setting is random, one-sided, or 
simply a form of collective madness. Here, the meanings of such violence are 
investigated are part of a complex dynamic which has real and symbolic stakes, and 
real and symbolic victims. On the other hand, the philosophical question of whether 
the way in which political Islam in Algeria 'imagines' politics can be reconciled with 
other existing, or potential imaginations of the political is raised. Beyond 
considerations of power acquisition (which are indeed crucial), political Islam's 
struggle is one for the redefinition of Algerian political identity, a struggle where 
various postcolonial definitions of the political compete for supremacy. Thus, I will go 
further than Luis Martinez' focus on an 'imaginary of war' to explain the dynamics of 
the Algerian Civil War in the 199os. Martinez is right in pointing out the pitfalls of a 
culturally essentialist framework for understanding the crisis24 (especially when this 
involves drawing out an understanding of Algerian politics as necessarily 
characterised by violence). Like Martinez, I emphasise the interplay between the 
struggle for power in the Algerian polity, and the historical legacy which provides the 
inspiration for this struggle. To him, this 'imaginary of war' is the common element 
linking the aims and strategies of the actors involved in the conflict since it creates a 
tradition where violence is seen as a legitimate mode of accumulation of economic 
resources, political power and prestige25. He states: 
In this perspective, the civil war constitutes a political and economic 
operation aimed at the accumulation. of resources... Because it 
breaks the state monopoly on violence, the civil war is accompanied 
the by the privatisation of violence leading the -private accumulation 
of economic resources26. 
I hope to further this point by emphasising an area of analysis which Martinez does 
not dwell upon: that of political identity. The crisis of the Algerian polity is about 
governance and the conception of the state2', but this observation does not end at our 
assessment of violence. The problematic relationship between the state and the 
Islamist opposition denotes a greater malaise in the ways in which the postcolonial 
Algerian state, nation and identity have been built and continue to be built. I put 
24 Luis Martinez. 1998. La Guerre Civile en Algerie. p. 25-26. 
25 Luis Martinez. 1998. La Guerre Civile en Algerie. P. 23. 
26 Luis Martinez. 1998. La Guerre Civile en Algerie. P-36-37. Own translation, emphasis 
added. 
27 As Martinez acknowledges. Luis Martinez. 1998. La Guerre Civile en Algerie. P. 24. 
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great emphasis on the connection between the production of political discourse as 
part of political contest for power and legitimacy, and the identity components of the 
political lifeworld in Algeria. Through this prism, I intend to show that it is around 
the notion of the'political', broadly-speaking, that internal security issues are framed. 
As a result, this thesis identifies as the most important obstacle to long-term conflict 
resolution in Algerian politics the re-evaluation of the way identity claims relate to 
each other in the political lifeworld on the one hand, and how this lifeworld is 
articulated on the whole, on the other. 
1.3. The Rationale in its Academic Context 
From this overview, many of the threads linking and contrasting this dissertation to 
the recent literature on Islamism in Algeria (and elsewhere) have become apparent. 
Yet to fully show the rationale for this type of project, an overview of the academic 
debates which affect `the Islamist question' is pertinent here. 
1.3.1. The Centre and the Margin 
The spectre of an uncontrollable `Green Threat' permeates many of the discussions of 
contemporary political Islam. This view has been inspired and reinforced by 
instances of what has been coined 'fundamentalist' violence in the Middle East in 
recent years (most notably, with Hezbollah and Hamas violence towards Israel). 
Indeed, the spectre of violence has clearly appeared in the background of most 
discussions of Islamism since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Fuelled by the media, 
images of blood-thirsty, crazed Islamic fundamentalists committing horrific acts of 
terrorist violence against innocent civilians haunt the collective consciousness of the 
public in Europe and North America. Political Islam has come to symbolise a new, 
post-Cold War, threat in absentia of anything else to fear28. This is, of course, only 
part of the story: International Relations as a field has come up with a number of 
potential challengers to the Soviet Union's title of 'Evil Empire' besides the Islamic 
threat. But such problems, best exemplified by the idea of the 'rogue state', share a 
sense of unease and uncertainty with regards to the perceived ideological fluidity of 
life after superpower rivalry. This is a question of disciplinary focus, but it is also a 
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more theoretical debate, and one which goes to the heart of current thinking in 
International Relations. Thinking about a phenomenon like political Islam, I would 
argue, implies asking certain questions about the nature of security and world order 
in the post-Cold War world, but it also strikes at the heart of a clash between different 
visions of the future of the discipline, and of the methodologies used to underpin 
different projects in International Relations research. 
Indeed, the study of political Islam cannot be considered to be marginal in 
International Relations in general and with Middle Eastern studies in particular. 
However, the way in which it has been approached in the literature, as chapter three 
investigates, shows the propensity of the discipline to construct a reading political 
Islam that is almost systematically geared towards risk assessment. In fact, most of 
the Western literature on Islamism has focused either on its potential/actual lack of 
compatibility with democracy29, human rights30, women's rights31, or on the possible 
threat it poses to the Middle East or the `Westi32. In this sense, political Islam is seen 
to matter to International Relations insofar as it is (potentially) disruptive and 
deviant from the norm (i. e. rogue). The dynamics characterising the relationships 
between Islamists and other political actors in their own environments have been, 
until very recently, ignored by the literature. In the same vein, the differences at both 
the doctrinal and tactical levels among Islamist groups and parties have often been 
28Samuel Huntington. 1993. "The Clash of Civilisations" Foreign Affairs Summer. 
29See Ghassan Salame. (ed. ). 1994. Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics 
in the Muslim World. London: I. B. Tauris. Laura Guazzone (ed. ). 1995. The Islamist Dilemma: 
The Political Role of Islamist Movement in the Contemporary Arab World. Ithaca Press. John 
L. Esposito and John O. Voll. 1996. Islam and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ahmad S. Moussali. 1995. "Modern Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses on Civil Society, 
Pluralism and Democracy" in Augustus Richard Norton (ed. ) Civil Society in the Middle East 
(Vol I). New York: E. J. Brill. PP. 79-ii9. Gudrun Kramer. 1995. "Islam and Pluralism" in Rex 
Brynen, Baghat Korany and Paul Noble (eds. ). Political Liberalisation and Democratisation 
in the Arab World (Vol I). Boulder: Lynne Rienner. pp. 113-128. Fatima Memissi. 1993. Islam 
and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World. London: Virago. 
3oSee in particular works on the compatibility of Islam and Universal/Western definitions of 
human rights: Ann Elisabeth Mayer. 1991. Islam and Human Rights. Boulder: Westview 
Press and the work of Declan O. Sullivan. See Also Ann Elisabeth Mayer. 1997. "The Human 
Rights Jihad" in Martin Kramer. (ed. ) The Islamism Debate. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University 
Press. pp. 119-139. 
31For a treatment of gender issues in the Islamic world see the work of sociologist Fatima 
Mernissi, especially 1987. The Harem Politique: Le Prophete et les Femmes. Paris: Albin 
Michel. 
32See John L. Esposito. 1992. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. Fred Halliday. 1995. Islam and the Myth of Confrontation. Graham E. 
Fuller ad Ian O. Lesser. 1995. A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West. 
Boulder: Westview Press. 
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overlooked and are only beginning to be accounted for33. Admittedly, recent work on 
Middle Eastern politics has often taken on board these considerations in tackling the 
analysis of political Islam. The complexity of the political environments in which 
Islamists operate has been widely acknowledged, and is beginning to become the 
subject of serious inquiry34. Cliches of bearded mullahs and veiled women 
brandishing semi-automatic weapons have given way to a somewhat more realistic 
and nuanced understanding of Islamism as a political and social force35. By looking at 
political Islam in its political context, the central issues underpinning the motivations 
of Islamists, as well as those of the state and other political forces have come to the 
fore in terms which are not strictly religious" 
Despite this greater inclusion of context though, the working assumption of this type 
of literature remains tied to security issues related to policy-making. In that sense, 
while political Islam is now more at the centre of International Relations analysis, it 
remains fundamentally marginalised in the way that it is approached. The aims and 
assumptions underpinning security-based analyses effectively exclude the possibility 
of critically engaging with Islamism as a political player. By contrast to such 
dominant, security-based, and sometimes ideological, constructs on political Islam, 
this dissertation emphasises that, as a meaningful and valid form of political and 
social expression, political Islam deserves our attention in those terms37. As a result, 
the analytical project presented here attempts to provide a critical alternative to 
either assuming that political Islam is a threat, or focusing one's analysis on whether 
33A good example is Martin Kramer (ed. ). 1997. The Islamism Debate. 
34See for instance, Beinin and Stork (eds. ) 1997. Political Islam: Essays from Middle East 
Report. London: I. B. Tauris. John P. Entelis (ed. ). 1998. Islam, Democracy and the State in 
North Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Ghassan Salame (ed. ). 1994. 
Democracy without Democrats?. Laura Guazzone (ed. ) 1995. The Islamist Dilemma. Martin 
Kramer (ed. ). 1997. The Islamist Debate. 
35See the work of John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori in general - and in particular James 
P. Piscatori (ed. ). 1983. Islam in the Political Process. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. James P. Piscatori (ed. ). 1986. Islam in a World ofNation-States. Cambridge 
University Press. John L. Esposito. 1988. Islam: The Straight Path. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
36 See Francois Burgat. 1997. "Ballot Boxes, Militaries and Islamic Movements" in Martin 
Kramer (ed. ) The Islamism Debate. p. 35. Also, Rodinson argues that an ethical-religious 
ideology alone can alter the ethnic and political dynamic of a state or a culture only partially 
and uniterally (pp. 47-49)" Instead, he argues that the dynamics of Muslim societies cannot be 
explained by a verse of the Quran or religious doctrine - and hence are not 'exceptional'. See Maxime Rodinson. 1993. L'Islam: Politique et Croyance. Paris: Fayard. p. 113. 
37Esposito and Voll argue that "These [Islamist] movements represent the emergence of a 
major credible political and social alternative or orientation". John L. Esposito and John O. 
Voll. 1996. Islam and Democracy. p. 6. 
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it could be. Critical methodologies allow for an analytical standpoint where it is 
possible not to share the values, the faith or the vision for a better future put forward 
by Islamists, but to still understand what they fight for, and what they fight against. 
These ideals are meaningful, and they imply means and results which are temporal 
and varied. The story only begins with these first assumptions though. Indeed, that 
political Islam is politically meaningful is self-evident - or at least it should be -, but 
the conceptual and methodological choices implied by this assumption are not. 
1.3.2. Middle Eastern Studies meets Postcoloniality 
This dissertation brings in both a historical dimension to the analysis of continuity 
and change in the identity dimension of politics in the postcolonial states of North 
Africa, and an analysis of the place of political identity, framed through political 
discourse and political competition for power. This is a complex setting where 
conceptual models overlap and where multi-causal explanations often have more 
relevance and accuracy than models which privilege one set of explanatory factors at 
the expense of all others. As a result, the basic context for our discussion is wide and 
implies a focus which is original but which also pays tribute to the vast array of 
academic pieces dealing with political Islam. 
In the first instance, it is perhaps wise to point to the unique position of the case 
study this dissertation chooses to investigate. Algeria, along with the rest of North 
Africa, is often amalgamated into a broader conception of 'the Middle East' by 
analysts of history and contemporary politics. This is for cultural and well as political 
reasons, and a choice which this work does not aim to question. This being said, 
Algeria remains an African state that shares more features with the rest of the 
continent than is often acknowledged. This analysis will illustrate this point by taking 
up the question of postcoloniality and its relationship to the growth of social/political 
movements such as political Islam. Algeria's postcolonial status is one that brings our 
analysis closer to that of the politics of new states emerging from the post-war wave 
of decolonisation in Africa and South Asia (both regions which have inspired a vast 
range of analyses and concepts, especially in recent years). In this instance, the 
questions of independence and nation-building, of ethnic 'coherence' (and thus 
potential irredentism), of development and of regional as well global relationships 
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with other states will be seen to be of importance. These issues, in turn, have figured 
at the forefront of the literature concerned with the politics of post-colonial sub- 
Saharan Africa and India fairly systematically for instance, but are often made less 
explicit in works concerned with Middle Eastern politics. Clearly, most, if not all, 
analysts of the Middle East would agree that the issue of colonial interference into the 
political process (especially in terms of nation-building and economic development) 
is one that is both relevant and significant. Still, this dimension often remains 
dwarfed in relation to issues such as political economy (in relation to oil-producing 
states), questions of political legitimacy, and, most importantly, the analysis of 
conflict. Perhaps paradoxically, the idea of a colonial legacy, and the possibility of 
neo-imperialism by Western powers, are relevant to all these issues. In our present 
case, my aim will be to disentangle the ramifications of this dimension, through a 
conceptual framework which marries the aspects of political Islam which have been 
raised by the literature on Middle Eastern politics with the analytical insights brought 
about by recent debates concerning postcolonial studies and its critics. 
Algeria is a particularly good candidate for this exercise as it combines both strong 
postcolonial features (and a legacy of colonial presence which is both noticeable and 
extensive) and marked commonalties with the rest of the Middle East in terms of its 
state structure, economic resources and relationships, and culture. Algeria's Middle 
Eastern status in this regard is in little doubt: it displays most of the political traits 
which are characteristic of the region, an issue worth expanding on briefly. If 
considered as a unit, the Middle East can be first seen to be a site of conflict between 
nations, in the Gulf for instance, and of entrenched irredentism. However, the 
dynamics of conflict in the region, and especially the Arab-Israeli conflict, should not 
be allowed to obscure the common issues which these relatively new states have to 
face3S. Here, not only is the idea of regional state system featuring hierarchy in terms 
of power and potential co-operation one that currently displays much fluidity, but 
such a possibility is often also undermined by the lack of state consolidation by 
individual 'members'. Economic co-operation among oil states is notable, but on the 
whole, the Middle East does not display the patterns of internal and regional stability 
38 The best historical overview on the region is probably Albert Hourani et al. (eds. ) 1993. The 
Modern Middle East. London: I. B. Tauris. 
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seen in Europe for instance39. The causes and levels of such an instability are multiple 
and intertwined; suffice it to say that contested borders and sovereignty figure 
prominently in this equation. Coupled with internal instability fuelled by both 
internal ethnic heterogeneity and regional identity constructs such as Pan-Arabism 
and Pan-Islam, these areas of dispute have created a climate where state and nation- 
building have often proven a tricky endeavour" 
The colonial/imperialist dimension can be identified as a significant factor in this set 
of problems of course: after all, these states have often only won full formal 
independence since the Second World war, making strict comparison with current 
levels of European integration one that is perhaps unfair. More importantly though, 
both territorial problems and issues of development (and to a certain extent 
governance) have their roots in patterns of external dominance and exploitation 
which can be traced back to the colonial era. Arbitrary boundaries are a factor, the 
birth of Israel a contentious but relevant example. Overall, the most striking feature 
of this legacy remains in the area of international political economy, and its 
consequences for patterns of governance. Economic penetration and control by 'the 
North' is a feature of the Middle East shared with the rest of 'the South', albeit with 
the special dynamics brought about by oil trade. The links and potential co-operation 
among regional powers is weak due to the fragmentation of economic solidarity 
brought about by global patterns of trade, privileging strong unilateral links between 
patron states in the North and client elites in control of natural resources in the states 
of the South. Such a pattern brings the creation of powerful comprador classes in 
various Middle Eastern states, often leading to growing economic inequalities 
reinforced by lack of state accountability in democratic terms. Crises in legitimacy of 
the state in times of economic crisis can therefore be linked, in broad terms, to the 
structure of the global economic system and the place the region has in it41. 
39 On oil issues in the region, see James Bill and Robert Springborg. 1994. Politics in the 
Middle East (4th ed. ). New York: HarperCollins. Chapter nine. 
40 On ethnic issues in the Middle East, see Milton Eastman and Itamar Rabinovich (eds. ). 
1988. Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
On Pan Islamism and Pan Arabism, see Haifaa A. Jawad. 1994. "Pan-Islamism and Pan- 
Arabism" in Jawad (ed. ). The Middle East in the New World Order. London: Macmillan. On 
Arabism in the region, see Michael Barnett. 1998. Dialogues in Arab Politics. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
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The question remains as to what the place of political Islam in the region might be 
given these general circumstances. The contemporary wave of political Islam can be 
seen to be region-wide in its development, with initial signs present as early as the 
196os, and with its first notable impact in the mid-1970s in most cases. In the 198os 
and 199os, the growing sophistication and popular appeal of political Islam as an 
alternative to the political status quo are evident, as is the progressive maturation of 
the Islamist challenge to the state. In this confrontation, Islamist groups and parties 
have emerged as movements contesting state power, its underpinning legitimising 
claims and the existing political and economic structures imposed from above (as 
well as foreign interference). Beyond these similarities, the character and importance 
of Islamism in the region seem to vary considerably. The view that Islamism is 
primarily a form of political and social expression tied to contemporary Middle 
Eastern societies implies that political Islam is not monolithic in nature, but a varied 
phenomenon that changes over time and according to evolving political, economic 
and social circumstances. As Graham Fuller advocates: 
First, Islamic movements are considerably diverse from state to 
state... Second, Islamic movements are evolving... Third, the 
conditions themselves under which Islamist movements are 
evolving are diverse, and exert major impact on the character of 
emerging Islamist movements... Fourth, the phenomenon of 
Islamist movements is as integrally linked to local politics as almost 
any political party in the Muslim world could be42. 
This also indicates that despite the connotations of its name, political Islam has more 
to do with contemporary politics than cosmic ideals or religious practice. As a result, 
one can argue that political Islam is one of the possible expressions of the political 
and socio-economic patterns dominating the region as a whole, and not just the 
reflection of an understanding of Islamic culture and identity. 
On the whole, few, if any, states in the region have escaped the Islamist challenge, 
and even religiously conservative states such as Saudi Arabia have had to deal to 
political and cultural opposition in these terms. Algeria in this picture stands as 
41 For a theoretical overview of this structural analysis, see Johan Galtung. 1971. "A Structural 
Theory of Imperialism" Journal of Peace Research. Vol 13 (2). 
42Graham E. Fuller. 1997. "Islamism(s) in the Next Century" in Martin Kramer (ed. ). The 
Islamism Debate. p. 141-142. 
21 
perhaps the most extreme example of the Islamist-state confrontation. Like many 
states in the region, it is a postcolonial state where democratic deficit, coupled with a 
growing economic downturn since the 1970s has led to crisis in state legitimacy in the 
i98os onwards. In our case, such a moment of crisis crystallised with the 1988 food 
riots which precipitated rapid political liberalisation, the involvement and initial 
success of Islamists in the pluralist experiment of the early 199os, and the abrupt end 
of this experiment in January 1992, leading to the progressive disintegration of the 
state-Islamist relationship and the advent of Civil War. This is by and large the `worst 
case scenario' when imagining the potentially explosive combination of economic and 
political crisis, rapid democratisation and intense competition between the ruling 
elite (and especially the army) and the Islamist opposition. As such, this case study 
provides the backbone to an understanding of the difficulties in reconciling 
democratising trends with the actual prospect of shifts in the balance of power within 
Middle Eastern societies. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the Algerian case study, while commonly 
discussed in French academic and media circles, has never figured prominently on 
the research agenda of those Middle Eastern scholars in the English-speaking world 
interested in the issue of governance. The exceptions to this rule are noteworthy in 
terms of the quality of the work produced, but they are few and far between. The Civil 
War in Algeria in the last decade has gone some way in redressing the balance to 
include North Africa into studies of Middle Eastern politics in the English-speaking 
world in a more explicit and systematic fashion. For instance, the UK media was 
prompt in focusing on the degenerating security situation in Algeria, and both 
analytical and fair in its treatment of this case. The fact remains that Algeria remains 
the privileged territory of French-speaking scholars based either in France or in 
North Africa. On this perhaps more mundane level, this dissertation hopes to bridge 
the gap between the French-language literature on Algeria with the extensive analysis 
of political Islam in the rest of region produced by scholars working in English. 
1.4. Methodology 
Methodologically, this project bears only some resemblance to the majority of studies 
of political Islam and of Algeria in the field of political science. This choice is partly 
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theoretical - as chapter two illustrates - and partly the result of the evolution of the 
field over the past ten years. The philosophical dimension of this work is limited in its 
scope and concentrates on the theoretical and methodological implications of the 
philosophical stance adopted here: that of a critical hermeneutic approach to social 
science. On the other hand, the choice of this somewhat unusual approach is 
motivated, and stimulated, by recent directions taken by academic publications with 
regards to political Islam, and in particular with regards to Algerian Islamism. 
Indeed, the past few years have seen a flourishing literature focusing on the political 
dimension of Islamism, and on nationalism and civil society in the Middle East, 
invade the conceptual space previously monopolised by analytical themes such as the 
'Islamic threat' and the religious dimension of Islamism in the region. This change of 
emphasis is interpreted here as a positive - and necessary - step, which this 
dissertation contributes to. On the other hand, and with regards to the literature 
pertaining to Algerian Islamism in particular, this dissertation attempts to fill 
existing gaps in the literature rather than overthrow existing hypotheses. As chapter 
three illustrates, the majority of works produced in this field in recent years have 
contributed to our understanding of political Islam in a significant way, but 
somewhat selectively. The majority of works have focused on explaining the 'rise' of 
contemporary Algerian Islamism, the roots of the Civil War, and the political (and 
geopolitical) dimensions on the crisis43. Furthermore, most of these projects share a 
set of methodological tools, which, even if implicitly, reflect a commitment to a 
certain idea of the social science project: that of positivism. 
By contrast, this dissertation attempts to approach the issue of Islamism from a 
different methodological perspective rooted in a belief in the usefulness of 
conceptual, theoretical and methodological pluralism. What is questioned here is the 
ability of positivist studies of political Islam to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of political Islam. Such comprehensiveness, it is argued, comes from 
exploring the complementarity of, and dissonance between, the positivist approach 
with its 'alternatives'. More specifically, this dissertation defends a critical 
hermeneutic framework to investigate the type of political imagination that 
underpins political Islam in Algeria, a dimension of the phenomenon that is seen as 
43 See Omar Carlier. 1995. Entre Nation et Jihad. Paris: Presses the la Fondation Nationale 
des Sciences Politiques. Luis Martinez. 1998. La Guerre Civile enAlgerie. 
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one largely ignored in the literature, and which is not easily amenable to positivist 
methodologies. The critical hermeneutic standpoint allows us to go beyond the 
structural causes of contemporary Islamism in Algeria or an explanation for its 
struggle with the state. It allows us to look at the problem from the perspective of a 
struggle between different visions of modernity, different political languages, symbols 
and political imaginations, and political identities. Here, the participants in this 
struggle are most prominently Islamists and their political opponents (who often 
share more values and aims than is commonly acknowledged). 
On a methodological level, critical hermeneutics is translated as one possible 
direction in which post-Orientalism, as a alternative set of assumptions regimenting 
the conduct of social science inquiry in the field of Middle Eastern studies, can be 
taken. Starting with Edward Said's very influential Orientalism44, Bryan Turner's 
excellent Marx and the End of Orientalism45, and the fierce debate which still rages 
twenty years after the publication of these works, it is possible to identify a number of 
points of contention among scholars in terms of methodology, focus of analysis, 
terminology and assumptions which He at the heart of the Neo-Orientalist/Post- 
Orientalist divide. Principally, these are matters concerning authorship in research - 
objectivity, attitude towards the 'object' of inquiry, analytical assumptions by the 
author, etc. While these are worth elaborating on in detail (a task which chapter two 
performs), the main contention put forward here is that there is an intrinsic 
connection between the anti/post-Orientalist 'impulse' and the methodological 
solutions put forward by critical hermeneutics. As an expression of the interpretive 
social science, post-Orientalism questions the objectivist leanings of political analysis 
and advocates a more contextualised approach to knowledge acquisition. On the part 
of the observer, post-Orientalism expects a self-analysis of one's assumptions and 
prejudices, but it does not ask the observer to quit her/his critical endeavour 
altogether. 
In turn, dealing with the questions raised by the Orientalism debate is seen here as a 
prerequisite to understanding Islamism, as Francois Burgat argues46. In particular, 
the issue of objectivity in research is one that Burgat identifies as the inherent 
44Edward W. Said. 1995 (1978). Orientalism. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
45Bryan S. Turner. 1978. Marx and the End of Orientalism. London: Allen and Unwin. 
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stumbling bloc to our 'encounter' with political Islam - one which is argued here to be 
at least partially overcome through a critical hermeneutic research programme 
combined with an in-depth case study analysis. By focusing on the need to 
understand both the motivations of the Islamist ideologues and constituency and 
their interpretation of the lifeworld, this research attempts to critically engage the 
Islamist 'paradigm' on its own terms. Through post-Orientalism, the pitfalls of 
research identified by Said can be largely overcome, as critical hermeneutics displaces 
the analytical discourse on political Islam to a respectful and analytically fruitful 
endeavour. 
Beyond this research platform, this dissertation engages in a set of theoretical debates 
from a postcolonial perspective as practical avenues for carrying out post- 
Orientalism as a research project. Postcolonial studies is a rich and inter-disciplinary 
perspective mostly used in the field of cultural studies. It is a recent academic 
development which can be linked, broadly speaking, to the advent of postmodernist, 
poststructuralist and other 'deconstructivist' research projects. In the English- 
speaking world, the birth of the postcolonial studies project is most strongly linked to 
the Subaltern Studies Programme in India. The aims of this new school of thought on 
historiography and cultural studies has been to deconstruct the dominant academic 
discourse on India, and to theorise, as a counterpoint, on the postcolonial condition 
prevalent in states such as India. Three authors can be seen here as the key players in 
shaping the aims and structure of this endeavour: Gayatri Spivak, with her work on 
the subaltern condition and authorship (and her more recent work on postcolonial 
studies and philosophy), Homi K. Bhabha, with his focus on the nation, and Edward 
Said once again with Orientalism. The contribution of each of these authors will be 
analysed in more detail later on, but it worth pointing out straight away that Edward 
Said's presence as one of the 'forefathers/mothers' of postcolonial studies is no 
coincidence. Both Said and Spivak are well versed in continental philosophy and 
deconstructivist projects in particular. Central to their project, and to subsequent 
analyses in the field of postcolonial studies is the central question raised by 
hermeneutics: what is authorship, who speaks as the `subject' (and for what 
purpose? ). Even within the postcolonial studies community, the answers to this 
question have been varied. 
46Francois Burgat. 1996. L'Islamisme en Face. Paris: La Decouverte. p. 16 and if. 
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Here, the debates raised in the field of postcolonial studies will help us articulate our 
interpretive framework to the context of Middle Eastern studies. This will be done in 
two main ways. Firstly, this field posits the postcolonial condition as one where 
academic analysis is problematised. From this standpoint, moving beyond Said's 
critique of Orientalism implies drawing out a research project where the question of 
agency is renegotiated between the author and the subject to create a third space of 
analysis where the limitations of positivist approaches are overcome. Critical 
hermeneutics helps us bridge the gap between deconstructing positivist approaches 
and the need for critical analysis on the other hand. To complement this, postcolonial 
studies are used to draw out the practical implications of this theoretical stance by 
delineating the parameters for this academic encounter. Secondly, and on a more 
mundane level, postcolonial studies is a field where the basic historical tenets of the 
colonial era were first put into question in a fairly systematic manner. Applying post- 
Orientalism to 'the field' means questioning the premise that the colonial era had 
civilising components for its subjects, or even that this era has come to an 
unproblematic end since the advent of formal independence for most nations in the 
Postcolonial World. When looking at the political sphere in contemporary Algeria, we 
are in a position where being a postcolonial state is a determining factor to the 
analysis of political relationships in the contemporary setting, to patterns of state and 
nation-building upon independence, and, at the most basic level, to the very 
conception of the political. Postcolonial studies enable us to integrate a 
deconstruction. of the colonial factor in politics into our analysis of the postcolonial 
condition. Through this framework, being a postcolonial state means more than 
having gained formal independence after an era of colonisation. It implies 
possibilities and limitations which are unique to this condition. 
On a more practical note, postcolonial studies will help determine the central 
conceptual tools that will be used in our analysis of political Islam. Using concepts 
such as discourse, political imagination, identity and hybridity brings resonance to 
the ultimate aim of postcolonial studies, that is adding complexity to our 
understanding of the postcolonial Orient by facilitating greater access to the voices of 
postcolonial subjects. Here, both Islamists and the ruling elite in Algeria will be seen 
as postcolonial subjects par excellence and, as a matter of course, the ways in which 
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power struggle and the contest over political, cultural and religious legitimacy are 
articulated will be analysed to unearth the indigenous ways in which the political 
lifeworld is articulated. 
Still, it is worth pointing out from the outset that many of the concepts and 
arguments produced from the postcolonial perspective remain widely contested, both 
within and from outside the field. How important the `colonial dimension' really is, 
the possibility of giving voice to the marginalised subject and the contradictions of 
the postcolonial project in terms of resistance and empowerment are all areas of 
fierce debate. The importance of postcolonial studies to this work will thus need 
further development and qualification in chapter two. 
1.5. The Literature and Data 
The discussion so far has touched upon a vast array of literature pertaining to the 
various themes raised in this work. Yet the question of choice of sources is one that 
requires further explanation, especially given the critical stance adopted. Three key 
questions are worth addressing here: where adequate sources come from, how to 
assess which sources are acceptable given the theoretical commitments made here 
and which types of sources to use (primary vs. secondary). By looking at these 
questions, the choices made here and the overall place of the dissertation within the 
field become clearer. 
Firstly, sources emanating from the Middle East should be seen as equally relevant to 
those sources produced elsewhere. This means that the Orientalist tendency to 
marginalise work produced by `indigenous' scholars can be avoided. That being said, 
it cannot be assumed that such `indigenous' works are superior solely on the grounds 
that they are indigenous. Relying solely on work produced outside the region may 
introduce an ingrained bias, but so will blind nativism. The choice of sources will thus 
be based on the quality of the analysis produced, and its relevance, and the selection 
of a wide range of sources will be seen as important. Similarly, I will not rely on 
interpretive accounts of Islamist discourse only (even though these are crucial in 
some ways) and will instead go back to the original quotes by Islamists on a variety of 
occasions. 
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Secondly, the use of historical material on Algeria means that at least some of the 
sources used and analysed will belong to an Orientalist viewpoint, widely understood. 
How to approach this potential contradiction between the sources and the aims of the 
dissertation is not straightforward. On the one hand, the aim of this work is not, in 
the style of Said, to deconstruct the historical literature on Algeria to show its 
Orientalism (in some cases). On the other hand, should one argue that Orientalist 
sources on colonial history should be altogether discarded because of their bias for 
instance? Is it even realistic to expect that non-Orientalist material will constitute 
sufficient evidence to support a thesis since there is so little of it available? Or can 
Orientalist sources be seen as useful despite their bias, or even because of it? For 
instance, Charles-Andre Julien's Histoire de 1 Algerie Contemporaine displays many 
of the characteristics of classical Orientalism both in substance and in style: in 
particular the pre-colonial history of Algeria remains rather vague and the historical 
testimony used as supporting evidence privileges informants from the metropolis or 
colons themselves. Yet, one senses a genuine passion and sympathy for native 
Algerians in the writing style and content. And this account, even though partial in 
some ways, remains pertinent both in terms of the colonial world it vividly depicts 
(the omissions are just revealing as the inclusions), and the academic tradition it 
exemplifies47. The academic task of critical analysis can still proceed in this context. 
Thus, there is a case to be made that a critical distance from the text can allow the 
reader to make strategic choices with regards to the literature, even if it is biased, 
uneven, or too selective. Being inclusive rather than exclusive is the hallmark of the 
critical endeavour. 
Thirdly, the question of authorship is one which postcolonial studies as a field is still 
struggling with. The Subaltern Studies component of the postcolonial studies 
`movement' emphasises the need to re-introduce marginalised voices into academic 
discourse, especially when trying to undermine Orientalist accounts of history. This 
aim could be broadened to a wider postcolonial social science methodology focusing 
on the accounts produced by native informants as an alternative to dominant 
discourses on a particular subject. Here, this would imply the use of primary 
47 Charles-Andre Julien. 1964. Histoire de LAlgerie Contemporaine - see Volume I 
particularly. Paris: presses Universitaires de France. 
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resources on discourse by Algerian Islamists pitted against the secondary sources 
produced (by non-Islamists) in a biased way. In other words, the voice of the native 
informant could be used to undermine the generalisations and Orientalism of the 
Islamic Threat literature for instance. The subaltern standpoint will however be seen 
as ambiguous in the analysis of postcolonial studies developed in chapter two. 
Indeed, the question of whether the native informant's voice can be mediated into 
academic discourse without distortion (through interpretation) is one that remains 
problematic. Reproducing an unedited account displaying no outside analysis would 
be the only way to roughly approximate a `native voice' (even though some choices 
would always have to be made)48. In that case one would then have to ask what the 
value of such a text might be. Giving a voice to marginalised subjects may be worthy 
in itself, but the academic endeavour has always gone beyond this task, and analysis 
inevitably puts the author at the centre of the text. 
In addition, one could argue that, with the case study of Algeria, gaining access to and 
reproducing the discourse of Islamists in its primary form is not the most crucial 
aspect of critique since those material are easily available and already translated and 
reproduced in the academic literature. In fact, a number of publications have taken 
on this effort of documentation very seriously49 and Islamists themselves have been 
successful at spreading their message through a variety of media. The problem thus 
does not lie here with the inability of Islamists to have a voice, or for this voice to 
reach out. The problem is one of lack of critical connection between those sources 
which (re-)produce an account of the Islamist political discourse, and those analyses 
which make pronouncements on the overall value and meaning of the Islamist 
phenomenon. What Islamists have to say about themselves does not come into what 
we say about them to any great extent, as if those issues were unconnected. For 
instance, Marnia Larzeg's "Islamism and the Recolonization of Algeria" talks of the 
Algerian Islamist political project as one that equates "political delirium", but the 
particulars of this project are not analysed with in-depth reference to what Islamists 
themselves have to say about its°. Abed Charef's Algerie: LAutopsie dun Massacre is 
elegantly argued and critical, but the focus on the dynamics of violence itself means 
48 Even translation has its pitfalls in terms of interpretation. 
49 See, for instance, Mustafa Al-Ahnaf, Bernard Botiveau and Franck Fregosi. 1991. L'Algerie 
parses Islamistes. Paris: Karthala. 
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little analysis of what Algerian Islamism is about is produced51. A short treatment of 
propaganda eventually leads to the conclusion that the Islamist project of the FIS was 
`objectionable' and `dangerous'52, but this needs to be substantiated further (the fact 
that there was a civil war is not sufficient in itself). On a different note, Patrick 
Denaud's set of interviews and documents from FIS leaders, Algerie - Le FIS: Sa 
Direction Parle..., is an invaluable source of primary material relevant to any 
analysis of Islamist discourse in context. The unusual structure of discussion (with 
documents and information inserted by the author in between interviews of 
prominent FIS personalities) is fascinating, but only a short conclusion critically 
engages with the implications of the discourse produced in the text53. 
What these examples show is that, in the treatment of the Algerian Islamist discourse 
by the academic literature, the question of what the Islamist discourse is remains 
divorced from the wider context in which this discourse is inscribed. Not only is the 
relevance and meaning of Islamist discourse obscured by this abstraction, but the 
importance of discourse to our understanding of the Algerian political confrontation 
of the 199os also lacks development54. The sources mentioned above might be 
successful in highlighting many important aspects of political Islam in Algeria, 
and/or contributing to key debates in the field, but an important gap in the literature 
remains. 
It is within this gap that this dissertation finds its place. The prism of postcolonial 
studies, despite its unresolved ambiguities, acts as a novel way to look at the existing 
literature on Algeria (be it secondary or primary in nature). As a result, most of the 
data and discussion that I will engage with remains secondary resource material. The 
originality of this work does not lie in the subject material is deals with or the data 
that it uses, but in the links between theory and existing data it builds to provide a 
novel interpretation of such sources. In other words, I am not producing a work 
50 Marnia Larzeg. 1998. "Islamism and the Recolonization of Algeria" Arab Studies Quarterly. 
20(2). Spring. P. 56. 
51 Abed Charef. 1998. Algerie: Autopsie d'un Massacre. Paris: Editions de l'Aube. 
52 On propaganda, see chapter pp. 39-43" "Fel qu'il etait presente pas les dirigeants les plus 
connus du FIS, le discours islamiste etait aussi condamnable que dangereux". P. 221. In Abed 
Charef. 1998. Algerie: Autopsie d'un Massacre. 
53 Patrick Denaud. 1997. Algerie- Le FIS: Sa Direction Parle... Paris: L'Harmattan. 
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giving voice to marginalised subjects, but critically examining the existing literature 
to engage with this marginalisation and to provide an alternative interpretation of the 
`fragments of voices' produced in the literature. 
1.6. Chapter Structure 
The structure of the dissertation mirrors the aims, arguments and methodology 
outlined above in the following way. Chapter two, which presents the theoretical core 
of the thesis, develops an argument supporting a critical hermeneutic project and 
links this project to the Orientalism debate and its offspring, postcolonial theory - to 
which it is strongly related. Its starting point is placed on philosophical debates which 
affect the methods and assumptions of the social sciences, pitting positivist 
approaches against interpretive/hermeneutic ones. From this perspective, a 
consideration of the hermeneutic project is developed with a primary focus placed on 
the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Here, the problem of critical appraisal is identified 
as the most contentious issue facing the application of a hermeneutic framework to 
the social sciences. In response, the works of Jürgen Habermas and Paul Ricoeur are 
used to allow us to bridge the gap between interpretation and critique - and to 
introduce, in an interpretive way, the question of ideology. At this point, this largely 
philosophical discussion turns to the more concrete problems faced by Middle 
Eastern studies per se. By investigating the dominant assumptions which have 
historically underpinned Middle Eastern, Islamic and Oriental studies, this research 
attempts to link the above discussion with Edward Said's criticism of Orientalism and 
its surrounding debate. In this context, the question of ideology and research 
resurfaces clearly. The political commitments of researchers can be argued to be a 
primary influence not only on the questions which researchers ask but also on how 
they seek to answer them and which answers are then found. A critical hermeneutic 
framework is used here to address these problems. In conclusion, a list of key 
concepts this dissertation uses is drawn from an analysis of postcolonial studies. 
Chapter three presents an overview of the phenomenon of contemporary political 
Islam, and of the problems that pertain to the study of such a complex and 
sa Indeed, we ought to go further than reproduction of discourse and look to the issues we 
analyse from a critical standpoint. But this task can only occur insofar as we have engaged in 
31 
ambiguous set of movements. First, the problems associated with defining political 
Islam are outlined in the current, post-Cold War context, with different definitions of 
Islamism being considered. Secondly, the chapter develops a conception of a political 
Islam which is tied to the socio-economic and political developments in each of the 
states in the Middle East and North Africa which have been affected by Islamist 
movements. Thirdly, this chapter explores the relationship between political Islam 
and the cultural and political world in which it functions by focusing on the Islamist 
relationship to various conceptions of the modern. Overall, this chapter hopes to 
contextualise our case study analysis into its national, regional and global contexts. 
More loosely though, this analysis hopes to provide a literature review of the work 
produced and the themes and debates raised by the study of political Islam in the 
region. 
In turn, chapter four fully introduces our case study by drawing together the main 
elements of the ideological history of Algeria since the colonisation era, with special 
reference to the historical conditions surrounding the state-building processes of the 
Algerian state from independence onwards, with the ensuing socio-cultural, 
economic and political developments which have shaped contemporary Islamist 
activity in Algeria. Four historical periods are under scrutiny: the colonisation period, 
the independence war of 1954-1962, the post-independence period of nation- 
building, and the gradual erosion this ideal since the 1970S. 
Chapter five concentrates on the Algerian Islamist political imagination, its 
interpretation and articulation of the lifeworld in context. As a starting point this 
chapter asks general questions as to how the Islamist phenomenon can be best 
understood, with the working hypothesis that political Islam can be seen to function 
as a social movement. To investigate such an hypothesis, the discursive components 
of the Algerian Islamist challenge to the state are outlined through an analysis of its 
oppositional discourse. Of primary concern are the ideological components of that 
discourse, primarily in its official forms with an emphasis placed on complexity and 
depth in discursive formation and with the elements of political imagination 
translated into political practice. Beyond this, political imagination in this setting is 
also seen to display elements of diversity, an issue that will be explored through the 
some depth with such issues. 
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study of different interpretations of the basic imaginary themes laid out by other 
groups than the dominant Islamist tendency in the 199os, the FIS (Front Islamique 
du Salut). 
After focusing on the original elements of the Islamist political imagination and its 
confrontation with dominant state discourses in chapter five, the next part of our 
analysis looks at areas of commonalty in these divergent political imaginations. The 
primary area of investigation in chapter six is the concept of political identity as an 
illustrative example of discursive continuity - and forms of hybridity and mimicry in 
the development of oppositional discourses to the state. The main aim of the chapter 
is to chart and analyse the historical evolution of the identity themes of political 
imagination in Algeria from the colonial era onwards. The development of political 
identity as the basis of a common political lifeworld is drawn on to explain the areas 
of consistency between the Islamist political project and previous attempts to 
monopolise legitimacy in the polity by nationalist forces, and subsequently, the post- 
colonial ruling elite. This framework, in turn, helps me reinterpret the current crisis 
in governance in Algeria in more nuanced terms. 
Chapter seven presents tentative conclusions to this study, and it investigates, as a 
result, the practical and conceptual implications of the main arguments developed in 
this work. Two sections structure this discussion: firstly, and in the context of the 
Algerian recent civil war, conflict resolution techniques are investigated. Primarily, 
the processes of identity and state-building highlighted in this discussion form the 
basis of any reconciliation effort, and future state-building. My assessment of the 
prospect of long-term peace-building in the current political climate of Algeria 
remains however bleak. Secondly, and to go back to the general dimension of political 
Islam, the analysis produced here is extrapolated to the interaction between Islamist 
politics and the idea of the 'global'. This is a complex issue, but one that ultimately 
leads me to the conclusion that Islamist politics goes beyond the socio-cultural and 
political context in which it operates. It actively partakes the global conversation on 
Islam and its connection with 'modern' understandings of the political. 
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework: 
Critical Hermeneutics, Post-Orientalism and Postcolonial Studies 
In our theatres human beings 
wondrously became other human beings. 
Michael Ondaatje 
2.1. Introduction 
One of the principal aims of the introductory chapter of this dissertation was to 
convey an understanding of political Islam in context, and as a factor of the 
complexity inherent to Middle Eastern and North African political processes. Most 
notably, the unique place of Islamist politics in the region, and the social, cultural, 
economic and political structures and processes that different forms of Islamism 
highlight were identified as the primary foci of analysis. In the same vein, this chapter 
underlines the difficulties inherent to the study of Middle Eastern and North African 
politics, given the sets of research aims delineated in chapter one. These problems are 
manifest on three intertwined levels. At the most basic level, the so-called 
`resurgence' of political Islam, its impact region-wide, and its future political and geo- 
strategic ramifications have not become fully apparent yet, making predictions and 
theory-building problematic at best. There are several possible explanations for this 
problem, the most obvious Of which is that this `resurgence' is too recent and diverse 
a phenomenon for accurate predictions to be made. Secondly, and more importantly 
however, the question of whether we have the analytical material and outlook(s) 
necessary for explaining, interpreting and theorising on a phenomenon such as 
political Islam remains debatable - and debated. By dealing with religious and/or 
political matters characterising foreign societies, a `Western' scholarship on political 
Islam raises the issue of whether objectivity in research (let alone accuracy of the 
results) is a possible or, for that matter, a desirable outcome. This problem is central 
to the way political Islam has been approached academically since the 1970s, and falls 
within the larger context of the objectivity/subjectivity/inter-subjectivity debate at 
the forefront of Twentieth Century philosophy of science (and, by extension, social 
science). 
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Thirdly, and as a corollary to this question, conducting research on such slippery 
ground implies an examination of Middle Eastern studies as a field of inquiry, and 
thus of its constituent components - subject matter; choice of analytical categories, 
theoretical approaches, terminology, methodology, analytical assumptions; choice of 
sources, etc. A fruitful analogy here would be to imagine the discipline being gently 
coaxed on to a psychologist's couch so as to uncover, unravel and ultimately attempt 
to overcome the negative aspects of its `intellectual and emotional baggage' - with an 
appreciation of the fact that the psychologist comes with her/his own baggage also. 
Indeed, as with any other academic discipline, current research on the Middle East is 
necessarily influenced by previous works on history, political economy, culture and 
religion of the region, and thus by the assumptions and theoretical approaches 
adopted in them. These assumptions, in turn, always carry a certain ideological 
weight, or outlook, which affects not only the way in which the subject matter is 
approached, but also what the expected outcome of the research will be. One can thus 
speak of an epistemology of Middle Eastern studies, featuring particular sets of 
assumptions, theoretical approaches and methodologies used in the literature on 
political Islam. The argument presented here is not that this `baggage' needs to be 
erased altogether (it will be shown here that it cannot and should not be), but that 
sound social science scholarship requires self-reflection, and explicitness about 
discourse. 
Correspondingly, the structure of this chapter is four-tiered. Firstly, and by way of 
introduction to the questions outlined above, the question of the place of philosophy 
in the social sciences is briefly outlined. From this discussion stems our analysis of 
the debate between the positivist and the interpretive/hermeneutic approaches to 
social science, privileging and eventually adopting an interpretive approach. 
Secondly, this chapter discusses, starting with an analysis of Edward Said's classic 
work Orientalism, the issues and assumptions underpinning the Orientalist 
approach, its possible criticisms, and what a post-Orientalist research project implies. 
Thirdly, the relevance, and originality of this approach is developed on by engaging 
with recent developments in the field of postcolonial studies, our central theoretical 
framework. Finally, a range of central analytical concepts arising from the debates 
and commitments outlined above will be developed on briefly. 
Still, first and foremost, we need to answer the broadest question: where do we start 
from? 
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2.2. Epistemology and the Quest for Theoretical Tools 
2.2.1 Setting the Scene: An idea of Philosophy in Social Science 
In his controversial book The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, 
Peter Winch positions himself as a staunch supporter of a social science that heavily 
relies on philosophy as a epistemological and methodological guide, since, in his 
view, the fundamental concern of philosophy is the "question regarding the nature 
and intelligibility of reality"'. More specifically to our purpose, Winch's arguments 
are illuminating in two ways. Firstly, he introduces the idea that the social sciences 
cannot and should not attempt to live up to the Comtean ideal of positivist science2. 
Instead, he argues that "any worthwhile study of society must be philosophical in 
character and any worthwhile philosophy must be concerned with the nature of 
human societys'. This is a fair, if rather vague point. Secondly, Winch points to the 
lack of contradiction between philosophical work and (social) scientific research 
when he states that: 
Philosophy, for reasons which may be made more apparent 
subsequently, has no business being anti-scientific; if it tries to be 
so it will only succeed in making itself look ridiculous. (... ) But 
equally, and for the same reasons, philosophy must be on its guard 
against the extra-scientific pretensions of science4. 
Whether social science (and even natural science) can live up to these scientific 
pretensions is a point that remains elusive in Winch's work, but it has been taken up 
before and after the publication of The Idea of a Social Science by various 
philosophers and social scientists. We are touching upon a vast and difficult question 
with this type of debate, one that is at the core of the philosophy of the social sciences. 
In fact, this dilemma is really about what we are supposed to be `doing' as social 
scientists, what we are supposed to be looking for, and how we are supposed to 
proceed. Can we realistically assume that our sources as well as our own approaches 
are value free? Surely not, and I would argue, that such an outcome, if possible at all, 
is not one to be wished for. Can we on the other hand assume complete relativism? Or 
that all discourse is necessarily getting the in way of `serious' analysis? Is there a 
'Peter Winch 1988 (1958). The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy. p. i8. 
2This Comtean ideal, which is developed in more detail later in the chapter is inspired by the 
work of the `father' of sociology Auguste Comte who envisioned sociology as the most modern 
branch of the natural sciences where laws of behaviour could be constructed through the use 
of the scientific method. This ideal, in turn, has led generations of social scientist to aspire to 
the methodological reliability of the natural sciences without much success. 
3Peter Winch 1988 (1958). The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy. P. 3. 
4Peter Winch 1988 (1958). The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy. P. 2. 
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middle ground at all? And more specifically, how can we rephrase the overall 
question of philosophy's place in social science research in way that relates to our 
own methodological problems? 
In essence, it can be argued that philosophy as a field, and the various debates that 
concern it, illustrate most of the dilemmas this chapter has to address, and on three 
intertwined levels - that of the philosophy of social science research, epistemology 
and methodology. Firstly, the inherent conflict between positivist and 
interpretive/hermeneutic social science methods (which is an intrinsically 
philosophical debate) can be said to underpin the overall process of research. Not 
only does it help us delimit our research aims and methodologies, but it also 
highlights what the author sees as worthwhile research. Secondly, reflexivity in the 
aims of philosophy and, more specifically the philosophical debate between 
modernist and postmodernist approaches to truth/discourse and objectivity point to 
the need to assess the foundation of our discipline, its terminology, its methods, 
theories, accepted truths, and assumptions. By questioning the conventional wisdom 
on the region (and on political Islam in particular), and by identifying dominant 
discourses and their operating assumptions, we can redraw a set of assumptions 
which might be more in tune with the overall aim of analysis. We can be more self- 
reflexive and more explicit about our own assumptions and methods. Thirdly, an 
attachment to the philosophical roots of social science allows for a methodological 
eclecticism which does not necessarily privilege the methods of the natural sciences. 
Instead, by being informed by the above debates, can attempt to highlight problems 
with what we consider to be conventional wisdom in our research strategies, and thus 
delineate greater scope for flexibility concerning method. 
In this sense, philosophy has given our original questions about research methods 
and epistemology more depth and more complexity. Yet, now that we know what the 
issues are, the question remains as to how to go about addressing them. 
2.2.2 Debates in Contemporary Philosophy of Science 
Perhaps it seems odd to begin with a general discussion of the debates characterising 
the philosophy of science, but as we will see, such debates can be seen to go the heart 
of the issues of epistemology and thus theory and methodology occupying us here, 
and thus provide the best possible introduction to our hermeneutic framework. Our 
place to start is the work of Karl Popper and three of his main critics, as this set of 
discussions can be seen to exemplify the main dividing epistemological lines between 
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two broad tendencies: positivism and its critics. This duality in turn, has, for 
historical reasons, bridged the gap between the natural sciences and the relatively 
newer field of social science. 
Karl Popper himself prompted a revolution in the philosophy of the sciences by 
denying the importance of accretion in successfully establishing the validity of 
hypotheses. To him, it is the testing - i. e. the attempt to provide a falsification to 
working hypotheses - which is the most relevant test of validity. The overthrow of 
existing scientific 'truths' and their replacement by more valid, more sophisticated, 
hypotheses is the dominant process underpinning the idea of a scientific progress. Of 
course, Popper's own work recognised the difficulties associated with disproving 
theories (a problem shared by the idea of proving them beyond the shadow of a 
doubt): "In point of fact, no conclusive disproof of a theory can ever be produced; for 
it is always possible to say that the experimental results are not reliable or that the 
discrepancies which are asserted to exist between the experimental results and the 
theory are only apparent and that they will disappear with the advance of our 
understandingi'. At the time of the publication of Conjectures and Refutations, such 
a set of ideas proved significant in the field of the philosophy of science in the way 
that the issue of proof through the scientific method was articulated. Such ideas 
became quickly ingrained in the field to work as the most important supporting pillar 
to the idea of a unified positivist idea of scientific research, despite this 
acknowledgement of a certain notion of uncertainty. It is this aspect of research, on 
the other hand, that Popper's critics would develop on most closely. 
For instance, Paul Feyerabend's critique of the unity of the sciences and, by 
extension, its influence on the research agenda of the social sciences is clearly at odds 
with the unified framework provided by Popper. For him, "Science is an essentially 
anarchic enterprise"'. In essence, the spirit of his work is to `historicise' scientific 
endeavour and its method: "Neither science nor rationality are universal measures of 
excellence. They are particular traditions, unaware of their historical groundingt". His 
famous slogan "Anything goes", is more ironic and denotes a more complex 
understanding of the dynamics of research in the sciences that it is generally given 
credit for9. In fact, his main thesis is not one that questions the value of scientific 
5 Karl Popper. 1963. Conjectures and Refutations. London: Routledge and Keegan Paul. 
p. 129. 
6 Karl Popper. 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson. p. 50. 
7 Paul Feyerabend. 1988. Against Method (revised ed. ). London: Verso. p. 9. 
8 Paul Feyerabend. 1988. Against Method. P. 231. 
9 As he himself argues in the preface to the second edition of Against Method, in the wake of 
criticism in this regard. Paul Feyerabend. 1988. Against Method. p. vii. 
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research per se, but one that aims at unsettling the methodological certainties of the 
philosophy of science interpreted in the positivist, Popperian sense. His main 
argument here is that: 
.. the events, procedures and results that constitute the sciences have no common structure; there are no elements that occur in 
every scientific investigation but are missing elsewhere. Successful 
research does not obey general standards - the moves that advance 
it and the standards that define what counts as an advance are not 
always known to the movers"'o 
As a result, there is little reason for supporting the idea of a social science that follows 
the standards of rigour and rationality supposedly set by the natural sciences: in that 
sense, he separates natural science from social sciences and projects on each the 
ability to develop adequate methodologies independently". Instead, he argues for the 
use of pluralistic methodologies based on the acknowledgement that scientific 
theories are neither unified nor linear in their evolution towards 'scientific progress': 
Knowledge so conceived is not a series of self-consistent theories 
that converges towards an ideal view; it is not a gradual approach to 
the truth. It is rather an ever increasing ocean of mutually 
incompatible (and even perhaps incommensurable) alternatives, 
each single theory, each fairy-tale, each myth which is part of the 
collection forcing the others into greater articulation and all of them 
contributing, via this process of competition, to the development of 
our consciousnessi12. 
The idea that science is not composed of a single body of knowledge - with evolving 
sets of hypotheses being improved through Popperian falsification - is one that is 
developed more closely by Thomas Kuhn, with perhaps a less radical, but just as 
pervasive agenda in mind. Kuhn's main thesis, in his famed Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions regards the issue of the mechanisms that underpin scientific progress. 
His ideas are far too complex to summarise in detail here, but for our purposes it is 
worth discussing the idea of incommensurability of paradigms mentioned in 
Feyerabend's quote above. For Kuhn, the 'sciences' function as a conglomerate of 
overarching paradigms which work remarkably independently from each other - each 
building on increasingly sophisticated sets of hypotheses, but not really engaging in 
tests and communication across boundaries13. Most significantly, such 
i0 Paul Feyerabend. 1988. Against Method. Introduction to the Chinese Edition. p. 1. 
it Paul Feyerabend. 1988. Against Method. p. viii. 
12 Paul Feyerabend. 1988. Against Method. P. 21. 
13 See the main arguments presented in Thomas Kuhn. 1962. The Structure ofScientific 
Revolutions. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
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incommensurability makes the process of refutation one that is difficult to put into 
practice in the context of a specific paradigm. Thus, for Kuhn: 
The transition from criticism to commitment marks the point where 
progress - and 'normal' science begins. For him, the idea that on 
'refutation' one can demand the rejection, the elimination of a 
theory, is 'naive' falsificationism. Criticism of the dominant theory 
and proposals for new theories are only allowed in rare times of 
'crisis'... For Popper scientific change is rational or at least rationally 
reconstructible and false in the realm of the logic of discovery. For 
Kuhn scientific change - from one 'paradigm' to another - is a 
mystical conversion which is not and cannot be governed by rules of 
reason and which falls totally within the realm of the (social) 
psychology of discovery. Scientific change is a kind of religious 
change" 
What is to become more topical as we engage in the discussion of theory as it applies 
to our case study, and of note, is Kuhn's introduction of the idea of 'ideology' into 
contemporary philosophy of science. Here tests of validity are ingrained within a 
wider field than the Popperian project seems to acknowledge since "The criteria with 
which scientists determine the validity of an articulation or an application of existing 
theory are not by themselves sufficient to determine the choice between competing 
theories" 5. 
A third, and final type of commentary worth mentioning is Quine's sanguine critique 
of traditional forms of empiricism (and thus the idea of Positive Science) in "Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism". There, he points to two major issues undermining the 
ambitions of empiricism and testing in terms of neutrality. Firstly, he questions the 
idea that observation produces a reliable, neutral picture of reality. Instead, he 
argues, there are no "brute facts" in the natural world that can be described without 
recourse to interpretation. Secondly, he challenges the assumption that the 
production of scientific facts can be abstracted from the theories generated to analyse 
them. Therefore, to him, it is inaccurate to view the use of testing method as a way to 
produce a stable understanding empirical truth. 16 
14 Imre Lakatos. 1970. "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programme" 
in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds. ) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 93. 
15 Thomas Kuhn. 197o. "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research? " in Imre Lakatos and 
Alan Musgrave (eds. ) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. p. 19. 
16 W . V. 0. Quine. 1993. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" reprinted in James E. Fetzer (ed. ) Foundations of the Philosophy of Science: Recent Developments. New York: Paragon House. 
pp. 23ff. See section six in particular. 
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Overall, it is beyond the remit of this work to attempt solving this puzzle - and 
dilemma - between competing conceptions of the underpinning logic of scientific 
inquiry, and it is perhaps unwise to stray too far from the specific sets of theoretical 
problems occupying us here. Still this short overview works, in my mind, as an 
significant example of a point of engagement into the debates which characterise the 
ways in which social science is formulated and conducted, and by extension the 
research programme underpinning this dissertation. Such debates in the philosophy 
of the sciences raise issues concerning the idea of objectivity and unity in science. 
Without wanting to 'take sides' at this early stage - and having done little justice to 
the thought of each of our protagonists - it is still striking how the positivist ideal of 
social science remains grounded in an ideal research programme set up in view of the 
more Popperian view delineated here. There, a rigorous, if not ruthless, process of 
systematic falsificationism, through testing of hypotheses (i. e. the infamous 'scientific 
method') allows for a unified, linear (or quasi-linear) dynamic of progress. On the 
other hand, Quine, Feyerabend and Kuhn, despite their differences (which are too 
complex to summarise here), can all be seen as representatives of a position where 
standards of neutrality in the practice of research are viewed with suspicion, and 
analysed in terms, which in Kuhn's case, are almost deconstructive in character. If 
Kuhn, Quine and/or Feyerabend are right, even if only insofar as they expose the 
shakier foundations of a positivist natural science, it is fair to assume that a social 
science attempting to live up to those very standards in its analysis of the social world 
will not escape the same criticism. This is in essence the most salient strength of 
Feyerabend's critique: by stating that social science has the ability to stand on its own 
theoretical and methodological feet, he does more than critique the 'pretensions' of 
science. He opens up the possibility of flexibility and dialogue within social science in 
ways that go beyond the remit of his critique per se. 
2.2.3. Positivism and its Discontents 
Philosophers and theory-minded political scientists could say at this point that there 
is little new about such debates on truth and objectivity: Hegel and his followers 
struggled with such ideas, and the philosophical Establishment, long before Kuhn's 
rattling of Popperian self-evident truths. In fact, debates concerning the 
interpretation of a reality that necessarily escapes definitive, neutral, all- 
encompassing views goes back to issues raised by Aristotle. Despite such long- 
standing debates though, one of triumphs of the modern age would be the 
establishment of positivism as the dominant epistemological project of the natural 
and social sciences. 
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Positivism as an epistemological project finds its roots in the Enlightenment, with a 
special focus placed on the rational, unprejudiced appetite for discovery and 
classification of the natural, and later social, world in an almost encyclopaedic 
fashion. Such principles are now seen as the foundation of modem science and 
knowledge in a way that is often described as uncontroversial. But it should be noted 
that such a move had a revolutionary epistemological agenda aimed at disturbing 
established ideas of tradition and ideology - and prompted critiques both from a 
traditional point of view and from alternative perspectives upon its very creation. 
Martin Hollis points to J. S. Mill's A System of Logic as one of the first systematic 
attempts to draw out a practical positivist agenda for the pursuit of knowledge". 
Most interesting in this example is Mill's use of the idea of logic to underpin a project 
destined at putting together a set of laws governing the human world. Thus, at this 
level, many different theories can be seen to fall under the rubric of positivism since 
it: 
... embraces any approach which applies the scientific method to human affairs conceived as belonging to a natural order open to 
objective inquiry. That lets Comte, Durkheim, Weber and Marx all 
count as positivists and it is not uncommon to hear them grouped 
together under this general label's. 
From this basic definition, we can derive two main versions of positivism which have 
been influential in the development of contemporary social sciences. First, Comtean 
positivism as applied to the social world has formed the basis upon which the 
scientific method made its transition into the epistemological centre of the newly- 
born social sciences: 
. t- 
Positive knowledge, so called to distinguish it from the theological 
and metaphysical conceptions of the world from which it emerged, 
yields a methodologically unified and hierarchical conception of 
science, based on causal laws of phenomena, . 
derived from 
observation. The progress of knowledge is a process by which the 
individual sciences, each with its own distinct level of analysis, 
successfully attain the state of positive, scientific knowledge. 
'Sociology' (the term is Comte's invention) is the last to achieve this 
status and provides the coping-stone for the entire edifice of science 
and the basis of a positivist morality and politics19 
17 Martin Hollis. 1994. The Philosophy of Social Science: an Introduction. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 1o. 
18 Martin Hollis. 1994. The Philosophy of Social Science. P-41. 
19 William Outhwaite. 1987. New Philosophies of Social Science: Realism, Hermeneutics and 
Critical Theory. London: Macmillan. P-5. 
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Secondly, a more systematically empirical - and linguistic - version of positivism was 
developed by the Vienna Circle, under the term Logical Empiricism, where 
"propositions which could not be tested and verified were literally meaningless"20. In 
both cases, the main arguments proposed came under attack on the issue of what 
would prove a definite test of such validity given the complexity of the social world, 
and the difficulty in measuring `it'. Still, the basic crux of such ideas has remained 
dominant in the formulation and aims of social science programmes: the importance 
and possibility of neutral testing of hypotheses, objectivity in authorship and unity 
between all sciences under the banner of logic of explanation: 
As long as there has been a social science, the expectation has been 
that it would turn from its humanistic infancy to the maturity of 
hard science, thereby leaving behind its dependence on value, 
judgement and individual insight. The dream of modern Western 
man to be freed from his passions, his unconscious, his history, and 
his traditions through the liberating use of reason has been the 
deepest theme of contemporary social-scientific thought Z1. 
In practice, positivist social science can be defined as an attempt to analyse and 
categorise the `social world'. From this rather vague definition, we can deduce the 
equally vague working hypothesis that within social science, the aim of political 
analysis has traditionally involved analysing and/or comparing different political or 
social systems or their components so as to reach conclusions concerning the 
characteristics and relative merits of each. This can definitely be seen as the case with 
early efforts in the field epitomised by a state-centered, institutional approach, and its 
emphasis on the comparisons between the structures of different political systems". 
However, this classical approach was challenged in the i96os and 1970s, by the 
American-led school of behaviouralism epitomised by the work of Gabriel Almond 
and Sydney Verba (notably in the Civic Culture23), Lucian Pye24 and with the 
20 William Outhwaite. 1987. New Philosophies of Social Science. p. 6. 
21Clifford Geertz. 1987. "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight" in Paul Rabinow and 
William M. Sullivan (eds). Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look. Los Angeles: 
University of California Press. P. 235. This remark is inspired by Paul Ricoeur's work on 
hermeneutics. See Paul Ricoeur. 1970. Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation 
New Haven: Yale University Press. p. ff 20. (as quoted in Geertz' text. ) 
22See Rod Hague, Martin Harrop and Shaun Breslin. 1992. Comparative Government and 
Politics. (third edition). London: Macmillan. 
23Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture. Princeton (N. J. ): Princeton 
University Press. See also, by the same authors. 198o. The Civic Culture Revisited. Same 
editor. 
24Pye defines political culture as "the sum of fundamental values, sentiments and knowledge 
that give form and substance to political processes" see Lucien Pye. 1995. "Political Culture" in 
Seymour Lipset (ed. ) The Encyclopaedia of Democracy. London: Routledge. p965. 
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academic journal Comparative Politics. With a focus placed on societies as opposed 
to political structures, the behaviouralists attempted to uncover social processes 
through the study of attitudes and behaviour of various political actors in a way more 
formal studies could not. More specifically, David Easton's focus on political systems 
as the determinant level of analysis for comparative studies reinforced the 
behaviourist idea of a society (and ideas) - bound form of political life 25. Despite its 
dominance in the field of comparative politics, however, behaviouralism became 
increasingly challenged for its abandonment of the state-centric approach. Most 
notably with their Bringing the State Back In, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer 
and Theda Scokpol pointed to the centrality of the state as a social actor, redressing 
the balance once again towards more formal processes26. Still, what these varied and 
evolving interests and foci all seem to suggest, is a shared commitment, in practice, if 
not always explicitly in principle, to a research agenda and set of methodologies 
aimed at producing a stable and systematised body of knowledge under controlled 
conditions. 
First disturbed through Popperian claims that scientific knowledge claims can never 
be fully proved with supporting evidence, but only refuted, the logic of positivism has 
been subsequently questioned in a systematic manner by hermeneutics, critical 
theory and postmodernist and poststructuralist, thinkers, to the extent that the term 
"positivist" has now acquired a distinctively pejorative connotation in many circles: 
Terms that were once used as proud self-descriptions have become 
mild expressions for derision - "positivist", "empiricist", 
"Hempelian", "objectivist", "hard-nosed", "analytical". The left 
brain, which once seemed to occupy all of cranial space has been 
relegated to a mere 50 percent in order to make a place for the right 
hemisphere, for whose activity there is growing respect. Even worse, 
in some quarters some researchers have abandoned the very notion 
of truth as regulative ideal, and mouthing exciting names 
("Hanson", "Kuhn", "Feyerabend") they have hoisted the banners of 
either relativism or subjectivism"27. 
By contrast to the project of explanation, the tradition of understanding (verstehen) 
developed as part of the German philosophical tradition spearheaded by Hegelian 
25See David Easton. 1965. A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs (N. J. )/ 
Prentice Hall. and David Easton. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley. 
26Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Ruchemeyer and Theda Skocpol. 1985. Bringing the State Back In. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See chapter One in particular, by Theda Skocpol 
"Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research". 
27D. C. Phillips. 1987. Philosophy, Science and Social Inquiry: Contemporary Methodological 
Controversies in Social Science and Related Applied Fields of Research. Oxford: Pergamon 
Press. p. viii. 
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critiques. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith summarise the basic dichotomy arising from 
this critique: the development in parallel of two distinct traditions in the social 
sciences: Explanation (epitomised by the search for causation in a way resembling the 
natural sciences) and Understanding (based on an insider's point of view and for the 
search of meaning in context)"'. On the side of explanation, the rise of the scientific 
method and empirical analysis form a strong, and pervasive, basis for analysis29. For 
the proponents of understanding, on the other hand, the rise of Historicism, the 
Frankfurt school, and more recently the blossoming of poststructuralist, 
postmodernist, and critical discourses are of note3o 
Overall, the critiques of positivism are too numerous to investigate in detail here, but 
to give an idea of the major epistemological issues which have prompted this work to 
opt for an approach based on hermeneutics, four main areas of critique are worth 
bringing up: 
i. The social sciences cannot live up to the standards of research set up in the 
natural sciences (even assuming those match up the Popperian ideal) because of the 
specific characteristics of the social world, which can be summarised as complex, 
unpredictable, fluid, if not indescribable. The crux of the issue is whether applying 
the scientific method to the social sciences would provide accurate results: in a 
nutshell, such pragmatic difficulties are: "the complex and interactive nature of 
human attributes, the difficulty of measuring the ineffable, the policy or decision- 
making orientation of the social sciences, and the limitations of the experimental 
method in studying human and social affairsi31 
2. Following on from 1., one could question the usefulness of a theory that aims 
at being all-encompassing. As Pnina Werbner states: 
Methodological silences are constituted by the gaps created by our 
scientific discourses, the remainder these discourses generate. As 
28 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith. 199o. Explaining and Understanding International 
Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Introduction. 
29 Martin Hollis points to four possibilities within the broad idea of positivism: objectivism, 
behaviouralism, naturalism and empiricism. There a thus different possibilities for positivism, 
specially if it is to be rescued from critiques. Martin Hollis. 1996. "The Last Post? " in Steve 
Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds. ) International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 3o2ff. 
30 For a discussion of the various epistemological possibilities in international Theory in these 
terms, see the various contributions in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds. ) 
International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. For a good summary of Critical Theory and 
Hermeneutics, at an introductory level, see David West. 1996. An Introduction to Continental 
Philosophy. Cambridge: Polity Press. pp-5511" 
31 D. C. Phillips. 1987. Philosophy, Science and Social Inquiry. P. 50. 
45 
Strathern points out, no representation however complex and 
apparently exhaustive, is ever complete; there are always, in 
principle, further gaps to be filled, described or explained32. 
3. Michael Root points to the issue of whether partisanship can be escaped in 
the framework of institutionalised research: 
The social sciences espouse the anti-perfection principle when they 
preach value-neutrality and tell us that teaching and research in 
their field should be neutral regarding ideals of the good life... [but] 
Like institutional discrimination, partisanship in the social sciences 
does not depend on one's intentions but is written into the norms 
that govern the practice" 
4. Building on from this point, one could follow on the route of critical theory 
and ask difficult questions as to the role of ideology in positivism, despite its claims to 
neutrality, a point developed in detail by Habermas' work in particular - which will be 
expanded on later on. Habermas' "general thesis was that positivism had transformed 
epistemology, the theory of knowledge, into a mere methodology of science. In his 
historical discussion of positivism, Habermas attempted to recover the philosophical 
reflection which positivism had obscured: the way in which science was grounded in 
the fundamental interests in knowledge which set the conditions for possible 
knowledge of nature and societyv34. In that sense, Knowledge and Human Interests 
aims at unmasking a type of 'false consciousness' tying a specific production of 
knowledge to the reproduction of existing social inequalities" 
These are only sketches of where criticism of positivism can go - and has gone. But 
because of the problems and limitations outlined above (and in conjunction with 
recent developments in the philosophy of knowledge), it is obvious to me that the 
approach of Understanding seems an attractive to prospect to investigate for our 
purposes. 
2.2.4. The Interpretive School. 
32 Pnina Werbner. 1996. "Essentialising the Other: A Critical response" in Terence Ranger, 
Yunas Samad and Ossie Stuart (eds. ) Culture, Identity and Politics: Ethnic Minorities in 
Britain. Aldershot: Averbury. p. 72. Reference from M. Strathern from her 1991 volume 
Partial Connections. Maryland: Rouman and Littlefield. p. 119 in original text. 
33 Michael Root. 1993. Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. pp. 1,3. 
Emphasis added. 
34 William Outwaite. 1987. New Philosophies of Social Science. pp. 13-14. 
35 This an overall set of terms applied to the field of critical theory by Michael Root. See 
Michael Root. 1993. Philosophy of the Social Sciences. P-7. 
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Hermeneutics, originally derived form the Aristotelian idea of phronesis, has been 
historically defined, refined and debated by a number of philosophers of the 
Continental tradition, including Hegel, Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Husserl, Betti, 
Gadamer, Heidegger, and Ricoeur36. Despite the sheer variety of what the various 
views from the hermeneutic school of thought encapsulate and imply, they all point to 
an interpretive approach which is radically different (and some would argue 
irreconcilable) to an understanding of the social science project based on positivist 
approaches37. Indeed, philosophers of the hermeneutic school of thought agree on a 
strong distaste for an epistemology of the social sciences attempting to mimic and 
eventually live up to the Comtean ideals of positivist science. By contrast, the 
hermeneutic approach argues that such standards of objectivity are neither possible, 
nor desirable38. For interpretive scholars, the failure of the social sciences to develop 
into the Comtean utopia is not due to "methodological immaturity, but reflects 
something fundamental about the human world"". This project is of course clearly 
designed to undermine the positivist notion of neutrality: 
Gadamer maintains that the natural sciences are the product of a 
tradition of interpretation and that their norms and standards are 
simply the `prejudices' of that tradition. To hold them up as the 
muster of knowledge in general is thus to overlook the extent to 
which they are historically conditioned and moreover, to refuse to 
recognise the existence of other historically constituted norms and 
standards40. 
Instead, interpretive studies attempt to refocus the aims of the social science project 
elsewhere: "The interpretive turn refocuses attention on the concrete varieties of 
cultural meaning, in their particularity and complex texture, but without falling into 
the traps of historicism or cultural relativism in their classic formsi41. They set out to 
provide a set of context-dependent methodologies for social inquiry. For them, social 
36 For an overview of the historical development of the field, and the main aspects of most 
classical hermeneutical thinkers, see Josef Bleicher. ig8o. Contemporary Hermeneutics. 
London: Routledge and Keegan Paul. 
37 For a summary of the development and main tenets of hermeneutical thought, see Kurt 
Mueller-Volmer. 1986. "Introduction" in his edited volume The Hermeneutics Reader. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
38 See Hans-Georg Gadamer. 1986. `The Historicity of Understanding - Extracts from Truth 
and Method" in Kurt Mueller-Volmer (ed. ) The Hermeneutics Reader. p. 257. 
39Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan. 1987- "The Interpretive Turn: A Second Look" In 
their edited volume. 1987. Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look. (Second Edition). P-5. 
40 Georgia Warnke. 1987. Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. p. 3. 
41Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan. 1987. "The Interpretive Turn: A Second Look". P-5- 
6. 
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meanings are neither objectively identifiable and codifiable, nor purely relative. 
Instead, they talk of inter-subjective meanings: 
The actors may have all sorts of beliefs and attitudes which may be 
rightly thought of as their individual beliefs and attitudes, even if 
others share them... But what they do bring into [social] 
negotiations is the set of ideas and norms constitutive of 
negotiations themselves. These must be the common property of the 
society before there can be any question of anyone entering into 
negotiation or not. Hence they are not subjective meanings, the 
property of one or some individuals, but rather inter-subjective 
meanings, which are constitutive of the social matrix in which 
individuals find themselves and act 42. 
In turn, inter-subjectivity implies that social research is necessarily interpretive, a 
consideration affecting both the aims and the methods of the social science project. 
Social science analysis occurs within a hermeneutic circle predicated upon the 
interpretive nature of the conversation that binds the author, the object of the study 
and the reader. Not only does the set of prejudices affecting the observer affect their 
research on the object, but there are no guarantees that the reader of the observer's 
text will not bring in his/her own prejudices in their reading. Thus, the inescapable 
nature of the hermeneutics circle lies in the inevitability of interpretation. The final, 
underpinning loop of this circle is that general rules of behaviour can never be 
extracted from the political/cultural/social world, as social values and practices are 
inherently tied to the self-formative practices of culture43. For Gadamer, this 
umbilical chord that links the essence of human existence to tradition does not imply 
that all meanings are historically-fixed or traditional, as the term is commonly 
understood. Here, tradition itself is seen as multiple, contested, overlapping; it 
represent a constant reworking of historical truth, or at least of the struggle over 
legitimate control over its significance "44 
Despite such difficulties, interpretive scholars such as Hans-Georg Gadamer hope to 
build on the possibility of different outlooks and interpretation merging through what 
he terms the "fusion of horizons", a process of mediated communication emphasising 
42Charles Taylor. 1987. "Interpretation and the Science of Man", in Paul Rabinow and William 
M. Sullivan (eds. ). 1987. Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look. p. 57. 
43 Hans-Georg Gadamer. 1996 (1959). "Du Cercle de la Comprehension" in his La Philosophie 
Hermeneutique, Jean Gordin (trans. ). Paris: PUF. pp. 73ff. 
44Hans-Georg Gadamer. 1979. Truth and Method. Wiliam Glen-Doepel (trans. ) London: 
Sheed and Ward. For a good analysis - and summary - of this work, see Joel C. Weinsheimer. 
1985. Gadamer's Hermeneutics: A Reading of Truth and Method. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. For a summary of Gadamer's position on the fusion of horizons, see James 
diCenso. 199o. Hermeneutics and the Disclosure of Truth. Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press. pp. 96ff. 
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dialogue45. Heidegger's radical focus on the ontological roots of interpretation 
provides a framework for hermeneutics many others have built on. That being said, 
the classical hermeneutics stance of Schleiermacher and Dilthey focuses more closely 
on issues of concrete research, in other words, on building an alternative set of 
methodologies for the social sciences. Gadamer, by contrast, has attempted to marry 
to ontological level of analysis with the practical problems of interpretation to 
produce the definitive handbook of hermeneutics, Truth and Method: "For Gadamer 
focuses on the `fact' that the actual situation in which human understanding takes 
place is always an understanding through language and tradition, both of which have 
been manifest considerations in hermeneutical thinking"46 
From this short overview, we can derive three main ways in which hermeneutics is 
used here as the epistemological foundation for our research project: 
" Firstly, the hermeneutics project, through its focus on interpretation as the 
necessary mediator between the object of study and the analyst (as well as 
the reader) identifies the main pitfall of positivist studies, and creates the 
discursive space for us to proceed with a project focusing on the gaps 
produced by the positivist analyses of our case study. Section 2.3. develops 
in more depth the importance of epistemology to the study of the Middle 
East. Suffice it to say here that questioning the objectivity of research on the 
Middle East and replacing this assumption with a general suspicion towards 
the narratives produced on the region is the foundation upon which this 
work can proceed. 
" Secondly, the Gadamerian standpoint questions the practical limitations of 
the use of abstract methods: "Indeed one of Gadamer's principal 
contributions to discussions in the philosophy of political inquiry is that 
understanding is not and cannot be wholly governed by method"47". This 
points to the importance of context and the power relationships 
underpinning the production of knowledge, for instance, an issue taken on 
in the next section on critique. 
45 For a good summary of Gadamer's thought, see David Couzens Hoy. 1978. "The nature of 
Understanding: Hans-Georg Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics" in his The Critical 
Circle: Literature, History, and Philosophical Hermeneutics. Berkeley (Ca. ): University of 
California Press. 
46 See Theodore Kiesel. 1985. " The Happening of Tradition" in Robert Hollinger (ed. ) 
Hermeneutics and Praxis. Notre Dame (Indiana): NDUP. P. 4. 
47 Andrew Davison. 1998. Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic 
Reconsideration. New haven: Yale University Press. p. 52. 
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" Thirdly, the focus on the production of discourse in politics and the question 
of opposition in the creation of tradition (and history) are key concepts 
which our analytical framework uses when taking on the tools of the 
postcolonial studies project - itself a modern variant of the interpretive 
stance. 
Bearing such advantages in mind, one main issue with the interpretive standpoint 
remains salient. If, in hermeneutic terms, the issue of interpretation is unavoidable, 
then by what means does the researcher assess the validity of claims he/she is 
working with - and how does, by extension, the reader assess the quality of the work 
produced? By escaping the strict framework of explanation in positivist terms, is the 
interpretive stance doomed to relativism? Hollis and Smith argue that hermeneutics 
is "not particularly relativistic" since it does not claim that there is an infinite number 
of possible, or indeed adequate, number of interpretations48 . As our discussion above 
suggests also, relativism and inter-subjectivity are not synonymous49, but the 
question of how different interpretations can be mediated, and the rules operating in 
the process of dialogue are not easily drawn out. Thus, the idea of critique - and of 
assessment within the hermeneutic framework - has been a concern of many 
interpretive scholars aiming at overcoming the common claim that relativism in 
interpretation undermines its viability as an epistemological alternative. This remains 
a tricky issue though, and one we need to develop on in more depth" 
2.2.5. Critique and Interpretation 
The question of critique can be said to characterise an alternative to the more 
ontological focus of Gadamer's hermeneutics. The critical dimension of such an 
interpretive framework is based on the work of post-Frankfurt School scholar Jürgen 
Habermas, a proponent of hermeneutics, but one mindful of the potential and actual 
limitations of the interpretive position, and of Paul Ricoeurs'. Critical Theory here 
cannot be defined as a unified field strictly speaking, but there is common ground 
48 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith. 19go. Explaining and Understanding International 
Relations. p. 84. 
49 In fact, the consensus on hermeneutics seems to point to the search for a middle ground 
between abstract rationality and complete relativism. See David Ingram. 1985. 
"Hermeneutics and Truth" in Robert Hollinger (ed. ) Hermeneutics and Praxis. P-41. For an 
in-depth study of such issues, see Richard Bernstein. 1983. Beyond Objectivism and 
Relativism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
50 For an eloquent critique of Gadamer's Truth and Method, see Richard Bernstein. 1985. 
"From Hermeneutics to Praxis" in Robert Hollinger (ed. ) Hermeneutics and Praxis. pp. 274ff. 
5' For an excellent analysis of both authors, see John B. Thompson. 1981. Critical 
Hermeneutics: A Study in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur and Jurgen Habermas. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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among critical theorists in the defence of "the possibility of an independent moment 
of criticismiS2. Indeed, Habermas' critical attitude assumes an interpretive social 
science project, but also attempts to overcome the weaknesses of that project, as 
identified by himself and the critics of hermeneutics53. Habermas retains a "nearer 
affinity to the Kantian project for stating the conditions for reliability in 
knowledge"54, which leads him to argue that despite the interpretive nature of the 
social sciences, it is a worthwhile project capable of producing 'reliable' and 'stable' 
results. Habermas may question objectivism, but he remains a firm realist (in 
philosophical terms); in other words he does not question the existence of a reality 
'out there', only the hegemony of scientific discourses in capturing it: "Scientism 
means... that we no longer understand science as one form of possible knowledge, but 
rather identify knowledge with sciencei55. In Knowledge and Human Interests, 
Habermas delineates three types of interests linked to three different epistemologies 
and methodologies for articulating them and thus producing knowledge: technical- 
instrumental (as applied to the natural sciences), historical-hermeneutic (defined in 
Gadamerian terms), and critical (as applied to the social sciences). In this way, 
Habermas attempts to overcome the explanation/understanding dichotomy, or 
rather, the specific circumstances of the critical moment in the social sciences, to 
build a third category marrying the twoS6. Thus, for Habermas, the positivist project 
is not to be disregarded altogether since the issue at stake "is not technical reason as 
such but universalization, the forfeiture of a more comprehensive concept of reason 
in favor of the exclusive validity of scientific and technological thought"57. By 
contrast, he looks at the field of hermeneutics as the locus for the human interactions 
underpinning possible forms of emancipation, since, to him, "Individuals act within a 
matrix of intersubjective meanings"58. Furthermore, while he acknowledges that 
capturing a stable sense of a reality (or at least a certain class of object or actions 
within that reality) is a difficult endeavour - full of ideological preconceptions, and 
interests -, he asserts that a degree of common, intelligible concepts that make the 
52David Held. i98o. Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas. London: 
Hutchinson. pp. 14-15. See also David Couzens Hoy and Thomas McCarthy. 1994. Critical 
Theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
53 For his critique of Hermeneutics - and the influence of this school of thought on his own 
work, see Jurgen Habermas. 1986. "On Hermeneutics' Claim to Universality" reprinted in 
Kurt Mueller-Volmer. 1986. (ed. ) The Hermeneutics Reader. pp. 249ff" 
54 Roy Howard. 1982. Three Faces of Hermeneutics. Berkeley (Cal. ): University of California 
Press. p. 121. 
55 Jurgen Habermas. 1971. Knowledge and Human Interests. Boston: Beacon press-P-4. 
56 Jurgen Habermas. 1971. Knowledge and Human Interests. 
57 Thomas Mc Carthy. 1978. The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas. Cambridge (Mass. ): 
MIT Press. p. 22. 
58 David Held. 198o. Introduction to Critical Theory. p. 307. 
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subject/object communication possible. Our interpretation of 'reality' is thus context- 
bound, but not unintelligible: 
Hermeneutics must assimilate the dialectic of the general and the 
individual that determines the relation of objectivation and 
experience and comes to expression as such in the medium of the 
`common'. If this is so, then understanding itself is bound to a 
situation in which at least two subjects communicate in a language 
that allows them to share - that is, to make communicable through 
intersubjectively valid symbols - what is absolutely unsharable and 
individual. Hermeneutic understanding ties the interpreter to the 
role of partner in dialogue" 
Habermas focuses on the interests which have come to shape these traditions and 
hopes to use his critique of ideology to create a common language as mediatory tool 
in emancipation from such constructs. - hence a greater critical emphasis on the 
power underpinnings of the production of knowledge than Gadamerian 
hermeneutics. But this implies him bridging some of the gap with positivism, insofar 
as this common language is predicated upon the idea that such dilemmas and 
questions can be disentangled and solved through the use of reason in Kantian terms. 
This gesture solves some of problems of interpretation highlighted above, but his 
enterprise has also been seen as problematic, or at least ambiguous, in its attachment 
to the legacy of modernity. For Jameson, this commitment works as Habermas' 
greatest contribution: 
We are indebted to Jürgen Habermas for his dramatic reversal and 
re-articulation of what remains the affirmation of the supreme value 
of the Modern and the repudiation of the theory, as well as the 
practice, of postmodernism. For Habermas; however, the vice of 
postmodernism consists very centrally in its politically reactionary 
function, as the attempt everywhere to discredit a modernist 
impulse Habermas himself associates with the bourgeois 
Enlightenment and with the latter's still universalizing and Utopian 
spirit. With Adorno himself, Habermas seeks to rescue and to 
recommemorate what both see as essentially, critical and Utopian 
power of the great height of modernism" 
But for stauncher critics, Habermas flirts too closely with the Kantian ideal of ethics, 
or he fails to deliver a third way in communication in any significant sense: "While 
the idea of unconstrained discourse as the regulative principle of discourse is 
important, it is not apparent that it generated criteria that actually aid the resolution 
59Jurgen Habermas. 1971. Knowledge and Human Interests. pp. i79-18o. 
6°Fredric Jameson. 1987. "The Politics of Theory: Ideological Positions in the Postmodernism 
Debate". In Rabinow and Sullivan (eds. ) Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look. P. 357. 
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of disputed between competing theoretical systems or value positions"61. Still, on the 
whole, his contribution and views are eclectic, and have remained significant, for the 
main part in terms of his critique of ideology - where instrumental reason, based on 
positivist methodologies, has come to justify elite interests at the expense of self- 
reflection and its emancipatory potential. For our purposes, it is this specific aspect of 
Habermas' critical hermeneutics which is of use for our purposes. In a way, this focus 
works a rejoinder to the general aims of the postcolonial studies project in the self- 
emancipation from domination that his revision of the Frankfurt School hopes to 
bring. There is thus an evident link in his work between a philosophical project linked 
to the possibility of critical studies and a political project inspired by the vagaries of 
2. loth Century continental European history' 
The fact remains however that the issue of critique within the hermeneutic project 
needs to be systematically addressed in the context both of ontology and of the 
practical dimensions of dialogue through research. Here Gadamer and Habermas can 
be seen as useful of course, but neither systematises the practical relationship 
between ontology and the question of the text. In other words, we need to look at the 
idea that it is within the project of hermeneutics that mediation through critique can 
be drawn out. The most prominent supporter of such an endeavour is French 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur. At the heart of his work the traditional dichotomy between 
explanation and understanding - with the dualism in terms of philosophical 
underpinnings this implies - is systematically questioned. For him, both participate in 
the hermeneutic endeavour in dialectic relationship: "By dialectic, I understand the 
view that explanation and understanding would not constitute mutually exclusive 
poles, but rather relative movements in a complex process called interpretation , 63 . 
Ricoeur points to how this applies to the field of historical analysis, and concludes 
that this dialectic relationship can be characterised in the following way: 
"Understanding precedes, accompanies, closes, and thus envelops explanation. In 
return, explanation develops understanding analytically"64 
61 David Held. ig8o. Introduction to Critical Theory. p. 397. For further critiques of Habermas 
and his responses, see John Thompson and David Held (eds. ). 1982. Habermas: Critical 
Debates. London: Macmillan. For advanced texts on Habermas, see Stephen White (ed. ). 
1995. The Cambridge Companion to Habermas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
William Outwaite. 1994. Habermas: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
62 Influences on Habermas' thought are multiple in this regard. Adorno and Horkheimer (and 
the Frankfurt School in general) are notable, but so are Karl-Otto Apel, Marx, Freud, and the 
legacy of the ideological struggles affecting Germany during and after World War Two 
(especially national socialism and communism). 
63 Paul Ricoeur. 1978. "Explanation and Understanding" in Charles Reagan and David Stewart 
(eds) The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. p. 150. Originally published as "Expliquer et 
Comprendre" Revue Philosophique de Louvain 75 in 1977. Editors' translation. 
64 Paul Ricoeur. 1978. "Explanation and Understanding" in Charles Reagan and David Stewart 
(eds) The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. p. 165. 
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The originality - and ambition - of Ricoeur's hermeneutical stance lies in its marrying 
the project of Husserlian phenomenology with the interpretive epistemological stance 
of Schleiermacher and Dilthey) and the ontological hermeneutics of Heidegger65. In 
that sense, he follows on from the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, yet at the same 
time, his approach places greater emphasis on the explicit uses of critical thinking as 
part of interpretation: 
Ricoeur's position, which is shared with his dialogue partner in 
hermeneutics, Hans-Georg Gadamer, is that language in which both 
our abstract thinking and our concrete experiencing assume definite 
shape and are determined as thought or experience of something 
and not another thing. Understanding is the process that 
synthesizes the perceiving-experiencing on the one hand and the 
thinking on the other66 
Debates with Gadamer on the 'Conflict of Interpretations' and ways to bridge it where 
surprisingly good-natured and constructive - in fact their work was seen by both as 
quite "complementaryi67 . In fact, Gadamer's 
hermeneutics can be seen to inspire 
Ricoeur's own stance: "... I think even the conflict of interpretations could have a 
resolution. For the critique of ideologies, psychoanalysis, and every radical form of 
critique should be and needs to be integrated into this basic process of social life -a 
way which I call (in a manner I find satisfactory) hermeneutical"68 . Ricoeur 
develops 
this issue to derive the possibilities of mediation in the conflict of interpretations, a 
slightly different slant on Gadamer's fusion of horizons, more closely anchored in the 
practical dilemmas of modernity. But the priorities are the same, even if Gadamer's 
assessment of the prospect of fusion is less optimistic. He thus embeds a critical 
65 David E. Klemm. 1983. The Hermeneutical Theory of Paul Ricoeur. Toronto: Associated 
University Press. p. i5. the meeting point between hermeneutics, phenomenology and 
Heidegger's ontology in Ricoeur's work can be summarised thus: "My problem will be exactly 
this: what happens to an epistemology of interpretation, born of a reflection on exegesis, on 
the method of history, on psychoanalysis, on the phenomenology of religion, etc., when it is 
touched, animated, and, as we might say, inspired by an ontology of understanding? " In other 
words, his works is focusing on the problem of interpretation in understanding as a mode of 
being. Paul Ricoeur. 1974. The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics edited by 
Don Ihde. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. p. 7. 
66 David E. Klemm. 1983. The Hermeneutical Theory of Paul Ricoeur. pp. lo-u. 
67 Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur. 1991. "The Conflict of Interpretations: Debate with 
Hans-Georg Gadamer" in Mario Valdes (ed. ). 1991. A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and 
Imagination. P. 216. 
68 Hans-Georg Gadamer in Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur. 1991. "The Conflict of Interpretations: 
Debate with Hans-Georg Gadamer" in Mario Valdes (ed. ). 1991. A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection 
and Imagination. p. 223. 
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moment within the hermeneutic endeavour69, or element of 'productive distantiation' 
- with overall process implies engaging with cultural traditions and critically 
reinterpreting them70. In that sense, Ricoeur hopes to build a bridge between 
Gadamerian Hermeneutics and the critical necessity highlighted by the work of 
Jürgen Habermas71. 
Of note with Ricoeur is the importance of the text as primary locus for the 
hermeneutic project: "The dominant problematic is that of the text, which 
reintroduces a positive and, if I may say so, productive notion of distantiation. In my 
view, the text is much more than a particular case of intersubjective communication, 
it is the paradigm of distantiation in communication"72. This, in turn, makes 
Ricoeur's hermeneutics one that is linked to the poststructuralist project, but not in a 
fully deconstructive way - in fact, his strategies work as a counterpoint to 
deconstruction73. He defines the hermeneutics project in quite precise terms: 
"Hermeneutic then is simply the theory that regulates the transition from structure of 
the work to the world of the work. To interpret a work is to display the world to which 
it refers by virtue of its 'arrangement', its 'genre', and its 'style"'74. Thus, for him, 
... the main problem of hermeneutics 
is that of interpretation. Not 
interpretation in any undetermined sense of the word, but 
interpretation with two qualifications: one concerning its scope or 
field of application, another its epistemological specificity. As 
concerns the first point, I should say that there are problems of 
interpretation because there are texts, written texts, the autonomy 
of which... creates specific problems; these problems are usually 
solved in spoken language by the kind of exchange or intercourse 
which we call dialogue or conversation. With written texts, the 
69 For an in-depth discussion of Habermas, see Paul Ricoeur. 1986. "Habermas" in George 
Taylor (ed. ) Lectures on Ideology and Utopia. New York: Columbia University Press. 
pp. 232ff. 
70 Paul Ricoeur. 1974. "Ethics and Culture". in David Stewart and Joseph Bien (eds. ) Paul 
Ricoeur: Political and Social Essays. pp. 252ff. Reprinted from Philosophy Today (17 - 
Summer 1973). 
71 The differences with Critical Theory, though, are still notable: "While hermeneutical 
philosophy sees in tradition a dimension of historical consciousness, an aspect of 
participation in cultural heritages and reactivation of them, the critique of ideologies sees in 
the same tradition the place par excellence of distortions and alienations and opposes to it the 
regulative idea, which it projects into the future, of communication without frontiers and 
without constraint". See Paul Ricoeur. 1974. "Ethics and Culture"p. 248. 
72 Paul Ricoeur. 1981. Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. John Thompson (ed. and 
trans. ) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 131. On p. 43, Ricoeur goes as far as 
defining hermeneutics as "the theory of the operations of understanding in their relation to 
the interpretation of texts". See also Paul Ricoeur. 1971. "The Model of the Text: Meaningful 
Action considered as a Text" Social Research 38(3). 
73 Mario Valdes (ed. ). 1991. "Introduction: Paul Ricoeur's Post-Structuralist Hermeneutics" in 
his A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination. p. 17. 
74 Paul Ricoeur. 1977. The Rule of the Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinay Studies in the Creation of 
Meaning in Language. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. p. 220. 
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discourse must speak by itself. Let us say, therefore, that there are 
problems of interpretation because the relation writing-reading is 
not a particular case of the relation speaking-hearing in the 
dialogical situation75. 
But how can this conversation be mediated in a practical sense? The critical aspect of 
Ricoeur's hermeneutics becomes most apparent here, with the possibility for 
establishing "a circular, practical, and concrete relation, between the sort of 
participation which is the soul of historical consciousness and the sort of distantiation 
which is the soul of every critical philosophyi76. The key tool for achieving this critical 
choice between interpretations remains the vaguest part of his argument though: 
"Perhaps we should say that a text is a finite space of interpretations: there is not just 
one interpretation, but, on the other hand, there is not an infinite number of them. A 
text is a space of variations that has its own constraints; and in order to choose a 
different interpretation, we must always have better reasons"". The `better reasons' 
are an interesting turn of phrase: are they based on the use of Reason, or on mediated 
communication through dialogue? And then, through which means are such criteria 
for differentiation achieved? Such is the crux of the critical problem for hermeneutics. 
2.2. Endpoint: Beyond Ricoeur? 
The analysis of the various strands of hermeneutics summarised above suggests that 
there is no easy answer to the problem of interpretation, and no straightforward 
avenue for reconciling hermeneutics and the question of critique. That being said, 
such efforts, however imperfect, still underlie a general uneasiness with the 
objectivist standards of positivism. In terms of epistemology, the final choice, and our 
endpoint, is thus that the interpretive project matches most closely the problems and 
dilemmas in analysis that dissertations such as this one have to face. Ricoeur's 
questioning of truth in the production of historiography78 and Habermas' critique of 
ideology are cases in point79. Also, it is worth pointing out that from this general level 
75 Paul Ricoeur. 1991. "Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics" in Mario Valdes 
(ed. ). 1991. A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination. p. 303. 
76 Paul Ricoeur. 1974. "Ethics and Culture". p. 249. 
77 Paul Ricoeur. 1991. "Myth as the Bearer of Possible Worlds: Interview with Richard 
Kearney" in Mario Valdes (ed. ). 1991. A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination. P-496. 
Emphasis added. 
78 See Paul Ricoeur. 1983. Temps et Recit - Tome 1. Paris: Seuil. I am also referring to a lecture 
"Historiography and the Representation of the Past" presented by Paul Ricoeur as part of the 
2000 Years: Faith, Culture and Identity in the Common Era public lectures series on 31 May 
Woo at St Andrews University. 
79 On the uses of Critical Theory, see S. Leonard's assertion that they key component and 
application of the field lies the argument that: "All social discourse is historically and 
contextually specific, which in essence means that it originates in and is addressed ... to a 
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of analysis, several avenues for building a theoretical framework are still open to us: 
postmodernism, and poststructuralism, cannot be seen as equivalent to the 
interpretive impulse as such. They are historically and politically distinct phenomena, 
despite their common philosophical roots. Still, at heart, the postmodern school of 
thought in political science can be seen as politically reactionary to dominant 
discourses, as exemplified by Feminist critiques of such discourses. Therefore, on 
certain levels these two approaches can be seen as complementary, on others, 
divergent80. In the context of Middle Eastern studies though, the option that our 
theoretical approach will embrace is one linked to the specific questioned raised by 
critique, most notably with the Orientalism debate81. 
2.3. Epistemology, or Epistemologies, of the Middle East? 
2.3.1. The Orient In Social Science Research 
The traditional form of study of the Middle and Far East, or Orientalism, predates the 
development of social science as a discipline (and its relevant methodologies) by 
several centuries. Through trade, wars of conquest, explorers and poets, the history of 
the Orient has become intertwined with `our' history, that of a divided Europe; and 
the multiple realities of the Orient, or rather its changing realities, have become 
familiar cliches. Yet, the cliches of today's Orient, as depicted in the popular press and 
television, are not ones of dark princes and mysterious harems, but ones of poverty, 
squalor, religious intolerance, and a proclivity for terrorism. The Middle East 
(including North Africa) is arguably the theatre for widespread conflict. It also 
constitutes, with the rest of Africa, South America, South Asia and part of the far 
East, what can still be loosely termed `the Third World', and is thus facing economic 
and political developmental challenges. Finally, it is the theatre for widespread 
societal change where, since the mid-1970s, political Islam -a certain vision of 
religion and socio-political order - has developed a mounting challenge to existing 
political orders, with often disastrous political consequences, as exemplified by the 
specific set of social and political interests" See Stephen Leonard. 199o. Criticial Theory in 
Political Practice. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press. 
80 For an overview of the contexts of the postmodernism impulse in various disciplines, see 
Frederic Jameson. 1987. "The Politics of Theory: Ideological Positions in the Postmodernism 
Debate". In Rabinow and Sullivan (eds. ) Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look. For 
arguments linking hermeneutics to deconstruction, see Hugh Silverman. 1994. Textualities 
Between Hermeneutics and Deconstruction. London: Routledge. 
8' Another, potentially complementary possibility here is the work produced by the school of 
New Historicism (which is connected to post-Marxist analyses, and the work of Foucault, in 
some subtle and less subtle ways. See, as an introduction, Kiernan Ryan (ed. ). 1996. New 
Historicism and Ctultural Materialism: A Reader. London: Arnold. and H. Aram Veeser (ed. ). 
1989. The New Historicism. London: Routledge. 
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Algerian civil war. However, the Orient, has much more to offer to the social scientist 
than this impressionist rendition. In fact, it is because the societies in the Middle East 
are undergoing such changes that today's Orient is anything but a cliche. 
Indeed, the contemporary Middle East challenges the way scholarship in the Anglo- 
Saxon and Continental European traditions has theorised on this region and has 
attempted to make comprehensive analyses and predictions. The relatively recent 
development of contemporary forms of political Islam is a case in point. The logic of 
Weberian sociology has been turned on its head when the middle classes of many 
Middle Eastern states do not attempt to make authoritarian regimes more pluralistic 
or democratic to satisfy their capitalistic interests, but instead congregate with the 
urban poor to push for an Islamist political platform which Western observers cannot 
but see as `fundamentalist' and feudalistic. We equally fail to explain the advent of 
political Islam through a grand theory on post-Cold War changes. A world-wide 
resurgence of ethnic and religious-political groups since the ending of the Cold War 
has been widely observed in the media and academic publications. However, no 
`Clash of Civilisations' theory has successfully explained the reasons underpinning the 
internal changes in Middle Eastern societies political Islam signifies and announces 
(after all, Middle Eastern politics do not revolve around Western concerns alone, a 
point which seems to elude grand theorists such as Samuel Huntington82). Culturalist 
explanations also provide facile, and only partial answers. The `political cultures' of 
various Middle Eastern societies, a term originally coined by the behaviourist school 
of comparative studies in a rather different context, becomes often confused with a 
simplistic, Eurocentric view of Islam and Middle Eastern societies83. 
On the other hand, Orientalism remains quite difficult to define since it includes 
many disciplines, methodologies and spans centuries of Western scholarship. In fact, 
it represents more a set of assumptions and epistemology common to a variety of 
disciplines than a discipline in itself. As a tradition of scholarship, Orientalism 
encapsulates centuries of academic and journalistic writing on art, literature, 
architecture, poetry, history, politics, studies of religion, anthropology, and more 
recently, what we term social science. Thus, when it comes to the Orient, the 
academic tradition of Orientalism can easily be encapsulated into the ethos, methods 
82 Furthermore, the so-called resurgence of the `Green Menace' predates the ending of the 
Cold War by two decades and thus cannot be logically explained by it alone. 
83 This type of explanation can also run the risk of fuelling `Clash of Civilisations' arguments 
which derive from a culturalist slippery slope the idea of an unchanging, monolithic and 
menacing Orient. The influence of culture in general and political culture in particular, to the 
phenomenon of political Islam, is in fact much more varied, particular to specific societies, 
and embedded in contemporary socio-political realities than a purely culturalist argument 
would suggest. 
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and aims of social science. Indeed, the commonalties between the disciplines making 
up Orientalism and the social science project concerning the Middle East, besides the 
proximity of their objects of study, is to uncover an `Islamic world' as it applies to 
politics, religion, culture, etc. The guiding principle of this type of analysis is 
historicist, if not culturalist, in nature; the explanatory power of Orientalism lies in its 
focus on classical Islam and its cultural forms as the determinants of the historical 
development of the Orient, including modern Middle Eastern societies84. Essentially, 
Orientalism is based on an epistemology which is essentialist, 
empiricist and historicist. The essentialist assumption is present in 
the notion that `Islam' is a coherent, homogenous global entity, and 
also in the decline thesis where Islam is seen as declining because of 
some flaw in its essence. Social and political decline is a 
consequence of some historically ever-present element - 
authoritarianism, the lack of autonomous oppositional groups or 
laws, slavish adherence to formal custom or the failure of ruling 
institutions (... ) In this historicist approach, the dynamic history of 
Western civilisation, punctured by constant, progressive 
revolutions, is contrasted with the static history of Islam in which 
popular uprisings are merely an index of despotism and decay85. 
Thus, through Orientalism, an understanding of various events, phenomena and 
structures characterising the Middle East can be built on the cultural and religious 
elements of classical Islam. In the 19th and loth Centuries, Orientalist studies grew 
with the development of social science. Comparative studies between European and 
Middle Eastern states, their political structures, religions and customs came to 
highlight striking differences among political and social systems and open new areas 
of learning. Indeed, the classical Orientalist view of history and political science 
allowed for the development of the first chairs in Islamic studies in the West, now 
followed by the growth in the study of the Arabic language, Quranic studies, and 
classical Islamic history. This is an obviously positive occurrence with the net growth 
of a field out of practically nothing: language, history, art, politics, culture, religion, 
architecture. Yet, despite these analytical advances, the underlying assumptions of 
Orientalist thinking remained largely unchanged. The birth of anthropology in 
particular and the development of modern social science methodologies only worked 
to reinforce the assumption that Orientalist writing carried an implicit, 
Enlightenment-bound form of objectivity. Similarly, the Orientalist assumption that 
the Orient was largely a "unified system, one characterised by stationariness, lack of 
social change, the absence of a middle class bourgeois culture, and the absence of a 
84Bryan S. Turner. 1978. Marx and the End of Orientalism. London: Allen and Unwin. p. 6. 
85Bryan S. Turner. 1978. Marx and the End of Orientalism. P. 7. 
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civil society" was shared by both Karl Marx and Max Weber86, whose ideas where 
extremely influential on the birth and development of social science as a discipline. 
This methodological status quo became increasingly challenged in the mid to late 
1970s with, in particular, Marshall G. S. Hodgson's The Venture of Islam, the first 
attempt, in the English-speaking world at least, to integrate an in-depth, generalist 
account of the history, and culture, of the Islamic World with the view that: 
One of the most serious levels of historical scholarship - where the 
human relevance of major cultural traditions is at issue, such as that 
of religious or artistic or legal or governmental traditions, or even 
that of whole civilization - historical judgement cannot be entirely 
disengaged form the basic commitments of enquirers. Indeed, it is 
not necessarily desirable that it should be: the very issues can arise 
only as we are humanly deeply engaged87. 
But most forceful, and well-known, in this vein is Edward W. Said's Orientalism, and 
neo-Marxist critiques of Orientalist writing, which questioned the very foundations of 
the study of the region among Western scholars, and the motivations underpinning 
their contribution to the field. Western objectivity, the unified, coherent nature of the 
Muslim World, and the conclusions reached by various scholars regarding that world 
all came under scrutiny, with an implicit challenge to what can be termed as the 
`dominant' discourses on the Middle East. It is in these rather critical terms that 
Orientalism can be best defined and understood - and that the whole question of self- 
reflection in the field can be most succinctly and efficiently approached. 
2.3.2 Orientalism and Beyond 
Orientalism, Edward Said's landmark critique of the methods and assumptions 
employed by the scholarship dealing with the Orient, fundamentally changed the 
direction and outlook on the Middle East in International Relations scholarship. 
Primarily, the argument developed by Said emphasised the importance of 
assumptions scholars make in their academic discussions of the Orient, and how 
these assumptions become ingrained in the academic and political discourses on the 
Orient. Consequently, Said's approach both highlights the critical importance of 
analytical assumptions to the direction of analysis, and sets out the pitfalls of social 
science research on the Middle East. In this sense, the questions Said raises in 
86Bryan S. Turner. 1994. Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism. London: Routledge. 
P"5. 
87Marshall G. S. Hodgson. 1974. The Venture of Islam. Conscience and History in a World 
Civilization Chicago: Chicago University Press. P. 27. 
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Orientalism underpin the analytical assumptions of this study and thus deserve close 
attention. 
The main goal of Said's study was to question the self-proclaimed objectivity of 
Western knowledge about the Orient. To him, Orientalism was more than a field of 
study, it was: 
... the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient - dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views on it, describing 
it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism (is) 
a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority 
over the Orient". 
Through a textual analysis of both founding and relatively recent Western 
scholarship, Said identified the distortions the uneven power relationship between 
the West and the Orient had imposed on Orientalist writing. His dismissal of the 
objective validity of Western scholarship was, in a sense, grounded in the belief that 
the "closeness between politics and Orientalism, or to put it more circumspectively, 
the great likelihood that ideas about the Orient drawn from Orientalism can be put 
into political use, is an important but extremely sensitive truth"89. Yet, more 
importantly, this view reflected Said's assertion that while Orientalism said little 
about the Orient itself, it provided an accurate insight into the nature and forms of 
Western domination over the Orient9o 
In essence, Said's critique questioned the foundations of Western knowledge of the 
Middle East, leading to a fierce debate over both the objectivity of Western 
scholarship in this field and the authenticity of knowledge in general in terms of 
representation91. This also mirrored feminist, postmodernist and poststructuralist 
rejections of dominant discourses and histories92. However, the groundbreaking 
nature of Said's work should also be put into its proper theoretical context. In one 
way, it is indebted to Foucault's connection between power and the building of 
knowledge (and thus discourses)". Indeed, Said's preoccupation with the 
demystification of Orientalist historiography finds strong resonance in the framework 
88Edward W. Said. 1995 (1978). Orientalism. Harmondsworth: Penguin. P-3. 
89Edward W. Said. 1995 (1978). Orientalism. p. 96. 
9°Edward W. Said. 1995 (1978). Orientalism. p. 6. 
91 The issue of representation in Said's work mirrors his concerns in literary criticism. See Jan 
Gorak. 1991. The Making of the Modern Canon. London: Athlone. pp. 202ff. 
92Bryan S. Turner. 1994. Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism, p. 3. 
93 See Imre Salunsinszky. 1987. "Edward Said" in his Criticism and Society. New York: 
Methuen. p. 124- On p. 125, he also points to the influence of Deleuze, Vico, Chomsky, Lucaks 
and Fanon on Said's work in literary criticism (an issues which is equally relevant to his work 
on Orientalism and the representation of Islam). 
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of analysis set up by Foucault's work on societal mechanisms of `Othering' and his 
views on the role of the intellectual in de-centering the discourses which underpin 
such societal processes: 
The essential political problem for the intellectual is not to criticise 
the ideological contents supposedly linked to science, or to ensure 
that his own scientific practice is accompanied by a correct ideology, 
but that of ascertaining the possibility of constituting a new politics 
of truth ... it is not a matter of emancipating truth from every system 
of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but 
of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, 
economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time. 
The political question, to sum up, is not error, illusion, alienated 
consciousness or ideology; it is truth itself. Hence the importance of 
Nietzsche? '. 
Said's approach has echoes of such a view, even though it can hardly be seen as 
radical in its implications95, or be termed `Nietzschean': 
The central point in all this, however, as Vico taught us, that human history is 
made by human beings. Since the struggle for control over territory is part of 
that history, so too is the struggle over social and historical meaning. (... ) What 
makes all these fluid and extraordinarily rich actualities difficult to accept is 
that most people resist the underlying notion: that human identity is not only 
not natural and stable, but constructed and occasionally even invented 
outright. 96 
This theme of historical construction - and struggle over the control of historical 
validity is a central - but sometimes too implicit - theme of Said's work; beyond 
cultural imperialism, there is a series of processes in the construction of human 
knowledge which needs examining in more depth. In fact, Said acknowledged later on 
the interpretive epistemology underpinning his project, especially in the context of 
the critical components of his methodology with regards to textual analysis: 
94Michel Foucault. i98o. "Truth and Power - Interview conducted by Alessandro Fontana and 
Pascale Pasquino" in Michel Foucault. i98o. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings, 1972-1977. New York: Pantheon Books. p. 133. 
95Indeed, Said's work has concentrated on a narrower focus, that of uncovering the many 
layers of imperialism by the West - be it academic (in Orientalism), journalistic (Covering 
Islam) or culture in general (Culture and Imperialism). As a result, the implications of Said's 
work on broader issues of discourse formation remain largely implicit. See Edward W. 
Said-1993. Culture and Imperialism. London Vintage. and Edward W. Said. 1997. Covering 
Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How we see the Rest of the World. 
London: Vintage. 
96Edward W. Said. 1995 (1978). "Afterword to the 1995 Printing", in Orientalism. pp. 331-332. 
Italics added. 
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... as with aspects of what Vico calls the world of nations, the Orient 
and the Occident are facts produced by human beings, and as such 
must be studied as integral components of the social, and not the 
divine or natural, world... Far from being a crudely political 
apprehension of what has been called the problem of Orientalism, 
this is in reality a fact basic to any theory of interpretation or 
hermeneutics97. 
Similarly, the role of the popular media in constructing a certain politics of truth is 
apparent. In this sense Said's work shares the preoccupations of American political 
thinker Noam Chomsky, particularly in his work on the Vietnam War and American 
Foreign Policy towards Central and South America98. Chomsky's scepticism towards 
the self-proclaimed political truths of those in power - and his overt criticism of the 
ways in which political and security priorities of the US Government warrant the 
manipulation of the truth - add a more conceptual dimension to Said's own 
arguments". On a wider, and more theoretical note, Said's analysis should be seen as 
an important piece in the development of scepticism with Orientalist discourse. But it 
is by no means the only analysis produced at that time, and in fact draws heavily on 
previous analyses of the colonial condition in particular'oo. Said's originality lies in its 
breadth of research and use of textual analysis derived from literary criticism. From a 
different, but complementary perspective, Bryan Turner's Marx and the End of 
Orientalism, published in the same year as Said's Orientalism, effected a similar type 
of critique, but in a narrower, and arguably more thorough, manner" The target of 
Turner's analysis is the Marxist-historicist paradigm and the dichotomies on the 
Orient traditionally produced by it. One by one, Turner disentangles the 
contradictions of this discourse, and manages to produce an eloquent de-centering of 
97 Edward W. Said. 1984. "Orientalism Reconsidered" in Francis Barker et al (eds. ) Europe 
and Its Others. University of Essex Papers. p. 15. 
98Covering Islam in particular echoes of the themes raised in Noam Chomsky's 
Manufacturing Consent. seeloo for full ref. 
99Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky. 1994 (1988). Manufacturing Consent: The 
Political Economy of the Mass Media. London: Vintage. Noam Chomsky. 1969. American 
Power and the New Mandarins. Harmonsdworth: Penguin. Noam Chomsky. 1991. Deterring 
Democracy. London: Vintage. 
º°° Said aknowledges this when he states: "... what I said in Orientalism has been said before 
me by A. L. Tibawi, by Abdullah Laraoui, by Anwar Abdel Malek, by Talal Asad, by S. H. Alatas, 
by Fanon and Cesaire, by Pannikar, and Romila Thapar, all of whom had suffered the ravages 
of imperialism and colonialism, and who in challenging the authority, provenance, and 
institutions of the science that represented them to Europe, were also understanding 
themselves as more than what this science said they were" . In Edward W. Said. 1984. "Orientalism Reconsidered" . p. 17. 
101 For a similar type of analysis, but applied to the work of Max Weber, see Bryan Turner. 
1981. "Weber's Orientalism" in his For Weber: Essays on the Sociology of Fate. Routledge 
and Keegan Paul. pp. 257ff. 
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dichotomies. Still, the most important aspect of Turner's contribution to Said's 
perspective is to go further than the deconstruction of discourse. For him: 
The criticism of Orientalism in its various forms requires something 
more than the valid but indecisive notion that at its worse 
Orientalist scholarship was a rather thin disguise for attitudes of 
moral or racial superiority and thereby a justification for 
colonialism... The end of Orientalism requires a fundamental attack 
on the theoretical and epistemological roots of Orientalist 
scholarship which creates the long tradition of Oriental Despotism, 
mosaic societies and the `Muslim City9102 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that beyond the study of the Orient, Said's arguments 
work as rejoinders to developments in social theory (itself indebted to Continental 
Philosophy, unsurprisingly) on identity and the Self-Other relationship. For instance, 
Iver Neumann's Uses of the Other extrapolates, from a similar set of philosophical 
influences, a type of argument referring to representation of the `East' in European 
discourses of politics'03 His conclusion can work equally well for our purposes here, 
when, in reference to the work of William Connolly and Zygmunt Bauman, he states: 
The `East' is indeed Europe's other, and it is continuously recycled 
in order to represent European identities. Since the `Eastern 
absence' is a defining trait of `European' identities, there is no use 
talking about the end of the east/West divide in European history 
after the end of the Cold Warloa 
Thus the importance of representation, cultural boundaries, and the negotiation of 
the self/other relationship highlighted by Said work equally well in more theoretical 
discussions, in the case of Turner, and in different contexts, in the case of Neumann. 
2.3_3 Limitations and Legacies 
With this strong, if not explicit, connection to poststructuralist critiques of 
objectivity, and despite its powerful argument, Said's approach has been often 
criticised, on three main grounds. Firstly, his critical approach of the power- 
knowledge nexus left little room for concrete political solutions or alternatives to 
dominant discourses. Indeed, if Said - and Foucault - are right, then there is little 
chance of overcoming the tendency for scholarship to reflect power relations, to be 
102 Bryan S. Turner. 1978. Marx and the End of Orientalism. p. 85. For Turner, in conclusion, 
the analytical tools of the Marxist paradigm have the potential for building such a critique. 
103 Iver B. Neumann. 1999. Uses of the Other: The East' in European Identity Formation. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
104 Iver B. Neumann. 1999. Uses of the Other. P. 207 and if. 
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genuinely objective, or even to take into account scholarship from the Orient. Indeed, 
for Foucault, this is probably unavoidable. This problem is a serious one, which many 
studies, including this one, attempt to accommodate if not overcome through opening 
up assumptions to scrutiny, using hermeneutic methodologies, and using more 
sources originating from the Middle East. It is thus through `Cross-Cultural 
Encounter' that post-Orientalist scholarship starts its own academic journey - but 
despite all good intentions, these are very high, if not impossible, standards of 
scholarship to fully meet. 
Secondly, Said's quasi-conspiratorial theory was described, at best, as useful but 
"excessive"'os, and, at worst, as completely false, paranoid and incomprehensible"' 
This form of criticism, which, once again, is levelled against 
postmodernist/poststructuralist and postcolonial scholarship, can often be very 
personal, since Said's work itself is very critical of those who are subsequently 
reviewing his work. Beyond this battle of egos lies an important issue however. To 
what extent is the wilful exploitation and domination of the Orient taking place by 
Western scholars? Are scholars willing participants in this process? Or are they 
merely guilty of `bad scholarship' (by using too narrow a range of sources, and not 
practising enough common sense in assessing these sources and thus reproducing 
their biases)? This question extends beyond considerations of degrees of `guilt' in this 
regard, they guide us in discerning where to look for prejudice in scholarship: 
assumptions, terminology, categories, methodologies, etc. 
Thirdly, the framework that Orientalism provided to a new generation of scholarship 
was in a sense ambiguous because it left open the possibility of 'relativism"" in 
scholarship and risked privileging `indigenous' as opposed to `alien' discourse, in 
terms of `authenticity'. In fact, Said's work has often been misread in this way. 
Nevertheless, this distorted view carries the implicit assumption that Oriental, as 
opposed to Orientalist - scholarship is necessarily more accurate and more objective, 
thus opening the door to a form of reverse Orientalism108. Beyond Said's own 
rejection of this over-simplification and distortion of his work however, this view can 
be challenged as illogical and perversely anti-academic. While Said has a point in 
1°5John Esposito. 1992 The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? Oxford: Oxford University Press 
p. 234. 
l06Bernard Lewis. 1993" Islam and the West. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 8. To be 
sure, Lewis' rather harsh assessment of Said's arguments is to be interpreted as a somewhat 
emotional response to Said's own vilification of Lewis' scholarship. 
lo7 This, in turn, implied that the bias identified by Said could be used by regimes in the Middle 
East to legitimise authoritarian rule and to reject Western criticism in these terms. 
1o8Bryan S. Turner. 1994. Orientalism, Postmodernism, and Globalism, P-7 and Bernard 
Lewis. 1993. Islam and the West, pp. 121-122. 
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questioning the self-proclaimed objectivity of Western scholarship, it does not imply 
that non-Westerners will be objective or accurate, or not interested in using 
knowledge to further power interests. Said's point is one of the inclusion of context in 
scholarship: context of the subject (the author) and thus their prejudices, and context 
of the object of study. In that sense, Said's argument if pushed to its logical extreme 
implies that there is no privileged, objective place to construct analysis from. If 
anything, Said should stand accused of risking relativism, not reverse Orientalism. 
But should this fresh accusation stand? Or is this a form of inter-subjectivity the kind 
of common sense approach advocated by Marshall Hodgson? By acknowledging the 
interpretive nature of scholarship on the Orient (even to criticise it), Said achieves 
more than deconstruction, he opens the door to `encounters' with the Oriental Other 
which can be based on this inherent inter-subjectivity"' 
The above criticisms, and the ways in which they have been addressed by post- 
Orientalist scholarship, form a valuable debate, which has led and still leads to 
though-provoking outcomes. However, these (sometimes valid) points should not 
detract from the complex legacy of Said's high profile set of critiques"'. One could 
argue that beyond the deconstruction of classical works on the Orient, there is little 
relevance to current scholarship on the Middle East by Said's work. Here, two points 
related to our aims are worth pointing out. Firstly, and beyond the critique of 
Orientalist scholarship, Said provides us the tools for deconstructing any 
historiographical production, including that of nascent postcolonial states and that of 
dominant forms of political imagination (and their challengers). Secondly, it is 
perhaps unwise to assume that with the publication of Said's Orientalism, the field of 
Middle Eastern studies would be instantly `purged' of its central vices. In fact, parallel 
to the development of post-Orientalist analyses (by Middle Eastern and Western 
scholars), the field has remained strangely resilient in its espousal of themes such as 
Oriental despotism. Such themes have become more sophisticated in their 
presentation of Middle Eastern societies, looking for instance at problems of civil 
society and democratisation (issues that concern us here), but as Yahya Sadowski 
points out: 
The thesis that Middle Eastern societies are resistant to 
democratization had been a standard tenet of Orientalist thought 
for decades, but in the ig8os a new generation of Orientalists 
inverted some of the old assumptions and employed a new 
109 The idea of Cross Cultural Encounter is developed on later. 
11o For a good analysis and a balanced overall assessment of the importance of Said's work, see 
Bart Moore Gilbert. 1997. Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics. London: Verso. 
Chapter 2. 
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vocabulary which allowed them to link their work to a wider, 
international debate about the relationship between `civil society' 
and democratization. These updated argument sought to prove not 
only - as neo-Orientalist Daniel Pipes put it - that `Muslim countries 
have the most terrorists and the fewer democracies in the world', 
but that they always would"' 
In turn, this kind of critique could be said to be applicable to the discourse produced 
on contemporary political Islam, especially in the context of `Clash of Civilisations' 
arguments, an issue taken up in more detail in chapter three, where dominant 
constructs of political Islam are put into question. I only need to allude to the 
description of Islamist forms of contest as backward, narrow-minded and by 
definition antidemocratic. These are difficult questions to address sensitively, but 
looking at the Islamist alternative as one lacking in depth and relevance, and lacking 
the attributes which could qualify it as a legitimate political player only reproduces 
the Orientalist frameworks for understanding the shape of politics in the Middle East. 
All in all, the most important legacy of Edward Said's work for contemporary Middle 
Eastern studies remains in the area of discursive critique. His marrying of an 
epistemological stance that is both interpretive and critical in character with the 
practical deconstruction of dominant discourses on the Orient opened the door to the 
creation of a whole field of critique concerned with the connection between colonising 
power and forms of knowledge bound to the colonial endeavour. Inspiring the growth 
of postcolonial perspectives in this precise sense, with the help of Gayatri Spivak, 
Said's ambitious critique allowed for a theoretical and practical discussion of the 
colonial and postcolonial condition from the perspective of the `native'. By way of 
deconstruction, he achieved the possibility for the construction of alternatives. 
2.4. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
2.4.1. Postcolonial Studies 
By now, it should be obvious that an interpretive epistemology permeates much work 
produced to 'de-center' or deconstruct dominant discourses on the Middle East. Also, 
the overlap between different types of analyses from a postmodern, poststructuralist, 
111 Yahya Sadowski. 1997. "The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate" in Joel Beinin 
and Joe Stork (eds. ) Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report. London: I. B. Tauris. 
P"34. He quotes Daniel Pipes in his 1990 article "The Muslims are Coming! The Muslims are 
Coming! " National Review 42 (November 19), p. 29. The work of Daniel Pipes is very relevant 
in this regard, see for instance Daniel Pipes. 1983. In the Path of God: Islam and Political 
Power. New York: Basic Books. 
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and Marxist critiques is apparent in the field of social theory and beyond. Still, for our 
purposes, postcolonial studies, itself an application of the epistemological stance and 
critique of Orientalism outlined above, is the most relevant theoretical standpoint 
with applicability to our case study"'. 
This dissertation is mainly concerned with the place of the political imagination of 
Islamist politics vis-a-vis dominant discourses on the political in a case study where 
the colonial dimension, and its consequences in terms of nation-building and 
representation are of note. Algeria is indeed part of the Middle East, but our 
theoretical understanding of the issues affecting governmentality in formerly French 
North Africa cannot be detached from the colonial encounter that postcolonial 
studies tackles. In fact, the use of postcolonial studies and other 'alternative' critical 
methodologies to the context of the analysis of North Africa (and especially history) is 
of particular relevance here. For instance, Burke argues that the marginality of the 
Maghrib in academia, where it is often not considered to be `properly' Middle 
Eastern, make it particularly well suited to such critical methodologies: 
For the first time, it is possible to imagine North Africa not in terms 
of what it is not (African, Arab, French), but rather as a site from 
which to interrogate the dichotomous forms of identity and 
historical understanding which derive from the history of 
modernity. Today, in a different historical moment, that of the 
'posts' (colonial, modern, Cold War, Gulf War, structuralist) the 
'lacks' appear in a different guise: as marks of hybridity, alterity and 
liminality, sites of resistance and contest' 13 
Theoretically, this relevance to the Algerian case study manifests itself at the level of 
its focus on representation, in terms of history and in terms of identity in particular. 
Its aim is to theorise historicity, to de-centre it, and to assess the dialectical 
relationship between political power (in colonial and postcolonial situations) and the 
construction of identity (for the self and for communities) through history. It is thus 
my hope that postcolonial studies helps us produce a set of analytical concepts which 
would match the post-Orientalist standpoint set out in the previous section. 
112 There is more overlap between postcolonial studies and postmodernism than many 
scholars on each side of the divide would like to acknowledge. Barker et al argue that the links 
with poststructuralism are closer. For differences, and forms of hostility (briefly), see Francis 
Barker et al (eds. ). 1994. Colonial Discourse/Postcolonial Theory. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. pp. 3ff. 
113 Edmund Burke 111.1998. "Theorizing the Histories of Colonialism and Nationalism in the 
Arab Maghrib" Arab Studies Quarterly. 20(2). pp. 6. 
68 
Postcolonial studies is a recent phenomenon inspired, in different ways, by the work 
of Said, that of Gayatri Spivak, but also Homi Bhabha and the subaltern studies group 
on Indian historiography headed by Ranajit Guha' la It remains a vast and disputed 
field"' touching upon literary criticism, social studies, geography, history, philosophy 
and political science. At the most general level, three main aims of postcolonial 
studies are most often quoted in the literature: 
1. To deconstruct and rewrite colonial history in ways that empower the colonised 
population in terms of their history (by dismantling civilising myths, and giving 
native informants a voice principally). This implies a view of historical endeavour as 
being one emphasising multiplicity of accounts' 16; 
2. To provide a critical analysis of the postcolonial condition given the colonial legacy 
in various terms, and therefore, in Guha's terms, an exposition of the failure of 
postcolonial nations to 'come to their own' by overcoming the legacy of colonialism. "; 
3. To 'de-center' scholarship on the postcolonial world, to give marginalised scholars 
as well as subaltern subjects a voice"' 
These aims are not necessarily contradictory, but they imply slightly different visions 
for what postcolonial studies can achieve: are our aims simply to redress academic 
partiality and to explore perspectives on the modern world from a different 
perspective? Or should we aim to make postcolonial studies a tool for cultural and 
political emancipation? Ideally, one imagines that these aims should go hand in hand. 
114 Bart Moore-Gilbert, Gareth Stanton and Willy Maley. 1997. "Introduction" in their (eds. ) 
Postcolonial Criticism. London: Longman. 
115 On this variety, see Stephen Slemon. 1994" "The Scramble for Postcolonialism" in Chris 
Tiffin and Alan Lawson (eds. ) De-scribing Empire: Postcolonialism and Textuality. London: 
Routledge. Some authors have disputed the usefulness of this field on the ground that it 
presents too vague a set of research aims, or that it is too plagued by internal dissent to 
actually get on with the business of analysis. See, for instance, Russell Jacoby. 1995. "Marginal 
Returns: The Trouble with Postcolonial Theory" Lingua Franca Sept/Oct. pp. 3off. 
116 For an example of this, see Nicholas B. Dirks. 1993. "Colonial Histories and native 
Informants: Biography of an Archive" in Carol Beckenridge and peter van der Veer (eds. ) 
Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia. Philadelphia: 
University of Philadelphia Press. 
117 Ranajit Guha. 1988. "On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India" in Ranajit 
Guha and Gayatri Spivak (eds. ) Selected Subaltern Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
P-43. 
118 There are inherent problems associated with the subaltern production of alternative 
histories: looking in particular at institutional and conceptual barriers to the de-centering of 
discourses on the state. See Dipesh Chakrabarty. 1992. "Postcoloniality and the Artifice of 
History: Who Speaks for `Indian' Pasts? " Representations 32 (Winter). 
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But why should the colonial dimensions matter so much, now that most colonial 
`possessions' have been reclaimed by the native subject? Or, as Bill Ashcroft et al. 
would put it: "Why should postcolonial societies continue to engage with the imperial 
experience? Since all the post-colonial societies we discuss have achieved their 
independence, why is the issue of coloniality relevant at all? ""'. Two aspects are 
worth bearing in mind here as a response. Firstly, colonialism may be over but 
alternative forms of domination subsist. Secondly and most importantly for our 
purposes, the condition of postcoloniality may imply the reproduction of colonial 
practice in terms of surveillance, governance and representation by the postcolonial 
state. 
Here, a definition of the postcolonial condition could well be that: "... postcoloniality 
can be best thought of as a form of contestatory/oppositional consciousness, 
emerging from either pre-existing imperial, colonial, or ongoing subaltern 
positions"12o The issue of subalternity thus goes to the heart of the postcolonial 
studies project12' and is worth pausing on. Ranajit Guha defines subaltern as "a 
name for the general attribute of subordination" along various lines including race, 
class and gender 122. As a field, subaltern studies focuses on historiography as a 
privileged site to identify patterns of control over the production of historical 
knowledge by elites'23. Postcolonial studies takes this critique on board and applies its 
insight to the production of colonial as well as postcolonial knowledge (and the 
connections between the two) in a more systematic way. In that sense, postcolonial 
studies marries a subaltern critique of historiographical production with the spirit of 
Edward Said's wider critique of Orientalism124. That being said, there are tensions 
inherent to the ways in which the subaltern consciousness is to be recovered, if it is to 
119 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin. 1989. The Empire Writes Back: Theory 
and Practice in Postcolonial Literatures. London: Routledge. p. 6. 
12o In that sense, postcoloniality theorises upon global inequalities (in their various forms) in a 
way that goes beyond the strict remit of the colonial experience, however `formative'. See J. 
Jorge Klor de Alva. 1995. "The Postcolonization of the (Latin) American Experience: A 
Reconsideration of `Colonialism', `Postcolonialism', and `Mestizaje"' in Gyan Prakash (ed. ) 
After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements. Princeton (NJ): 
Princeton University Press. p. 245- 
12, This term is originally derived from Gramsci who uses it to "refer to those groups in society 
who are subject to the hegemony of the ruling classes". See Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and 
Helen Tiffin. 1998. Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies. London: Routledge. P. 215. 
122 See his preface to Selected Subaltern Studies for more detail. Ranajit Guha and Gayatri 
Spivak (eds. ) Selected Subaltern Studies. 
123 See Ranajit Guha. 1983. Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India. 
Oxford and Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
124 Neither field is a subset of the other strictly speaking; there is a large degree of overlap 
theoretically but foci can vary - subaltern studies can deal with non-postcolonial situations 
while postcolonial studies can approach other issues than subalternity. 
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bypass essentialist reconstruction, a point raised by Gayatri Spivak`ZS. She describes 
the problem of subaltern consciousness in terms of method: 
To investigate, discover and establish a subaltern, or peasant 
consciousness seems at first to be a positivistic project -a project 
which assumes that, if properly prosecuted, it will lead to firm 
ground, to some thing that can be disclosed... Yet even as 
`consciousness' is this entertained as an indivisible self-approximate 
signified or ground, there is a force at work here which would 
contradict such a metaphysics. For consciousness here is not 
consciousness-in-general, but a historicized political species 
thereof, subaltern consciousness ... there is always a 
counterpointing suggestion in the work of the [subaltern studies] 
group that subaltern consciousness is subject to the cathexis of the 
elite, that it is never fully recoverable, that it is always askew from 
its received signifiers, indeed that it is effaced even as it is disclosed, 
that it is irreducibly discursive126 
From this, we can deduce that the questions of interpretation, recovery and 
representation underpin the central dilemma in the treatment of the concept of the 
`colonial': 
... "at the heart of this concern with theory is the problem of 
representation: how is it possible to write about another culture, about the Other in a 
colonial situation, and to present such a representation of three dimensional, flesh- 
and-blood people in the pages of a two dimensional text? ""' This is inherently an 
interpretive task, and one which has the ambition to unearth gaps in the production 
of history, based on, as John Hawley would put it, an "unacknowledged hermeneutics 
of suspicion""' 
As a result the postcolonial position puts us in a situation where we have to confront 
"the deep, the profoundly perturbed and perturbing question of our relationship to 
others - other cultures, other states, other histories, other experiences, traditions, 
peoples, and destiniesi12'. This problematic relationship - this encounter with the 
Other - is crystallised through by violent cultural assault that long-term colonialism 
implies, and more subtle patterns of intercultural penetration and hybridity inherent 
to colonial rule. Deconstructing such complex mechanism is part of the analytical 
125 Gayatri Spivak. 1988. "Can the Subaltern Speak? ". in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds. ) 
Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Basinkstoke: Macmillan. 
126 Gayatri Spivak. 1988. "Introduction" in Spivak and Ranajit Guha (eds. ) Selected Subaltern 
Studies. pp. io-ii. 
127 David Prochaska. 199o. Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bone 1870-1920. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 28. 
128 John C. Hawley. 1996. "Introduction" in his (ed. ) Writing the Nation: Self and Country in 
Postcolonial Imagination. Atlanta: Odopi. p. xocii. 
129 Edward Said. 1989. "Representing the Colonised: Anthropology's Interlocutors" Critical 
Inquiry 15(2). p. 216. 
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aims of the field. For Abdul JanMohammed, the key cultural issue in colonisation is 
linked to this notion of `Othering': 
If every desire is at base a desire to impose oneself on another and 
to be recognised by the Other, then the colonial situation provides 
an ideal context for the fulfilment of that fundamental drive. The 
colonialist's military superiority ensures a complete projection of 
this self on the Other"130 
Here, the contribution of postmodern theory to this framework should not be 
altogether excluded insofar as it treats the idea of `Otherness' in a similar way to 
postcolonial studies. An example of such an overlap could be, for instance, Zygmunt 
Bauman's association of the idea of the 'stranger' with the actors excluded by 
modernity, and those elements which are deligitimated and silenced through 
modernity's strive for Sameness"' Close to the surface in this type of analysis is a 
consideration of power - and the ways in which representation underpins dominant 
discourses in political and cultural terms: 
Subaltern studies is about power, who has it and who doesn't, who 
is gaining it and who is losing it. Power is related to representation: 
which representations have cognitive authority or can secure 
hegemony, which do not have authority or are not hegemonic. 
Gayatri Spivak formulated the problem concisely: If the subaltern 
could speak - that is, speak in a way that really mattered to us - then 
it wouldn't be subaltern 132 
Foucauldian thought is of critical importance in the same way that it underscores the 
deconstructive elements of Said's own analysis of Orientalist discourse, especially his 
theorising of power relationships and representations. Postcolonial studies is 
therefore is linked to the development of poststructuralist formulations of discourse 
analysis and can be seen to be grounded in the Foucauldian "project of the 
genealogical analysis of modernity"133. But, as Spivak points out in this regard, this 
legacy is mixed: 
130 Abdul JanMohammed. 1995. `The Economy of Manichean Allegory' in Bill Ashcroft et al 
(eds. ) The Postcolonial Studies Reader. London: Routledge. P. 20. 
131 Generally, see Zygmunt Bauman. 1993. Postmodern Ethics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. On the 
concept of the stranger, see Zygmunt Bauman. 1997. "The making and Unmaking of 
Strangers". in P. Werbner and T. Modood (eds. ) Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multicultural 
Identities and the Politics ofAnti-Racism. London: Zed Books. 
132 John Beverley. 1999. Subalternity and Representation: Arguments in Cultural Theory. 
Durham: Duke University Press. p. i. 
133 Francis Barker et al (eds. ). 1994. Colonial Discourse/Postcolonial Theory. p. 2. 
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Although Foucault is a brilliant thinker of power-in-spacing, the 
awareness of the topographic reinscription of imperialism does not 
inform his presuppositions. He is taken in by the restricted version 
of the West produced by that reinscription and thus helps to 
consolidate its effects... The clinic, the asylum, the prison, the 
university, seem screen allegories that foreclose a reading of the 
broader narratives of imperialism13a 
Another way in which postcolonial studies overlap with and complements the 
deconstructive endeavour of poststructuralists is linked to the work of Jacques 
Derrida. There is an inherent, if diffuse, relationship between the aims of Derrida's 
critique of Western metaphysics and the postcolonial theory of Spivak (she translated 
Of Grammatology). Here it is the issue of deconstruction of dominant forms of 
representation that is most relevant. For Derrida: "To 'deconstruct' philosophy is thus 
to work through the structured genealogy of its concepts in the most scrupulous and 
immanent fashion, but at the same time to determine, from a certain external 
perspective that it cannot name or describe, what this history may have concealed or 
excluded, constituting itself as a history through this repression in which it has a 
stake""'. So we are looking at a double focus: widening the scope to include 
marginalised voices while accounting for the power strategies and their links to 
discourse production inherent to the colonial encounter: 
By this I mean a project of understanding that delves into the 
history of colonialism not only to document its record of 
domination but also to track the failures, silences, displacements, 
and transformations produced by its functioning; not only to 
chronicle the functioning of Western dominance and resistance to 
it, but to mark those (subaltern) positions and knowledges that 
could not be properly recognized and named, only `normalized', by 
colonial discourses 13 
In practice, such a standpoint is best illustrated by Homi Bhabha's analysis of the 
discursive strategies of colonial rule. Colonial discourse, he argues, is: 
... an apparatus that turns on the recognition and disavowal of 
racial/cultural/ historical differences. Its predominant strategic 
function is the creation of a space for a `subject peoples' through the 
production of knowledges in terms of which surveillance is 
exercised and a complex form of pleasure/unpleasure is incited. It 
seeks authorization for its strategies by the production of 
134 Gaytri Spivak. 1988. "Can the Subaltern Speak? " pp. 271-313. 
135 Jacques Derrida. 1981. Positions (trans. Alan Bass). Chicago: Chicago University Press. p. 6. 
136 Gyan Prakash. 1995. "Introduction: After Colonialism" in his (ed. ) After Colonialism: 
Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements. p. 6. 
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knowledges by colonizer and colonized which are stereotypical but 
antithetically evaluated. The objective of colonial discourse is to 
construe the colonized as a population of degenerate types on the 
basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish 
systems of administration and instruction 137. 
Such a type of deconstruction of discourse in the analysis of historiography, in turn, 
points to two trends: discourses produced as a result of the subjectification of the 
colonized populations, and strategies of resistance to that subjectification developed 
over time13s 
2.4.2. Critiques and Legacy 
Our overview of postcolonial studies above is broad, and perhaps does not account 
strongly enough for the deep disagreements which confront scholars interested in 
theory and praxis in this field. Here, I only want to highlight some of the principal 
qualms with the analytical principles outlined above so as to clarify my own position 
with regards to the field and its applicability to the case study analysed here. 
The first, and most common criticism of postcolonial studies is based on a question of 
terminology, and focuses most strongly on the implications of terminological choices. 
Shohat suggests that the term `postcolonial' is problematic insofar as it assumes that 
colonialism has been overcome through the use of the prefix 'post_, 139 At face value, 
this is a critique that is easy to overcome: most scholars in the field have convincingly 
argued that it is because the transition to postcoloniality is problematic that 
postcolonial studies is a relevant tool of analysis. Thus, the prefix 'post-' signifies the 
ambiguity inherent to the postcolonial condition. 'Post-' encompasses a chronological 
sequence of events, and marks a significant, defining, historical moment for the 
societies concerned. What it does not do is suggest that such a transition is automatic, 
or unproblematic. That being said, the underlying tension highlighted by such a 
critique is not so easily dealt with, an issue best put forward by Anne McClintock. For 
her, the focus on the postcolonial is problematic because as a marker of difference, it 
does not overcome the primacy of the European standard. In that sense: "If the 
theory promises a decentering of history in hybridity, syncretism, multidimensional 
137 Homi k. Bhabha. 1986. "The other Question: Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse 
of Colonialism" in Francis Barker et al (eds. ). Literature, Politics and Theory. London: 
Methuen. p. 154. 
138 Ian Adam and Helen Tiffin. 1991. Past the last Post: Theorising PostcoIonialism and 
Postmodernism. London. p. vii. On the issue of resistance, see also Benita Party. 1994. 
"Resistance Theory/ Theorising Resistance or two Cheers for Nativism" in Francis Barker et al 
(eds. ) Colonial Discourse/Postcolonial Theory. pp. 172ff. 
139 E. Shohat. 1992. "Notes of the 'Post-Colonial" Social Text 31-32. p. 104. 
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time and so forth, the singularity of the term effects a recentering of a global history 
around the single rubric of European time"'ao 
This is indeed an insightful critique in terms of the dangers of postcolonial theory's 
emancipatory aims. Still, from an analytical perspective, there is a case to be made for 
postcolonial theory not being the end-result of postcolonial emancipation, but a 
starting point in theorising subalternity in general and the postcolonial condition in 
its multiple forms in particular (including the importance of power in regimenting 
the production of historical discourse)"'. The emancipatory power of such an 
endeavour is less obvious from the outset, but the main contribution of postcolonial 
theory may still remain to theorise the possibilities and limitations of the postmodern 
condition in terms of this power dialectic. Wanting to escape terms which are bound 
to 'the rubric of European time' or established dichotomies is a valuable endeavour, 
but there is also a critical place for the analysis of the power underpinnings of the 
construction of colonial/postcolonial history. 
On a related note, Annie Coombes highlights the danger of the celebration of 
hybridity through the use of curatorial strategies such as postcolonial studies. For 
her, it risks putting all forms of diversity and hybridity on a homogeneous level, 
without properly theorising the power relationships which underpin the production 
of such discourses: 
Nevertheless, one thing we should have learnt by now is that it is 
not enough to imagine the voluntarist disposal of the complex 
ideological frameworks which have existed for so long in Western 
cultural and scientific institutions for the appraisal of non-Western 
material culture, if the power relations which have facilitated such 
easy categories remain intact and unexposed"' 
This is echoed by Terry Eagleton's critique that postcolonial thought deals with 
cultural difference, but does not theorise economic exploitation closely enough"'. 
The risk highlighted here that of describing dualities without overcoming them, 
especially when in fact the centre/margins relationship is one that mutates over time. 
Perhaps what these critiques suggest is the difficulty in giving subalternity a voice 
independently of dominant European constructs through postcolonial theory. Here, 
140 Anne McClintock. 1992. "The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term 'Post-Colonialism"' 
Social Text 32-33. p. 86. 
141 For a short discussion of McClintock and on the question of terminology, see Bill Ashcroft 
et al (eds. ) 1995. The Postcolonial Studies Reader. pp. 3-4. 
142 Annie Coombes. 1994. "The Recalcitrant Object: Culture Contact and the Question of 
Hybridity" in Francis Barker et al (eds. ) Colonial Discourse/Postcolonial Theory. p. iii. 
143 Terry Eagleton. 1994. "Goodbye to the Enlightenment" The Guardian, May 5. 
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a whole array of analyses focusing on power relations has made its way into 
postcolonial studies. Chandra Mohanty, for instance, discusses various ways in which 
the centre/margin dichotomy is negotiated in various settings, and how its 
boundaries can be seen to overlap, or how new spaces outside the dichotomy can be 
opened uplaa More theoretically, Spivak, through her analysis of the contribution of 
Foucault and Deleuze to the field, argues that a poststructuralist perspective alone 
does not sufficiently address in a critical manner the question of ideology145As a 
result, she uses explicitly Marxist tools of analysis along with deconstruction. In a 
way this is a rejoinder to Habermas and Marxist critiques. On the other side of the 
equation though, Robert Young sees, by contrast, the Marxist influence on 
postcolonial theory as detrimental because "Marxism, as a body of knowledge itself 
remains complicit with, and even extends, the system to which it is opposed"146. 
Spivak recognises this potential problem, but argues for a form of `strategic 
essentialism' where the critical aspects of Marxist are selected as analytical tools 
without recourse to the foundational aspect of Marx' views on the Orient, for 
instance14' 
This problem of analytical tools - and of the relationship of postcolonial studies to 
Marxist critiques - goes even further, with Aijaz Ahmad's critique. Firstly, he notes 
and emphasises uneven and diverse patterns of decolonisation, with specific 
consequence for the postcolonial patterns of resource distribution148. The essence of 
this point is the danger of homogeneity in the treatment of the postcolonial condition 
by scholars. A second, and more damaging, point from Ahmad's Marxist standpoint is 
that he seems to suggest that the term postcolonial puts colonialism at the centre of 
the historical evolution of material relations, when colonialism is the reflection of 
broader patterns of modernity, a more fruitful locus of analysis149 Consequently, he 
argues that postcolonial theory's focus on hybridity and movement merely reflects 
patterns of global capitalism'50. Dirlik in turn, takes this point further to argue that as 
144 Chandra Mohanty. i99i. "Cartographies of Struggle: Third World Women and the Politics 
of Feminism" in Mohanty, T. Russo and L. 'forres (eds. ) Third World Women and the Politics 
of Feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. p. ii. 
145 Gayatri Spivak. 1999. A Critique of Postcolonial reason: Toward a History of the 
Vanishing present. Cambridge (Mass. ): Harvard University Press. P249. 
146 Robert Young argues from a poststructuralist perspective. See Robert Young. 199o. White 
Mythologies: Writing History and the West. London: Routledge. P-3- 
147 See Gayatri Spivak. 199o. The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues. 
Sarah Harasym (ed. ). London: Routledge. 
148 Aijaz Ahmad. 1992. In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures. London: Verso. p. 18. 
149 Aijaz Ahmad. 1995. "The Politics of Literary Postcoloniality" Race and Class 36(3). P. 7. 
150 See Aijaz Ahmad. 1995. "The Politics of Literary Postcoloniality". 
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a result, postcolonial theory is complicit to such patterns, and that its foci are 
symptoms of dominant motifs of globalisation'sl 
The accusation of complicity with neo-imperialist forces, one way or another, has 
plagued debates on postcoloniality. Here, I acknowledge the strength and relevance 
of this perspective, but once again, the critical aspect of political studies is supposed 
to be the locus upon which distantiation from dominant discursive patterns occur. 
This last issue, while important, is also of less relevance to our aims, since our focus 
will not be placed on the dynamics of the colonised/coloniser relationship (before or 
after independence) to a great extent, but rather on the ways in which issues of 
governance are affected by the postcolonial condition internally. 
Overall though, we remain confronted with the recurring question: What is 
postcoloniality? Is it a discursive formation limited to previously marginalised 
academics152, or does it have the tools for producing alternative analyses of the 
colonial world and of the possibilities and risks of the postcolonial condition? I would 
argue here that it is necessary to move on to the issue of postcoloniality itself in order 
to move on from such debates. It is in this aspect of subalternity that my main 
criticism of the field resides. The idea of giving the `subaltern subject' a voice remains 
controversial and over-ambitious. The challenge of the subaltern school in India in 
terms of historiography was just as much about their subalternity in the academic 
field than anything else; the endeavour was about giving them, their ideas and their 
theoretical constructs a 'voice'. The problems highlighted by Spivak in 'Can the 
Subaltern Speak? ' remain just as significant. Involving testimony from native 
informants and stepping away from politically motivated academic renditions of the 
colonial/postcolonial world (as a way of overcoming Orientalism, for instance) form a 
solid basis for academic scholarship. But the voice put forward in my academic world 
remain predominantly mine - maybe a glimpse of other voices can be perceived there, 
but these are by definition distorted by the editing and analytical choices that I make 
to put my own arguments forward. It is perhaps in the very nature of authorship to 
have one dominant voice after all. 
Nevertheless, postcolonial studies as a field is valuable to our specific analytical aims 
despite these critiques and debates. Our main areas of investigation are linked to the 
'5' A. Dirlik. 1997. The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global 
Capitalism. Boulder: Westview Press. and article of the same name in Critical Inquiry 20 
(Winter 1994. ) 
152 See Kwame Anthony Appiah. 1992. In my Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of 
Culture. London: Methuen. 
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dialectic linking colonial and postcolonial forms of governance (divergence, hybridity 
and complicity) as the basis for contemporary constructs of the Algerian political 
lifeworld. As a result, our study is tied to an idea of postcoloniality where 'post' does 
not imply an unproblematic chasm between colonial and postcolonial times, but a 
problematic connection affecting both the coloniser and the colonised in terms of 
identity building - and eventually, the power relationships affecting postcolonial 
peoples. This is particularly useful insofar as it helps us analyse the production of 
discourse, and strategies of resistance to dominant forms of discourses. It is in this 
way that postcolonial studies differs most markedly from postmodernist accounts and 
offers us novel critical avenues, as argued by John Beverley: 
... I find it useful sometimes to see both subaltern studies and 
cultural studies as connected to that 'incredulity to metanarratives' 
Jean Francois Lyotard offers as a definition of the postmodern: that 
is, the crisis or erosion of notions of modernity based on 
Eurocentric historicism and a positivist epistemology and 
end/means rationality supposedly embedded in the operations of 
the market, the state and the corresponding forms of academic 
disciplinarity. The difference is perhaps that where Lyotard gives 
'incredulity to metanarratives' the form of a project that can and 
must take place within the space of globalization ... subaltern 
studies might be seen instead as an effort to articulate against that 
which is hegemonic in globalization something like what has been 
called (although I do not much care for the term) a 
postmodernism of resistance'ls3 
In laying the foundation for theorising upon the complexity of the Postcolonial 
Condition where the legacy of colonial times is pervasive and often subtle is thus the 
greatest legacy and importance of this field, since, more often than not: 
The newly independent nation-state makes available the fruits of 
liberation only selectively and unevenly... `Colonialism' is not just 
something that happens from outside a country or people, not just 
something that operates with the collusion of forces inside, but a 
version of it can be duplicated from within"' 
2.4.3. Conceptual Framework 
Taking on this legacy, and developing a set of conceptual tools based on such insights 
and suited to our analytical aims is thus our endpoint. Such concepts are applied in 
each relevant chapter. What I want to do here is to summarise the main ways in 
153John Beverley. 1999. Subalternity and Representation.. p. 15. Emphasis added. 
154 Ania Loomba. 1998. Colonialism/Postcolonialism: The New Critical Idiom. London: 
Routledge. pp. 11-12. Emphasis added. 
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which the postcolonial framework of analysis matches the perspective on political 
Islam employed in later parts of this dissertation. The postcolonial perspective is seen 
here as critical in four main ways: 
1. This standpoints emphasises the importance of the colonial past as a `formative 
experience' in terms of political identity, and thus helps us define the patterns 
affecting the transition to and elements of the postcolonial condition. 
2. The methodology of postcolonial studies allows us to focus on the decentering of 
dominant discourses of the nation as a strategy for analysis, and to look at the control 
over the production of historiography by the postcolonial state for political purposes 
in particular. 
3. Postcolonial studies provide us with the vocabulary for articulating the question of 
discursive representation and to account for the complexity of postcolonial identity- 
building. Such a conception, "mobilised by postcolonial politics" is varied and goes 
beyond the remit of ethnicity "in a plurality of contested arenas" where "postcolonial 
strategies improvise multiple shifting identities""' 
4. The field, especially if understood through the analytical prism set out by Gayatri 
Spivak, emphasises cultural hybridity and heterogeneity as well as considerations of 
power, allowing for a practical application of critical hermeneutics. 
These strategies often echo the deconstruction of Orientalist discourse; here I will 
juxtapose this methodology with the analysis of the strategies of the postcolonial state 
in reproducing such patterns as the basis for governance. 
Firstly, it should be pointed out that a significant part of the construction of political 
identity and the imaginary of the nation in the postcolonial setting hinges on 
questions of representation. This is a key issue in the production of dominant 
discourses by the state of course, but it is also a privileged discursive site for 
contestatory forms of discourse15' . Political identity formation 
itself is seen here as a 
complex, ongoing process characterised by both the appropriation of historical 
constructs in practical terms and the necessity for boundaries and exclusion as part 
155 Richard Webner. 1996. "Introduction" in his and Terence Ranger's (eds) Postcolonial 
Identities in Africa. London: Zed Books. 
156 Spivak put great emphasis on this issue, for instance: "Let us take seriously the possibility 
that systems of representation come to hand when we secure our own culture - our own 
cultural explanations". See Gayatri Spivak. 1999. A Critique of Postcolonial Reason. p. 173. 
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and parcel of self-definition 157. In the latter's case, Chantal Mouffe's work on the 
formation of political identity can be seen to exemplify this issue of positionality in 
terms which are not far removed from Said's: differentiation from the other 
inherently implicates a negation of the other. In this sense at least, our 
understanding of the 'political' in a postcolonial context should thus take into account 
the fact that: 
Looking at the issue of identity in this way transforms the way we 
think of the political. The Political can no longer be located as 
present only in a certain type of institution, as representative of a 
sphere or level of society. It should rather be understood as a 
dimension inherent to all human society which stems from our very 
ontological condition's'. 
In the postcolonial setting, the question of identity in nation-building is of course of 
primary importance, since it is the handling of legitimising tools of governance which 
dominate the relationship between postcolonial elites and potential opposition 
groups in civil society. In postcolonial terms, the dominant issue underpinning such 
claims on legitimacy is based on the needs for authenticity as a means to overcome 
the legacy and structures of colonialism: ... "The 
demand for a rejection of the 
influence of the colonial period in programmes of decolonisation has invoked the idea 
that certain forms and practices are `inauthentic', some decolonizing states arguing 
for a recuperation of authentic pre-colonial traditions and customss159 Such a use of 
cultural aspects of identity within the realm of postcolonial politics, in turn, relies on 
the process of appropriation mentioned above. Homi Bhabha, for instance, highlights 
the difficulties associated in representation of the past in these circumstances: 
The enunciation of cultural difference problematizes the division of 
past and present, tradition and modernity, at the level of cultural 
representation and its authoritative address. It is the problem of 
how, in signifying the present, something comes to be repeated, 
relocated, and translated in the name of tradition, in the guise of a 
pastness that is not necessarily a faithful sign of historical memory 
'57 Paul Ricoeur distinguishes between two dimensions of identity: la memete (self-identity 
developed over time) and Tipseite (the drawing of boundaries in relationship to others). 
Zigmunt Bauman develops on this distinction when discussing nationalism to argue that 
boundary-setting often comes before and shapes self-identity. These are only two proponents 
of such a view - see chapter six for a closer analysis of relationality in identity. Paul Ricoeur. 
199o. Soi-meme comme un Autre. Paris: Editions du Seuil. pp. 148-150- Z. Bauman 1992. 
"Modernity and Ambivalence" in Mike Featherstone (ed. ). 1990. Global Culture: Nationalism, 
Globalisation and Modernity. London: Sage p. 677. 
1$8 Chantal Mouffe. 1994. "For a Politics of Nomadic Identity" in George Robertson et al. (eds. ) 
Travellers' Tales: Narratives of Home and Displacements. London: Routledge. p. 1o8. 
159 See Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin. 1998. Key Concepts in Post-Colonial 
Studies. P. 21. 
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but a strategy of representing authority in terms of the artifice of the 
archaic16o 
Postcolonial politics are thus strongly linked to the construction of a nationalist 
discourse designed to capture the imaginary of a past `Golden Age'. It is Homi 
Bhabha, once again who develops on the close proximity between the imagination of 
the nation and the production of discourses, or narratives in Nation and Narration: 
It is the project of Nation and Narration to explore the Janus-faced 
ambivalence of language itself in the construction of the Janus- 
faced discourse of the nation... If the ambivalent figure of the nation 
is a problem of its transitional history, its conceptual indeterminacy, 
its wavering between vocabularies, then what effect does this have 
on narratives and discourses that signify a sense of `nationness': the 
heimlich pleasures of the hearth, the unheimlich terror of the space 
or race of the Other; the comfort of social belonging, the hidden 
injuries of class; the customs of taste, the powers of political 
affiliation; the sense of social order, the sensibility of sexuality; the 
blindness of bureaucracy, the straight insight of institutions; the 
quality of justice, the common sense of injustice; the langue of the 
law and the parole of the people1" 
Partha Chaterjee's Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World opens up the use of 
the concept of the nation in a similar way to look at the ways in which political 
identity becomes inscribed in political discourse and institutionalised in way that 
carries ambiguity162. The relationship to the discourse of the former coloniser can be 
seen here as influencing the creation of postcolonial discourses on the nation and 
corresponding institution despite the emancipatory rhetoric of national liberation in 
ways that are varied, complex and dynamic. For our purposes, we will see the identity 
dimension of political imagination in a way that involves interpretation, selection, 
mediation and silencing, issues explored in more detail and in context in chapter six. 
Overall, several key trends mark the transition to postcoloniality and thus patterns of 
nation-building, ideological tenets, and parameters for political competition in 
ideological terms: rupture, competition, mimicry/complicity, hybridity. It is those 
concepts that our main analytical chapters explore with regards to the oppositional 
political imagination of Algerian Islam and its relationship to dominant forms of 
political imagination inscribed by the postcolonial state. This is an extrapolation in 
analysis between the colonial/postcolonial transition theorised upon by postcolonial 
160 Homi K. Bhabha. 1995. "Cultural Diversity and Cultural Differences" in Bill Ashcroft et al 
(eds. ) The Postcolonial Studies Reader. London: Routledge. P. 207. 
161 Homi K. Bhabha. 199o. Nation and Narration. London: Routledge. pp. 3,2. 
162 Partha Chatterjee. 1986. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative 
Discourse. London: Zed Books. 
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studies to the experience of political competition within the framework of 
postcoloniality. 
2 . 5. Conclusion 
This chapter has been structured as a journey from the more general to the more 
particular, and from broad questions of epistemology to a choice of conceptual tools. 
The links between critical hermeneutics and post-Orientalism are epistemological in 
nature, but they also denote the need to find practical application to the question of 
interpretation and the difficulties of critique. As a field, postcolonial studies is seen 
here as useful, but in many ways, each of our conceptual chapters will attempt to 
apply the above concepts to a novel situation, and for purposes which may not have 
been at the forefront of theories of the postcolonial as set out above. In that sense, 
chapters five, six and seven, take on theoretical issues to apply them to a new context 
in postcolonial studies, matching the traditional aims of historiographical study with 
an engagement with the reality of postcolonial rule. 
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Chapter Three 
Defining Islamist Politics 
3. i. Introduction 
Partly because it enjoys a high media profile, and partly because of the violence it is 
often associated with, political Islam is, as a matter of course, a contentious field of 
study. In this sense, an introduction to Islamism in general - encompassing both 
definition and context - lies at the basis of any coherent understanding of a specific 
case study of political Islam (for our purposes; that of Algerian Islamism). 
Accordingly, the aims of this chapter are to 'place' political Islam geographically and 
politically, and to provide a comprehensive discussion of the definitional problems 
associated with this phenomenon - and their implications for analysis. The structure 
of the analysis developed here reflects these aims. Starting with a consideration of 
political Islam's place in the post-Cold War world (and thus a brief discussion of the 
literature debating this point), this chapter critically engages with the mainstream 
definitions of political Islam - especially the amalgamations that the terms 
`fundamentalism' and `Islamic terrorism' imply. As a result, it attempts to refocus 
both our definition and our analytical foci when considering Islamist politics. As an 
alternative, this chapter highlights the main characteristics of political Islam - as a 
region-wide phenomenon'. These include the political and social dimensions of the 
phenomenon and its place in the modern world. In this sense, our definition aims to 
suggest where a more comprehensive understanding of political Islam may lie, and to 
delineate signposts as to analytical prisms which are relevant to that understanding. 
In turn, these general considerations are designed to provide the background for the 
overview of contemporary Islamism in Algeria developed in Chapter Four. 
3.2. Political Islam in the New World Order 
With the ending of the Cold War, the media and academe based in Europe and North 
America have discussed at length, with varying depth, but always a sense of urgency, 
the idea that religion and ethnicity (as opposed to secular ideology) would shape the 
new international order and be the cause of future conflicts among states, if not 
within states. The initial debate between those, like Francis Fukuyama, who saw the 
1 Chapter Five will go further in its treatment of political Islam in Algeria, to make a case for 
defining Islamist politics as social movements. 
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post-Cold War world as characterised by the triumph of Western Liberal democratic 
ideals in the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union2, and those, like John 
Mearsheimer, who asserted that a new world order would, in the absence of 
superpower dominance, be fraught with internal religious, ethnic and territorial 
strife, set the trend for what has become one of the central debates in International 
Relations since the end of the Cold War3. Fukuyama argued that religion as a political 
force would only assume residual importance; Mearsheimer, on the other hand, 
warned scholars and policy-makers that the Cold War would soon be missed for its 
systemic stability and predictability4. 
Subsequent developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina, former Soviet Republics in Central 
Asia, Rwanda, Chechnya, Somalia, the former Zaire and now Kosovo, to name but a 
few examples, have demonstrated that Mearsheimer's prophecy captured the 
fragmenting implications of the end of superpower supremacy. In fact, the 
globalisation of the discourse on democracy identified by Fukuyama has been 
matched by an opposite trend featuring the reaffirmation of localised cultural, ethnic 
and religious practices and values exemplified by a vast range of ethno-nationalist 
and religious-based movements in various parts of the world, including former 
communist countries, Europe, the United States, the Muslim world, Africa, South 
Asia and Israels. At the root of these challenges lie a range of socio-economic, political 
and cultural aspirations which vary widely, but which invariably encompass a deep 
dissatisfaction with perceived dominant cultural and political values (or the absence 
thereof) often embodied by the state, law, and other established modes of social 
2In his article "The End of History? ", Fukuyama argues that the Western system of liberal 
democracy has acquired a universally recognised value, having triumphed over competing 
ideologies (namely communism). At the root of this explanation lied Fukuyama's conviction 
that previous forms of government such as communism and fascism are fatally flawed, and 
that, on the other hand, liberal democracy corresponds to an "end point of mankind's 
ideological evolution". See Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History? ", The National Interest 
16, Summer 1989, PP-3-18. Underpinning this argument is the issue of whether democratic 
systems are indeed more peaceful (and thus superior). For a discussion of the issue of 
democracies fighting one another see John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The 
Obsolescence of Major War. Basic Books: New York. 1989. 
3See John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War" 
International Security 15(1-Summer). PP. 5-56. 
4Furthermore, Fukuyama argued that the possibility of an ethnic or religious "comeback" was 
peripheral to the more central issue of the goodness of liberal democracy itself. See Francis 
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press (Macmillan). p. xxi. 
In this sense, he failed to see how religious revivalism would question not only the need for 
Western-style democracy, but would also undermine our understanding of 'liberal democracy' 
as a universal good. 
5 Examples of such vehement rejection of dominant cultural patterns can range from the 
revival of local languages and dialects, with, for instance, the Celtic language in Great Britain 
(and Breton in France) being taught in schools and finding their ways on various televisions 
programmes, to the secessionist movements which have accompanied the disintegration of 
the former Soviet Union in 1991. 
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organisation. Furthermore, identity-based forms of revivalism in the post-Cold War 
world have succeeded in going beyond the mere rejection of the political and cultural 
status quo to actively advocate radical change, as well as mobilise popular support to 
participate in the political process to that effect, and propose challenging alternatives 
to existing political structures. The Islamist challenge to a Western-centric, uni-linear 
model of modernisation (and modernity) is but one example such revival. Yet, the 
question remains as to whether these phenomena constitute a new trend in 
International Relations which heralds an era of internal wars and virulent 
nationalism (as the evidence from the first decade of the post-Cold War era seems to 
suggest)6. One could ask, on the contrary, whether these trends and problems were 
also present during the Cold War, but were either dwarfed by ideological superpower 
rivalry, or simply not the focus of analysis by the academe. 
In this context, the possible resurgence of an `Islamic threat' has become one of the 
most prominent leitmotifs of International Relations research, as well as the media. 
Indeed, popular images of a growing `Islamic threat' or `Green Peril' replacing the 
`Red Menace/Evil Empire' as the new global challenger to Western liberal ideas and 
states have accompanied the growing media exposure of Islamist movements in the 
Middle East, North Africa and elsewhere'. Despite strong evidence supporting the 
thesis that contemporary forms of political Islam began their 'revival' from the mid- 
1970s onwards', the resurgence of Islam in politics has been largely perceived as a 
distinctively post-Cold War, direct, threat to peace and stability for the states 
concerned and regionally. Additionally, this resurgence has been seen as threatening 
to Western interests and security in demographic, political and even civilisational 
terms9. The possibility of a 'Clash of Civilisations' between a monolithic 'World of 
Islam' and an equally monolithic 'West' has consequently become an issue of great 
debate among scholars. Headed by Samuel Huntington, the proponents of this thesis 
have emphasised the history of conflictual relations between Muslim/Middle Eastern 
6The consequences of neo-nationalism in the Balkans (especially Serbian nationalism) on the 
population of Bosnia-Herzegovina and more recently Kosovo constitute grim evidence 
supporting this thesis. 
7 See R. H. Pelletreau, Jr (ed). 1994. "Political Islam. Symposium: Resurgent Islam in the 
Middle East" Middle East Policy. 3(2). Judith Miller. 1993. "The Challenge of Radical Islam". 
Foreign Affairs. Spring. 
81n fact, the understanding of resurgent Islam as a post-Cold War phenomenon is misleading 
because it overlooks one of the most important events marking Islamic revivalism, the 
overthrow the Shah in Iran by an indigenous Islamic Revolution in 1979. An'Islamic State' 
thus predates the advent of the Cold War by a decade. 
9Most notably see Samuel Huntington. 1993. "The Clash of Civilizations? " Foreign Affairs. 
Summer. and Bernard Lewis. 199o. "The Roots of Muslim Rage" The Atlantic Monthly. 266- 
Sept. Daniel Pipes. 1986. "Fundamentalist Muslims" Foreign Affairs. Summer. These views 
have been echoed in the media also. See, for instance, Daniel Pipes. 1992. "Fundamental 
Questions about Islam" The Wall Street Journal, Oct 3oth, p. All. 
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and European powers, the ideological opposition between Islamist politics and liberal 
democratic principles, and the Islamists' vehement rejection of Western values and 
influence. This evidence has been used to argue that the revival of Islam as a political 
force is on an inevitable collision course with the West1°. The detractors of such an 
approach point to the diversity and complexity of politics in the Middle East and the 
Maghrib to highlight the essentialist nature of culturalist arguments of this type and 
to warn Western policy-makers of the dangers of self-fulfilling prophecies". 
Indeed, Huntington's argument, while provocative, assumes the existence of unitary, 
and internally harmonious, 'security blocs' and indeed underplays conflict within the 
Middle East (and in the West for that matter)" . It is culturally essentialist in that it 
assumes that the cultural commonalties of the Muslim world's peoples will 
necessarily outweigh their differences and that this 'Muslim World' is interested in 
confrontation with the West also for cultural and historical reasons13. Yet, for all its 
ambiguities and problems, Huntington's alarmist call has succeeded in opening a 
Pandora's box of Western cultural anxieties which strike at the heart of both Western 
political identity and of its academic ways of grappling with the 'outside world' - 
issues which are far from unproblematic. In turn, the debate surrounding "The Clash 
of Civilizations" denotes a profound shift in analytical emphasis away from a clear 
confident position crystallised in an ideological, and strategic opposition between 
liberal democratic capitalism and communism - which ignored the decolonised Third 
World or used it as proxy. Instead, it has moved on to more localised problems of 
nationalism, ethnicity and religion - in other words, questions of political identity- 
building - which cannot be easily understood, let alone controlled. 
Thus, one of the central challenges of the 'New World Order' has been this attempt to 
grapple with the 'reassertion' of a decolonised Third World, a Second World in 
transition and groups at the fringes of First World societies resisting easy 
loSee Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations? ". 
1, Most notably see John Esposito. 1994. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? Second 
Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fred Halliday. 1995. Islam and the Myth of 
Confrontation. London: I. B. Tauris. A. Al-Azmeh. 1993. Islams and Modernities. London: 
Verso. Anoushivaran Ehteshami. 1997. "Islamic Fundamentalism and Political Islam" in Biran 
White et al (eds. ) Issues in World Politics. London: Macmillan. Ehteshami states: "Islam, 
however, in both its political and religious guises, is not a monolithic force and does not speak 
with one voice. " p. 179. Fred Halliday states: "The very concept of an'Islamic' threat is itself a 
chimera, and to talk of some enduring, transhistorical conflict between 'Islamic' and Western' 
worlds is nonsense", p. ii3. 
12 See Joel Beinin and Joe Stork. 1997. "On the Modernity, Historical Specificity, and 
International Context of Political Islam", in Beinin and Stork (eds. ) Political Islam: Essays 
From Middle East Report. London: I. B. Tauris. P. 20. 
13 Fred Halliday. 1995. Islam and the Myth of Confrontation. P. 2-3. 
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categorisation14 . On a deeper level still, this post-Cold War anxiety has put into 
question our understanding of what constitutes the political realm. Including the 
aims and activities of religious, politico-religious, or ethno-nationalist movements in 
the spectrum of political analysis seems unavoidable, but it implies the mental, if not 
emotional, acknowledgement of the intrinsically political nature and relevance of 
these movements not only to their societies, but also to this 'New World Order'. In 
this sense, one needs to assume that: 
... if we are going to look at these movements; however strange, 
aberrant or fanatical some of them may seem to us, we have to take 
seriously both what they are saying and the alternative societies 
they are trying to build in response to the confusion they feel in a 
world from which landmarks have disappeared. Our working 
hypothesis will be that what these movements say and do is 
meaningful, and does not spring from a dethronement of reason or 
from manipulation by hidden forces; rather it is the undeniable 
evidence of a deep malaise in society that can no longer be 
interpreted in terms of our own traditional categories of thought. " 
In essence, this view questions not only the assumption that ethno-nationalism and 
'fundamentalism' are absurd phenomena which remain independent of historical and 
socio-political contexts, but it also challenges the corollary to this assumption - 
namely, the view that all ethno-nationalist and political-religious groups are 
inherently backward. The case of Islamist movements in the Middle East and North 
Africa is a striking example. With political Islam, the overlap between religion and 
politics has too often been seen as an unintelligible step backward in civilisational 
development implying intolerant, violent societies, a stereotype which has been 
reinforced by symbols of fanaticism conveyed from contemporary developments in 
the Muslim World. Most notably, Khomeini's Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, and 
the subsequent anti-Western rhetoric of the Iranian regime (with, in particular, the 
death sentence proclaimed in a fatwa against British author Salman Rushdie for his 
Satanic Verses) have worked to perpetuate, if not institutionalise, the image of an 
inherently violent and anti-Western political Islam. The fear of a terrorist Islamic 
'fundamentalism' was initially fuelled by a wave of hostage-taking, hijacking and 
bombing activities in the 198os16, most notably by the Lebanese Hezbollah. By the 
199os, such attacks on Western targets started moving beyond the Middle Eastern 
14 See Mark Juergensmeyer. 1993. The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the 
Secular State. Berkeley: University of California Press. Gilles Kepel. 1995. The Revenge of 
God. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
15Gilles Kepel. 1995. The Revenge of God. p. ii. 
16even though Western fears and paranoia of the Muslim world, its religion and its power date 
back to the Crusades and have been inherent to the Orientalist writings on the region in a 
variety of fields. See Edward Said. 1995 (1978). Orientalism. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
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theatre with, for instance, the first attack on the World Trade Centre in New York City 
in 1993 (which was allegedly sponsored by Osama Bin Laden) and the wave of 
bombings in Paris by the Algerian GIA groups in the mid 199os. Furthermore, the 11th 
September suicide attacks and the resulting `War on Terrorism' have all reinforced 
the idea of a political Islam that acts as a destabilising force in politics, if not as a 
catalyst for violent struggle, both locally and regionally. 
It should be pointed out however, that framing our understanding of political Islam 
in an 'Islamic threat' debate, or purely in terms of violence or terrorism, binds us to 
seeing its manifestations in isolation from the political and socio-economic 
environments which frame its struggle. It prevents us from accounting for its 
diversity, and precludes an appreciation of the complex dynamics of change which 
characterise Islamist politics". In fact, and despite common goals such as the 
creation of an Islamist state, Islamist movements can be most strikingly described 
through the sheer diversity of their political ideology and aims. These range from 
democratic to theocratic, top-down or grass-root oriented, peaceful, violent, 
revolutionary, inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideas, inspired by extreme right-wing 
ideas, broad in scope, narrow in scope, utopian, messianic, apocalyptic18. In addition, 
the range of their activities is equally diverse and include running for political office, 
terrorism and guerrilla warfare, the provision of welfare services and education, 
religious teaching and preaching, pastoral care, banking, grassroots consciousness 
raising, peaceful political protest, the infiltration of existing trade unions and 
professional associations, the provision of humanitarian aid to the victims of natural 
catastrophes, black market activities, drug trafficking and intimidation. Furthermore, 
one should not forget that violence committed by Islamist groups has been only 
episodic in some cases, and widespread in others. Examples include terrorist attacks 
on tourists by Egyptian Islamists (which tend to be episodic, but high profile and 
high-casualty-oriented) to the Algerian civil war (which combined various patterns of 
violence including structural violence, human rights violations, terrorism, guerrilla 
warfare, abduction and intimidation, political assassinations, all committed by a 
variety of political actors including Islamists and the state). In this sense, the attitude 
of Islamist militants towards violence has varied according to local circumstances and 
has changed over time. 
17 See Laura Guazzone. 1995. "Islamism and Islamists in the Contemporary Arab World" in 
her (ed. ) The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movement in the 
Contemporary Arab World. Ithaca Press. p. i. and if. 
18 For an in-depth discussion of the ideological underpinnings of political Islam, see Ibrahim 
Abu-Rabi. 1996. Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. Chapter One, on the intellectual context and 
themes underpinning contemporary political Islam, highlights the dynamic 
relationshipbetween Islamic political thought and other intellectual debates in the region. 
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3.3. Political Islam: A Definition 
Given such variety and complexity, a number of issues can be raised from the outset 
concerning the use of the term political Islam in any analytical piece of writing. 
Firstly, one must ask whether it is accurate to depict political Islam as the mere 
application of the tenets of Islam to the political sphere. Is Islamism the political 
expression of Islam, or is it an interpretation of the message of Islam and its 
application to the world of cultural/religious ideas and politics? Secondly, this issue is 
compounded by the fact that Islamists do not always call themselves Islamists, but 
often good Muslims, better Muslims, if not the only Muslims. This self-description is 
often accompanied by the claim to be a 'true follower' of Islam as opposed to a 
'follower of an interpretation of Islamic principles to be applied to a specific set of 
socio-political and cultural circumstances' (which would tend to summarise how 
analysts would see them). As a result, there is a gap between how Western analysts 
describe the phenomenon at hand and the ways in which Islamists see themselves. 
This raises the question of whether it is possible to describe an ideology, or a set of 
political movements using different labels and explanatory tools (if not world views) 
to those who are its protagonists. Thirdly, and as a result, the very nature of the 
religion-politics nexus in the case of Islam and political Islam needs to be 
problematised somewhat. Can Islam indeed be seen as din wa-dawla (often 
translated as 'religion and state'), thus making politics an intrinsic part of religion? Or 
is the connection between political aims and religious principles in Islamism tied to 
the specific historical and political conditions in which it has arisen, thus making 
political Islam intrinsically distinct to Islam19? 
33.1. Islam and Islamism 
I will argue here that the religious practices and beliefs of most Muslims are indeed 
varied and are not equivalent to the ideology, goals and strategies of Islamists2°. 
While all Islamists are Muslims, not all Muslims are Islamists. The distinction 
between the term Islamic and Islamist is thus important in that it avoids making 
inaccurate generalisations which are discriminatory to those Muslims who are not 
19 For an overview of the religion-politics nexus, see James Piscatori. 1983. "Introduction" in 
his (ed. ) Islam in the Political Process. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For a 
discussion of this issue in the context of Iran, see Sami Zubaida. 1997 "Is Iran an Islamic 
State? " in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds. ) Political Islam. 
20 For a similar argument, see Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, London: I. B. Tauris 
1994. and Francois Burgat, L'Islamisme au Maghreb: La Voix du Sud (Second Edition). 
Paris: Payot 1995, p"14-15. 
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Islamists, and to those Islamists who may object to being assimilated to other, non- 
Islamist, Muslims. In addition, it should be noted that assimilating political Islam to 
Islam as a religion easily runs the risk of oversimplifying our understanding of both 
phenomena21 . At best, such confusion precludes a contextualised view of Islamism 
which would take into account both its historical and its socio-political contexts22. At 
worst, this can lead to an essentialist view of Islam based on a culturally deterministic 
and monolithic understanding23 of the political processes in the Middle East and 
more generally in the Muslim World24. Finally, this distinction allows us to 
discriminate between the condemnation of the violence of some Islamist groups and 
that of Islam in general. 
Arguably, political Islam is both a lot more and a lot less than Islam. It is a lot more 
because it has been shaped by historical, political and socio-economic forces which lie 
beyond the religious text; and it is a lot less because its outlook and principles are far 
less universal in scope than the religious principles of Islam. That being said however, 
both political Islam and the religion of Islam are complex phenomena with diverse 
expressions, and their history and meaning are intertwined in some important 
ways25. While the Islamic sacred texts (from the Qur'an to the shari'a, and with the 
Hadith-based Islamic jurisprudence) outline, often in detail, the acceptable principles 
of law and government, these principles have been interpreted and applied in 
different ways historically, across the Sunni/Shi'i divide and from state to state26. As 
Simon Bromley reminds us: 
Historically, then, 'Islam' has had no unitary nature, and therefore it 
cannot be understood either as an enduring, recalcitrant tradition, a 
cultural form operating to block other social and historical 
21 See James Piscatori. 1986. Islam in a World ofNation-States. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. p. i3. 
22As argued by Francois Burgat. 1997. " Islam, Opposition Politique et Modernisation Sociale". 
Les Cahiers de L'Orient. 45(1): 65-66. 
23As argued by Charles Tripp, "Islam and the Secular Logic of the State in the Middle East" in 
Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushivaran Ehteshami (eds. ) 1996. Islamic Fundamentalism. 
Boulder: Westview Press. P-51. and Ibrahim Abu-Rabi. 1996. Intellectual Origins of Islamic 
Resurgence in the Middle East. Abu-Rabi states: "... we must be far from assuming, as many 
commentators of 'political Islam' often do, that the Islamist discourse is essentialist, purist, 
homogeneous, one-dimensional, antimodernist, and irrationally anti-Western". p. 2. 
24 In fact, as Fred Halliday points out, large number of Muslims do not live in the Middle East 
(e. g. Pakistan, Nigeria, Indonesia), and many non-Muslims (such as Christians) live in this 
region. The'Muslim world' and the Middle East are thus not equivalent terms. Fred Halliday. 
1995. Islam and the Myth of Confrontation. p. 30. 
250n the importance of Islam culturally and in politics, see G. W. Choudhury. 199o. Islam in 
the Contemporary World. London: Indus Thames. 
260n the internal diversity of the discourse of Islam, see John Richard Bowen. 1993. Muslims 
Through Discourse. Princeton (N. J. ): Princeton University Press. On the intricacies of the 
connection between Islam and the production of political discourse, see William Roff. (ed. ). 
1987. Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning. London: Croom Helm. 
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determinations, or in terms of the theological power of the clergy 
based on an unchanging doctrine. As a form of religious 
identification and a culture of signification, 'Islam' remains rooted 
in broader sets of social and material practices, and thus its 
changing forms must also be related to the historically given 
organisation of economy and polity27. 
In turn, the relationship between the Islamic clergy and secular political power 
centres in the Muslim world has been a tumultuous one historically, and has shifted 
between mutual support, competition, and outright antagonism. Nazih Ayubi points 
to the historical support for political institutions and rulers by the religious 
establishment of various Islamic nations through the legitimising force of Islam28. By 
contrast, Islam has also served as a legitimising tool and factor for unity in revolt or 
revolution against `unjust' rule. For instance, Islam was used by Algerian nationalist 
forces as an anti-French rallying call during the Algerian Independence War, 
demonstrating its power as a unifying force against colonial oppression29. In this 
sense, the connection between religious and political power in the Muslim World is 
an obvious one (indeed, a similar connection could be drawn for European politics 
and Christianity), and it is also "perhaps also true that the Islamic tradition has been 
invoked and manipulated differently by various people for the sake of safeguarding 
their own interests and objectives in times of crisis and predicamenti30. Additionally, 
what this parallel also highlights is the importance of religious legitimacy as a 
symbolic, legitimising, force in the political sphere. As Aziz Al-Azmeh has pointed 
out, the Middle Eastern state has been a critical instrument of Islamisation since the 
1970s, as it used the religious card not only to sideline left-wing opposition parties, 
but also to reinforce its own fledging control over the public sphere31. Contemporary 
political Islam illustrates this trend, but also interprets the religion-politics nexus in a 
novel way. 
Islamist movements have posed an ideological challenge to existing regimes by using 
a religious frame of reference to criticise dominant political and cultural norms32. 
27Simon Bromley. 1994. Rethinking Middle East Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. p. 43. 
28Nazih Ayubi. i99i. Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World. London: 
Routledge. PP. 1-3. 
29Saddam Hussein has also been known to use the Islamic'Jihad' card to rally the Arab World 
against the US-led coalition during the Second Gulf War, with mixed success. For a detailed 
study of the Islamic component of the Algerian revolutionary rhetoric, see Monique Gadant. 
1988. Islam etNationalisme enAlgerie. Paris: L'Harmattan. 
30 Ibrahim Abu-Rabi. 1996. Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab 
World. p. 44. 
31 Aziz Al-Azmeh. 1992. al-Ilmaniyya min manzur mukatif. quoted in Ghassan Salame. 1994" 
"Introduction: Where are the Democrats? " in Ghassan Salame (ed. ). 1994. Democracy 
without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World. London: I. B. Tauris. p. 7. 
32Nazih Ayubi. 1991. Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World. pp. 62,65. 
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Here, Islam can be seen as an inspiration to political Islam insofar as it offers the 
basis for the cultural and political identity which Islamists share. It also provides the 
basis for the political ideas and motifs through which they gather public support and 
around which they draw a platform for challenging existing power structures and 
ideologies. But the Islamist ideological constructs also draw from secular sources for 
inspiration, and they are dependent on political and cultural trends for their 
evolution: "the Islamist discourse, in its different manifestations, histories, 
conditions, and ideological pronouncements, is a distinctive intellectual formation 
that must be located within the broader context of Arab intellectual history that has 
been weltering with all sorts of discourses, both secular and religiousi33. While they 
are based on religious ideals, they are concerned with the realities of political power. 
In this sense, Islam exercises a subtle, pervasive influence on Islamism, but it does 
not hold a monopoly on such an influence. In Fred Halliday's words, 
Islam, like culture and history, becomes a reserve on which the 
promoters of new identities can draw. But as an ideological 
interpretation so in the fostering of ethnic identities, the choice and 
character of identity is determined by contemporary and secular 
forces, not by religion itself" 
What Halliday points to here is the need to avoid essentialist interpretations 
concerning the role of religion in politics, especially, when the issue of political 
identity comes into play: 
It is never valid to present 'Muslim' as a term of ethnic identity. This 
is either a stereotypical projection employed by those who have 
sought and still seek to dominate or exclude people of Islamic 
origin, or it is an equally spurious claim made by people within an 
Islamic community who seek to exercise authority over a special 
group by advancing their particular interpretation as as the sole 
legitimate and authoritative 'Islam'. Other identities - social, ethnic, 
linguistic and national - all play their part" 
Thus, 'Islamism' is seen here to apply to a range of contemporary social and political 
movements which are part of a political spectrum of ideas and activities. These are, at 
least in part, qualitatively different to that of the religious practice of the Islamic 
faith, and as a political phenomenon, it cannot be explained through the prism of 
religion alone. Instead, a highly selective and very innovative ideological 
33 Ibrahim Abu-Rabi. 1996. Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab 
World. p. 2. 
34 Fred Halliday. 1995" Islam and the Myth of Confrontation. pp115-116. 
35 Fred Halliday. 1995. Islam and the Myth of Confrontation. ppi15. 
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interpretation of Islam provides the basis for an alternative to the status quo, 
whatever its current forms36. As Beinin and Stork argue: 
... today's Islamist thinkers and activists are creatively deploying 
selected elements of the Islamic tradition, combined with ideas, 
techniques, institutions and commodities of the present and recent 
past, to cope with specifically modem predicaments: political, 
social, economic, and cultural issues that emerged in the Middle 
East as a result of the expansion of the world capitalist market, the 
colonization of important part of the region by England and France, 
the formation of new territorial nation-states, the rise and decline of 
secular nationalist movements, the frustrations and failures of 
economic development, the reformation of gender relations, and the 
hybridization of culture and identity in the course of the wide range 
of contacts and interactions among Europeans and their cultures 
and the peoples of the Middle East... Many of the solutions political 
Islam offers have no specific historical precedent in Islamic 
tradition37. 
This range of interpretations, in turn, is highly dependent on the ideologues and 
leaders of Islamist movements who make the choices as to the emphasis of the 
doctrine, and whose interpretation of Islam is coloured by their political and personal 
experience38. In sum, political Islam is a political phenomenon, since it is predicated 
upon an ideology, involved with other actors in political processes, and trying to seize 
power to affect political change39. Correspondingly, its relationship to the polity - the 
state, its institutions and official political processes - lies at the core of its evolution. 
Thus, even if Islamists assert that they do not distinguish between religion and 
politics, our analysis of political and religious motivations underpinning Islamism 
must do so. 
3.3.2. The problems with Fundamentalism, Radicalism, Militantism and other 
Qualifiers 
'Islamic Fundamentalism' has been of the terms most commonly used to define the 
contemporary resurgence of Islam in political sphere in the media and by 
36Nazih Ayubi. i99i. Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World. p. 3. 
37 Joel Beinin and Joe Stork. 1997. "On the Modernity, Historical Specificity, and 
International Context of Political Islam". p. 4. 
38Ibrahim Abu-Rabi. 1996. Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab 
World. See in particular chapters 4 and 5 which contextualise Sayyid Qutb's intellectual 
contribution in his professional and personal experience. 
39 For an analysis of political Islam in those terms, see, for instance, Laura Guazzone (ed. ). 
The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Arab World. 
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academics40. Its implications as a concept, however, have been widely debated among 
scholars, and most have now abandoned its use for terms such as Islamic or Islamist 
politics, Islamism, Islamicism, Islamic activism and Islamic radicalism. Indeed, the 
term 'fundamentalism' is misleading because it has been associated in the media with 
images of violence and often equated with terms such fanaticism, extremism and 
terrorism, thus denoting a pejorative, reductionist view of political Islam. Suffice it to 
say here that violence is only one of the possible facets of Islamist politics - and that 
non-violent Islamist groups exist throughout the region. There are also abundant 
examples of Islamist groups performing 'social' functions of charity, education, 
spiritual guidance, and disaster relief, with the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Palestinian 
Hamas, the Egyptian and Jordanian Muslim Brothers, and the Algerian F. I. S. as 
prime instances. These examples are particularly telling given that it is precisely those 
groups which have been the betes noires of both regimes in the Middle East and 
Western observers. 
Moreover, the Protestant origin of the word fundamentalism suggests a literalist 
attitude toward the holy scripture and a belief in its inerrancy and in a number of 
fundamental precepts41. This vision is both too broad and too narrow: on the one 
hand all Muslims believe in the inerrancy of the sacred text; on the other hand, the 
importance of political activism as the main feature of political Islam, and its relative 
ideological paucity and flexibility, is largely underplayed by such a definition42. Yet, 
most importantly, the term 'fundamentalism' obscures the innovative nature of 
contemporary Islamist ideology and its methods. In other words, 
... the terms 'revival' and 'fundamentalist' are misleading, since both 
refer to trends within a religion. This Islamic current [i. e. 
contemporary forms of political Islam] involves not a revival of 
religious belief, but an assertion of the relevance of this belief, 
selectively interpreted, to politics" 
By contrast, the terms Islamic Revivalism, Reformism and Radicalism, developed in 
Youssef Choueiri's Islamic Fundamentalism approximate more closely the reality of 
4°See, for instance, Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushivaran Ehteshami (eds. ). 1996. Islamic 
Fundamentalism. Boulder: Westview Press. Youssef Choueiri. 199o. Islamic 
Fundamentalism. London: Pinter and the Fundamentalism Project edited by Martin Marty 
and Scott Appleby. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
41 See Joel Beinin and Joe Stork. 1997. "On the Modernity, Historical Specificity, and 
International Context of Political Islam". p. 3. 
42 John Esposito. 1992. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? P-7. Abdel Salam Sidahmed and 
Anoushivaran Ehteshami (eds. ). 1996. Islamic Fundamentalism. pp. 2-5. 
43Fred Halliday. 1994. "The Politics of Islamic Fundamentalism: Iran, Tunisia and the 
Challenge to the Secular State" in Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan (eds. ). 1994. Islam, 
Globalization and Postmodernity. London: Routledge. P. 93. 
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political Islam insofar as they convey the cyclical nature of the resurgence of Islamic 
movements in the political sphere historically, with an appreciation of the original 
nature of contemporary forms of political Islam due to their unique intellectual and 
political contexts44. Choueiri emphasises this cyclical theme to provide a historical 
background to Islamism to contextualise its relevance, while respecting its innovative 
elements. For him, the Islamic Revivalists of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century 
primarily worked to undermine mystical versions of Islam. On the other hand, the 
Islamic Reformists of the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century attempted to 
reverse perceived Islamic decline by revising traditional Islamic outlooks and 
practices and infusing them with Western political thought and structures45. Finally, 
contemporary Islamist groups, which he terms 'Islamist Radicals', have challenged 
Westernised elites and the state, and promoted the idea of political Islam as a self- 
sufficient ideology capable of forming the basis for a 'truly Islamic' government. It is 
those radicals who, in the contemporary setting, have developed the structures and 
rhetoric that is commonly termed 'Islamic fundamentalism'. 
Does the term 'Radical Islam' best define this phenomenon though? It strongly 
supports a view of political Islam that is politically militant and does not equate 
Islamism to traditionalism or literalism. In this sense, this distinction performs the 
important task of 'historicising' political Islam - it acknowledges its deep roots in 
Middle Eastern societies, and allows us to identify both areas of historical continuity 
and of innovation. However, like 'fundamentalism', the term 'Radical Islam' remains 
a rather vague category because it assumes that all Islamists and their supporters are 
radicals -a term which carries ambiguous meanings46. In addition, this term implies 
that these 'radicals' can be distinguished from more acceptable 'moderates', a neat 
distinction which neither reflects the reality of patterns of political allegiance within 
social movements nor explains what constitutes radical as opposed to moderate 
behaviour. Are these 'radicals' radical because of their commitment to affecting 
radical political change, or because they use radical methods (or both)? 
44See Youssef Choueiri. 199o. Islamic Fundamentalism. For a good sruvey of the revivalist 
literature in a contemporary context, see Y. Haddad. 1991. "The Revivalist Literature and the 
Literature of revival: An Introduction" in Haddad et al (eds. ) The Contemporary Islamic 
Revival: A Critical Survey and Bibliography. New York: Greenwood Press. 
45 Youssef Choueiri. 19go. Islamic Fundamentalism. Introduction. for more detail, see 
Ibrahim Abu-Rabi. 1996. Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab 
World. pp. 6-12. One should point out that, despite these themes of continuity, contemporary 
Islamism is not an unproblematic "continuation" of revivalism or reformism; in fact, "the 
literature of Islamic resurgence is highly critical of both". in Abu-Rabi, p. 38. 
46 The term 'radical' itself is problematic, as illustrated by its Oxford dictionary definition, the 
adjective 'radical' being defined as "of the roots of roots; fundamental" or "far-reaching; 
thorough" or "advocating thorough reform; holding extreme political views". But, is political 
Islam concerned with fundamentals, far-reaching change, or extreme political views? These 
definitions are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but they are not synonymous. 
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In the same vein, Ibrahim Karawan attempts to address this problem in his 
definitional framework in The Islamist Impasse47. He differentiates between militant 
and political Islamists, a slightly different formulation of the radical/moderate 
distinction used in the contemporary setting48. Here as elsewhere, such a divide is 
seen in both ideological and tactical terms, mainly to establish clearer boundaries 
between violent and non-violent Islamists. To Karawan: 
Militant leaders ... combine ideological purity and deep contempt for political compromise with a keen sense of urgency for direct 
Islamic action... Militant Islamists believe that their primary 
obligation is to act as dedicated fighters against states which they 
see as embodying contemporary 'ignorance' - jahiliyya. Militants 
reject the current political and social order entirely: they aim to 
wage a war of attrition against the state for as long as it takes to 
overthrow it. In the process, they hope to produce a constant stream 
of martyrs to sustain and increase radical fervoura9 
On the other hand, Karawan defines political Islamists in the following way: 
Political Islamists believe that violent struggle is futile and self- 
defeating, and reject the assumptions of urgency advocated by 
militants. Political Islamist groups include the MB (the region's 
oldest such organisation), the Front Islamique du Salut (F. I. S. ) - 
until the Algerian regime banned it in 1992 - and the parliamentary 
activities of Hizbollah in Lebanon and the Hizb al-Islah (Reform 
Party) in Yemen. The appeal of political Islamism extends beyond 
the marginal elements in urban society to the educated middle 
classes... Political Islamists pursue two key strategies to achieve 
their aim of an Islamic state: they establish socio-economic 
institutions (schools, clinics and day-care centres); and they take 
part in elections whenever possible, even when no change in a 
country's political leadership is in prospect5o 
At face value, this distinction avoids assimilating all Islamists to one model, but does 
it successfully capture both the essence and the diversity of political Islam? Here, the 
problems with 'fundamentalism' resurface, with a choice of terms which is neither 
particularly accurate nor particularly neutral. All Islamists are concerned with 
political problems and political power, and they are all active in trying to affect 
political outcomes. Thus, they can all be defined as 'political' Islamists and 'militants'. 
47Ibrahim Karawan. 1997. The Islamist Impasse: Adelphi paper 314. London: IISS. 
48Ibrahim Karawan. 1997. The Islamist Impasse, pp. 16-24. 
49Ibrahim Karawan. 1997. The Islamist Impasse, pp. 16-19. 
SoIbrahim Karawan. 1997. The Islamist Impasse, pp. 20-21. 
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Moreover, the distinction that Karawan makes between those ready to compromise 
(or who see the futility of violent action) and their more extreme counterparts is 
artificial in several ways. Individuals and groups are diverse in their aims and means, 
but Karawan neglects to mention the changes that the doctrine and tactics of 
Islamists undergo over time due to their dynamic relationships to political actors and 
events. Indeed, as has been pointed out by two commentators on regional forms of 
political Islam, there is little point is dividing Islamists into 'acceptable' and 'non- 
acceptable' categories (i. e. militant/extreme vs. moderate) since moderation and 
extremism can only be defined against the political processes that foster them". As is 
demonstrated by their research, Islamist movements are not the prisoners of their 
own discourse and tactics: these are intrinsically linked to their ability to negotiate 
their access and integration into existing power structuresS2. In the case of Hezbollah, 
both a 'militant' and a 'political' wing of activity coexist, largely as a result of the 
changing socio-political context of Lebanese politics, where Hezbollah supporters can 
now have access to official channels of power through elections53. On the other hand, 
the supporters of the disbanded Algerian F. I. S. - itself a loose coalition of various 
Islamist and Islamic groups - have chosen various tactics for coping with the ending 
of the democratic experiment in early 1992. The G. I. A. groups, along with other 
violent and non-violent groups, are, in part at least, the product of these political 
changes. Therefore, the boundaries between 'extreme' and 'moderate' can and do shift 
in a variety of settings over time. Also, a distinct or covert overlap between violent 
and non-violent wings of the same Islamist organisations are a common occurrence, 
which is well illustrated by the cases of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah 
and the Palestinian Harnas. 
In this sense, the terms 'militant' and 'radical' Islamism illustrate the fact that there 
are inherent definitional problems pertaining to the concept and its internal diversity 
which cannot be easily overcome, if they can be overcome at all. Yet, more 
importantly, the definitional problems outlined above illustrate that in many ways, 
the difficulty in defining political Islam resides in our willingness to make it fit into 
pre-existing conceptual categories it is ill-suited to fit. Describing political Islam as 
extremist, radical or fundamentalist is necessarily inaccurate and often derogatory, 
and the question of whether political Islam is anachronistic or revolutionary is itself a 
reflection of such misconceptions. Instead, our definition ought to acknowledge both 
5 For a discussion of the complexity of classification between extremists and moderates, see 
Martin Kramer. 1997-'The Mismeasure of Political Islam" in his (ed. ) The Islamism Debate. 
Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press. pp. 16iff. 
52Hamit Bozarslan and Cecile. Jolly. 1997. "Turquie, Egypte, Algerie: Violences et Politique" 
Les Cahiers de, L'Orient. 45(1), p. 21. 
53 See the work of Magnus Ranstorp. 
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these inherent difficulties and the fact that these difficulties exist for a reason. 
Substituting the term `political Islam' for 'fundamentalism' amounts to nothing more 
than political correctness if the way in which we understand 'political Islam' and 
envisage studying it do not change as well. Therefore, our definitional task is double: 
it involves finding an adequate term, and changing the parameters for using that 
term. 
3.3.3" A Working Definition 
The most common term which has been used in the recent literature is Islamism or 
political Islam. Designed to detract from the pejorative connotations of 
'fundamentalism' and to translate the inherently political nature of this phenomenon, 
this term has gained wide acceptance and has been seldom criticised54 . As illustrated 
by its extensive use in this chapter, this term is the one preferred in this analysis on 
the following grounds: 
" The terms 'political Islam', 'Islamist politics' and 'Islamism' do not carry 
intrinsically pejorative assumptions. 
" While Islamism is too vague a term (it does not qualify the relationship between 
politics and Islam), it does take on the political dimension of the phenomenon, 
thus making it possible for us to study it in those terms, and in context. 
Additionally, it suggests that such movements cannot be reduced to violence (or 
terrorism) and irrationality. 
" The term 'Islamist politics' is a particularly accurate one, as it conveys the 
diversity and fluidity of this phenomenon. Arguably, one should talk of political 
Islams as opposed to political Islam". As Hilterman pointed out, "the various 
'branches' of the Islamist movement show intriguing variations across Arab 
societies, suggesting perhaps that they are not branches as much as parallel 
movements bearing the same nameiS6. Perhaps then, the best way to deal with 
such a diversity is to define political Islam as nebuleuse Islamiste (Islamist 
nebula), a term coined by the French academic literature on political Islam 17- 
" The term Islamist politics can be applied at both macro and micro levels of 
analysis: general observations concerning the political, religious, or cultural 
54 Nikki Keddie has been the precursor to this change in terminology. See Nikki Keddie. 1986. 
"The Islamist Movement in Tunisia" Maghreb Review 11(1). 
5 "Political Islams" is somewhat problematic as a terns given that the plural "Islams" is 
grammatically incorrect. 
5 . Joost Hilterman. 1997. "Introduction to Part Five", in. Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds. ) Political Islam. p. 311. 
57See Michel Seurat. 1989. "L'Utopie Islamiste au Moyen-Orient Arabe" in L'Etat de Barbarie. 
Paris: Seuil (Esprit). pp. 5-6. 
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relevance of political Islam do not necessarily exclude micro analyses of the 
diversity of the phenomenon by looking at specific groups. 
As a result, the political movements this dissertation investigates are simply termed 
Islamist movements, groups and political parties. Their ideologies and their 
manifestations are termed political Islam, Islamist politics or, generally speaking, 
Islamism. In turn, uncovering what these terms actually imply in the contemporary 
Algerian context is, to a large extent, the aim this analysis. 
Overall, Islamism can be seen as a historically distinct political-religious 
phenomenon with cultural, religious, social and political expressions, and which is 
neither bound to traditional forms of Islam or to scriptural literalism. As an ideology, 
it sees its interpretation of Islam and Islamic law as the most comprehensive and 
only legitimate guide to government. Thus, 
The term 'political Islam' is associated here with the goal and 
related political programme designed to establish a worldwide 
Islamic order. This goal has been pursued on two related level: one 
challenging the status quo within Muslim countries and the other 
representing an increasingly transnational network of contacts 
aimed at establishing a 'Pax-Islamica' (literally Islamic peace) 
across the Arab and Muslim world58. 
As a self-proclaimed alternative to secular nationalism, liberal democracy, socialism 
and capitalism, it is opposed to Western influence, it aims to undermine existing 
regimes, and it sees political activism as a religious duty. As a political movement, its 
objective is to seize political power to effect radical socio-cultural and political 
change. In terms of policies, Islamism carries a conservative agenda emphasising the 
importance of Islamic Law as the main source of legislation and affecting issues 
ranging from distributive justice, to public mores and a range of issues that are bound 
to the specific environments in which it operates59. As a region-wide movement, it is 
both fragmentary (i. e. bound to its specific environment) and versatile in its rhetoric 
and choice of tactics. But, most importantly, because it is a full-fledged political actor, 
it changes over time through interactions with other political actors. Thus, 
In discussing political Islam, we must move beyond the explication 
of texts and the biographies of intellectual figures to examine the 
local circumstances and historical particularities of each movement, 
58 Anoushivaran Ehteshami. 1997. "Islamic Fundamentalism and Political Islam". p. 180. 
59Laura Guazzone. 1995. "Islamism and Islamists in the Contemporary Arab World". P-5. 
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which often turn out to be more substantial than a simple 
conception of 'Islam' in opposition to secular politics60 
Yet, before this analysis moves on to an analysis of such a case study, a consideration 
of the contexts in which the term political Islam should be used - and a discussion of 
the analytical foci which are implied by this definitional problematic - are in order. 
3.4. Refocusing the analysis of Political Islam 
So far, this analysis has pointed to the fact that Islamist groups and parties can and 
should be seen as contemporary political and social movements which act in the 
context of various national and regional structures and within the international 
political arena. Notwithstanding the strong religious and cultural components that 
Islamist politics imply, our focus needs to be firmly placed on that context if we are to 
successfully map out the main feature of this multifaceted phenomenon, and thus to 
ultimately better understand its religious and cultural components. The analytical 
focus should be placed on "a historical examination of the articulation of Islamic 
political movements with the surrounding social structure, state formation, 
competing ideologies, and exogenous forces such as colonialism and the world 
marketi61. The aim of this section is thus to substantiate the claim that, given the 
specific political circumstances in which they operate, Islamist movements constitute 
a indigenous form of protest, and a political alternative to existing power structures 
and ideologies". In turn, there are various aspects to that claim, which will be 
investigated systematically. These include: 
" The socio-political contexts of political Islam and their influence on its rise as a 
region-wide phenomenon (and, in particular, political Islam's relationship to the 
state); 
" Its place in existing power structures and political processes; 
" And its relationship to modernity as a political construct and the modern world as 
a lived social reality. 
60 Joel Beinin and Joe Stork. 1997. "On the Modernity, Historical Specificity, and 
International Context of Political Islam". P-7- 
61 Eric Davis. 1987. "The Concept of Revival and the Study of Islam and Politics" in Barbara 
Stowasser (ed. ) The Islamic Impulse. Georgetown: Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies. 
P-37. 
62 Ibrahim Abu-Rabi. 1996. Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab 
World. p. 53. 
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3.4.1" Political Islam in Context 
Many authors have justly demonstrated how distinctive forms of social, political and 
economic hardship have underpinned the growth of Islamist groups in the region 
since the mid-1970s. Their analyses of the growth of contemporary Islamism have 
established a connection between disaffection with the political system, socio- 
economic hardship and religious resurgence63. R. Hrair Dekmejian's conceptual 
model in Islam and Revolution exemplifies this trend". Dekmejian's framework for 
understanding the underpinning dynamics of political Islam emphasises the dual 
importance of historical context and current socio-economic and political trends to 
explain the allure of such an ideological alternative. He thus links in context with 
ideology (and leadership) as the leading factors in the success of the Islamist 'recipe 6' 
(see Figure 3.1. ). 
63 See for instance, Nazih Ayubi's framework on the socio-economic bases of political Islam in 
Nazih Ayubi. 1991. PoliticalIslam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World. pp. 158ff. Richards 
and Waterbury go further when they engage with the idea of a political economy of Islamism. 
See Alan Richards and JohnWaterbury. 1996 A Political Economy of the Middle East (2nd 
ed. ). Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 346ff. 
64 R. Hrair Dekmejian. 1995. Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (2nd 
Ed. ) Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. See also R. Hrair Dekmejian. 1988. "Islamic 
Revival: Catalysts, Categories, and Consequences" in Shireen T. Hunter (ed. ) The Politics of 
Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
65 R. Hrair Dekmejian. 1995. Islam in Revolution. See chapter one for overall framework. 
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From: R. Hrair Dekmejian. 1995. Islam in Revolution. Reproduction of Fig 1, p. 5. 
This approach has been echoed by recent accounts of political Islam - both in general 
terms and in case study analyses6". Perhaps Beinin and Stork summarise this 
dynamic best when they state: 
All these movements draw strength from the widespread 
deficiencies of the postcolonial states in the Middle East: massive 
corruption, overreliance on coercion, and the failure of Arab 
socialism in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Algeria - and a comparable form 
66 For a good summary of the debates surrounding the 'Islamic Resurgence', see John Voll. 
1994. ! slam: Contüiuity (End Gumge in the Modern World (2nd ed. ) Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press. chapter seven. 
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of state-led development in Turkey - to produce sustained 
development... These failures have coincided with the collapse of 
various secularist, nationalist, and leftist political projects, leaving 
the field of opposition politics more or less open to Islamists67. 
As a result, political Islam is interpreted as "distinctive mode of response to major 
social and cultural change introduced either by exogenous or indigenous forces and 
perceived as threatening to dilute or dissolve the clear lines of Islamic identity, or to 
overwhelm that identity in a synthesis of many different elementsi68. In addition to 
this crisis environment, several historical factors are crucial to this "response": 
colonialism and neo-imperialism are framed in a historical interpretation of 
oppression and decline, most poignantly exemplified by the creation of Israel and, in 
particular the defeat by Israel in 196769. This is not the only case study worth 
mentioning in this regard however, as one commentator of South Asia remarks: 
To assume that fundamentalism is merely linked to religious issues 
is, in the Indian case at least, to elide issues of class, the after-effects 
of colonialism and the protest of the marginalised against the 
institutionalised system of privileges70. 
In this context, the rise of protest movements such as Islamism can be inscribed 
within the broader framework of decolonisation and its consequences. 
In essence, these approaches are useful in accounting for the `reactive' dimension of 
political Islam, since it focuses on 'Historical Anchors' and a 'Crisis Environment' as 
explanatory factors for the rise of contemporary Islamist movements. However, this 
type of approach pays little attention to `proactive' dimensions of Islamist politics and 
thus risks underplaying an essential dimension of the equation: the ideological depth 
and the complexity of Islamist doctrine. According to such a model, Islamist ideology 
can easily end up being defined almost by default, as an ideological ersatz featuring 
just criticism of the state, but still politically hollow. The often vague religious 
terminology and imagery used to frame this criticism seem to yield little practical 
relevance, particularly from a Western perspective". The opaque nature of Islamism 
67 Joel Beinin and Joe Stork. 1997. "On the Modernity, Historical Specificity, and 
International Context of Political Islam". p. 8. 
68 John Voll. 1992. "Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan" in 
Martin Marty and Scott Appleby (eds. ) Fundamentalism Observed. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. p. 347. 
69 Ibrahim Abu-Rabi. 1996. Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab 
World. P. 262. and R. Hrair Dekmejian. 1995. Islam in Revolution. pp. 28-29. 
70 Sanjay Srivastava. "Introduction" Special Issue on Nationalism The Australian journal of 
Anthropology 7(2). p. 93. 
71 For an example on this type of focus, see Marnia Marzeg. 1998. "Islamism and the 
Recolonization of Algeria" Arab Studies Quarterly 20(2 -Spring). In her analysis of the 
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as an ideology stems largely from the fact that, along with many Islamists and their 
constituency, analysts persist in analysing Islamist doctrine in a political and 
ideological vacuum, through the religious prism of its rhetoric, when other ideological 
influences are also at play72. More than a 'theatre of operation' for Islamists, the 
political world and its ideological currents lie at the core of the formulation of 
Islamist doctrine. 
As a consequence, Dekmejian's assumptions regarding the individual motivations for 
adhering to the Islamist ideological alternative can be altered to take into account the 
fact that political Islam is more than a social-spiritual refuge, or a source of comfort 
in a difficult, unpredictable world: 
Tale 3.1. The Appeal of the Islamist Alternative: 73 
Dekmejian's model Amended Model 
Islamic fundamentalism bestows a new Islamist ideologies articulate political 
identity upon a multitude of alienated indi- alternatives to existing political orders 
-viduals who have lost their social-spiritual and cultural mores 
bearings 
It defines the world-views of the believers in They provide incisive critiques of current 
unambiguous terms by identifying the state structures and behaviour 
sources of good and evil 
It offers alternative modalities to cope with Islamist politics often provide practical 
the harsh environment help in lieu of the state as well as spiritual 
assistance to societies in crisis 
It provides a protest ideology against the They provide a protest ideology against 
established order the established order and provide the 
ideological justification for carrying out 
political protest 
It grants a sense of dignity and belonging, They provide opportunities for political 
and a spiritual refuge from uncertainty expression and empowerment as well as 
spiritual guidance at the individual level 
It promises a better life in a future Islamist They promise political change in morally, 
utopia culturally, and religiously legitimated 
terms 
From: column one - R. Hrair Dekmejian. 1995. Islam in Revolution. from p. 49. 
Bearing this qualifier in mind, this view of the reactive dimension of political Islam 
has now gained wide acceptance and has led to insightful analyses depicting the 
Algerian case study, she emphasises the 'nihilistic' aspect of Islamist discourse. For a full 
discussion of this paper, see chapter five. 
72See chapter five on ideological sources, and complexity in political imagination for our case 
study. 
73 R. Hrair Dekmejian. 1995. Islam in Revolution. from p. 49. 
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complex dynamics which characterise the relationship of Islamist movements to 
other political actors, and in particular, the state. 
3.4.2 Islamism and the State 
For Charles Tripp, various forms of Islamism are "responses to encounters with 
particular forms of power of which the state may be the most public and symbolic 
repository. The goals and methods of the organisations associated with the 
reassertion of Islamic values in political life are to a large degree shaped by the 
structures of imagination and power appropriate to the statei74. In this sense, the 
rise of contemporary political Islam is intrinsically linked to the various legitimacy 
crises characterising Middle Eastern and North African states, and consequently, its 
various forms and evolution are predicated upon the social, political and economic 
conditions which define this crisis. In this setting, analysts such Nazih Ayubi have 
been accurate in defining the relationship between the state and Islamist groups as 
inherently oppositional: 
... the quest for authenticity and the quest 
for participation, have in 
reality expressed themselves in the form of a confrontation between 
the Islamists and the State. For it is precisely the modem secular 
State which - in their view - has caused the alienation while failing 
to provide the political and economic opportunities. Given this 
perspective, it is not easy to mistake the distinctly anti-statist 
colouring of the Islamist discourse75. 
In keeping with Tripp's and Ayubi's conclusions, Islamist groups and political parties 
can be defined as political groups which are the product of specific set of political 
structures and relationships, and which have defined themselves in oppositional 
terms to existing forms of power embodied by the state, in religious, cultural, 
ideological, moral and political terms and according to their own political project. 
This oppositional character manifests itself at the level of doctrine formation, in the 
choice of tactics in dealing with the political world (especially in terms of acquisition 
of political power), and in the overall dynamics guiding political relationships 
between Islamists and other political actors76. This being said, "the assumptions and 
concepts of the nation-state underlie, implicitly or explicitly, most modem Islamist 
ideologies"". Islamist politics thus, while challenging the power of the state, do not 
74Charles Tripp. 1996. "Islam and the Secular Logic of the State in the Middle East" in 
Sidahmed and Ehteshami. (eds) Islamic Fundamentalism. p. 52. emphasis added. 
75Nazih Ayubi. 1991. Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the modern World, p. 220. 
76 Francois Burgat 1996. L7slamisme en Face. Paris: La Decouverte. pp. 78ff. 
7 Sami Zubaida. 1997. "Is Iran an Islamic State? " in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds. ) Political 
Islam. p. 105. 
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attempt for the most part to question the existence of states per se. In many ways, the 
strategies for articulating politics fit into existing patterns of political behaviour and 
rhetoric's. Overall, this type of approach 'brings the state back in' to the analysis of 
political Islam (along with other political actors which are linked to the Islamist-state 
connection). It is the substance of the challenge of political Islam to the state - in 
religious, moral and ideological terms - rather than its forms (violent or not, 
successful or not) that constitute the linchpin to our understanding this 
phenomenon79. 
Overall, it can be said that the interaction between Islamists and other political actors 
within and outside power structures have highlighted the deeply challenging nature 
of political Islam to the political and cultural status quo of the societies in which it 
operates. By proposing a full-fledged alternative to existing political structures and 
the loci of power within those regimes, political Islam has proved to be on a collision 
course with the state, and in many cases it has proved to be regimes' most formidable 
(and sometimes sole) opposition80. On the other hand, the growing confidence, 
maturity and popularity of Islamist political parties and movements in the Middle 
East and North Africa, which have been accompanied by a timid and ambiguous 
process of political liberalisation throughout the region81, have raised the prospect of 
- and have sometimes led to - the involvement of Islamists in the democratic process, 
most notably in Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, and Jordan82. This involvement (through 
elections, charitable and welfare associations, professional unions and other 
channels) has resulted in a variety of state responses ranging from violent repression 
(for instance in Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria) to co-optation (attempted, often in 
conjunction with repressive measures in Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan) or inclusion in 
existing democratic processes (with the notable example of Turkey)". 
78 This argument on duality, and ambiguity, will be substantiated for our case study in our 
main analytical chapters. 
79 For a set of short case studies depicting the dynamic between the state and its Islamist 
opposition, see John Esposito. 1992. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? Chapter Four. 
8o The case of Algeria is the most obvious one, but Islamist opposition has also made 
significant inroads elsewhere (especially in the Maghreb) and have overtaken Leftist and 
Liberal opposition groups in terms of size and popularity. Esposito, among others, has showed 
that Islamism has moved from a peripheral position on the political chessboard of Middle 
Eastern societies to articulate more mainstream opposition. John Esposito. 1994" The Islamic 
Threat: Myth or Reality? pp. 22ff. 
8lexamples here of increase in elections but raise doubts as to how meaningful the changes 
they imply are. 
82 For a summary on the Turkish case, see Ronnie Margulies and Ergin Yidizoglu. 1997. "The 
Resurgence of Islam and the Welfare Party in Turkey" in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds. ) 
Political Islam. 
83 Michael C. Hudson. 1995. "Arab Regimes and Democratization: Responses to the Challenge 
of Political Islam" in Laura Guazzone (ed. ) The Islamist Dilemma. chapter eight. 
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In this sense, it can be argued that Islamist groups and political parties have proven 
to be not only embedded in the political process as full-fledged actors, but also to be 
the actors setting the political agenda against the state. For instance, Algerian 
Islamists in the late i98os and early 199os, organised around the F. I. S. coalition were 
the fiercest (and best organised) critics of the lack of state legitimacy, and its 
inefficiency and corruption. In the aftermath of the 1988 food riots and the violent 
response of the regime, the F. I. S. effectively monopolised the discourse for political 
protest and articulated a political programme of reforms demanding greater political 
pluralism through a process of democratisation, as well as economic and social 
reform. In turn, it is through this largely oppositional programme that Algerian 
Islamists managed to gain mainstream support at the grassroots level, as reflected by 
their local elections' victory in June 1990 and promising elections results in the first 
round of the aborted 1991/1992 legislative elections84. Similarly, Islamists in 
Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, among others, have put forward coherent and often just 
criticisms of the state, despite the lack of political sophistication the common Islamist 
slogan "Islam is the solution" seems to suggest. In fact, it would be injudicious to 
define Islamists purely in terms of their political slogans given the inherently 
oppositional nature of their political outlook. It is, in many ways, the problems that 
they highlight through their political challenge to the state that confer them their 
political relevance and strength. 
Furthermore, the relationship between political Islam and the realms of political 
power is not necessarily translated into direct confrontation for access to official, and 
formal, channels of political representation. For instance, the success of Egyptian 
Islamists in having effectively replaced the state in its welfare functions at the local 
level (in terms of charity, education, social and medical provisions, etc. ) and its 
successful penetration of most prestigious professional associations (including the 
Egyptian Engineering, Bar and Medical Associations) confirm political Islam's ability 
to capture the grass-root and middle class level of political legitimacy, and power85. 
This ability, in turn, conjures up images of an unofficial Islamist state functioning 
within a larger stateS6. Here, there is mixed evidence supporting the viability of such 
an Islamist alternative. Indeed, on the one hand the accession to power of an army- 
Islamist coalition in the Sudan, the political and social control of the Taliban forces in 
Afghanistan, as well as the continued political strength of the Islamic regime in Iran 
84 See chapter four for greater detail. 
85For an excellent overview of the Islamist penetration of informal channels of power in 
Egypt, see Carrie Rosefsky Wickham. 1997. "Islamic Mobilisation and Political Change: The 
Islamist Trend in Egypt's Professional Associations". in Beinin and Stork (eds. ) Political 
Islam. 
86Rosefsky Wickham coins the term "state within a state" on p. i3o. 
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(arguably the closest example of an Islamic state by Islamist standards) illustrate that 
the Islamist alternative is de facto a realistic possibility, albeit a controversial one87. 
Still, the particulars of an Islamist-defined Islamic state are themselves a problematic 
issue, as the connection between the shari'a and effective policy-making in terms of 
internal political problems, law and economic policy and well as foreign policy is far 
from straightforward. 
3.4.3" Islamism and The Political Process 
In addition to power considerations, the Islamists' interaction with the state in 
various Middle Eastern states has often raised issues concerning the nature of the 
state and political processes which go beyond the scope of the Islamist political 
agenda. In particular, the substance of the Islamist critique of state policies and 
legitimacy fits into broader patterns of state-building affecting the structure of civil 
society, its strength and its role, and thus the prospects and possible types of 
democratisation -a set of phenomena which, until recently, was analysed in isolation 
from contemporary protest movements such as political Islam". The prospect of 
meaningful democratisation in the Middle East remains a thorny issue at best89, 
especially with the added prospect of Islamists gaining power through elections 
despite being largely perceived as antidemocratic forces90. As Bill and Springborg 
show, 
Fundamental questions of identity, authenticity, and legitimacy 
continue to plague the region. As the winds of democratization gust 
unevenly across the world, most Middle Eastern governments still 
resist transforming their political systems and maintain power 
87Whether Iran is an example of an Islamic state as envisioned by Islamists is a debated issue 
among Islamists themselves and in the Western literature on the subject. See, for instance, 
Olivier Roy. 1994. The Failure of Political Islam. London: I. B. Tauris. and Sami Zubaida. 1997. 
"Is Iran an Islamic State? " in Beinin and Stork (eds). Political Islam. 
88 The issue of Islam's compatibility has also been debated widely, but with varying degrees of 
success, see Martin Kramer. 1993. "Islam vs. Democracy" Commentary 95(1). Bernard Lewis. 
1993. "Islam and Liberal Democracy" Atlantic Monthly. February. For more recent analyses 
bucking this trend, see Najib Ghadbian. 1997. Democratization and the Islamist Challenge in 
the Arab World. Boulder: Westview Press. For a general approach on civil society and 
democratisation in the region, see Nazih Ayubi. 1995. Over-stating the Arab State: Politics 
and Society in the Middle East. London: I. B. Tauris. chapter eleven. See also, for a more 
general summary, Heather Deegan. 1993. The Middle East and Problems of Democracy. 
Buckingham: Open University Press. 
89 The lack of democratic foundations in Middle East should not be assumed to be solely due a 
Middle Eastern cultural exceptionalism in this regard - as Charles Issawi argued, it is the 
presence and control of French and British colonial powers in the region that prevented the 
growth of such foundations. See Issawi. 1956. "Economic and Social Foundations of 
Democracy in the Middle East" International Affairs 32. 
For a balanced view of this issue, see Gudrun Krämer. 1997. "Islamist Notions of 
Democracy". in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds. ) Political Islam. 
108 
through incremental reform, selective coercion, and economic 
inducement. Genuine political participation remains a distant goal. 
Nonetheless, there has been movement as defensive political leaders 
increasingly announce constitutional reform, electoral processes, 
and the formation of a wide variety of consultative parliamentary 
bodies91 
The Islamist issue takes special importance in this context, and in several ways. 
Firstly, democratisation represents one of the principal legitimising tools of the 
nation-state, and has also become, despite early rejection, one the main agendas 
pushed by Islamists as a means of ensuring their participation in the political process 
and as a way to challenge what they perceive to be the regimes' lack of popular (and 
religious) legitimacy. Secondly, the issue of inclusion of Islamists into the 
democratisation process raises a number of issues relating to the nature of democracy 
in the Middle East. Arguably, Western liberal democracy has traditionally implied a 
set of principles and codes of conduct complementing a set of structures and a form 
of government92. The vehement rejection of Western political and cultural forms by 
Islamists has raised alarm concerning the commitment of Islamists to uphold 
democratic principles if elected, raising the spectre of autocratic - and in fact 
theocratic - regimes93. In a nutshell, the 'Islamist dilemma' lies between excluding the 
Islamist opposition from the political process at the risk of creating double standards 
with regards to the freedom to participate in representative government (and thus 
undermining democracy), and including Islamists and running the risk of letting 
them win a legitimate victory by `Western' standards, only to subsequently uphold 
undemocratic principles and law, if not to cancel democratic processes altogether9a 
91 James A. Bill and Robert Springborg. 1994. Politics in the Middle East (4th Ed. ) New York: 
HarperCollins. pp. ix-x. 
92 In his discussion of democratisation in the Middle East, Jean Leca defines democracy thus: 
"The meaning of 'democratic rules' usually takes on, prima facie, a legal-organizational 
dimension: the legal existence of political parties and interest groups and their integration 
into a constitutional legal order. But is also has a normative dimension, the core of which is 
pluralism... that is to say that no single group or party enjoys a monopoly on the political truth. 
Pluralism thus entails tolerance, acceptance of majority rule, limited government, and 
protection of basic rights. The term'democratic rules' also has a power dimension: the sharing 
of power within the system, the emergence of different centres of power, and the 
accountability of power-holders to elected representatives and to public opinion". Jean Leca. 
1992. "Democratisation in the Arab World: Uncertainty, Vulnerability and Legitimacy" in 
Salame (ed. ) Democracy without Democrats? p. 49. 
93 For a discussion of these ambiguities, see Gudrun Krämer. 1995. "Cross-Links and Double 
Talk? Islamic Movements in the Political Process" in Laura Guazzone. The Islamist Dilemma. 
94See Laura Guazzone, "Islamism and Islamists in the Contemporary Arab World" in Laura 
Guazzone, ed., The Islamist Dilemma, P. 22. One should thus beware of explanations which 
rely on the 'essence' of religion to make generalisations about the political outlook of a 
civilisation. See also Gudrun Krämer. 1994. "The Integration of the Integrists: a Comparative 
Study of Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia" in Ghassan Salame (ed. ) Democracy without 
Democrats?. In the case of Algeria, Lahouari Addi joined an echo of protest against the 
participation of Islamist in elections on the grounds that a working democracy requires 
committed partners. Lahouari Addi. 1992. "Islamicist Utopia and Democracy" in Charles 
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Thirdly, the evolution of Islamic and Islamist discourse on democratisation has raised 
the issue of whether Western democratic systems are applicable or appropriate to the 
Middle East, and have paved the way for the development of Islamic, if not Islamist, 
interpretations of political representation and political legitimacy which are neither 
what current Middle Eastern states practice not what the West advocates. 
Here, the question of whether principled democracy necessarily implies that free and 
fair elections should occur along the Western democratic model remain a 
controversial one95. It is possible to conceive of a 'principled' form of democracy 
based on other principles than those implied in the Western liberal model, Islam 
being as worthy an actual/potential candidate as any96. Still, acknowledging that 
there is, in principle, no reason for Islam to be incompatible with democracy does not 
imply that Islamists are necessarily democratic in their outlook, or even that Middle 
Eastern societies are democratic. Here, the question of whether Islamists work within 
democratic systems logically precedes the question of whether they can be democratic 
themselves, and an adequate answer to the first question is a precondition to dealing 
with the second. While the question of whether Islamists can or should be included in 
the democratic process is a fascinating and important one, its treatment must come 
with the acknowledgement that most regimes against which they operate also lack 
political legitimacy and meaningful democratic credentials97. In this sense, the issue 
of democratisation puts the political agenda of both the Islamists and existing 
regimes into question, and highlights the particulars of the political culture of the 
societies in which these relationships are taking place98. As Kedourie puts it, the 
category of 'democratisation' is thus quite problematic: 
Butterworth and I. William Zartman (eds. ) Political Islam: Special Issue of the Annals of the 
Academy of Political and Social Science. 524 (November). 
95Not only are different Islamist groups and parties defining the application of the shari'a in 
different ways, but Western misperceptions of the Islamist political programmes and their 
own views on the categories and preconditions that underpin political dogma in general 
somewhat skew their interpretation of the potential/actual effectiveness and relevance of 
Islamist politics. 
96 As Ghassan Salame justly states, "a Muslim would have difficulty in accepting the his 
religion legitimizes nothing but authoritarianism, even if he admits that Islam has in effect 
been taken as an obligatory point of reference by innumerable non-democrtic regimes and 
parties throughout history. Someone who is both a good Muslim and a good democrat is not 
an aberration". Ghassan Salame. 1994""Introduction: Where are the Democrats" in Salame 
(ed. ). 1994. Democracy without Democrats?. PP. 3-4. 
97 To complicate matters further, one can identify a clear state double-speak on democracy in 
the Middle East. The fact that Western liberal democratic models cannot be seen as inherently 
universal opens the door to non-democratic practices to be labelled as 'differently' democratic. 
Issues of definition are thus of prime importance since the line between democracy and non- 
democracy, while difficult to define, exists. 
98 This is an issue of great debate - can the Middle East be considered an exceptional case 
where political culture forms an obstacle to democratisation? Ghassan Salame, among others, 
questions such exceptionalism as opening the door local apologists to reject democratisation 
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... democracy is an ambiguous and equivocal word which can easily be exploited in double-talk, and which, taken on its own, is 
incapable of giving one an appreciation of the complex of ideas and 
institutions which serve as a specific against despotism and a 
safeguard for political freedom. It is safer, more exact, and more 
intelligible to speak rather of constitutional and representative 
government" 
From this context, the state-building processes which underpin each of the societies 
concerned need to be discussed in more depth. In particular, the widely debated 
importance of a civil society as the pillar for the development of a democratic civic 
culture is cast into new light when civil society expresses itself through Islamist 
politicsloo The compatibility a democratic, pluralist political culture with a political 
culture based on religious principles is far from obvious (a problem which is further 
compounded by the problems associated with analysing the cultural or religious 
elements of politics in the Middle East from a Western perspective). The extent and 
meaning of political relationships at the more informal level of civil society is also a 
indicator of the types of, and change in state-society relations, given that election 
results are not necessarily the most reliable sources of information regarding civil 
discontent and protest. As a result, the question of whether Islamist politics 
constitute a religious, or a conservative, or even a nationalist force in civil society is 
the key to understanding the mechanisms for social protest in Middle Eastern 
societies. Moreover, the contents of Islamist forms of social protest are indicative of 
problems in state-building specific to the postcolonial Middle East, and articulated to 
reflect local political and social conditions. The range of Islamist political promises 
and criticisms of the state covers practical issues of legitimacy in representation, 
inefficiency and corruption to match moral and symbolic expectations and 
principles. The distinction between these two dimensions is analytically important, as 
these reflect intertwined facets of the state-building process. On the one hand, the 
in the name of "authenticity" (see footnote 91). See Ghassan Salame. 1994""Introduction: 
Where are the Democrats? " in Salame (ed. ) Democracy without Democrats?. PP. 1-3 
99Elie Kedourie. 1994. Democracy and Arab Political Culture. London: Frank Cass. P. 5. 
1O° Muhammad Muslih and A. Richard Norton have argued that civil society is often under- 
developed in the Middle East due to existing relationships of clientelism. See Muhammad 
Muslih and Augustus Richard Norton. 1991. Political Tides in the Middle East. New York: 
Foreign Policy Association. p. 11. Could political Islam be seen as a force which can transcend 
such ties and create an opening for such a civil society? As Gudrun Krämer has pointed out, 
"The demand for human rights, participation and democracy comes from across the political 
spectrum, from the nationalist and secularist Arab left... to the broad Islamist movement that 
over the last two decades has emerged as a dominant voice in intellectual and political life", in 
Krämer. 1992. "Liberalization and Democracy in the Arab World" Middle East Report 22, 
P. 23. Overall, our analysis of political Islam as a social movement illustrating the possibilities 
for civil societies can be seen to problematise this concept in a fundamental way. 
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pragmatic dimension of the Islamist agenda underlines structural problems in the 
articulation of political power. These can be institutional (with lack of representation 
or authoritarianism), at the level of practice (with corruption) or based on the 
political vision of individuals (Ataturk's secularisation policies in Turkey are an 
example). On the other hand, the Islamist political project (an Islamic state, the re- 
Islamisation of society, the rejection of Westernising cultural influences) outlines a 
genuine alternative in the values that underpin state-building as well as nation- 
building. It touches upon issues of political and moral identity, and how these 
translate in the political process through individuals and institutions. 
The relationship between (religiously based) morality and politics in political Islam is 
another, related, contentious topic, and thus worth addressing, even briefly. As a 
starting point, one observes that Islamist movements have not actively sought to 
eliminate political institutions altogether in order to amalgamate politics to a 
religious-based morality, as it has often been argued. So far, Islamists have been 
willing to be politically active within the confines of existing states and through 
official political channels when permitted to do so1°'. Arguably, "by and large they 
accept the territorial and political framework of the existing states and their economic 
foundations, which have been shaped by the legacy of European interests in the 
Middle East"102. Still, Islamist doctrine both advocates the creation an Islamic state 
and promotes the idea of a unified, stateless Islamic ummah. The ambiguity is thus 
double: are Islamists advocating the creation of theocracies (which they would 
perhaps base on the Iranian model103) or are they calling the very notion of the state 
illegitimate? Are Islamists playing the political game for instrumental reasons or is 
representation (through the principle of shura - consultation) the keystone to the 
very notion of, political and religious legitimacy for Islamists? Islamist movements 
across the region have been reluctant to fully clarify their position in this regard, and, 
arguably, part of the Islamist appeal lies in this ambiguity'°4 
-'Furthermore, Islamists have often framed their discourse in state-bound terms - e. g. 
"Tunisian Islam" rhetoric of Shaik Hamid al-Nayfar. Quoted in Joost Hilterman. 1997. 
"Introduction to Part Five" in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds. ) Political Islam. p. 311. 
102 Joel Beinin and Joe Stork. 1997. "On the Modernity, Historical Specificity, and 
International Context of Political Islam". P. 4. 
103 Sami Zubaida highlights the internationalist and nationalist strands of political Islam in 
Iran. see Zubaida. 1997. "Is Iran an Islamic State? ". in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds. ) 
Political Islam. p. 105ff. 
104 The roots and importance of morality, and especially moral legitimacy, is crucial to 
Islamists, and this issue will be addressed in the case of Algerian Islamism in Chapter Five. 
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3.4.4" Islamist Politics and Modernity 
The equation of the austere Islamist political agenda and its rejection of 'Western 
values' has often been equated with traditionalism at best, and the longing for a 
feudal society at worst. This misreading of the nature of contemporary political Islam 
challenges both the Islamist ideology and its historical origins. Ideologically, Islamist 
politics differ radically from most traditional Islamic scholarship in their insistence 
on political activism and in their opposition to state power. In the same vein, the 
historical resurgence of Islam as a political force has been concerned with 
undermining the influence of Sufi orders and other mystical versions of Islam. 
Contemporary political Islam has challenged the traditional orders' political passivity, 
thus fundamentally challenging the power and legitimacy of traditional Islamist 
clerics (ulema)1°5 Thus, we need not oversimplify Islamist political thought and 
objectives as anachronistic or traditionalist. Indeed, the Islamist world-view is 
composed of both traditional and contemporary elements, in the same way that it is 
composed of religious and political components with the production of a hybrid 
political discourse this implies"'. An example of this lies in the notion of Islamic 
Banking, a model for banking which attempts to reconcile the ethical requisites of 
Islam (concerning usury in particular) with the necessity of participation in the global 
economy1°7. In addition, and as Olivier Roy argues, the didactic manner in which the 
Islamist intelligentsia develops its religious knowledge and its extensive use of new 
technologies have led to traditional channels within Islam being bypassed and to the 
production of a new, fragmented discourse that is "more imaginary than 
theoretical"108. Hybridity is more than ideological in nature here: it involves the tools 
of the Western culture such as the internet being used in a countercultural manner, 
and across boundaries"'. 
Overall then, dealing with the question of modernity is more than a definitional 
endeavour, since the relationship between political Islam and what we understand as 
the modern world has helped define Islamist movements' aims, as Abu-Rabi has 
justly pointed out for the case of Egypt: 
las Graham E. Fuller ad Ian 0. Lesser. 1995. A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and 
the West. Boulder: Westview Press. p. 6. 
106 More details on this point in the specific context of Algeria in chapter four. 
107 For a discussion of this controversial topic, see Karen Pfeifer. 1997. "Is there an Islamic 
Economics? " in Beinin and Stork (eds. ) Political Islam. 
108 Olivier Roy. 1994. The Failure of Political Islam. London: I. B. Tauris. p. 97. 
109 in the case of Algerian Islamism, an example of an internet site dedicated to activism can 
be found at http: //www. bakoone. il2. com/fis. html. The site address for the FIS supporters in 
the UK has changed over the years, presumably for security reasons. 
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Reacting to Westernization and its various cultural and political 
forms and expressions, Islamic resurgence, in the form of the 
Islamic Brotherhood Movement, aimed, from its very beginning at 
finding the al-hall al-islami (Islamic Solution) -a famous slogan of 
all Islamic organisations - to the problems of alienation, education, 
economic organization, and social justice in society'lo 
In fact, the question of whether Islamism represents a rejection of modernity, an 
expression of modernity, or a post-modern ideological current lies at the core of our 
understanding of what political Islam stands for and whether it poses a genuine 
challenge to the 'West' in ideological and cultural terms. But firstly, we need to 
elucidate what we mean by modernity and how it applies to political Islam. 
Central to the conception of modernity dominant among social scientists is the 
'secularisation thesis' whereby industrialisation leads to a decline in the influence of 
religion over time, as exemplified by the Industrial Revolution in Europe and as 
argued from the 1950s onwards through the medium of 'modernisation theory'"' 
Here, modernisation can be defined as "the process by which historically evolved 
institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the 
unprecedented increase in man's (sic) knowledge, permitting control over his 
environment, that accompanied the scientific revolutionr'12. In addition, Anthony 
Giddens delineates four main institutions that characterise modernity thus 
understood: industrialisation, capitalism, the concentration of military power, and 
the control, or surveillance, of the social realm - all of which constitute the building 
blocks of the transition from traditional societies to modernity113 This process is 
aimed at the progressive undermining of the traditional bases of knowledge (cultural, 
political and religious) and thus the "institutionalization of doubt""' 
Can this analysis be transposed to other regions of the world where a similar 
revolution was forestalled by colonialism, however? Ernest Gellner is but one analyst 
who has questioned the validity of this thesis, or at least challenged its universal 
applicability by remarking that: 
the secularization thesis does not apply to Islam. In the course of 
the last one hundred years, the hold of Islam over the minds and 
'to Ibrahim Abu-Rabi. 1996. Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab 
World. p. 51. 
'Il For an overview, see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori Muslim Politics. Princeton 
(NJ): Princeton University Press. pp. 22ff. 
112 C. E. Black. 1966. The Dynamics of Modernization. New York: Harper and Row. P. 7- 
113 Anthony Giddens. 199o. The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford (Cal): Stanford 
University Press. p. 59. 
114 Anthony Giddens. 199o. The Consequences of Modernity. p. 176. 
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hearts of believers has not diminished and, by some criteria, has 
probably increased"'. 
Such an observation is not easy to dismiss; it is indeed evident that the influence of 
Islam has not diminished throughout the region, even in states, such as Atatürk's 
Turkey, where concerted efforts to 'modernise' were accompanied by deliberate 
attempts to secularise. And if we are to take the contemporary development of 
Islamist movements throughout the region as an indicator of strength of religious 
feeling, one cannot but acknowledge the remarkable resilience of Islam to the 
pressures such 'modernisation-secularisation" 16 From these observations, analysts 
have attempted to account for the special role Islam may play in resistance to 
modernity thus understood. Bill and Springborg for instance see socio-economic 
factors as crucial to the development of state structures in the Middle East. Yet, they 
still argue that Islam itself can work to impede nation and state-building given its 
universalist outlook and its structural implications for social stratification"'. Islamic 
universalism is described here as a "two-edged sword"118 which promotes a 
community of believers while creating "a continuing disjunction between the theory 
of Islam and the practice of the nation state"119. The Muslim nation transcends the 
territorial boundaries of states, making the task of state-building arduous politically. 
In terms of societal structures of governance, Islam proves equally problematic for 
Bill and Springborg. Sovereignty by the ruler(s) rests not with `the people', but with 
God, to whom both the rulers and the people are accountable. This goes to the heart 
of political legitimacy in the ruler-ruled relationship: Islam creates a framework that 
goes beyond the full control of the political process through the mechanisms of the 
state alone 120. Finally, they point to the significance the relative lack of integration of 
religious orders in Islam in the absence of development of civil society institutions121. 
Ernest Gellner also takes on this issue to argue that Islam can impede the growth of 
an independent bourgeoisie capable of fostering political and economic 
modernisation 122. In both cases, it is the singularity of Islam as a religion and as a 
115 Ernest Gellner. 1994. "Foreword" in Akbar Ahmed and Hastings Dorman (eds. ) Islam, 
Globalization and Postmodernity. London: Routledge. p. xi. 
6 John Esposito. 1992. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? p. io. 
117 James Bill and Robert Springborg. 1994. Politics in the Middle East (4th Ed. ) Boston: 
Little, Brown. pp. 45-54. Bill and Springborg also acknowledge the importance of economic 
factors in the growth of modernisation, and their argument remains careful. 
118 James Bill and Robert Springborg. 1994. Politics in the Middle East. P. 46. 
119 James Bill and Robert Springborg. 1994. Politics in the Middle East. p. 47. 
120 James Bill and Robert Springborg. 1994. Politics in the Middle East. pp. 48-49. They also 
point to the consolidation of the power of the Sultan as a means to gain greater control by 
rulers historically. 
121 James Bill and Robert Springborg. 1994. Politics in the Middle East. p. 51. They recognise 
that religion alone is not responsible for this. 
122 Ernest Gellner. 1984. 'Foreword' in Said Amir Arjomand (ed. ) From Nationalism to 
Revolutionary Islam. London: Macmillan. 
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model for social life and organisation which has taken the Muslim world on a 
different route to that of Western modernity. Both arguments point to the social and 
political consequences of the cultural values of Islam, a difficult case to prove 
decisively, but one which raises the important question of whether Islam is 
compatible with such an understanding of modernity. 
Yet, perhaps the explanation for such a resistance lies not primarily with Islam itself, 
but in the very way the modernisation thesis articulates the relationship between 
modernising trends and tradition123. Eikelman and Piscatori point to the importance 
of tradition as a "profound vehicle for evolutionary and revolutionary change" with 
special reference to the Middle East124. Additionally, it is possible to criticise this 
standpoint as putting forward a rather uni-linear (dare we say Eurocentric? ) view of 
what the scientific - and economic - gains of modernisation are supposed to bring to 
the spheres of culture and politics. Is it so difficult to imagine a pattern of 
modernisation which does not only preserve the influence of religion (and tradition in 
general), but which is actually also underpinned and promoted by them? Rightly or 
wrongly, it is precisely the aim of Islamist movements to promote such a model for 
achieving modernisation. 
Indeed, if we take modernity to mean models of governance and political-economic 
forms of organisation, as well as moral codes and cultural influences inspired by the 
Western model, then most Islamist movements would proclaim themselves to be 
opposed to modernity. Two definitional problems arise from such a limited 
framework however. On the one hand, being anti-Western (assuming that there is a 
united comprehensive political-cultural entity known as the West') does not 
necessarily imply being anti-modernity, simply because modernity itself is far too 
complex a phenomenon to be summarised in such terms125. Here, Islamists have been 
adamant in their support of the technological and scientific gains of modernity - it is, 
in their view, the lack of morality characterising Western-style modernity that is 
essentially questionable126. Such morality can only be provided through the 
framework of Islam, or more specifically through the revival of the cultural and 
123 for a detailed critique of the applicability of modernisation theory to the Islamic world, see 
Michael C. Hudson. i98o. "Islam and Political Development" in John Esposito (ed. ) Islam 
and Development: Religion and Socio-Political Change. Syracuse (NY): Syracuse University 
Press. PP-5-10- 
124 Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori. 1996. Muslim Politics. P. 25. 
125for a nuanced and intelligent discussion of this problem, see Davison chapter one. Andrew 
Davison. 1998. Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic Reconsideration. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. See also Carl Hallencreutz and David Westerlund. 1995" 
"Introduction" in David Westerlund (ed. ) Questioning the Secular State. The Worldwide 
Resurgence of Religion in Politics. London: Hurst and Co. 
126 John Esposito. 1992. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? p. 19. 
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political attributes of a historically constructed 'Golden Age' of Islam (generally seen 
to include the lifetime of the prophet Muhammad and the first four Caliphs) 127. This 
is an innovative interpretation of modernity where modernisation in scientific and 
economic terms is coupled with an emphasis on the preservation of traditional modes 
of thought in terms not only of religion (to counter to secularisation thesis), but also 
in terms of the moral functions and characteristics of the state. In this sense, 
describing political Islam as traditionalist is more inaccurate than wrong. 
On the other hand, and more importantly, being anti-Western does not imply 
escaping modernity altogether. The very fact that Islamist groups seek political power 
and legitimacy as well as international recognition as a force in politics implies that 
their forms of political activity, violent or not, do not contradict existing patterns of 
political activity. As a result, it can be said that political Islam is not anti-modernity 
per se, but anti-Western, following an Islamist vision of what the West' stands for. 
Arguably, the overview of the causes and context of political Islam presented in this 
chapter shows that Islamists movements, like nationalism, are the product of the 
modern age and one of its most innovative actors today. Indeed, I shall argue here 
that Islamism cannot stand outside modernity, as the ideological hybridity which 
characterises it prevents it: 
Islamists do not uncritically reject modernity; they are trying to 
reformulate it and regulate it, using the discursive terms of the 
Islamic heritage128. 
It is one of the many facets of the modern age precisely because of its opposition to 
dominant understandings of modernity framed in the political opposition to 
colonialism and neo-imperialism on the one hand, and as a challenge to existing 
patterns of state building and power on the other. 
Following Davison, we can argue that "there are multiple possibilities for modernity 
and secularism 029, and that the modern age is not one of uni-linear progress, but one 
where different models of what constitutes the 'modern' are contested. Davison's 
own definition is a useful starting point in this regard - both for a critique of existing 
frameworks for understanding modernity, and as an alternative to them. He states: 
127 The Four Rightly Guided Caliphs' rule followed the death of Muhammad in 632 and lasted 
until 66iAC. For more details on a perceived Golden Age followed by decline, see Ibrahim 
Abu-Rabi. Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World. Chapter 
One. 
X28 Joel Beinin and Joe Stork. 1997. "On the Modernity, Historical Specificity, and 
International Context of Political Islam". p. 4. 
129 Andrew Davison. 1998. Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey. p. i9. 
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Multiple modernities do exist (in past and present), are meaningful 
in the lives of many people who participate in the politics of 
modernity, and must be understood as such. We need to understand 
modernity differently and seek to understand others as they 
understand themselves rather than exclude them from modernity, 
even if they might appear to exclude themselves (philosophically 
and ideologically). Modern or not, political actors of radically 
alternative ideological orientations participate in and are shaped by 
the politics of modernity, and their significance in that context 
should not be devalued under any set of criteria130 
Some authors have gone further than Davison in their critique of dominant 
understandings of modernity, pointing out, in Foucauldian terms, the power 
relationship between those included in and those excluded from modernity131. Susan 
Harding, quoted in Davison, develops on this dialectic. For Harding, modernism (to 
be understood as a Western construct of modernity) actively distorts the 
representations of traditional forms of beliefs and practices (including those of 
religion) to secure a historical and political legitimacy over them in the name of 
Reason. The language of modernism is one that aims for neutrality, objectivity, and 
analysis in order to mask the relationship of domination is supports. Here, the 
'excluded' are defined as obscurantist, fundamentalist, or fanatical (to be neatly 
opposed in a binary fashion to the enlightened and tolerant character of modernism). 
Modernism creates its Others but as Harding points out, these are still central to its 
formulation: 
Bible-belief is not an invention of modem discourses, but 
fundamentalism is. Fundamentalism is a part of modernism's 
history, not outside of it, alien and anachronistic"'. 
'Fundamentalism' (of the Islamist kind and others) is critical to Western 
understandings of modernity as it is the norm against which it is defined. Excluding 
Islamism from modernity is thus a dangerous exercise and one which excludes the 
many possibilities of modernity which Jürgen Habermas has periodically reminded 
us of133, and to which Davison alludes in his definition. In summary, we can thus see 
that dealing with the problematic of political Islam's relationship to modernity raises 
13° Andrew Davison. 1998. Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey. P-31- 
131 See, for instance, Stuart Hall. 1996. "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power" in 
Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert and Kenneth Thomson (eds. ) Modernity: An 
Introduction to Modern Societies. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
132 Susan Harding. 1991. "Representing Fundamentalism: The Problem of the Repugnant 
Cultural Other" Social Research 58(2). Quoted in Andrew Davison. 1998. Secularism and 
Revivalism in Turkey. P. 28. 
133 Jürgen Habermas. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
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more questions than it answers, despite the obvious attachment of Islamists to 
tradition. Even in broad terms, we can see here that Islamism cannot be easily 
excluded from modernity or opposed to it -a point which I hope to deal with in more 
detail throughout a more detailed analysis of the Algerian case later on. 
The question remains as to whether political Islam is more than a manifestation of 
modernity and one of the precursors of a postmodern age. While the issues of 
whether postmodernity actually exists, and of whether we live in a post-modern 
world are themselves hotly debated134, the place of political Islam is this 'postmodern 
world' is even more problematic than Islamism's place in modernity. This question 
has not been dealt with in the literature on political Islam in great detail with the 
partial exception of Akbar Ahmed's work on Islam and postmodernity, an approach 
which is not without its ambiguities 135 By seeing the 'Islamic resurgence' as a cultural 
challenge to the dominance of Western (and mainly American) cultural norms, icons, 
and vision of progress, Ahmed successfully articulates the increasing frustration of 
many with a monolithic, globalised version of happiness and consumer satisfaction. 
For Ahmed, this form of protest ties in with other marginalised voices, mostly from 
post-colonial societies, reclaiming the legitimacy of their patterns of development, 
cultural norms, and discourse. Arguably, political Islam displays some postmodern 
qualities in those terms because it articulates protest against dominant political 
discourses in religious-cultural terms. Yet, whether political Islam itself can be seen 
as the flag-bearer for a wider Islamic cultural and religious revival remains to be seen. 
Indeed, political Islam may represent previously marginalised voices, but it does not 
necessarily champion the expression of marginalised voices in general. In this sense, 
political Islam remains tied to the conditions of modernity once again, and 
particularly to modernity-bound forms of struggle for discourse legitimacy. Thus, 
while it is neither a traditional nor a traditionalist form of political expression, its 
position as a postmodern cultural pioneer remains ambiguous. 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has raised a number of themes and arguments which, by way of a 
conclusion, are worth summarising. With the starting point of the academic context 
in which political Islam has evolved over the past few years, this chapter has 
134 Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan. 1994. "Islam in the Age of Postmodernity" in 
Ahmed and Donnan (eds. ) Islam, Globalization and Postmoder pity. p. 11. Ahmed and Dorman 
go as far as acknowledging that the conceptual ambiguity surrounding postmodernism is 
"part of its allure". 
135Akbar S. Ahmed. 1992. Postmodernism and Islam: Predicament and Promise. London: 
Routledge. 
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highlighted a number of preconceptions and fallacies which surround the study of 
this diverse phenomenon. Moving away from a conception of a political Islam that 
can be simplistically amalgamated with intolerance and terrorism, this analysis seeks 
to present a more contextualised vision of Islamist politics. In this sense, focusing on 
the political, economic, socio-cultural and historical elements of specific cases of 
political Islam is seen as more analytically fruitful. This task is arguably ambitious 
however; the diversity and complexity which this discussion aims to unearth imply 
that a comprehensive overview of all aspects of all Islamist movements would require 
an encyclopaedia rather than a chapter. My aim was thus somewhat more modest: to 
problematise our conception of political Islam with regards to its place in the 
International System, in the ideological and political chessboard of the Middle East, 
and in the modern world. From these questions I hope to derive a contextualised set 
of answers, by focusing more closely on one case study to facilitate clarity and 
precision in analysis. Chapter four thus aims to analyse the case of Islamist 
movements in Algeria in those terms. 
120 
Chapter Four 
History and the Islamist Movement Algeria: 
An Overview of Context and Evolution 
4.1. Introduction 
Whether through the media or in academic publications, images of contemporary Algeria 
are ones of a society at a turning point - politically, economically and culturally'. It is 
important in this context to review the origins of the current political situation to 
contextualise the dilemmas and problems faced in the wake of the Civil War. Chapter four 
is the first of three analytical chapters concerned with the Algerian political lifeworld and 
the way in which Islamist movements relate to it to achieve their aims. It performs the 
relatively straightforward task of establishing the links between the historical evolution of 
ideology in 19th and loth Century Algeria and the development of contemporary 
Algerian Islamist movements. In addition, this chapter aims to apply the overview 
provided in Chapter Three to the Algerian case study. 
This chapter follows a chronological structure, highlighting the most important facets of 
colonial and postcolonial politics underpinning the growth of political Islam. Firstly, a 
section on historiography highlights the pitfalls and traditional problems associated with 
historical analysis, especially in the case of Algeria. Secondly, a number of key points 
concerning the colonisation process and colonial history are made as a backdrop to 
nation-building - and the place of Islam in it - in the postcolonial era. Thirdly, an 
ideological history of Algeria since colonisation is drawn, with the principal aim of linking 
various historical events, and political actors to ideological currents. This connection is 
established to help pinpoint the origins of various ideological themes which underpin the 
Algerian political lifeworld in general and that of political Islam in Algeria in particular. 
Here, the legacy of colonisation - and of the decolonisation process itself - are seen a 
crucial components of the lifeworld, but other influences are also unearthed. Particular 
emphasis will be placed on the post-1988 events, including the main events shaping the 
Civil War. By way of conclusion, this chapter offers a short overview of the principal 
1 In the rest of North Africa, for instance, various regimes have been more successful 
in containing their Islamist opposition. The example of Morocco is telling in this 
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characteristics of the Islamist current in Algeria in historical context. 
Overall, the discussion developed here can be tied back to the central research questions 
addressed in the dissertation in two ways. First, this chapter acts as a critical introduction 
to the history of Algerian Islamism in its context - with special emphasis placed on the 
evolution of Islamist thought vis-a-vis colonial and postcolonial political developments 
in Algeria. This is the foundation upon which the central arguments developed in further 
chapters will be based. Secondly, looking at Islamism as a postcolonial phenomenon 
requires inquiring about the connections between the foundational themes of the 
Islamist political imagination and the way in which the articulation of political rights and 
governance has evolved since colonial times. More specifically, this chapter makes 
reference to the evolution of governance as a result of decolonisation to establish a 
connection between the growth of Islamism and its political context. Questions of 
political and economic crises are worth tackling of course (and this has been done 
convincingly elsewhere), but the ways in which the state actually fostered the growth of 
contemporary Islamist movements directly and indirectly through policies pertaining to 
political culture also ought to be integrated into the discussion. Political imagination does 
not function in abstract from the political lifeworld it is derived from. Predominant ideas 
of the time, such as the promotion of Arabisation as a cornerstone for postcolonial 
identity, have helped shape the Islamist phenomenon in Algeria. 
. 2. Historical Origins 
. 2.1. A Note on Historical Writin 
Writing a historical chapter presenting the main events of Algerian history since the 
colonial era seems an easy task - in view of the enormous amount of material produced 
on this subject by historians, political analysts, sociologists, as well as the memoirs 
produced by the various political actors of the contemporary era. Still, it should be 
pointed out from the outset that any such `historical overview' implies a definite, pre- 
established set of analytical aims which not only assist the selection of adequate material 
but also foster and reflect a specific interpretation of Algerian history. Indeed, chapter two 
regard. 
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has argued that social science is a project bound to interpretation of the material by the 
researcher (and of the end-product by its reader). Thus, history, like all social 
science/humanities disciplines, implies the use of prisms as a means of selection, an 
inevitable process that considerably reduces the scope of the analysis. While this is true of 
history in general, it is particularly applicable to the historical analysis of Algeria, a field in 
which `truth' has been fiercely contested: 
There is a historiographical debate over colonial Algeria which mirrors 
the personal and private one, a debate which revolves essentially 
around the nature and consequences of French colonialism in Algeria. 
The end of French rule and the beginning of Algerian independence are 
still so close, achieved in such a violent paroxysm of decolonization and 
national liberation, that the literature on Algeria suffers from the bane 
of so much contemporary history: too much personal polemic and not 
enough dispassionate analysis, too much in the way of historical myth 
and too little historical fact, too much reading the present into the past 
and too little consideration of the past on its own terms2. 
Our first acknowledgement should thus be that the `historical chapter' of this dissertation 
forgoes the illusory safety of `description' and ventures, by choice and by obligation, onto 
the more difficult terrain of historical analysis. As is connoted by the title of this chapter, 
this analytical approach limits itself to one facet of the recent history of Algeria, that of the 
evolution of the ideological underpinnings of the Algerian political lifeworld and the place 
of Islam, Islamic revolt and Islamism in it. This implies that a number of historical 
impasses have been made. In turn, the choice of such an approach has been motivated by 
two factors: firstly, by the fact that the aim of this historical chapter is to provide the 
background for a specific analytical focus (that of the place of Algerian Islamism in the 
political lifeworld), and secondly because outstanding historical work on loth Century 
Algeria has already been produced, making such an endeavour partially redundant. 
Overall, the imprint of the postcolonial studies project (our dominant analytical tool) lies 
in the choice of tracing the origins of the Islamist movement in Algeria in the context of 
the evolution of broader ideological, political, socio-economic and cultural forces dating 
back, but not limited to, the experience of colonialism. More importantly though, the 
postcolonial studies standpoint helps us re-articulate our analysis of Algerian history to 
problematise the construction of colonial and nationalist histories to emphasise 
2 David Prochaska. 199o. Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bone 1870 -1920. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 1. 
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heterogeneity, competition and division, but also complicity, continuity and compromise 
in terms of power relationships among dominant political players, including the 
Islamic/Islamist'factor' in Algerian politics: 
Today, our view is shaped by an awareness of multiple agencies and 
divergent power relations - not just colonial, but also of indigenous 
elites and subaltern groups, men and women, urban and rural, and 
inter ethnic (religious and linguistic) domination and subordination. It 
is tempting to say that postcolonial histories differ from nationalist and 
colonial ones in that the latter are homogeneous and teleological, 
whereas ours are aware of multiple causalities and multiple agencies3. 
This historical task is vast and goes beyond the remit of one chapter. Still, the issues of 
multiplicity in agency, the difficulties and positioning of historical knowledge, and the 
complexity of the ideological and discursive background the contemporary history of 
Algerian political Islam are all considered key features of this overview. 
4.2.2. Historical Background 
Even though the history of Algeria begins a long time before the French invasion of 1830, 
historical analyses tend to begin their exposition at that date, for two main reasons. 
Firstly, Algeria did not exist as a 'state' (strictly speaking) before it was conquered and 
'unified' by the French4. Whether or not that unification strictly followed the ethnic and 
cultural lines of a pre-existing 'Algerian nation' is an interesting question, albeit one 
fraught with ambiguities5. But one thing is certain, we cannot easily conceptualise Algeria 
as a single unit before colonisation, a problem which has dogged the analysis of pre- 
colonial times and has led to this important chapter of Algerian history to be 
systematically underplayed. Secondly, there has been a tendency, perhaps associated 
3 Edmund Burke Ill. 1998. "Theorizing the Histories of Colonialism and Nationalism 
in the Arab Maghrib" Arab Studies Quarterly. 20(2). p. 13. 
4 In fact, Algeria only became formally a state upon independence, but that is hardly 
unique: very few states existed outside Europe at the time, and arguably the concept 
of a state emerged from Europe, perhaps paradoxically at the same time that 
colonialism became the norm. In addition, one should be careful not to conclude 
from this that pre-colonial Algeria was not a nation simply because it was not a state 
- this type of argument has often been put forward by Orientalists to justify 
colonisation. See David Prochaska. i99o. Making Algeria French. P. 2. 
5 These issues of boundaries are common to most post-colonial nations in Africa. 
The arbitrary nature of state formation during the Age of Empire has ramifications 
still felt widely on the African continent. Concerning Algeria, the case of the Western 
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with the absence of such an unproblematic unity to Algerian historical development, to 
assume that the history of pre-colonial Algeria was static and thus not particularly 
relevant. This problem can be associated to the fact that much of the early historical work 
on Algeria was conducted by French Orientalists whose work carried a pacifying and 
legitimising political agenda6. As a justification to the French conquest of most of North 
Africa, historical writing at the time emphasised themes such as the importance of 
bringing modernity and civilisation to this 'backward' area of the world, and underplayed 
the pre-colonial characteristics of Algerian history. Qualified as a 'traditional society' 
(meant in the worst possible way), and seen as the product of the decline of the Ottoman 
Empire, Algeria was thus reified into the mirror image of the conquering, civilised 
colonial power. History defined through such a binary opposition turned Algeria into a 
society that begged to be conquered. Whereas France was seen to yield superior power 
and civilisation, Algeria was qualified in passive terms as an object of conquest by 
successive empires. To French Enlightenment, one could oppose a lack of cultural 
sophistication, a lack of military power, a lack of economic and political development. In 
that sense, 'history indeed only started when France reached the Algerian shores, as a 
rich culture became only the prelude to the real existence of Algeria, as it became 
French7. 
Contemporary authors on the subject have pointed to alternative sets of analyses of the 
history and sociology of the consequences of colonisation8. David Gordon thus divides 
the academic corpus into four camps - the Orientalist discourse of the 'Ecole d'Alger', a 
group of Muslim scholars reinterpreting history from an Islamic perspective (and as 
native informants) around the 1930 period, liberal colonialists of the 1930s onwards who 
were sympathetic to the Algerian plight for independence, and, during and after the 
independence war, an Algerian Nationalist/French Marxist cluster which developed on 
Sahara is an interesting case in point. 
6 This school is remembered as L'Ecole D'Alger' and dominated the discourse on 
Algerian history until independence, and with a quasi-monopoly on that discourse 
until 1930. David Prochaska lists the following historians and social scientists as the 
figureheads on this movement: E. F. Gautier, George Marcais, Christian Courtois, 
Roger Le Tourneau, Stephane Gsell, Claude Martin, Julien Franc and Pierre Boyer. 
See David Prochaska. 199o. Making Algeria French. P. 1-2. 
7 For a short but well illustrated critique of French Orientalism with regards to the 
colonisation of North Africa, see Edmund Burke 111.1998. "Theorizing the Histories 
of Colonialism and Nationalism in the Arab Maghrib" . pp. 7ff. a See David Gordon. 1971. Self-Determination and History in the Third World. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 152-174. 
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the work of their Islamic predecessors. The historical accounts derived from such a 
diversity point to two main orientations in academic writing: one that mainly sees French 
colonialism as a positive influence on Algerian society9, and one which questions both 
those benefits and the very idea of a mission civilisatrice: 
The anti-colonialists rebute this view, arguing that even if the French are 
primarily responsible for laying the groundwork for a modern society, a 
vastly disproportionate amount of the benefits accrued not to the 
Algerians but to the French. Even more important, these historians 
point out that the effects of the French presence on Algerian society and 
culture - the systematic neglect if not outright attack on the Islamic 
religion, the refusal to provide for Arabic education, the progressive 
impoverishment of the Algerianfellah (peasant), the expropriation and 
exploitation of the best arable land and forests, the destruction or 
cooptation of the indigenous elite - were nothing short of catastrophic. 
The Front de la Liberation Nationale (FLN) goes still further and charges 
that the French were guilty of depersonalization, deculturation, enforced 
resettlement, and in some cases even of genocides°. 
The question of Orientalism is therefore one that is far from implicit in the study of 
Algerian history. The political underpinnings of much of the work produced on the 
subject have long been acknowledged. In more recent times, the historical writing on 
Algeria has foregone many of the problems associated with the classic Orientalist 
literature on the subject, but Algerian history has remained a deeply contested and 
political field. The first casualty to this phenomenon has been pre-colonial history. Very 
few attempts have been made to reconstruct the history of those times and the effect of 
colonisation from the 'native informant's' point of view, to use Spivak's turn of phrase. 
The practical limitations to such an endeavour are obvious: the length of time since the 
events took place and the lack of material make this task of reconstruction arduous. On 
the other hand, drawing together a picture of such a period carries its own political risks: 
is the pre-colonial period a Golden Age of freedom and civilisation from which nativists 
can draw to conceptualise their vision of a post-colonial future freed from foreign 
9 An interesting example of Orientalist literature dealing with the benefits of 
colonisation is Leon Blondel. 1838. NouvelApercu sur L'Algerie. n-ois Necessites on 
Afrique: Conserver - Pacifier - Coloniser. Delaunay. The title of the publication says 
it all with clear priorities being identified as retaining colonies, pacifiying, and 
colonising them thoroughly. This work makes no apologies for the use of 
colonisation as a means to further French interests. The subtext of the piece is of 
course deeply unequal with the colonised population seen as benefiting from French 
involvement. 
1° See David Prochaska. 199o. Making Algeria French. p. 3. 
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influence? Perhaps simply flipping the coin from a systematically negative interpretation 
to that of a perfect society is also an imagination of the past which oversimplifies reality 
and too easily lends itself to political manipulation". As chapter six analyses in more 
depth, the use of history for political purposes in the postcolonial era has proven one of 
the strongest pillars supporting elite rule. In that sense, in postcolonial times in Algeria, 
history has not only been under surveillancel2, but also a factor in the maintenance of 
existing power relations, as a factor in control and surveillance. The question remains as 
where our starting point should be in our analysis of the historical origins of political 
Islam, if we are to successfully navigate between the Charybdis of Orientalist discourse 
and the Scylla of nativism. 
An exhaustive analysis of this period would perhaps obscure the present aims of the 
analysis, but several points are worth mentioning in any case. What is now known as the 
Berber minority was originally the dominant cultural and ethnic entity populating most 
of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. As Gillespie points out, the Berber culture of the time 
displayed both socio-political organisation and cultural sophistication. In fact, "to the 
strong loyalties of the tribe, the Berber added individualism, democratic participation in 
internal affairs and fierce opposition to foreign invasion"13. The Maghrib's position in the 
Mediterranean made it a privileged target for invasion by the Phoenicians, the Romans, 
the Byzantines, the Visigoths, the Arabs and the Ottomans over several centuries, and 
thus the Maghrib constituted a prime theatre for cultural metissage of which the Arab 
language and the Islamic religion were the most pervasive, but not sole, examples. The 
Ottoman rule over Algeria, while tumultuous, lasted over three hundred years, until 
French invasion began on 5 July 1830'4. 
Prior to colonisation, Algeria did not function as an independent state, but was under the 
"On this problematic issue, see Jean-Claude Vatin. 1983. L Algerie Politique: 
Histoire et Societe. Paris: Presses FNSP. Chapter One. 
12 For the use of that tems and a development on these ideas, see Gilles Manceron 
and Hassan Remaoun. 1993. D'Une Rive a l'Autre: La Guerre d'Algerie et la 
Memoire de l'Histoire. Paris: Syros. Chapter Two "En Algerie, l'Histoire sous 
Surveillance". 
13 See Joan Gillespie. 196o. Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution. London: Ernest 
Benn. p. 17. 
14 For an overview of precolonial history, see John B. Wolf. 1979. The Barbary 
Coast: Algiers under the Turks, 15oo to 1830. New York: W. W. Norton. Marcel 
Colombe. 1957. "L'Algerie Turque" in Jean Alazard et al. Initiation aL Algerie. Paris: 
Librairie d'Amerique et d'Orient. pp. 99ff. 
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rule of the Ottoman Empire with the status of Regency of Algiers. Such a rule was coming 
under increasing pressure due to a steady financial decline in the fortunes of the Ottoman 
province, in the context of general crisis in the Empire. The question of the settlements of 
French debts to the Dey of Algiers became the focal point of the disputes between the 
French authorities and the Ottoman Empire at that time. These remained acute and the 
source of much mutual resentment despite wide and tumultuous political changes in 
France in the first two decades of the 19th Century. Matters came to a head with the now 
famous diplomatic incident of the "coup d'eventail" whereby the Dey, Hussein, is said to 
have slapped the French Consul Duval with (or without) the help of a large fan on April 
29,1827 after a protracted argument concerning diplomatic relations between the two 
nations, especially with regards to the matters of unsettled debts by the French". 
Whether this incident worked as an excuse rather than a catalyst remains uncertain, but 
the insult nevertheless left King Charles X prepared for retaliation at the first available 
opportunity. Instability in Europe prevented him from taking direct action for a further 
three years, after which he announced that, as an act of revenge on the "barbarian 
power", military action would be taken to "restore French honour" and ultimately make 
gains for the cause of Christianity16. The crusading overtones of this statement are 
notable here. More widely, early historians have highlighted the international context of 
this dispute in an era of imperial expansion. Augustin Bernard notes that wider 
considerations of competition in Africa with England prompted the invasion17. That 
being said, this enthusiasm was somewhat measured given the price incurred by 
previous efforts at colonial rule. Thus, 
When France took the first important step in 1830 toward a new 
colonial cycle in her history, she had been familiar with the problem of 
colonial administration for a long time. The French overseas 
possessions, much of which had been lost in the wars with England, 
had once comprised one of great mercantilist empires of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries18. 
15 Charles-Andre Julien. 1964. Histoire de 1 Algerie Contemporaine - Vol i. La 
Conquete et les debuts de la Colonisation (1827-1871). Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France. pp. 26ft: see also Yves lacoste et al. 196o. L'Algerie, Passe et Present. Le 
Cadre et les Etapes de la Constitution de I Algerie Actuelle. Paris: Editions Sociales. 
pp. 234-246. 
'b Charles-Andre Julien. 1964. Histoire de l Algerie Contemporaine - Vol 1. p. 38. 
17 Augustin Bernard. 1930. Histoire des Colonies Francaises et de ('Expansion de la 
France dans le Monde. Tome 2: L'Algerie. Paris: Plon. p. 99. 
18 Vincent Confer. 1966. France and Algeria: The Problem of Civil and Political 
Reform, 187o-1920. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. p. i. 
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French administrators were aware of the difficulties associated with invasion and colonial 
rule, and it is only with confidence in their military capabilities that further development 
of the empire was considered feasible at that timel9. Pragmatic considerations for France 
(in terms of its relationship to Algeria and its situation in Europe) were thus critical to the 
policy that ensued. That being said, while the fact that Ottoman-controlled Algeria was 
predominantly Muslim was not the main reason why colonisation occurred, an inherent 
sense of the civilisational superiority of Christian France made the process far more 
palatable than it would have been in different circumstances. 
4.3" Islamism in Historical Context 
4.3.1" Islamism and the Colonial legacy 
The Islamist movement in Algeria is one that is rooted in the Ulemas movement, and 
previous to that, Islamic movements of revolt against colonisation. The history of 
Algerian Islamism thus starts at least as far back as 1830, with the progressive 
assimilation of Algerian territory into the French colonial empire by force. The history of 
colonial times and that of Islamism are thus entwined. The effect of the presence of the 
French was understandably direct, through the complex processes of colonisation, which 
would be near absolute, for the next 132 years, leaving a legacy that is still deceptively 
pervasive long after Algeria gained its formal independence 20. Colonisation has military 
and political components of course. But perhaps more importantly, foreign rule implied 
the domination over and manipulation of culture and of social structures including local 
government, schools and the family. Religion and language quickly became the keystones 
19 Raoul Girardet goes further to argue that the later part of the 19th Century, after 
the first new wave of colonisation including Algeria, a "militant doctrine of 
colonisation" developed in France as a result of early successes. See Raoul Girardet. 
1972. L'Idee Coloniale en France de 1871 a 1962. Paris: Livre de Poche Pluriel. p. 43. 
20 The historical literature on the colonial and decolonisation period is vast and 
uneven in quality. Example of sources consulted here include: Charles Andre Julien. 
1931. Histoire de L Afrique du Nord (Tunisie, Algerie, Maroc). Paris: Payot. 
Raymond Aron (ed). 1962. Les origins de la Guerre d Algerie. Paris: Sindbad. 
Stephane Gsell et al. 1927. Histoire de L Algerie. Paris: Boivin. Claude Martin. 1963. 
Histoire de IAlgerie Francaise (183o-1962). Paris: 4 Fils Aymon. Henri Blet. 1946- 
195o. Histoire de la Colonisation Francaise. Tomes 2&3. Paris: Arthaud. C. R. 
Ageron. 1979. Histoire de I Algerie Contemporaine Tomes 1 and 2. Paris: PUF. For 
an Algerian perspective, see Ferhat Abbas. 1962. Guerre et Revolution en Algerie. 
Tome 1: La Nuit Coloniale. Paris: Julliard. 
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of the attempted destruction of existing kinship ties and identities. Concomitantly, the 
colonial aim was to reconstruct a new identity for the native Algerian population 21- one 
where the needs of colonial rule would be accommodated while the civilising mission of 
French rule would become the vehicle for new dreams and identities. Several salient 
points are worth mentioning here. 
Firstly, one should not assume that French invasion was met by passivity and acceptance 
by the native population. The war of colonisation was a protracted and bloody one - and it 
was followed by a long period of revolt which had to met by force22. Islam, in turn, was a 
key factor in these revolts. Most notably, Amir Abd al-Qadir led a historic battle against 
the French from 1832 until his surrender in 1847, under the banner of Islam23. His 
rhetoric specifically emphasised the religious motivations for his struggle and the 
establishment of an independent state which would be Muslim. Of note in this setting is 
the fact that Islam, which had been implanted in Algeria since the 7th Century functioned 
as the strongest point of ideological reference, as well as the basis for national identity for 
the vast majority of natives, proving an effective counterpoint to French cultural and 
political domination24. The idea of political action in Islamic terms, a proto-Islamism, 
thus originated from a position of cultural, political and military resistance. 
Secondly, this revolt against colonisation was compounded by French uncertainty as to 
the gains to the Empire Algeria would bring, given the large financial and human costs 
incurred in the first few years of colonial involvement: 
21The term `native' here refers to the colonised population of Algeria. Many colons 
would later be native of Algeria themselves (and feel about Algeria as their - French - 
homeland). Thus, being a native would thus become a complex affair. On the other 
hand, 'native' here is not used with the negative connotations it has often been 
associated with either (i. e. native=backward). The distinction between colons and 
natives is made for the purpose of clarity only. 
22 In Kabylia, for instance, revolts in 1857 and 1870-71 set up a culture of resistance 
to invasion. 
23 For an early and sympathetic portrait of al-Qadir in the French historical 
literature, see Augustin Bernard. 1930. Histoire des Colonies Francaises. pp. 227- 
247. For an in-depth historical account of al-Qadir's resistance to French invasion, 
see Wilfrid Blunt. 1947. Desert Hawk: Abd el Kader and the French Conquest of 
Algeria. London: Methuen. That being said this account deals with the issue of 
resistance to colonialism in an uneven tone, which is reminiscent of classic 
Orientalist texts at times. 
24 Benjamin Stora. 1991. Histoire de lAlgerie Coloniale (1830-1954). Paris: La 
Decouverte. pp. 41ff. 
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The conquest of Algeria was a long and difficult process. Geographical 
obstacles challenging progress from the North to mountainous regions, 
the untamable hostility of patriotic forces inspired by an intransigent 
Islam, deadly diseases and tactical errors all explain the length of the 
process and the human losses incurred25. 
Also worth noting in this regard is that patterns of invasion were initially characterised by 
relative lack of long-term planning: occupation was only partial, due to revolts but also 
because of the lack of commitment to take over territory which may not be of use for 
colonial purposes. Most significantly, the occupation of Algeria in the early years of rule 
was dominated by a military element, leading to ruthless repression of revolts and the 
absence of civilian authorities to administer law and order26. Additionally, settlement by 
colons was not controlled by metropolitan France in a rigorous way, leading to 
uncontrolled settlement patterns and relative lawlessness with a large degree of colon 
control early on, almost as if the military occupation and civil government were unrelated 
events. The cost of such of a policy (or lack thereof) would be paid in human terms by the 
native population27. The legacy of these early years of oppression would be mixed: for 
reasons of personal safety many native Algerians would forgo overt revolt for the years to 
come, but the battle-lines between the imposed French culture and the authentic (and 
increasingly idealised) native and Islamic culture were drawn. 
Thirdly, a number of legal measures designed to administer the colon/colonised 
relationship were established over the years, with consequences as to the actual status of 
the native population. These were mostly geared towards land reform and native status 
under the law, but at every turn, colon resistance to assimilation and equal rights, and 
their influence in the metropole, made gains for the natives futile. In fact, even those laws 
designed to protect the native population were used to further undermine their position. 
Several key turning points are salient here: 
The policy of cantonnement in the 1850s following the transition to a civilian 
government through the bureaux arabes "pushed out the semi-nomadic tribes from 
25 Charles-Andre Julien. 1964. Histoire de l Algerie Contemporaine - Vol 1. P. 270. 
own translation. 
26 See Henri Brunchwig. 1949. La Colonisation Francaise. Paris: Calmann-Levy. 
p. 28. 
27 For a summary of these patterns, see once again Charles-Andre Julien. 1964. 
Histoire de lAlgerie Contemporaine - Vol i. chapter three. 
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a considerable part of their former territories and restricted most of them to large but 
segregated Arab-Berber preserves"28. Large-scale land reform granted the vast 
amounts of land to the new settlers, at the expense of the local tribes. 
. The senatus-consulte of April 22,1863 tried to overcome this problem somewhat by 
drawing more explicitly a law on property as it affected the native population. The 
senatus-consulte was originally designed to help formalise the ownership of whatever 
land had been left to native Algerians. However, this had unforeseen consequences: 
the rules of ownership pertaining to families rather than tribes made it easier for 
colons to buy small plots of land from Muslim owners for a low price to increase the 
size of their properties. In societal terms, it also contributed to the further erosion of 
traditional ties, leading to "widespread political and social changes with the 
dissolution of tribes"29. 
The senatus-consulte of Julyi , 1865 was the first formal attempt at creating a 
legal 
framework for integration of natives, and regimented their status under the law. Here, 
Algerian natives would be able to come under the jurisdiction of Islamic law if they 
kept their Muslim status, but also they had the alternative of assimilating into the 
French way of life and be granted citizenship, but only on the precondition that they 
reneged on Islam. This piece of legislation was originally introduced with the hope of 
integrating as many Algerians as possible3°. Needless to say, such a move backfired, 
since there were very few takers of French citizenship under such conditions31, even 
with the added pressure. of colons using the special status of Muslims as an excuse for 
discrimination under the law. Still, policy in the 187os continued in the direction of 
assimilation, framing France's role in Algeria as one of mission civilisatrice32. 
The Code de L7ndigenat, established in 1881 formalised the discrepancies in legal 
rights between colons and natives. This constituted a "humiliating regime of 
28 Vincent Confer. 1966. France and Algeria. p. 5. 
29 Augustin Bernard. 193o. Histoire des Colonies Francaises. pp. 348-349" In fact, the 
Warnier Laws of 1873 and 1887 compounded this problem by further dispossessing local 
populations. 
3° Augustin Bernard. 1930. Histoire des Colonies Francaises. P. 358. 
31 The Jewish population took on this opportunity to gain citizenship on the other hand. 
32 Vincent Confer. 1966. France and Algeria. p2i. For a good summary of the tenets, and 
consequences, of mission civilisatrice in cultural terms, see David C. Gordon. 1962. North 
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exception" containing provisions for prosecuting Muslims under French laws for 
offences ranging from failing to take on compulsory fire-fighting duties to speaking to 
European civilians and officials disrespectfully. More alarmingly, the Code was used 
to prosecute individuals deemed undesirables, often with the concurrent use of the 
laws to exonerate colon excesses33 
These policies would contribute to a system of governance that made the integration of 
the native population impossible. Beyond this, they perpetuated and reinforced a 
bipolarity between the French and the Muslim identities which would not be lost on the 
native population. The senatus-consulte of 1865 de facto inscribed the `Muslim' status as 
one that had political undertones and repercussions. Being a Muslim under French law 
became synonymous with being unable to gain the political and judicial privileges of the 
pieds-noirs colons. Native Algerians had to choose between being French and being 
Muslim: they could not be both. In this sense, it was the French authorities that 
institutionalised Islam's political meaning as an alternative to the colonial model at that 
time. That native Algerians would later reject the French model - and presence - in terms 
relating to Islam stems in part from this process. 
A fourth area of importance is the unique status of Algeria in the French empire. Unlike 
its neighbours Tunisia and Morocco which were conquered under mandate of 
protectorate, Algeria suffered comprehensive colonisation involving large scale 
population movements, the complete restructuring of the political and judicial system, 
the destruction of local schooling, the imposition of new cultural norms, the 
disempowerment of Islamic order and, eventually, the incorporation of Algeria into 
French territory. With the acquisition of the status of region (three departements in 
total), Algeria became France. This understandably created a strong sense of ownership 
for the French authorities, and the long-term settlement of a large and varied European 
population made the withdrawal from Algeria unthinkable. 
That being said, Algeria remained a dual society: underneath the veneer of this regional 
status lied a colonised population with a status and sense of identity that remained 
Africa's French legacy: 1954-1962. Chapter two. 
33 John Ruedy. 1992. Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. p. 89. 
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ambiguous. Natives spoke French and those who attended French-run schools were 
taught the finer points of French culture, but this assimilation remained uneven in its 
results. Algeria was French but were Algerians French? The evidence suggests that many 
natives from generations that had known nothing but colonisation would live their 
identity in hybrid fashion. The Young Algerians movement would for instance argue for 
greater political rights for natives through the ideal of liberty advocated by the French 
Revolution. The French presence was not questioned, but the lessons the Revolution 
were learnt and reinterpreted for a new setting. The coloniser was caught at its own game 
of socialisation. On the other hand, a remarkable resistance to cultural penetration and 
assimilation also persisted among many. This came in part from the legal status of 
Algerian natives under the Code de 1'Indigenat. But added to such limitations were 
uneven patterns of integration in terms of education, political representation, land 
reform, tax, administrative and legal rights, 34 with projects for positive reforms for the 
native population systematically undermined by the colon population. 
This setting provided the impetus for the establishment of a tradition of cultural 
resistance in Algeria over the colonial period. Jean Ganiage notes that opposition to 
French rule remained as strong, if somewhat more muted, in the early 20th Century as it 
had upon colonisation35. Here, Islam was never far from the surface as a motivating 
factor for questioning French (and thus un-Islamic) rule. The oppression of the Algerian 
religious establishment (which was at the time of invasion disparate geographically and 
diverse in terms of religious practice) led to religious reform in the long term, but also 
ultimately led to the commitment to the struggle for independence in Islamic terms. The 
turn of the Century saw the progressive but definite growth in demands for greater 
political rights on the part of Muslim Algerians, leading to the development of a multi- 
stranded movement for independence in the inter-war period36. Original attempts at 
34 Jean Ganiage. 1968. L'Expansion Colonfale de la France. pp. 286ff. Ruedy summarises this 
phenomenon as such: "It had taken the Europeans half a century to overcome the Algerians' 
determined but perennially disunited military resistance. The assured maintenance of the 
occupation for another seventy years by institutionalising a system of legal discrimination 
that kept the native majority in a position of permanent inferiority. The major elements of 
that legal edifice were civil, political, juridical and fiscal inequality". See John Ruedy. 1992. 
Modern Algeria. p. 86. 
35 Jean Ganiage. 1968. L'Expansion Coloniale de la France sous la Troisieme Republique 
(1871-1914). Paris: Payot. pp. 279ff. 
36 Jean-Louis Planche. 1999. "Les Lieux de l'Algerianite" Autrement -Collection Memoires: 
Alger 1960-1939: Le Modele Ambigu du Triomphe Colonial 55 (March). pp. i8off. Benjamin 
Stora. 1991. La Gangrene et 1'Oubli: La memoire de la Guerre d'Algerie. Paris: La 
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greater political emancipation had been framed within the framework of continued 
French rule37, but upon the failure of the reformers to gain concessions, later movements 
would distantiate themselves further from the ideal of integration38 
The second stage in the development of Islamism in Algeria is notable at this juncture. As 
Al Ahnaf, Botiveau and Fregosi show in their discussion of contemporary political Islam 
in Algeria, L'Algerie par ses Islamistes, the Islamist movement in Algeria started as a 
"state of mind" before it developed as a movement, and later political parties39. While Al- 
Qadir had proposed a model for resistance to French invasion in Islamic terms (perhaps 
the initial "state of mind"), the independentist movement led by Adbelhamid Ben Badis, 
the Ulema Association (Association des Oulemas), would set up an organised movement 
marrying the religious components of Islam and the political imperatives of the lggos. 
This was a slow evolution, but an unmistakable stepping stone in the development of an 
Islamist political imagination. The original platform of the Association was explicitly 
apolitical: it emphasised the need for reform in religious practice in Algeria, both with 
individual believers and established religious institutions. Islam was dominated at the 
time by religious orders centered around local centres of worship of individual saints40. 
The Ulema Association's first aim was one of reform and unification of Islam. However, 
beyond this commitment to purify Islam from maraboutism (through reform, or Islah) 
were aims which had inherent political ramifications: the unification of Algerian people 
under the banner of Islam, the promotion of Arabic language, and the defense of an 
Arabic culture4l. Four key concepts are key to understanding the social and political 
appeal of such a model: ummah (nation), cha'ab (the people), watan (the homeland), 
Decouverte. pp. 121ff. 
37 The failure of the liberal Blum-Violette Laws in 1936 are notable here. see chapter six for 
greater detail, and for a good historical summary, David Gordon. 1966. The Passing of 
French Algeria. Oxford: Oxford University Press. chapter 2. 
38 This area is analysed in much greater detail in chapter six. For a comprehensive analysis, 
see Andre Nouschi. 1962. La Naissance du Nationalisme Algerien. 1914-1954. Paris: Les 
Editions de Minuit. Mohamed Harbi. 1975. Aux Origines du FLN, le Populisme 
Revolutionnaire en Algerie. Paris: Bourgeois. Mahfoud Kaddache. 198o. Histoire du 
Nationalisme Algerien. Algiers: SNED. For a good summary, see Samir Amin. 1970. The 
Maghreb in the Modern World. Harmondsworth: Penguin. pp. 9off. and Jean-Claude Vatin. 
1983. LAlgerie Politique: Hlstoire et Societe. pp. iggff. For an overview of inter-war Algeria, 
see Jacques Berque. 1962. Le Maghreb entre deux Guerres. Paris: Esprit. 
39 Mustafa Al-Ahnad, Bernard Botiveau and Frank Fregosi. 1991. L'Algerie par ses Islamistes. 
Paris: Karthala. P. 21. 
40 See Benjamin Stora. 1999. Histoire de l'Algerie Coloniale. Paris: La Decouverte. P. 74. 
41 As stated in the Association 1931's declaration of principles. Quoted in Mustafa Al-Ahnad, 
Bernard Botiveau and Frank Fregosi. 1991. L'Algerie par ses Islamistes. pp. 21-22. 
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and quawmiyya (nationality). Inspired by the Salafiyya school of Islam, the Ulemas 
placed the current political struggle of Algerians into a broader religious context42. These 
themes, in turn, would lie at the core of the Islamist point of view for years to come. 
In the 1930s, the movement would spread from the Constantinois region to various local 
branches in rural areas. According to Jacques Berque, this process would lead to a new 
form of Islamic practice - along a Jacobin model - which would mediate the differences 
between traditional rural areas and the urban centres. The Ulema template would prove 
popular to both urban and the rural Middle Classes and Lower-Middle Classes43. In turn, 
the Association would come in direct competition with another political movement for 
emancipation led by Messali Hadj. Both would prove critical to the rise of a distinctively 
populist political platform, but Messali Hadj would capture the hopes of disenchanted 
youth and gain the upper hand in the Front Populaire years, when compromise with the 
French still seemed possible. The followers of Ben Badis would bide their time, and 
become critical in the emancipation struggle that followed in the 195os, and later in the 
competition over the control of the postcolonial state. Ben Badis' ideas would remain 
prominent among those willing to create and Islamic state in Algeria in the 196os, and in 
the later years of Islamist renaissance. 
Overall, the colonial period is one that can be characterised by uneven patterns of 
integration, with a dissonance between the aims of metropolitan France, and those of the 
colon population often at odds with regards to the status and right of natives. The 
particulars of, this tripartite relationship, in turn were significant in shaping the 
nationalist movements of the early loth Century. It is therefore in those terms that we 
can speak of a colonial legacy shaping the structures and aims of the postcolonial state, as 
well as influencing the birth of contemporary political Islam45. 
42Adberrahim Lamchichi. 1992. L'Islamisme enAlgerie. Paris: L'Harmattan. p. 62. 
43 See Jacques Berque. 1962. Le Maghreb entre deux Guerres. 
44 Omar earlier. 1995. Entre Nation et Jihad: histoire Sociale des Radicalismes Algeriens. 
Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. P. 54. 
45 The importance of the colonial legacy in Algeria is a dominant theme in much historical 
work. An example of such a focus is Yves Lacoste et al. 196o. Algerie, Passe et Present. For 
this type of argument see Benjamin Stora. 1991. Histoire de 1'Algerie Coloniale. Stora states 
that contemporary Algeria is the result of a "colonial reality". p. 6. 
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. 2. The War of Independence 
Algerian nationalism entered its modern phase in the 192os, but it is only after World 
War II that nationalist movements such as the PPA (Parti du Peuple Algerien) and its 
successor the MTLD (Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertes Democratiques) found 
the means and the opportunity to organise large-scale revolt. The international context is 
of importance here. The participation of Algerian soldiers under the French banner in 
World War II created a generation of well-trained and experienced soldiers. The defeat of 
France and German occupation created a power vacuum in Algeria - and breathing space 
politically and culturally - for the occupied population, even though the lack of control by 
the metropole over the colon population led to noticeable reversals in the treatment of the 
local population (especially but not only the Jews). Most significantly, the war created the 
expectation that the sacrifice of Algerian lives for France was meaningful and that it 
would lead to greater political participation and rights for the colonised populations. 
When post-war France failed to meet these expectations, and in the context of the 
decolonisation of many parts of what was to become the Third World, the possibility of 
political uprising found new impetus46. Most notably, the rise to power of Colonel Gamal 
Abdel Nasser to power in Egypt in 1952 brought to the fore a new kind of pan-Arabic 
nationalism - and a thirst for empowerment which reached as far as the French 
protectorates of North Africa47. The 1945-1954 period, as a result, is dominated by the 
growing confidence and unity of the nationalist movement in terms of its ideological 
commitment to emancipation, but also by the emergence of widely different views as to 
how this project could be achieved48. 
A series of attacks launched against institutions and members of the colonial 
administration on November 1,1954 sparked a long, brutal and eventually successful 
independence war49. The different phases of the war have been covered in detail 
46 Full-scale uprising did not occur until 1954, but early signs of rebellion were evident with 
the Setif uprising of 1945 which was met with disproportionate force, leading to 17,000 to 
45,000 deaths (depending on accounts). See Manfred Halpern. 1948. "The Algerian Uprising 
of 1945" The Middle East Journal. pp. 191-202. 
47 Michael K. Clark. 1959. Algeria in Turmoil: A History of the Rebellion. New York: Praeger. 
P-9. 
48 Michael K. Clark. 1959. Algeria in Turmoil: A History of the Rebellion. Chapter soff. 
49 Many sources on the Algerian war can be found. The main ones consulted here include: 
Bernard Droz and Evelyne Lever. 1982. Histoire de la Guerre d Algerie, 1954-1962. Paris: 
Seuil (Points). Alistair Horne. 1977. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. London: 
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elsewhere, but a short summary, and an overview of the themes which matter most to our 
analysis remains useful here. After the attacks of the ist of November, it took both the 
Algerians and the French time to come to terms with the seriousness of the revolt, which 
remained limited to a small number of militants. It is only at the end of the year that the 
metropole sent more troops to cope with widening conflict. 1955 reflects this confusion 
with early FLN success met with ruthless repression by French forces while the ministry 
of Interior tried to draw up a rapid plan of reform for Algeria. 1955 and 1956 saw 
increasing political instability in French political circles with the weaknesses of the 
Fourth Republic becoming more apparent given the Algerian situation. On the loth 
August 1956, the FLN convened at the Soummam Conference to draw a stronger political 
platform, sort out issues of leadership and plan for its political future in case of victory. 
Ideologically, this was a turning point for the party that showed, under the banner of 
CNRA (Comite National de la Revolution Algerienne) its unifying force and the bases of 
its future claims to political legitimacy. On the ground, however, the first years of the war 
were characterised by lack of revolutionary zeal on the part of many Algerians, and the 
difficulty of the FLN to broaden its appeal for a general call to revolution. The progressive 
amalgamation of most opposition groups into the FLN would remedy this to a certain 
extent, but the battle to convince the majority of Algerians of the necessity of 
independence at the price of armed struggle was far from won. In many ways, it is the 
stepping up of French repression of the insurrection, and the brutality characterising the 
now famous Battle of Algiers in 19575°, which changed these dynamics. The length of 
conflict helped create the setting for the growth of an independentist consciousness 
among Algerians, and the reported excesses of the French army - including accusations of 
widespread torture - made the case for independence stronger than ever. 
Macmillan (Papermac). William B. Quandt. 1969. Revolution and Political leadership: 
Algeria 1954-1968. Cambridge (Mass. ): MIT Press. Joseph Kraft. i96i. The Struggle for 
Algeria. New York: Double Day. Jules Roy. 196o. La Guerre d Algerie. Paris: Juilliard Joan 
Gillespie. i96o. The Algerian Rebellion and Revolution. Edgar O'Ballance. 1967. The 
Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62. London: Faber and Faber. Henri Alleg. 1958. La Question. 
Paris: Editions de Minuit. Charles-Henri Favrod. 1959. La Revolution Algerienne. Paris: 
Plon. Michael K. Clark. 1959. Algeria in Turmoil. Benjamin Stora. 1993. Histoire de la Guerre 
d Algerie (1954-1962). Paris: La Decouverte. Alain de Serigny. 1958. La Revolution du 13 
Mai. Paris: Plon. Jean Rous. 1965. Chronique de la Decolonisation. Paris: Presence Africaine. 
Edward Behr. 1962. The Algerian Problem. New York: WW Norton. Yves Courriere. 
1967,1970,1971. Les Fils de la Toussaint, L'Heure des Colonels, Les Feux du Desespoir. Paris: 
Fayard. See also Yves Courierre and Philippe Monnier La Guerre d'Algerie (recent 
documentary series illustrating Yves Courriere's books). 
5° For a detailed and elegant historical analysis of the Battle of Algiers, see Alistair Home. 
1977. A Savage War of Peace. pp. 183ff. See also Pontecorvo's semi-documentary La 
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This is not the only dimension of the conflict worth bearing in mind though: events and 
political decisions in France would also a have a strong bearing on the shape and eventual 
outcome of the conflict. Successive governments had failed to solve the Algerian problem, 
and increasing criticism of the ends of and means used to keep Algeria French by the 
armed forces came under wide criticism 'by French civil society groups. At no previous 
time had the colon wishes been more at odds with political opinion in France - and such 
a division required the leadership and unifying force of both a head of government and of 
new institutions. The man for job was of course General de Gaulle, who drew up the 
framework for a new constitution that would enable him to have the freedom to operate 
on the ground and end the rebellion. Whether de Gaulle was prepared to let go of Algeria 
upon assuming his new powers in June 1958 is unlikely, but the possibility had become a 
defacto political reality. Like his predecessors, de Gaulle attempted to draw a programme 
of reforms, offered initiatives for amnesties and leniency for native combatants, and 
proposed a cease-fire to stop the momentum of the independence movement. He also 
made conciliatory, if ambiguous, gestures towards the colon population upon his visit. 
Despite these efforts though, the FLN rejected such measures, cornering de Gaulle into 
recognising the right of Algerians to self-determination in September 1959. The war was 
far from over however, since such a recognition couldn't be interpreted in any other way 
than betrayal by the colon population as well as powerful segments of the army making 
progress and sacrifices on the ground. A new phase of the conflict arose from this change 
of dynamics, notably with the creation of local militias and eventually the powerful OAS 
(Organisation Armee Secrete)51. From 1961 onwards, the OAS became a new participant 
in the hostilities, fighting both the Algerian independence movement in Algeria and the 
French government, with attempts on de Gaulle's life. For the FLN, the war against 
France, on the other hand, was not over. De Gaulle's suggestion that Algeria could be 
independent, and his treatment of FLN delegates as legitimate political interlocutors was 
contradicted in practice with continued army involvement. That being said, the political 
tide had turned against French Algeria both among natives and in French public opinion. 
With the OAS and the colon population increasingly isolated, the hostilities turned to 
terrorism tactics and a scorched earth policy on the part of the OAS, even the in the 
context of the Evian Accords of March 1962, which officially ended the war. Formal 
Battaglia diAlgeri (1965). 
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independence was officially granted in July 1962, in a continued climate of fear and 
revenge, and with the rapid departure of the colon population52. 
The brutality of the war is of course notable, but so is the emotional sense of rupture 
brought upon by the war, both between Algeria and France, but also within Algeria and 
within France. Issues of internal divisions are of particular importance to the ideological 
evolution of the Algerian political lifeworld. Indeed, the independence movement, despite 
its strong roots, remained divided on the issue of tactics and aims well into several years 
into the conflict. Only one small wing of one independentist tendency (the PPA-MTLD) 
was responsible for the start of the insurrection with only nine key figures at its head53. It 
would take several months to galvanise the rest of the PPA-MTLD constituency fully and 
effectively (originally 20,000 supporters in total), with the rest of the Algerian population 
still by and large divided on the issue of independence. Additionally, unlike many 
independentist groups54, the branch of the independence movement lead by Messali 
Hadj would refuse to come under the banner of the nascent FLN, and in fact would 
compete for power and legitimacy within the insurrection for years to come under the 
banner of the MNA (Mouvernent National Algerien)55. In fact, may of the early casualties 
of the war were due to infighting among native Algerians, either through attacks on 
members of the opposite independentist camp, or on Algerians collaborating with the 
French (or being too passive for the independentists' taste)56. Therefore, it is worth 
emphasising that the independence war in Algeria was neither spontaneous, nor united. 
It involved internal strife and violence deciding which tendency would take charge of the 
movement, and ultimately head an independent state (the FLN won, and Messali Hadj's 
contribution to Algerian nationalism over decades was officially erased from the memory 
of the new nation)57. Overall, 
I 
the war was initially another native insurrection that 
51 Robert Buchard. 1963. Organisation Armee Secrete. Paris: Seuil. 
52 See Jean-Jacques Jordi. 1999. "L'Exode des Francais" Autrement -Collection Memoires: 
Alger 1940-1962: Une Ville en Guerre . 56 (March) pp. 25off. 
53 Larbi Ben M'Hidi, Didouche Mourad, Rabah Bitat, Krim Belkacem, Mohamed Boudiaf, and 
Mostefa Ben Boulaid on Algerian soil; supporting the movement from Egypt were Mohamed 
Khider, Hocine Ait Ahmed and Ahmed Ben Bella. 
4 Measures of unification and entente during the course of 1956 involved powerful groups 
such as Ferhat Abbas' UDMA and the Communist party. 
55 This confrontation would last for almost as long as the war, from 1955 until 1962. 
56 This would be exemplified by the ruthless elimination of collaborators with the French 
after the FLN victory. 
57 See Benjamin Stora. 1991. La Gangrene et l'Oubli. Chapters io, 11 and 12 in particular on 
divisions within the independence movement, and their consequences for postcolonial 
nation-building. 
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broadened its constituency and scope over time and reached a momentum which 
ultimately could not be stopped. The divisions did not end there however. The dynamics 
of the war influenced changes in power among the leadership of the FLN first between 
internal and external leaders, and a few years into the conflict, from internal forces to a 
new military elite based at the frontiers. Common goals could not fully overcome power 
struggle within the FLN, explaining much of the competition and purging instincts of the 
FLN after independence. 
What these different elements did have a common was a profound distaste for the 
inequalities and perceived hypocrisy of French colonial rule, and in particular the cultural 
aspects of colonisation. The aims of the movement reflected in the FLN critique of 
cultural problems associated with colonialism: 
Colonialism has attacked the cultural and religious heritage of the 
Algerian nation, intent on depersonalizing the masses so as to exploit 
them further and to implement the policy of 'assimilation'... The 
results of this policy are characterized at present by the refusal to 
allow the teaching of Arabic in government schools and by many 
hindrances to free education58. 
The great unifying force of the movement in this setting was the careful combination of 
two broad tendencies, seen as complementary: socialism and Islam. Most saliently, Islam 
was once again a key rallying call for cultural reassertion, it provided hope and a sense of 
pride, as well as a thirst for justice without compromise and a reason for self-sacrifice. 
The backing of the religious figures gave the FLN the moral legitimacy it needed and the 
spiritual vocabulary for armed struggle. Indeed, from the first attacks in 1954, the 
freedom fighters assumed the names of mudjahidin, `the fighters of the faith'; they 
framed the obligation to rebel in terms of Jihad, and they adopted a rhetoric inspired 
from al-Qadir, adapted to a modern context. Such a strong religious resonance would 
hold great symbolic power in the postcolonial era. On the other hand, the FLN's 
attachment to socialism owed much ideologically to the communist doctrine of Mao Tse- 
tung, and tactically to guerilla tactics developed in the Viet Minh in French Indochina, 
with the imprint of communism in terms of organisation59. This hybridity in designing 
58 FLN pamphlet. 1956. " What is Algeria? " quoted in David C. Gordon. 1962. North Africa's 
French legacy. p. 35. 
59 Edgar O'Ballance. 1967. The Algerian Insurrection.. pp. 2o5 and 213. 
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the aims of the movement, and the means to achieve them, was partially tactical (to 
accommodate different tendencies within the FLN, and to provide its armed branch, the 
ALN - Armee de la Liberation Nationale - with effective tactical tools for warfare), and 
partially principled, since the combination of Islam and socialism seemed to encapsulate 
the desire for emancipation with the need for cultural authenticity. But tensions between 
the two tendencies were not to be easily overcome, both ideologically, and in terms of 
partisanship among leaders. In turn, the socialist content of the revolution, compounded 
by the FLN assimilation of or victory over rival groups, lead to its monopoly on political 
power and, most importantly, on political legitimacy. After the war, this would make the 
FLN party machine the only political player deserving to represent the Algerian people, 
leading to a near monopoly on political power in the postcolonial era60. 
By the time independence was gained in 1962, between 500,000 and 1 million people 
had died as the result of the war, and the war had also led to strong economic and social 
restructuring, especially in the country side. For France, the results would be equally 
devastating: the Fourth Republic had been brought to its knees, the issue of Algerian 
independence and of the war had torn French public opinion apart 61, the overnight 
exodus of the colon population changed the political and social landscape of France 
irremediably, and Charles de Gaulle had almost been assassinated by some of its own 
citizens. But the Algerian population was at last free to form and consolidate an 
independent state. Still, the legacy of the war was one of unity and sacrifice but one which 
would come at a heavy price. 
4.3.3 Four Key Postcolonial Periods 
Our analysis leads us to the post-colonial era and the factors underpinning the growth of 
current Islamist groups per se. The social, economic and political factors outlined in this 
discussion emphasise long-term factors such as policies of Arabisation with more 
contingent factors relating to the socio-economic climate of the 1970s and 198os. Here, 
60 Benjamin Stora speaks of a conception of the nation tied to a vision of unity and thus a lack 
in dissonant voices on the path to postcolonial government. See Benjamin Stora. 1993. 
Histoire de la Guerre d Algerie. p. 44. 
61 For a discussion of French opposition movements to the Algerian war, see Martin Evans. 
1997. The Memory of Resistance: French Opposition to the Algeria War (1954-1962). 
Oxford: Berg. 
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the failure of populist/socialist economic projects and social planning relying on strong 
oil prices to finance heavy industrialisation projects, and the failure of such projects to 
create the incentives for sustainable economic growth are notable. The neglect of the 
agricultural sector since independence made Algeria reliant almost exclusively on its oil 
and natural gas resources for revenue, and with devaluation of oil prices in the 198os, 
much of the state's wealth dwindled, prompting heavy borrowing to meet domestic 
demands, and growing international debt problems. Many authors have pointed to the 
failure of authoritarian states to deliver economic growth as the root of political dissent 
and growing pressure from civil society for greater political pluralism. Algeria in the late 
198os is a textbook case illustrating such a trend with mounting social pressure in the 
wake of the failure of FLN-controlled regime to fulfil the conditions of its populist social 
contract. Such economic considerations - and their social and political implications are of 
great importance to explanations of the dynamics of the growth of oppositional social 
movements such as political Islam. With this borne in mind though, the question of why 
opposition to the state took the form of political Islam requires explanatory tools of a 
different type. For the purposes of this analysis, I rely on a chronological account of the 
phases of development - and roots causes - of political Islam in more detail to account for 
the specific ways in which political Islam interacted with the state. Political Islam is a 
region-wide phenomenon and there is little evidence to suggest that its effects should 
have been felt to any less degree in Algeria than anywhere else in the region. Still, the 
confrontation between Islamists and the state in Algeria took on a different - and more 
extreme - turn there than elsewhere, highlighting the unique setting in which Algerian 
Islamism took shape. 
4. ý. ý. i. The Ben Bella Era: ig62-1g6S62 
The end of the war saw divisions within the FLN become fractures. In addition, the 
Islamic current, which had been a key source of support for the FLN, became increasingly 
sidelined. The presence of powerful competing ideas inside the FLN (principally 
socialism) ensured that a specifically Islamic state was never likely to be achieved63. 
62 For an in-depth account of the Ben Bella era, see David and Marina Ottoway. 1969. Algeria, 
The Making of a Socialist Revolution. Berkeley: University of California Press. Herve 
Bourges. 1967. L'Algerie a 1'Epreuve du Pouvoir. Paris: Grasset. Gerard Chaliand. 1964. 
LAlgerie est-elle Socialiste? Paris: Maspero. 
63 Most of the religious leaders of the time were purged from the party and replaced by 
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Nevertheless, Islam and Islamic symbols were still clearly present in the debate and the 
formulation of the new state. For instance, Islam became the religion of the state and the 
constitution stipulated that the president should be a Muslim. Politically however, the 
consensus built into the FIN party machine was one revolving around a developmental 
populist form of socialism64, inspired by other socialist experiments, but also with the 
concern to be authentically Algerian in character, as expressed by President Ben Bella: 
"We want an Algerian socialism, born of our national experience, benefiting from the 
experience of socialist countries"65. 
The transition to postcolonial status implied the drawing of new bases for governance 
and an underpinning ideology that could articulate the importance of authenticity. Jean- 
Claude Vatin comments on the complex ideological makeup of the new state 
characterised by features strongly linked to combination of the "images of a glorified 
past", involving the "idealisation of pre-colonial authorities": 
Liberated Algeria sings the praises of the djemaa of its ancestors, of the 
khalifalik and aghalik of Abdel Kader, and in doing so it emphasises 
certain favourable aspects in a partial analysis which provides it with 
the fiction of a supposedly balanced and harmonious world... it shows 
the Algerians' wish to find their place in their on history, to see the past 
in terms of black and white, to discover pointers for their own ideology 
and to revitalise their roots66. 
This process, in turn, was compounded by a strong official rejection of the possibility of 
neo-colonial influence - with Ben Bella's admission that such concerns created rifts 
within the party machine: 
'modernists' early on, a move which was followed by a wave of nationalisation in the name of 
Algerian socialism. See Raymon Vallin. 1973. "Muslim Socialism in Algeria. in I. William 
Zartman (ed. ) Man, State and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib. London: Pall Mall. 
p. 51. 
64 For an overview of the ideological development of socialism in Algeria in the postcolonial 
era, see Hugh Roberts. 1984. "The Politics of Algerian Socialism" in Richard Lawless and 
Allan Findlay (eds. ) North Africa: Contemporary Politics and Economic Development. New 
York: St Martin's Press. 
65 Ben Bella in an interview for "L'Unita" reprinted in Maria Antonietta Macciocchi. 1973. "An 
Interview with Ben Bella" in I. William Zartman (ed. ) Man, State and Society in the 
Contemporary Maghrib. p. 124. 
66 Jean-Claude Vatin. 198o. "The Maghreb Response to French Institutional 'Transfers': 
Problems of Analysis" in W. Morris-Jones and George Fisher (eds. ) Decolonisation and 
After: The British and French Experience. London: Frank Cass. P. 276. 
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That is the big question: Neocolonialism! When one asks us why we 
are divided after the CNRA at Tripoli, when one asks us what is the rift 
which opened in a group of men all united in the same faith to expel 
the oppressor, well then, I tell you that at the bottom of the dissension 
among us lay the question: what is our attitude toward 
neocolonialism? In other words, what is the ideological content of the 
Algerian revolution? I have asserted that neocolonialism is like the 
plague for us... Colonialism has been modernized, it has become more 
up to date, less crude; it has realized that the people cannot be 
dominated by the whip, by machine guns, by bloody repression. So it 
looks for other means, more progressive systems of domination: an 
enlightened colonialism, so to speak, based on a fictitious equality, with 
colonial peace hanging over our land and at the same time with 
economic and military domination of key points of our society. But this 
means a new form of slavery and oppression67. 
At the same time, Vatin points to the complex interaction between pre-colonial symbols 
and the reality of postcolonial administration, involving a large degree of similitude with 
colonial patterns - with the caveat of socialist ideology thrown in for good measure68. 
Such confusion and hybridity carried over to policies pertaining to culture, and 
particularly language and education, especially with Ben Bella's grand project of 
Arabisation, which carried with it an attachment to pre-colonial socio-cultural constructs 
clashing with the reality of a state where little classical Arabic was spoken. Added to this 
was the context of a postcolonial sense of unease with regards to French culture leading 
to partial assimilation of French cultural norms on the one hand, and nativist 
overcompensation on the other69. 
On the ground, the main ideological construct of the party machine under Ben Bella 
would rest on an attempt to merge the two central concepts identified as the key to the 
postcolonial condition - Islam and socialism - into the framework if Islamic socialism? °. 
More mundanely perhaps, but just as importantly, single party rule legitimised and 
67 Ben Bella in an interview for "L'Unita" reprinted in Maria Antonietta Macciocchi. 1973. 
"An Interview with Ben Bella" in I. William Zartman (ed. ) Man, State and Society in the 
Contemporary Maghrib. p. 125. 
68 Jean-Claude Vatin. 198o. "The Maghreb Response". p. 277. Francois Burgat expands on the 
selective attitude towards Western symbols and attributed of modernity (with science and 
technology seen in a positive light). Francois Burgat. 1993. L'Islamisme au Maghreb: La Voix 
du Sud (second edition). Paris: Payot 
69 For an overview, see David C. Gordon. 1962. North Africa's French legacy. chapters 7 and 
8. 
70 For an in-depth discussion of the principles of 'Islamic socialism and the popular debates 
revolving around it see Raymon Vallin. 1973. "Muslim Socialism in Algeria. in I. William 
Zartman (ed. ) Man, State and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib. PP. 5o-64. 
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strongly related to the conception of post-revolutionary political needs of stability and 
legitimacy: in that conception, 
... only the FLN, as the 
foremost revolutionary force of the republic, can 
guarantee this stability, and this by ensuring the conformity of the 
nation's policy to the orientation traced by the Revolution for all 
Algerian. On these grounds, the necessity of the party unique is firmly 
established7l. 
In that sense, FLN defined itself as the political player with "the only mandate from the 
people that is possible in Algeria"72. This issue if of importance to the development of civil 
society groups in the 1970s, since the development of political pluralism was stunted at 
the birth of state, both in deed, and through ideology. The anti-statist stance of 
opposition groups such as Islamist movements would be a visible result to this emphasis 
on complete control of the political lifeworld by the FLN from early on. 
Still, this ambitious ideological project met with some resistance both within the FLN and 
with large segments of the population. The difficulty that the president had in convincing 
both the religious establishment and the general population of the value of his original 
construct led to criticism, concessions to the more religious wing of the FLN, and 
mounting unrest. The al-Qiyam association led the first Islamist campaign to undermine 
the state at that time. Influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qiyam (The 
Values) articulated a conservative critique of the increasingly beleaguered government 
and contributed to its demise. Arguably, al-Qiyam can be seen as the first Islamist 
movement of the post-independence era, and an inspiration to the doctrine of later 
movements73. At the heart of the association lay one of main nationalist figures of the 
time: Malek Bennabi, which may explain the legal status al-Qiyam would enjoy upon its 
creation in 1964. The aims of the movement were in line with Islamist programmes 
developed elsewhere in the Muslim world74, but took on a specific meaning at a key 
period of Algerian history: that of the foundation of the state. The islamisation of society 
and preaching of Islam were most significant aspects of al-Qiyam's publication, Majallat 
71 P. J. Vatikiotis. 1973. "Tradition and Political Leadership: The Example of Algeria" in 
I. William Zartman (ed. ) Man, State and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib. p. 319. 
72 P. J. Vatikiotis. 1973. "Tradition and Political Leadership". P. 319. 
73 As argued by Abderrahim Lamchichi. 1992. L'Islamisme en Algerie. Paris: L'Harmattan. 
P"95. 
74 This is further developed in chapter five. 
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al-Tadhib al-Islami (Journal of Muslim Education). Emphasis was placed on the need to 
bring back the traditional values of Islam into Algerian society and the resistance to 
foreign ideologies threatening the authenticity of the Muslim way of life. This, in turn, 
would come hand in hand with pressure to create an Islamic form of governance on the 
part of the state. Al-Qiyam's critique would thus be impregnated with the political and 
cultural realities of the time, as a reaction against the cultural influence of France during 
the colonial period, and in response to the creation of opportunities to influence the 
future shape of governance. In practice, the relationship of the association with the state 
degenerated quickly from high profile conferences to violent confrontation with left-wing 
trade unions and students, and condemnation by the left-wing intelligentsia. The 
movement's religious doctrine antagonised secular elements of society. Its claims 
concerning legitimate rule under shari'a law and against foreign ideologies undermined 
Ben Bellas attempt at promoting Islamic socialism. By the end of 1965, al-Qiyam had 
been disavowed by the state75, but other Algerian Islamist thinkers were ready to follow in 
its footsteps, Mahfoud Nahnah being a prominent example. 
Such events were however not the main cause of the deposition of the Ben Bella 
government: internal divisions as to the ideological route to be taken by the postcolonial 
nation-state were of importance here, but most central to the shift in power from the 
historical leadership of the revolution to the external army factions which took over the 
final phases of the conflict reflected continuing divisions among the participants in the 
war of independence and struggle for the political spoils of war. In other words, the 
accession of Houari Boumediene to political prominence owes much to the shifting 
allegiances within the party in terms of political power76. This mixture of power struggle 
and ideological rivalry would form the foundation of the political lifeworld of postcolonial 
Algeria: 
Algeria terms itself a 'popular and democratic republic' and professes to 
follow a 'specifically Algerian socialism'. In fact these phrases mask an 
incoherent ideology never explicitly defined... and also never put into 
practice. They also conceal a continuing undercover struggle between 
elements influenced by secular, Marxist principles and others who 
would have Algeria give primacy to Islamic values. Finally, they hide 
the fact, since the coup of June 19,1965, Algeria is a military 
75 It would only be officially banned by the interior Ministry in March 1970. 
76 For a similar argument, see John Ruedy. 1992. Modern Algeria. p. 197. 
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dictatorship77. 
On June 19,1965, the army deposed President Ben Bella in a bloodless coup and the new 
leader and president Colonel Houari Boumedienee8 gained control of the polity with the 
promise of political openness and cultural change. His legacy, like his predecessor's, 
would remain ambiguous however. 
43.3.2" The Boumediene Era: 1965-1978 
Despite Boumediene' stress of Islamic roots and his own religiously conservative 
background, his main agenda was not one of religious revival but rather one of 
nationalism. The Boumediene era was one associated with the rise of the postcolonial 
developmental dream, heavy industrialisation, land reform and cultural and linguistic 
change under the banner of a nationalist programme based on the socialist political ideas 
prevalent in the Third World at the time79. It was a time of great economic achievements, 
especially in the 196os, but not one where political liberalisation was put on the agenda. 
In fact, despite Boumediene's condemnation of his predecessor as a demagogue trying to 
undermine the aims of the revolution, his persistence in pursuing a policy of economic 
development in socialist terms is notable. He did little to liberalise what was now a 
military-controlled single party systemBO. This was a common combination in the 
77 Charles Gallagher. 1973. "A Note on the Maghrib" in I. William Zartman (ed. ) Man, State 
and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib. p. 11. 
78 also spelled Boumedienne. 
79 For an overview of the socio-economic aspects of the postcolonial transition, see Samir 
Amin. 1970. The Maghreb in the Modern World. Chapter four. For a summary of 
development plans under the banner of socialism, see Lise Garon. 1993. L'Obsession 
Unitaire et la Nation Trompee: La Finde 1 Algerie Socialiste. Sainte-Foye (Canada): Presses 
Universitaires Laval. Chapter One. For an overall analysis of socio-economic patterns in 
precolonial, colonial and postcolonial times, see Mahfoud Bennoune. 1988. The Making of 
Contemporary Algeria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
80 Boumediene was quoted as saying "The morbid deviations of personal power have 
profoundly changed our institutions... In trying to muzzle and tame the vital forces of the 
Nation, in hardening and freezing the governing bodies of the country, in hoping to create the 
myth of the 'providential man', the dictator deliberatetly violated revolutionary legitimacy". 
Two points are worth noting here: first, it is notable that Boumediene condemned his 
predecessor in terms of his failure to live up to the ideals of the revolution. This stance would 
lead to the traditional appraisal of political ligitimacy of rule in terms of revolutionary ideas. 
Here, for instance, Boumediene states that his coup "was written in the historical logic of the 
revolution". Secondly, this stance did not mean any significant change in the process of 
institutionalising socialism in that revolutionary historical logic: "socialism is part of our 
national heritage". See Houari Boumediene. 1973. "The Third Anniversary of Algerian 
Independence". reprinted in I. William Zartman (ed. ) Man, State and Society in the 
Contemporary Maghrib. pp. 127-130. quotes from pp. 127 and 128. 
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developing world corresponding to what is commonly termed a populist social contract 
where citizens 'trade off their political rights for economic development and stability. 
Under the terms of this contract, the party machine aimed at incorporating most avenues 
for political expression through civil society and the few free options for political 
expression (such as the media and the mosques which went increasingly under the 
control of state bureaucracies)". 
The most significant aspect of the idea of legitimacy in governance during this time was 
the importance of army control of all aspects of the political process - with noticeable 
consequences on the way the post-independence political lifeworld came to be articulated 
and institutionalisedS2: 
i. There is no legitimacy outside the revolutionary symbols, groups, 
and policies. The Revolution is invoked by any government seeking to 
legitimize its incumbency, to which the opposition responds by 
decrying the betrayal of the Revolution and by promising a return to it. 
2. The revolutionary war gave rise to a strong millennialist feeling, 
including immediate expectations for the fruits of the revolution. 
3. If power in such a situation does not grow directly out of the barrel 
of a gun, it does grow out of the possession of a gun... The Army's role 
as guardian of the revolution gives it a primary task of safeguarding 
its own group interestsa3. 
The army had of course played a significant role in decolonisation, but the relative power 
of various army factions were underplayed by the rhetoric of the victorious FLN. These 
differences would remain apparent in the Ben Bella years, but not explicitly articulated. 
With the faction led by Boumediene coming into power in 1965, the role of the army 
would not diminish, on the contrary. The single-party structure of FLN would remain in 
place, but Boumediene would rely on the power of the military, and more specifically of 
the feared military run political `police' (securite militaire), to keep in power84. 
81 John Waterbury. 1997. "From Social Contracts to Extraction Contracts: The Political 
Economy of Authoritarianism and Democracy" in John P. Entelis (ed. ) Islam, Democracy 
and the State in North Africa. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press. pp. 141-142. 
82 This term is borrowed from John P. Entelis. 1986. Algeria: The Revolution 
Institutionalized. Boulder: Westview Press. 
83 I. William Zartman. 1973. "The Algerian Army in Politics" in I. William Zartman (ed. ) Man, 
State and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib. extracts from pp. 211-219. Emphasis in the 
original text. 
$4 Benjamin Stora. 1995. Histoire de IAlgerie depuis l'Independence. Paris: La Decouverte. 
p. 27. 
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Opponents and potential replacements were eliminated, exiled or sidelined (some 
historic leaders of the FLN were still alive). The circle of members of the military in real 
control of the executive and judiciary remained small, but grew in significance, while 
more independent committees (such as the Conseil de la Revolution) dwindled. Key 
political supporters were kept under control through a share of the hydrocarbon profit 
share, but the lion's share of the economic benefits of the new economy would be 
monopolised at the top of the power pyramid. It is no coincidence that Algerian heads of 
state are military men. Officially populist, the Algerian state would increasingly be ruled 
by the few, for the benefit of the same few. The themes of fidelity to the ideals of the 
revolution, adherence to the principles of Islam and socialist redistribution of goods grew 
increasing distant from the political reality of a military dictatorship. 
Specifically with regards to political Islam, the 1965-1971 period was marked by the 
government's success in controlling the growth a sizeable opposition based on Islam. 
Boumediene used a two-pronged approach of repression (when necessary) and 
incorporation (when possible) to prevent repeat performances of the al-Qiyam 
phenomenon. In this regard, Boumediene was infinitely more skilful than his 
predecessor in handling religious opinion towards his essential secular socio-economic 
and political programme. Despite these efforts however, the 1970s saw the progressive 
growth in power and confidence of nascent Islamist groups which were critical of state 
policy and behaviour. Two sets of events can be seen as catalysts in this regard. Firstly, 
the development of full-scale Arabisation programmes at all levels of education 
progressively changed the cultural landscape of Algeria, with specific consequences for 
the development of political Islam85. Such programmes were originally set up by the Ben 
Bella government in 1964 to apply to primary and secondary education; in turn, they 
became a priority for the Boumediene regime with mixed results. On the one hand, 
because the policy was not applied uniformally, it began to highlight and exacerbate class 
differences between poor ruralArabisants and elite Francophones. This gap applied both 
in terms of educational opportunities, and with regards to eventual access to career 
opportunities. Such patterns of class conflict would become more exacerbated as socio- 
85 On the background to the language issue in Algeria and its relationship to cultural 
formations, see Christine Souriau. 1980. "Arabisation and French Culture in the Maghreb". in 
W. Morris-Jones and George Fisher (eds. ) Decolonisation and After. PP-31 off. and 
Mohammed Benrabah. 1998. "La Langue Perdue" in Mohammed Benrabah et al. Les 
Violences en Algerie. Paris: Opus. pp. 63ff. 
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economic problems became more acute in the late 197os and 198os, with the overlap 
between 'being Arabisant' and 'being Islamist' growing steadily. On the other hand, the 
educational needs of Arabisation required the rapid development of a teaching corps 
capable of using Arabic fluently in classroom situations. In the direct aftermath of the 
independence war, French remained the dominant language of education and the regime 
had little choice but to call upon foreign teachers. A large number of these immigrant 
teachers were Egyptian Muslim Brothers who brought more than language skills with 
them. The fact that policies of Arabisation brought (Islamist) Muslim Brothers from 
Egypt after independence was a cultural factor of importance since the ideals of Hasan al- 
Banna, and later Sayyid Qutb, were introduced into schools, and developed through 
university life as a result. It can thus be argued that Islamism was introduced directly into 
schools to a whole generation of children who would associate Arabic with authenticity 
and French with foreign domination and class exploitation. More generally, the political 
roots of an Islamist alternative were laid into the imaginary of a generation through the 
most powerful of communication tools: education. 
Secondly, the state became actively involved in the development of Islamist activism in its 
management of the ambitious, but unpopular, programme of land reform dubbed the 
`Agrarian Revolution' in the 1970s. Land reform under Boumediene implied the 
collectivisation of land ownership and the creation communal farms. Left-wing university 
groups nurtured by the regime as `civil society' were to be the ambassadors of this 
programme. However, rural populations, and especially land owners, resisted the 
implementation of this policy, indicating a rift between the socialist wishes of the regime 
with the reality of rural life. Additionally, with the launch of the Agrarian Revolution as 
policy, the Boumediene regime managed to incense the Islamist opposition to a socialist 
(if not communist) political and economic agenda. The careful compromise between 
Islam and socialism had been upset. To many Islamists, socialism/communism was a 
foreign construct which had been developed in the Eastern bloc as a staunchly atheist 
political programme. While the Islamist viewpoint emphasised the importance of social 
justice and equality (a left-wing platform in some sense), it did so on religious grounds, 
and with the proviso that property rights should not come under attack. This programme 
was a step too far in the direction of socialism without, or even against, Islam. 
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Once the revolutionary plans of the regime proved too unpopular to implement, and in 
order to counter the left-wing youth groups that had become increasingly difficult to 
control, the regime used the Islamist groups to undermine the ambassadors of a policy 
now deemed embarrassing. Without having to lose face by abandoning its policy, the 
regime simply stopped advocating the Agrarian Revolution and let the Islamist groups in 
universities oust left-wing groups, sometimes violently. This had a profound effect on the 
future direction of the movement due to the power-play the regime enacted in response 
to growing popular discontent vis-a-vis such a programme. Here, the relaxed attitude of 
the regime toward nascent Islamist opposition groups in universities in the early to mid 
1970s helped bury the disaster of the Agrarian Revolution and made sure that left-wing 
civil society groups never gained their own voice, and power. 
It is evident that the subsequent growth of Islamism in Algeria was not anticipated by the 
regime as one which could not be ultimately controlled in a similar way. However, the 
consolidation of the Islamist ideal and its spread beyond the university setting went far 
beyond the expectations of the regime, an occurrence compounded by the growing crisis 
in political legitimacy of the state prompted by lack of social opportunities and a 
downward economic turn. These were inherently linked to state policies and clientelist 
networks institutionalised by the state. It is thus logical to assume that political 
opposition to the regime found fertile ground in an underdeveloped civil society in the 
late 1970s and 198os. The prominence of Islamism as a contender for political power was 
only made obvious in the wake of the 1988 food riots, but the signs of its strength and 
popularity were visible long before the process of democratisation made legalisation as a 
political party, or parties, possible. The first signal of Islamism's hold on the public mind 
came through the growth of private mosques, especially in poorer urban areas, which by 
avoiding official channels of Islam, claimed their own niche in civil society. The 
development of a set of vibrant political debates and passionate preaching of self-taught 
imams literally opened up previously taboo discussions on state legitimacy in religious - 
and thus moral - terms S6. This process took time to take hold of urban populations, but 
the combination of social welfare activities at the local level and the provision of religious 
guidance proved a winning formula for various Islamist groups. At this point, no unified 
86 For the best analysis of the growth of political Islam and its political programme through 
informal mosques, see Ahmed Rouadja. 199o. Les Freres et La Mosquee. Enquete sur the 
Mouvement Islamiste en Algerie. Paris: Karthala. 
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Islamist movement was noticeable. But the lack of overall guiding structures shouldn't 
obscure the variety of exchanges, influences and sometimes rivalry among imams, groups 
and mosques. 
Overall, the 1970s saw the growth of radical political movements both in universities and 
through mosques. Still this movement remained timid compared to Islamist equivalent 
in Syria, Egypt and Iran for instance. The last few years of the Boumediene 
administration were also marked by the manipulation of various emerging civil society 
groups to consolidate state power, with an intricate web of shifting alliances making the 
state independent from any specific group87. It is only after Boumediene's death in 197888 
that the Algerian state, failing to meet its obligations under the terms of its populist social 
contract, lost control of public opinion in a significant way to the advantage of the 
Islamist movement89. Still overall, it is noticeable that ideological contradictions 
continued to plague the political agenda of the state in the 1970s. The contradictions of 
Arabisation worked as an illustration to this rupture, but on the whole: 
The problem of defining Algeria's identity within the framework of 
Islamism, Arabism, and Algerianism was made all the more difficult by 
the cultural rupture between the national political leadership and the 
rural or recently urbanized masses9°. 
It is this ideological gap between the elites and civil society that Islamism learnt to excel at 
filling. 
4.3.3.3. The Chadli Benjedid Era: 1979-1992 
President Chadli spent the first few years of his political rule liberalising the regime's 
attitude to Islamist groups leading to their rapid development and their growth in 
confidence. From 1981 onwards, this activism saw the rise in violence by Islamist 
activists and their stockpiling of weapons, a trend which was met in November 1982 by 
87 See Jean Leca and . Jean-Claude Vatin. 1979. "Le Systeme Politique Algerien 1976-1978. 
Ideologie, Institutions et Changement Social" in Developpements Politiques au Maghreb. 
Amenagements Institutionels et Processus Electoraux. Paris: CNRS. pp. 27ff. 
88 Through natural causes (a rare blood disorder). 
89 See Mark Tessler. 1997. "The Origins of Popular Support for Islamist Movements: A 
Political Economy Analysis" in John P. Entelis (ed. ) Islam, Democracy and the State in 
North Africa. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press. 
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the arrest of some 400 militants and a new repressive phase which did little but 
strengthen the resolve and popularity of Islamists. In this increasingly volatile 
environment, the Chadli regime made some key concessions to the Islamist political 
agenda to retain control of political opinion. Overall, the influence of the movement 
seems to have grown steadily in the 198os, most noticeably in the areas of dress and 
public social behaviour9'. On a national level, this progressive political and social 
empowerment became most evident through the successful social pressure applied on 
the regime to revise the Family Code to bring it in line with the Islamist interpretation of 
Islamic principles. In a surprisingly apathetic political climate, the 1984 Family Code 
curtailed women's rights under the law in ways that could only be interpreted as a 
reversal of post-independence gains, especially in terms of custody rights and the right to 
divorce. It is arguable that such a move by the regime could be seen as an attempt to 
reclaim religious legitimacy from the Islamist opposition - or steal its 'moral thunder', so 
to speak. This is only one instance of the subtle power play between the regime and its 
opposition before 1988 though92. 
This climate was in turn underpinned by the growing crisis in the legitimacy of the state 
due to several factors. Firstly, Chadli's lack of charisma (compared to his predecessors) 
and his government's legitimacy being put into question because of poor economic 
performance amidst accusations of widespread corruption93 all contributed to mounting 
civil unrest. Politically, this was underpinned by the growing alienation of the regime 
from public life. Islamism, at that time, was only one expression of an increasingly vocal 
and organised civil society94. Furthermore, the growing economic inequalities stemming 
from clientelist networks siphoning the wealth produced through the exploitation of 
natural resources, coupled with rapid demographic growth, further undermined the 
90 John Ruedy. 1992. Modern Algeria. P. 224. 
91 On the specific conditions surrounding the rise of political Islam in Algeria, see, in 
particular, Ahmed Rouadja. 199o. Les Freres et La Mosquee. Paris: Karthala. Abderrahim 
Lamchichi. 1992. L'Islamisme en Algerie. Paris: L'Harmattan. 
92 For an overview of the place of Islamism in the political/ideological spectrum of the early 
Chadli years, see Jean-Claude Vatin. 1982. "Revival in the Maghreb: Islam as an Alternative 
Political Language" in Ali Hillal Dessouki (ed. ) Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World. New 
York: Praeger. pp. 221ff. 
93 On the issue of corruption in Algeria since independence, see Djillali Hadjadj. 1999. 
Corruption et Democratie en Algerie. Paris: La Dispute/Snedit. This a controversial source, 
but with many well illustrated points. 
94 For an overview of the growth and importance of political Islam at that time, see Robert 
Mortimer. 1991. "Islam and Multiparty Politics in Algeria" Middle East Journal 45(4). 
PP575ff" 
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socialist dream of the Boumediene era95. 
This crisis created a niche where Islamism could flourish and led to general social unrest 
culminating the food riots of October 1988, which were not only a political turning point 
for the whole of Algerian political life, but also a beginning for the Islamist bid for political 
power96. The riots highlighted the failure of the regime and the necessity of political 
liberalisation. They were also significant in that they were met by extreme violence by the 
army leading to an estimated 150-50o deaths (these numbers are widely disputed)97. The 
riots had economic and social underpinnings - but the violent repression of 
demonstrations by the army served to precipitate an acute crisis in state legitimacy and 
found political representation as a focal point for demands for social change. Several 
options were opened to the beleaguered Chadli Benjedid government at that time, even 
though political and economic concessions were unavoidable. Perhaps surprisingly, 
Chadli Benjedid opted for rapid and complete democratisation of the political system, the 
instigation of freedom of the press and the opening up of civil society to create the 
conditions for genuine pluralism. Noble as they may seem, such aims were underpinned 
by the firm belief on the part of the political elite that the ruling FLN could not lose a free 
and fair election, a conviction not shared by prominent members of the army. 
After his formal 're-election' in December 1988 (he was the only candidate), Chadli 
introduced a new constitution which removed the monopoly on power of the ruling 
party, introduced a formal separation of the party from the state, allowed for greater 
freedom of expression (especially through the press), and introduced multiparty 
elections. This constitution was formally endorsed by popular referendum in February 
1989. This process worked as the catalyst to the greater integration among rural and 
95 For an overview of patterns of investment during the first few years of the Chadli regime - 
with a special emphasis on problems associated with internal structuring of investment, see 
Marc Ollivier. 1985. "L'Economie Algerienne Vingt Ans apres 1966" L'Annuaire de IAfrique 
du Nord 24. pp. 417ff. 
96 A number of good historical and analytical sources were used in this overview. For 
historical narrative see Michael Willis. 1996. The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political 
History. Reading: Ithaca (Garnett). The Chapters on the post-1992 period were particularly 
useful. For an good analysis of the basic dynamic of the descent into civil war, Severine Labat. 
1995. Les Islamistes Algeriens: Entre les Urnes et le Maquis. (Paris: Seuil) is useful, even 
though Luis Martinez' analysis in La Guerre Civile en Algerie is more sophisticated and up to 
date. See also Amine Touati. 1995. Algerie, Les Islamistes a lAssaut du Pouvoir. Paris: 
L'Harmattan. 
97 On the direct aftermath of the riots, see Will D. Swearingen. 199o. "Algeria's Food Security 
Crisis" Middle East Report. 20, no 166 (Sept/Oct). pp. 2iff. 
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urban Islamist groups under one legal political banner. The Islamist response to 
liberalisation was the creation of the FIS (Front Islamique du Salut - Islamic Salvation 
Front), a loose coalition of Islamist groups that became finally endorsed as a political 
party by the authorities on September 16,1989. Despite early signs that Islamists were 
not interested in democracy, the FIS lost no time and busily recruited supporters and 
mounted and extended array of information networks and charitable organisations in the 
run-up to the local elections of June 1990. The initial popularity of the FIS in the run-up 
to the municipal elections of the 12 June 1990 can be explained both in terms of ideology 
and as a result of tactical choices. The unifying rhetoric of the slogan 'Islam is the 
solution' captured the mood of the electorate. The systematic opposition of the FIS to the 
regime (with regards to issues of economic mismanagement, corruption, lack of moral 
legitimacy and foreign meddling) added relevance and poignancy to an otherwise vague 
political project. In addition, the involvement of the FIS supporters in grass-root social 
welfare and charity activities would win hearts, while rallying public support at the key 
election time would ensure votes98. 
Bearing this in mind, it should also be noted that the scope and speed of the 
democratisation process led to the rapid legitimisation of a number of informal groups 
into political parties. The FIS represents a prominent but not unique example of such a 
transition from a diffuse set of groups and individuals into a full-fledged party aiming for 
access to official channels of power. The Kabyle dominated Rassemblement pour la 
Culture et la Democratie (RCD) also aimed to encapsulate an oppositional agenda in 
political and cultural terms. Other Islamist groups such as Hamas and En-Nahda also 
formed their independent political parties, albeit with less success than the FIS99. 
President Chadli had argued that elections could not be "selective" and thus that 
Islamists could not be excluded from running on religious grounds. Still, he had not 
anticipated the election results that ensued. It has been argued that Chadli had struck a 
deal with Islamists to make the FIS upon its creation the logical descendant of the FLN, 
98 Remy Leveau argues that the mismanagement of the democratisation process had a part to 
play in the post-1992 descent into violence in addition to these factors. See Remy Leveau. 
1993. Le Sabre et le Turban. Paris: Francois Bourin. pp. 141ff. 
99 For a full list of the political parties created in the wake of the 1989 wave of liberalisation 
see Mustafa al-Ahnaf, Bernard Botiveau and Franck Fregosi. 1991. L'Algerie par ses 
Islamistes. Paris: Karthala. Annexe 1. 
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most probably as a pragmatic way to co-opt the Islamist opposition into power-sharing. 
The elections and their aftermath were to be the test of that pact. Polls had suggested a 
comfortable victory for candidates of the FLN with the FIS as second place contenders 
predicted to gather around 25% of the vote. The results however, were a clear victory for 
the FIS with 54.3% of communal seats (853/1.539) and 57.4% of wilaya (regional) seats 
(31/48), with most support coming from urban areas. This was compounded with a 
disastrous performance of the FLN, with only 28.1% of the vote in local seats and 27.5% of 
wilaya seats100. Under a platform of economic reform, social and cultural change, the 
Islamists successfully reclaimed legitimacy from the ruling elite. 
Understandably, the regime's attitude to the FIS changed in the wake of the FLN's dismal 
electoral performance. From accommodation, President Chadli Benjedid's strategy 
moved toward a policy of co-optation coupled with attempts at containment. The 
manipulation of the electoral process (whereby elections where delayed to allow the 
regime to modify electoral laws to disadvantage the FIS) and the withdrawal of funds 
from local councils to undermine the FIS' credibility were used a ways to curtail further 
FIS victories, but in the event of a FIS take-over after the elections, Chadli prepared 
himself for political cohabitation. 
The record of Islamist in power at the local level is difficult to assess in these 
circumstances. The regime was also very apt at playing up on the fears of a theocratic 
dictatorship many Algerians felt vis-a-vis the FIS, often with good reason. Still, a number 
of patterns can be observed even through this limited experience. First, the success of the 
FIS in electoral terms touched a mixture of constituencies: including the large cities, 
middle-size cities, and rural areas stricken by poverty. For Severine Labat, it is this 
multiplicity that conferred on the FIS its dual identity as a social movement taking on the 
plight of the poorest, and a political party articulating the hopes of the upwardly mobile 
middle classed°l. This would suggest that the FIS drew its support from a varied social 
base, which is a success in itself. Secondly, the result of the elections brought noticeable 
100 For a full analysis and tables, see Jacques Fontaine. 199o. "Les Elections Locales 
Algeriennes du 12 Juin 199o" Maghreb-Mashrek. 129 (July-September). For comment, see 
Arun Kapil. 199o. "Algeria's Elections show Islamist Strength" Middle East Report. Sept/Oct 
and Jean Leca. 1990. "La Mobilisation Islamiste et les Elections Algeriennes" Maghreb- 
Mashrek. 129 (July-September). 
101 Severine Labat. 1995. Les Islamistes Algeriens: Entre les Urnes et le Maquis. Paris: Seuil. 
p. 184. 
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change to the local councils concerned. Islamists in local constituencies did not 
revolutionise the political sphere overnight, but their focus on redistribution of goods and 
social welfare had positive effects (which explains the continued, if more abated, 
popularity of the FIS in later elections). Additionally, the most noticeable change was in 
the area of public mores, especially in sea-side areas, with questions of dress (such as 
bathing suits), music, and the consumption of alcohol in bars being put into question in 
several constituencies1O2. More significantly, moves were made to end mixed education 
and impose Arabic as the sole official language in some instanced03. Both detractors and 
supporters saw these changes as precursors of things to come. All in all, therefore, it can 
be seen that elected FIS representatives lost no time and spared no effort in 
implementing an Islamist agenda on the ground. The results of such a commitment were 
also clear: those opposed to the Islamist political project only became more vehement in 
their opposition (on a variety of grounds, the libertarian one being the most clearly 
articulated). On the other hand, supporters of the FIS were inspired by these initial steps. 
With the army officially withdrawing from political life in the FLN (while keeping tight 
control of the executive and judiciary), a further election victory in the legislative 
elections of the following year seemed inevitable. Yet the relative freedom of the president 
to handle democratisation should not obscure the army's complete lack of support for a 
democratic outcome which could threaten their power, prestige and sizeable economic 
interests. Externally, cries of outrage at the possibility of a legitimately elected 
'fundamentalist' party, denoted the unease many commentators felt at the unpredictable 
outcomes Islamism in power might bring. 
Despite these efforts, and in the context of the continued failure of non-Islamist 
opposition groups to create a coherent alternative to it on a national basis, the legislative 
elections looked like another easy victory for the FIS. The first round of elections of 
December 26, iggl confirmed such predictions with the FIS gathering 47.3% of the vote 
with 231/430 seats won on the first round, and the FLN plummeting to 23.4% of the vote. 
Notable also was the respectable performance of smaller Islamist parties Hamas (5.3%) 
and En-Nah. dah (2.2%), taking the popularity of the Islamist political alternative clearly 
102 See in the case of Oran and Tipasa. Michael Willis. 1996.7he Islamist Challenge in Algeria. 
Ithaca Press. p. 158. 
103 See Michael Willis. 1996. Th. e Islamist Challenge in Algeria. p. 158. 
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over the 50% mark overall in the first round104. Both the regime and some members of 
the secular opposition called for the abandonment of the second ballot, now that the 
prospect of an 'Islamic state' loomed closer than ever. The president was rumoured to 
have attempted to negotiate some form of political cohabitation with the future Islamist- 
dominated General Assembly. The army, however, did not share Chadli's enthusiasm, as 
they feared both loss of power and that Islamists would lead Algeria to economic and 
political disaster. On January 11,1992 (only five days before the second round was to take 
place), and under considerable pressure from the army, President Chadli announced his 
resignation in a televised programme. He stated: "Given the difficulty and gravity of the 
current situation, I consider my resignation necessary to protect the unity of the people 
and the security of the country". 
Responses to the halting of the second ballot of the December 1991- January 1992 
legislative elections and the forced resignation of Chadli Benjedid correspondingly led to 
muffled condemnation (masking a sense of relief) internationally. Our analysis pointed to 
the almost certain victory of the FIS had the second round gone ahead, but should also 
highlight to the sizeable decline in the Islamist electoral performance in the first round by 
comparison to its stunning victory in local elections just 18 months previously. 
4.3.3.4" the Civil War'°5 
The army's involvement led to the complete reversal of the democratisation process and 
establishment of a transitional army-controlled government, the HCE (Haut Comite 
Mat). Upon cancellation of the elections, the FIS leaders had cautiously condemned the 
end of the process, but no calls to arms or for a coup were made. Perhaps surprise had a 
part to play in this relative apathy. Alternatively, FIS leaders may have felt that, with its 
relative control of popular opinion, a deal in terms of power-sharing with the army could 
still be negotiated106. In the few months that followed however, the FIS saw its status as a 
104 For a full analysis and tables, see Jacques Fontaine. 1992. "Les Elections Legislatives 
Algeriennes: Resultats du Premier Tour, 26 Decembre 1991" Maghreb-Mashrek 135 
(January-March). 
105 For an encompassing if general disucssion of the multiple layers of causation of the civil 
war, see Yves Lacoste. 1995. "Les Causes Specifiques du Drame Algerien" Herodote 77 (April- 
June). pp. gff. For a comparative analysis of politics in the Maghreb as a counter point, see 
Claire Spencer. 1993. The Maghreb in the 199os. Adelphi Paper 274. London: IISS. 





Violence in Algiers' suburbs (such as 'Les Eucalyptus') mounted as local Islamist cafds 
established veritable fiefdoms with relative impunity. Replacing the elected Islamist 
councilors on the ground, young Islamist militants quickly built on their popularity in 
suburban Algiers to intimidate the armed forces and police out of various pockets of 
territory. With this new power came the progressive growth of rackets and intimidation 
of the local population to keep gangs of young Islamists into funds. Violence against the 
police and army became common place, and delinquency became the hallmark of this 
new generation of Islamists. With older militants imprisoned or exiled, new groups found 
refuge in a lucrative way of life. The meaning Islamist political programme, in this 
atmosphere of violence and intimidation, was lost. 
Local victories against the police in 1993 and 1994 underscored a wider change in the 
dynamics of the conflict where Islamist groups became increasingly alienated from their 
constituency and isolated from one anotherll3. Martinez also points to the progressive 
return of democratisation, under strict control of the regime, as the catalyst to the influx 
of international aid into the state's coffers. This helped financing the long-term 
establishment of a war economy and the creation of new clientelist networks to lure 
young militants away from the cald way of lifel14. The ensuing period saw the 
geographical broadening and deepening of patterns of violence. For the second time in 
less than fifty years, hillside camps or maquis were established in rural areas as 
strongholds for Islamist forces. Taking violence to the countryside brought new 
opposition to Islamism in the shape of former FLN combatants supportive of the regime, 
but also new ways of procuring support and resources. Patterns of violence also became 
increasingly random, or if not random, high casualty-oriented and directed towards 
'civilians' caught up between opposite 'obligatory' allegiancesl'5. The degree of state 
involvement in such patterns has been widely debated but it is certain that the army itself 
Search for a Civil Pact" Middle East Report 25, no. 192, pp. 2ff. 
113 Luis Martinez. 1995. "L'Enivrement de la Violence". 
114 Luis Martinez. 1998. La Guerre Civile en Algerie. pp. 265ff. For a general overview of the 
socio-economic makeup in Algeria in the early 19gos, see S. E. Zaimeche. 1994. "Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia: Recent Social Change and Future Prospects" Middle Eastern Studies 
30(4), p"944-955. More specifically, on the continued dependency on hydrocarbon resources 
(and political implications), see JohnP. Entelis. 1999. "SONATRACH: The Political Economy 
of an Algerian State Institution" Middle East Journal. 53(1). 
115 For a powerful testimony of massacres of civilians in the latter part of the conflict, see 
Abed Charef. 1998. Algerie: Autopsie d'Un Massacre. Paris: L'Aube. 
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legal political party revoked, and its leaders and militants imprisonedl07. This move 
provoked few objections on the part of the Algerian population, even from those who had 
voted for the FIS. Many other oppositional parties welcomed the cancellation of elections 
because of fears of a theocratic government, including the RCD, and Et-Tahaddi 
(communist), as well as the influential UGTA trade union. With its hierarchical structure 
removed, the FIS coalition split into many groups reflecting existing divisions among 
party members. The democratic means for acquiring power having been discredited, the 
younger and more urban segments of the FIS tended to gravitate towards more violent 
groups wanting to spearhead a new revolution. This was countered by the 'old guard' of 
Islamism willing to adopt a more guarded approach involving consciousness-raising, 
political pressure through protest and appeals to the international community1o8. 
The split was more complex than this dichotomy between the followers of All Belhadj and 
those of Abassi Madani respectively seems to suggest though. Rivalry between groups 
resurfaced without the delicate power-sharing balance brought by the combined 
Madani/Belhadj leadership and in the absence of the promise of electoral victory as a 
reward for unity. Regional factions went their separate ways and exiled supporters and 
leaders interpreted the meaning of the crisis and the required steps to remedy the 
situation in widely different manners without an overall unifying framework of 
leaderships°9. The full role of the regime in this process of fragmentation remains unclear, 
but under army control, the state moved quickly in the direction of open repression, 
selectively arresting local FIS officials and prominent FIS supporters. This show of 
strength may have explained the lack of public uprising in the early months of 1992, and 
led to the first violent acts of retaliation of the part of Islamist groups through political 
assassinations of representatives of the regime locally. Still, at this point, the regime was 
of the elections, see Lahouari Addi. 1992. "Algeria's Democracy between the Islamists and the 
Elite" Middle East Report 22, number 175 (March-April), pp. 36-38. 
107 On state violence - within the framework of the discussion of all forms of political violence 
in Algeria - see Amnesty International et al. 1997. Algerie: Le Livre Noir. Paris: La 
Decouverte. and Reporters Sans Frontieres. 1996. Le Drame Algerien: Un Peuple en Otage. 
Paris: La Decouverte. On the state's place in the dynamics of the violence, see Ahmed 
Rouadja. 1998. "Logique de la Violence Politique" Confluences Mediterranee 25 (Spring). 
108 Here, the nonviolent aspects of political Islam in Algeria are worth bearing in mind by 
contrast. For an overview, see John P. Entelis. 1997. "Political Islam in the Maghreb: The 
Non-Violent Dimension" in John P. Entelis (ed. ) Islam, Democracy and the State in North 
Africa. pp. 57ff. 
109 See Luis Martinez. 1995""L'Enivrement de la Violence: 'Djihad' dans la Banlieue d'Alger" in 
Remy Leveau (ed). L'Algerie dans la Guerre. Paris: Editions Complexe. P. 39. 
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up on the agenda of European politics. That being said, the anti-Islamist reflexes of the 
French political elite were only reinforced through the use of violent means, proving 
counterproductive in the long-term both for Islamists in Algeria, and in terms of the 
integration of North African immigrants into French society in general. 
1995 was also a turning point in the war with the state regaining the upper hand in the 
conflict, partially through the efficient use of international aid to carry out the military 
campaign and to provide alternative ways of gaining financial resources for potential 
young militants. The progressive co-optation of a new generation of Islamists could be 
put into place, but the results of such a policy were mixed, with an enfeebled but still 
varied form of Islamist armed opposition persisting. Elections were finally held on 
November 16,1995, with Zeroual elected as president in less than pluralist conditions. 
Some opposition parties were allowed to run, including some smaller Islamist parties 
identified as 'moderate', but not the FIS. The fairness of the results of this election has 
been cast into doubt also, but without definite proof. In any case, Zeroual won the 
election convincingly with 6i% of the vote, and a strong Islamist performance, with 
Mahfoud Nahnah's Hamas gaining 25.6% of the vote is also notable. This sharp rise in 
the popularity of Hamas denotes, in the absence of the FIS as a contender for power, the 
strength in political commitment of one quarter of the voters to the Islamist political 
agenda, regardless of the violence of the previous years and of the possible consequences. 
Islamism thus was not eliminated as a political project with the cancellation of the 1992 
elections and the disbanding of the FIS. Despite much criticism and condemnation of 
this forced normalisation in the political landscape of Algeria, this election did herald a 
progressive return to democratisation with the inclusion of Islamists in government. This 
form of co-optation came to underpin the political strategy of the state with regards to 
the Islamist political agenda, while the military strategy on the ground focused on more 
radical aims. 1996 saw the introduction of the legal provisions needed to complement 
this set of policies with a new constitution curtailing opposition rights and banning 
'radical' Islamists from political participation and office. This move was widely 
condemned by Islamists as well as the non-Islamist opposition, but with little effect. 
Finally, the ruling party reinvented itself to shed its tarnished image and complete the 
return to pre-1988 politics (with a democratic twist). The party of the regime would now 
be called the RND (Rassemblement National pour la Democracie), with a strong 
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became split on the issue of policy toward Islamism. What had now become a fully 
fledged civil war could be handled through negotiation, co-optation and some degree of 
power-sharing (as advocated by the 'conciliators') or though all and all 'eradication'116. 
Regime behaviour in this regard appears rather erratic as different branches/factions of 
the armed forces carried widely different, if not opposite policies, on the ground. 
On January 31,1994 the appointment of General Eiamin Zeroual as the new head of 
state (in view of a return to democratic elections) heralded a progressive return to normal 
relations with the outside world. In this setting, internal chaos continued despite a failed 
attempt to create a forum for negotiation at the Sant' Egidio colloquium in November 
1994 - and the resulting Rome Accords of January 1995. Despite the presence of every 
opposition force at the negotiating table, and strong mediation, no result came of the 
colloquium in the absence of state support for a negotiated settlementl17. This tension 
between the idea of a return to elections and the refusal of the regime to engage politically 
with its opposition is telling - democratisation and cease-fire here would be solely on the 
state's terms. In reality, the stakes of the war rose to new levels in the course of 1994, with 
the GIA groups declaring 'total war' on the state, with the unambiguous response of 
Zeroual of 'total eradication' of Islamists on the ground. The GlAs remained, because of 
their amorphous structure, more immune to state repression in the short term than other 
Islamists. 
Also, the hijacking of an Algiers-Paris Air France flight on Christmas Eve 1994 ended 
with the intervention of the French. security forces and the killing of the four Islamists 
responsible. This would only be the first attempt to export the state-Islamist 
confrontation to France, who was accused of supporting of the regime diplomatically and 
in terms of training and information. Correspondingly, 1995 saw a wave of bombings 
(mostly in Paris) masterminded by Islamists, with the help of some members of the 
French-based Algerian diasporall8. While the Islamists did not succeed in convincing the 
French authorities to sever ties with the regime, it did bring the Algerian civil war higher 
116 See Hugh Roberts. 1994. "Algeria between Eradicators and Conciliators" Middle East 
Report. (July-August). and the section (pp. io6ff) of George Joffe. 1997. "The Army in 
Algerian Politics and Government" in Reza Shah-Kamezi (ed. ) Algeria: Revolution Revisited. 
London: Islamic World Report. 
117 For a good summary of the aims and state responses to this initiative, see Michael Willis. 
1996. The Islamist Challenge in Algeria. pp. 340-346. 
118 These came to halt in 1996 with the arrest of several militants and supporters. 
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Violence in Algiers' suburbs (such as 'Les Eucalyptus') mounted as local Islamist cafds 
established veritable fiefdoms with relative impunity. Replacing the elected Islamist 
councilors on the ground, young Islamist militants quickly built on their popularity in 
suburban Algiers to intimidate the armed forces and police out of various pockets of 
territory. With this new power came the progressive growth of rackets and intimidation 
of the local population to keep gangs of young Islamists into funds. Violence against the 
police and army became common place, and delinquency became the hallmark of this 
new generation of Islamists. With older militants imprisoned or exiled, new groups found 
refuge in a lucrative way of life. The meaning Islamist political programme, in this 
atmosphere of violence and intimidation, was lost. 
Local victories against the police in 1993 and 1994 underscored a wider change in the 
dynamics of the conflict where Islamist groups became increasingly alienated from their 
constituency and isolated from one another". Martinez also points to the progressive 
return of democratisation, under strict control of the regime, as the catalyst to the influx 
of international aid into the state's coffers. This helped financing the long-term 
establishment of a war economy and the creation of new clientelist networks to lure 
young militants away from the cald way of life'14. The ensuing period saw the 
geographical broadening and deepening of patterns of violence. For the second time in 
less than fifty years, hillside camps or maquis were established in rural areas as 
strongholds for Islamist forces. Taking violence to the countryside brought new 
opposition to Islamism in the shape of former FLN combatants supportive of the regime, 
but also new ways of procuring support and resources. Patterns of violence also became 
increasingly random, or if not random, high casualty-oriented and directed towards 
'civilians' caught up between opposite 'obligatory allegiancesl'5. The degree of state 
involvement in such patterns has been widely debated but it is certain that the army itself 
Search for a Civil Pact" Middle East Report 25, no. 192, pp. 2ff. 
113 Luis Martinez. 1995. "L'Enivrement de la Violence". 
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careful not to alienate the majority of the population, being all too aware that a sizeable 
portion of the Islamist vote had been cast as a condemnation of the state more than a 
principled commitment to the Islamist ideal. Playing the shrewd game of the defender of 
liberty against obscurantism, the regime managed to keep international condemnation 
and scrutiny at a minimum (the first damning Amnesty International report on human 
rights abuses by the state, published in March 1993, did little to overcome this). By 
appealing to anti-Islamist liberals in Algeria, it also positioned itself as the least worst of 
two evils'. 
Despite having limited means against the powerful army, many groups organised armed 
rebellion in response to mounting repression both quickly and effectively. The Islamists 
involved in violence moved beyond the rhetoric of 'older' leaders such as Abassi Madani 
towards a more reified quest for vengeance (for the death or arrest of relatives and 
friends) and local power and prestige. Four Islamist armed groups are identifiable here: 
the FIS-controlled AIS (Armee Islamique du Salut), Abdelkader Chebouti's Mouvement 
Islamique Arme (MIA), the MEI (Mouvement pour l'Etat Islamique) and the 
independent GIA groups (Groupes Islamiques Armes) characterised by a more 
amorphous structure composed of independent cells, and little political activity outside 
violent action. Their methods included terrorism and political assassination in particular. 
The GIA groups more specifically targeted governmental and administrative figures and 
foreign nationals (especially French ones) as well as cultural figures and journalists. But 
progressively, the targeting of armed groups extended to all those perceived to oppose the 
formation of an Islamic state. It was thus the electoral fiasco of January 1992 that lead to 
the fragmentation and polarisation of the Islamist movement"°, firing the first shot of the 
civil war"'. Notable also is the sheer monopoly on publicity for the Islamist cause by the 
GIA groups from early on, with other groups, apart from the powerful AIS, being 
progressively sidelined (but not eliminated). The rivalry between these groups, despite 
common aims, is also evident from early on112. 
110 This term is used by Severine Labat in Labat. 1995. "Le FIS a 1'Epreuve de la Lutte Armee". 
in Remy Leveau (ed). L'Algerie dans la Guerre. p. 87. 
111 This observation should help us concur with Gilbert Grandguillaume's warning that 
blaming political Islam for the civil war at face value is simplistic and dangerous. See Gilbert 
Grandguillaume. 1998. "Comment a-t-on pu en arriver la? " in Mohammed Benrabah et al. 
Les Violences en Algerie. Paris: Opus. pp. 7ff. 
112 The ideological and tactical differences between these groups will be developed on in more 
depth in chapter five. On rivalry, see Arun Kapil. 1995. "Algeria's Crisis Intensifies: The 
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emphasis placed on legitimate democratic credentials and political representation. On the 
ground however, the 1997 round of elections continued to be marred by accusations of 
widespread fraud. The RND managed to seize 155 seats and thus victory in the legislative 
elections on June 1997. In October of the same year, it clinched 55% of local seats. 
In the post-1996 period, violence started to subside progressively, with patterns of civil 
war becoming less prevalent, and with massacres being more episodic (even though still 
high casualty-oriented). Still, the overall dynamics of the conflict had now become 
apparent with a triangulation between Islamist violence, state violence and 
delinquency/crime developing over several years. In conjunction, this process brought 
about the evolution of specific patterns of economic gains linked to the civil war for all 
participantsll9. The state created new clientelist networks to keep young people away 
from the Islamist way of life. Many Islamist groups, on the other hand, were reluctant to 
give up the racketeering and other-extra-legal activities that had brought them wealth, 
local power, and prestige. By then, the demands for democracy in the name of the FIS 
had become drowned into wider issues of societal breakdown. The relative victory of the 
regime with regards to power retention made such issues all the more redundant. 
The last event of importance with regards to the Islamist-state relationship is the attempt 
by president Bouteflika to normalise the regime's relationship to Islamist supporters in 
civil society by offering a referendum on civil concord. This gesture of goodwill was 
designed to offer the public a choice as to whether Islamists who had not been guilty of 
blood crimes should be released from prison or exempted from prosecution. In a sense, 
such an initiative could be seen to denote an attempt to go down the road of a South 
African truth and reconciliation commission, offering pardons so as to wipe the 'slate 
clean' for Islamism in Algeria. The motives of such a move are however more complex, 
since wiping the slate clean for Islamism implies that the official version of Islamism 
being solely responsible for the civil war became further institutionalised. No attempt to 
assess state responsibilities accompanied this move, and reconciliation remained solely 
on the state's terms. The cynic may point out that it is the state's slate which benefited 
most from being cleansed by this type of pardon, and that it is the state which benefited 
most from normalising relations with Islamists in a context where the new constitution 
119 See Olivier Mongin and Lucile Provost. 1998. "Conclusion" in Mohammed Benrabah et al. 
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prevents the FIS from being re-created. 
Another facet brought out by the referendum on civil concord is that of civil society at 
large, which at last had the opportunity to function outside the state-Islamist binary 
opposition. The debates arising from Bouteflika's proposal have been telling in this 
regard. Here, a passionate backlash against Islamism after several years of civil war has 
been noticeable in large segments of society, suggesting that the regime has by and large 
been successful in positing itself as a more reasonable alternative than the FIS, despite its 
poor political and economic record. It has also been successful in fashioning a reading of 
the recent history of Algerian politics where Islamism has been delegitimised as a viable 
political alternative, making the cancellation of the 1992 elections seem justified with 
hindsight. Still, the ensuing Loi sur la Concorde Civile in 1999 gave Islamists the 
opportunity to come forward and gain full amnesty. Under previous amnesty efforts, over 
1,000 Islamists militants from the AIS and the Ligue islamique pour la da`wa et le jihad 
groups had been granted full presidential pardon (given the conditions of a previous 
cease-fire). With the new law, more radicalised groups could be included in addition. The 
2001 Amnesty International Report cites a significant number of takers for this set of 
amnesties with 4,500 militants from the GIA, the Groupe salafiste pour la predication et 
le combat, and smaller groups. The report also points out, on a more pessimistic note, the 
difficulties and ambiguities in the application of the law, where the assessment of 
responsibilities for atrocities by individual claimants have not been processed in a 
uniform manner. In addition, the 2000 levels of violence, after two years of relative calm, 
rose again to 2,500 victims - with perpetrators including Islamist groups, militias and 
security forces 120. 
4.4" Conclusion 
The chronological structure of this discussion of political Islam in Algeria is, in some 
ways, unavoidable, since I have attempted to provide an analysis of the factors 
underpinning its growth and shape. I have also chosen this type of structure to 
emphasise the changes the movement has undergone in response to the evolution of the 
political scene in Algeria. In that sense, context, and its evolution help us meet the 
Les Violences en Algerie. Paris: Opus. pp. 211ff. 
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methodological objectives set up in chapter two by providing an image of political Islam 
that is anything but monolithic. In addition, this strategy aims to provide the relevant 
background to the following analytical chapters in those terms. 
Overall the historical account provided here remains cursory in many ways, as my main 
aim is not historical as such. Still, I hope to have gone beyond a historical expose of 
Algerian Islamism to introduce a number of key themes which further chapters will 
explore in more depth. These include: 
The importance of Islam in the context of postcolonial nation-building, where it 
proved an area of contention and competition with socialist/secularist ideas. This, 
along with the burden of the French legacy in cultural and political terms, is one of the 
markers of divisions within the FLN early on, but also the signifier of the hybridity of 
motif within nation-building: 
The basic ingredient of North African attitudes is the area's Islamic 
background. It is only an apparent paradox that this must be 
understood in a dialectic context. North Africa - like any other culture 
area - can never be wholly `Frenchified' or Westernized'; it can only 
produce its own synthetic reactions to imported change, combining its 
past heritage with antithetical notions of secularization, materialism, 
revolution and nationalism. Nor can this synthesis be a single, linear 
evolution toward one inevitable outcome121. 
The importance of the legacy of armed struggle, not only in terms of patterns of 
nation-building, , 
but also with regards to postcolonial institutions, with the 
preponderance of army control underpinning single party rule as a main factor. This 
dimension of 'war making', in turn, explains the solidification of a political lifeworld 
underpinned by the needs of the military elite. Indeed: 
... we know relatively 
little about how states and societies in the Middle 
East have been shaped and reshaped by their intensive and prolonged 
exposure to and participation in war making and war preparation, 
often conducted by regimes that have embraced militarization as an 
everyday tool of governance as much as (if not more than) a means to 
120 Amnesty International Report 2001. Oxford: Al Publications. pp. 28ff. 
121 I. William Zartman. 1973. "Values and Attitudes in I. William Zartman (ed. ) Man, State 
and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib. p. 17. 
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ensure national security122 . 
9 The importance of political, cultural/linguistic and socio-economic factors in the 
development of political Islam since the mid-1970s. 
The importance of the interaction of the Islamist movement with the state over other 
political players/factors. Here, not only is the state/Islamist relationship one of 
significance to the aims and strategies of Islamism, but it is also one that displays 
characteristics of ideological exchange and hybridity. In the struggle for political 
power, Islamists have played upon issues of moral and political legitimacy and 
participated in the political game set up by the state when allowed to do so. The state 
is also of importance since it is the interruption of the democratic process that 
splintered the Islamist movement and polarised its militants. 
Finally, our overview has emphasised the tactical and rhetorical complexity of the 
Islamist movement in Algeria, with deep roots in history, but also flexibility and change 
in the modern era. In addition, our analysis suggests that political Islam in Algeria can be 
seen as a political player with a specific take on the history of postcolonial Algeria, and a 
way of imagining the political that is in opposition to dominant motifs of the political 
lifeworld, an issue to which we now turn. 
- Steven Heydemann. 2000. "War Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East". in 
Steven Heydemann (ed. ) War Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. p. i. 
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Chapter Five 
The Political Imagination of Algerian Islamism: 
Rupture, Complexity, Diversity 
Borders and barriers which enclose us within the safety of familiar territory can also become prisons 
and are often defended beyond reason or necessity. 
Edward Said 
5.1. Introduction 
As chapter four demonstrated, political Islam in Algeria is a nuanced, evolving 
phenomenon that has deep roots, and an enduring grassroots appeal. The short 
overview of the historical evolution of contemporary Algerian Islamism has also given 
us a number of clues as to the ideological components of Islamist discourse in 
context. The aim of the following two chapters is to expand on the components and 
place of an Algerian Islamist political imagination. Bearing in mind the variety in 
emphasis among Islamist groups and changes over time, a number of common areas 
can be drawn and analysed. In chapter three, I pointed out that Islamist slogans 
suggested an ideological and political shallowness that should be challenged. Overall, 
this study moves away from the common assertion that Islamist discourse is hollow 
and purely opportunist. By contrast, I analyse the main discursive themes and 
strategies Islamism enacts, emphasising the main areas of rupture from dominant 
forms of political discourse. Overall, this chapter fits into the broader aim of 
redefining political Islam as a social movement by focusing on issues of rupture, 
complexity and diversity, while chapter six will focus on areas of complicity and 
continuity with existing patterns in the political lifeworld. Chapter six will also help 
locate Islamist political discourse within broader patterns of identity-building since 
independence. 
Structurally, this discussion comprises of four parts. In the first instance, this chapter 
engages with the debate on whether Islamism in Algeria can be considered to be a 
social movement and/or an expression of nationalism. Secondly, the main discursive 
themes of Islamism are analysed with a focus on the political discourse of the FIS as 
the basis for our discussion. Thirdly, a consideration of political imagination is 
elaborated on in the context of Islamism in Algeria. Broader than discourse, political 
imagination encompasses symbolism (both in rhetoric and in action) as well as 
utopia. This is a wide topic, therefore only one theme of wider symbolism in this 
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political imagination is investigated in detail to illustrate the general points made on 
discourse in the previous section. Fourth, the evolution over time and according to 
circumstances of such themes among Islamist groups is charted as an opportunity to 
explore the rhetorical and tactical differences among Islamist tendencies in the 199os 
in more depth. Here, the outcome of our inquiry leads me to the conclusion that 
political Islam in Algeria ought to be seen as one of the manifestations of a political 
Islam that can be broadly conceived of as a social movement. Their opposition is a 
central feature, but also where areas of diversity and complexity coexist within a 
looser overall framework. 
5.2. Setting the Scene 
Looking at the political imagination of Algerian Islamism implies both an analysis of 
the elements making up this imaginary and a framework for understanding the place 
of political Islam in the political realm in wider terms. As a starting point, I want to 
address the latter concern, so as to set up a number of research signposts to guide 
further analysis. There are many possibilities for this type of starting point, but here, 
I will concentrate on an overview and critique of one recent article, Marnia Larzeg's 
"Islamism and the Recolonization of Algeria"', where such an assessment of the place 
of Algerian Islamism in the political lifeworld is made. 
Her main argument rests on the idea that Algerian Islamism is functioning in rupture 
from dominant patterns in the political lifeworld in the postcolonial era. Its aim, for 
Larzeg, is to `recolonize' the culture and political imagination of Algeria. She states: 
I will argue that-the Islamist movement means to redirect the socio- 
political evolution of Algeria through cultural recolonization. In so 
doing Islamism has in effect imposed on Algerians a new belief 
system and created a new counter-culture that thrives on nihilism, a 
blatant disregard for human life that cannot advance any political 
cause ... 
2 
To Larzeg, the importance of the colonial era to the drawing up of the Islamist 
political programme denotes a commitment to self-definition in blatantly anti- 
colonial terms, but she also implies that in so doing, political Islam reproduces 
similar patterns of cultural imposition3. Indeed, the violence linked to Algerian 
Islamist armed groups seems to suggest such an authoritarian streak. 
1 Marnia Larzeg. 1998. "Islamism and the Recolonization of Algeria" Arab Studies Quarterly. 
20(2) Spring. 
2 Marnia Larzeg. 1998. "Islamism and the Recolonization of Algeria". p. 45. 
3 Marnia Larzeg. 1998. "Islamism and the Recolonization of Algeria". P47. 
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Is this a fair assessment though? In some ways, it is, since Larzeg captures one of the 
dominant cultural motifs upon which political Islam builds its critique. As we will see, 
the issue of rupture, and the idea of a counter-culture (defined in anti-colonialist 
terms) are indeed central to the formulation of the Islamist agenda. But is such a 
simple picture an accurate reflection of the political imaginary put forward by 
Islamism, and more importantly, of its main influences? Larzeg's argument relies on 
a comparison between the cultural, structural violence of colonialism and equivalent 
trends with contemporary political Islam. I wish to question - or rather to further 
problematise - this argument on two interrelated levels. Firstly, it is an 
oversimplification of the Islamist political imagination, privileging one aspect of it (in 
fact, privileging the tactical choices of some Islamist armed groups as opposed to 
wider discursive formations. Tactical choices are relevant to the production and 
effectiveness of discourse, but they are only one part of the overall picture). Secondly, 
it is an oversimplification of the evolution of the postcolonial lifeworld. This view 
seems to assume that postcolonial nation-building is unproblematic in its 
relationship to the colonial era and its strategies for governance, including 
surveillance and structural violence. By building a bridge linking Islamist discourse to 
colonial discourse, Larzeg may have a point. But the eclipse of the political 
imagination of the state at the centre of this equation ignores the links between 
political Islam and the state in the contemporary setting. We are thus looking here, I 
would argue, at a complex picture where aspects of discourse and political 
imagination are being passed on historically, from the colonial era, to the postcolonial 
themes of nation-building and state ideology, to the formulation of oppositional 
discourses to the state. 
Larzeg's conclusion is that political Islam in Algeria: 
... is neither a reformist movement, nor a social movement 
bent 
upon socio-political and economic transformation. It is an 
oppositional movement to overthrow the existing order by using 
existing religious symbols familiar to Algerians but infusing them 
with different meanings in order to re-establish a mythic society, 
untainted by colonialism. The unrealistic character of this project 
qualifies it as political delirium'. 
I must admit to being suspicious of any assessment of an ideology or movement as 
`delirium' since it echoes too strongly of neo-Orientalist theses on `fundamentalism' 
in the first instance, and because such a framework implies that the contradictions 
4 Marnia Larzeg. 1998. "Islamism and the Recolonization of Algeria". p. 56. 
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and tensions within a political or social movement can work to disqualify it as a 
worthy member of `reasonable politics'. In my mind, such an overall argument relies 
primarily on an assessment of political Islam as a whole through the prism of recent 
Islamist violence. This is somewhat understandable since massacres perpetrated in 
the name of `Islam' are unlikely to attract much intellectual sympathy. Yet, in my 
mind, this remains too simplistic a picture of political Islam and of violence'. By 
contrast with this type of analysis, I wish to engage with the idea that Islamism's 
political imagination has a complex relationship to both the colonial era and 
postcolonial patterns of governance. It indeed functions in rupture with dominant 
patterns of political imagination and wrestles with the legacy of colonialism in those 
terms. But it also displays elements of hybridity in its relationship to the political 
realm. This is in essence a dual argument where political Islam, on the one hand, can 
be seen to be oppositional in its formulation of political programmes and use of 
symbolic sources, and where areas of continuity with state discourse can be identified 
in the development of the Islamist discourse on politics on the other hand. This is of 
course not to discount the issue of violence in the dynamics of the civil war of the 
199os, or to underplay the socio-economic causes of the conflict. My aim here is to 
show how these issues are embedded into a wider set of discursive practices guiding 
political behaviour as well as rhetoric; in other words, that Algerian political Islam 
engages in a struggle over political legitimacy with the state where issues of political 
imagination are intrinsic to practical avenues for political competition (be these 
violent struggle or elections). 
This, in turn, sheds a new light on whether one should - as Larzeg does - discount the 
possibility that political Islam could be seen to constitute an example of a 
social/political movement. As a starting point in this line of argument, it is perhaps 
wise to deal with definitions, and roots of what a social/political movement in the 
name of political Islam would look like. Starting again with Larzeg's assessment, we 
see a binary opposition set up between what a social movement is supposed to be, 
and what she terms "an oppositional movement to overthrow the existing order". 
Does this distinction hold under analytical scrutiny? On some level it does, since what 
Larzeg seems to be suggesting is that oppositional movements with radical, if not 
revolutionary aims (and overthrowing the existing order qualifies here) are 
qualitatively different from social movement attempting to work within the 
framework of existing power structures. Yet, this is once again only part of the picture 
in our case study: firstly, one could point to chapter four where political Islam was 
5I hope to show here that the discursive contradictions of political Islam are embedded in a 
context too. They reflect the complexity and contradictions of that context. 
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shown to have participated in the legal, institutional game of politics. It is in fact the 
unwillingness of the army to accept the consequences of the democratic process that 
pushed the Islamist tendency towards greater polarisation. In other words, the more 
`radical' aspect of political Islam for our case study can be located in a specific set of 
circumstances where its tactical choices and structure were influenced by more than 
ideological predisposition. Secondly, one could also argue that the boundaries 
between social, political and religious movements are often difficult to establish6. 
Equally porous is the distinction between the idea of changing/challenging the 
existing order and attempting to overthrow it. 
Therefore our first question should be `what is a social movement? ' and this 
assessment should refer to the possible ideological bases for the development of a 
`social consciousness' in civil society, with reference to our case study. Cyrus 
Ziraksadeh defines the main features of contemporary social movements as involving 
three main characteristics: a deliberate attempt to create a new social order; the 
provision of an opportunity for marginalised voices to unite and be heard; and tactics 
involving confrontational tactics or alternative ways of approaching political 
practice7. Straight away, we can see that a definition of social movements can 
accommodate the idea of the existing order being put into question. In fact, one could 
argue that, as representative of a civil society attempting to escape the power of the 
state, social movements are oppositional almost by definition, and that they should 
be expected to be reformist in their meekest forms, and revolutionary in their 
strongest: 
Social movements are a subset of the numerous actors operating the 
in realm of civil society. They are groups of people with a common 
interest who band together to pursue a far reaching transformation 
of society... Social movements, by definition, are not members of the 
elites in their societies. They are anti-systemic... They rely on mass 
mobilisation because they do not directly control the levers of 
formal power such as the state8. 
The use of violence in this type of framework is, as a matter of course, not systematic: 
indeed peaceful social movements are often the best example of a transformative 
voice in society (especially, but not necessarily in democratic circumstances). But 
violence also belongs to the realm of the possible tactics at the disposal of social 
6 Donatella della Porta and Marco Diani. Social Movements: An Introduction. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. pp. i6-19. 
7 Cyrus Ziraksadeh. 1997. Social Movements in Politics: A Comparative Study. London: 
Longman. p. 4-5. 
8 Robert O'Bien et al. 2000. Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Global Institutions 
and Global Social Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 12. 
173 
movements to achieve their aims, especially when other avenues for political change, 
or sometimes even for political protest, are absent. We can thus safely get away from 
a view of social movements limited to types of liberal, peaceful change exemplified by 
the Green movement for instance. Besides, even environmental groups can have 
violent wings or activists. 
Current thinking on social movement stems from the continued importance of social 
movements in national, regional and global politics since the upheavals of 1968 in 
various states. In fact, the global dimension of protest has come to the forefront of 
current thinking on social movements. Here, "A global social movement is one which 
operates in a global, as well as local, national and international space". The term 
"refers to groups of people around the world working on the transworld plane 
pursuing far reaching social changer. The relationship to civil society can thus be 
seen in a more complex ways when aims and bases for protest may be linked to other 
factors than those defined exclusively in the national realm. Overall, and despite such 
a wide scope though, social movements are characterised by two common elements: 
the types of aims they have (the transformation of society) and their position of 
subalternity in terms of access to decision-making. This is a question of power and 
power-sharing of course, but also one of competing ideas inscribed in different forms 
of discourse. Thus, as Alain Touraine argues, "Social movements are not a marginal 
rejection of order, they are the central forces fighting one against the other to control 
the production of society by itself and the action of classes for the shaping of 
historicity' " 
In some ways, this focus on competing forms of discourse work as a rejoinder to 
nationalist constructs of identity. This should come as little surprise, since the central 
relationship entered into by social movements is with the state, which controls most 
of the discursive sites for legitimacy by virtue of its command over political culture. 
There is a thus a strong overlap between the literature on nationalism and nation- 
building and the analysis of social movements and civil society. In those terms, the 
construction of the nation is one that is fluid over space and time, and thus inherently 
a privileged site for contestation in terms of culture, ideology, religion, etc.: 
... the apparatuses of discourse, technologies and institutions (print 
capitalism, education, mass media and so forth) which produced 
what is generally recognised as the 'national culture' (sic)... the 
nation is an effect of these cultural technologies, not their origin. A 
9 Robert O'Bien et al. 2000. Contesting Global Governance. pp. 12-13. 
to Alain Touraine. 198 1. The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 29. Emphasis added. 
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nation does not express itself through its culture: it is cultural 
apparatuses that produce 'the nation'. What is produced is not an 
identity or a single consciousness... but (hierarchically organised) 
values, dispositions and differences. This cultural and social 
heterogeneity is given a certain fixity by the articulating principle of 
'the nation' 1 
It is in fact in those terms that the so-called Islamist `resurgence' has been theorised 
upon in the literature on post-Cold War trends: the re-emergence of nationalist (or 
neo-nationalist) movements in recent years has been noted by many academics in 
terms of ethnicity, religion and culture12. For these authors, this revival may be a 
logical offshoot of lapses in ideological pressures from the superpowers, yet it 
remains fundamentally problematic due to its fragmentary potential on pre-existing 
conceptions of the nation. Indeed, as Stuart Hood warns us, "cultural nationalism 
assumes that nations are monolithic and denies the importance of subcultures based 
on sub-regionalism and class within the political unity of the nationi13. Yet what we 
have here is not a set of nationalist movements fighting the existence, integrity or role 
of the state, but a competition between state and oppositional understandings of the 
nation, both of which are equally `imaginedi1'. Therefore, the idea that political Islam 
could be seen through the framework of ethno-nationalism has its advantages, but 
also its limits. On the positive side, for instance, 
Wallerstein's concept, 'reactive ethno-nationalism', is valuable for 
situating Muslims in a broader global context. By assuming that 
anti-imperialist social movements are a dialectical combination of 
new identities formed in reaction to world systemic forces, reactive 
ethno-nationalism explains how subject people simultaneously 
invent new identities, in order to contest the costs exacted by the 
accumulation processes of the capitalist world economy" 
In the same vein, the strong tradition of protest in nationalist terms in Algeria during 
the colonial era was, as we saw in the previous chapter, underpinned by an explicit 
Islamic theme. However, when looking at the context of political Islam in more detail, 
the framework of nationalism seems only partially satisfactory: historically, as 
Francois Burgat points out, the 1970s saw the shift in political opposition for social 
11 J. Donald. 1988. "How English is it? Popular Literature and National Culture" New 
Formations. 6. p. 32. 
12 see for instance, the work of Mark Juergensmeyer. 
13 Stuart hood. 1988; "The Coughy Feeling" New Statesman and Society. 12 August p. 30-31. 
14 See chapter six on the imagination of the nation. 
15 Paul Lubeck. 2000. "The Islamic Revival: Antinomies of Islamic Movements under 
Globalization" in Robin Cohen and Shirin Rai (eds) Global Social Movements. London: 
Athlone Press. p. 153. 
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movements in the region from Marxism to Islamism16 . The question of nationalism 
does not account for the notion of social protest in explicit enough a set of terms here. 
There is also a global, or at least regional dimension to political Islam which goes 
beyond the remit of nationalist politics, at least in some ways. Once again, a strong 
tradition of regional links where pilgrimage networks worked as precursors to the 
development of this new form of "Islamic cosmopolitanism"" is notable. 
Consequently, we can see that nationalism alone is insufficient a term to cater for the 
complexity of the phenomenon at hand, and we need to adopt a more nuanced 
approach. The working hypothesis I will adopt here is that political Islam can be 
considered to function primarily as a social movement as defined above, bound in 
some ways to the national experience of opposition to the ruling elite in Algeria, but 
also with a regional and global ideological dimension. My `tour' of the political 
imagination of Algeria Islam, in turn, attempts to assess and/or substantiate this 
claim. 
5.3 Dominant Themes of the Algerian Islamist Political Discourse 
5.3.1 Origins 
Islamist political discourse in Algeria has evolved over a long period of time in 
response to far-reaching changes to the socio-economic and political context of the 
Algerian polity, with comprehensive input from ideologues from different 
generations. In the contemporary era, these changes have accelerated somewhat in 
the context of rapid democratisation (and its sudden reversal) arising from a deep 
legitimacy crisis for the state, as outlined in chapter four. We are thus looking at a 
complex phenomenon that is difficult to analyse systematically and in depth. Still, an 
initial general observation can be made concerning the contents and strategies of 
Islamist discourse since the mid-1970s: it has opted for a combination of traditional 
themes of Islamic scholarship (based on the works of Islamic orders, and a regional 
tradition of Reformist thought) with contemporary ways of approaching the 
connection between religion and politics. The 'traditional' elements of discourse are 
not limited to the Algerian context, however. Despite a long tradition of armed 
struggle in the name of Islam, Islamism remains a recent phenomenon in Algeria in 
comparison with other states in the region. The roots of political Islam have been 
present in Algeria since the onset of colonisation, but no movement akin in coherence 
16 See Francois Burgat. 1995. L'lslamisme au Maghreb: La Voix du Sud. (2nd ed. ). Paris: 
Payot. 
'7 Paul Lubeck. 2000. "The Islamic Revival" p. 163. 
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and strength to cases such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is noticeable until the 
post-colonial era. While Egypt saw the development of Islamist ideas and movements 
from the mid-1920S onwards, Algeria saw the development of nationalist movements, 
carrying a powerful nationalist, independentist, agenda at the forefront of political 
protest. Thus, like many states in the Middle East, Algeria experienced Islamism as a 
process of slow osmosis from elsewhere in the region (Egypt in the post-colonial era 
and Afghanistan after 1979 most notably). Islamism found fertile ground on Algerian 
soil in the socio-economic and political setting of the 1970s, but it is still worth 
pointing out that an external dimension of ideological influence played a great part in 
the shape and development of political Islam. Subsequently of course, Algerian 
Islamism found its own focus - fitting in loosely with the universalist aims of Islamist 
movements elsewhere in the region while developing tactics and a political 
programme adapted to its domestic environment. 
Here, our overview mainly rests on the dominant discursive themes of the FIS, 
including tensions within the movement, but the other main groups are be dealt with 
to some extent, in comparative terms, in section 5.5. One could argue that this 
selective approach reduces the scope of analysis; that being said, the focus on the FIS 
is based on its prominence - and thus significance - on the Algerian political scene 
since 1988. In addition, the FIS makes a particularly good candidate for an overall 
analysis of political imagination since its structure as a front with the explicit aim to 
unify and represent the various strands of Islamism. under one banner makes its 
common ground, as well as its compromises and tensions, a vivid and accurate 
picture of the ideological concepts, dilemmas and debates facing the Islamist 
movement. 
Starting with the most general consideration of political imagination, two main 
ideological inspirations to the FIS (and arguably all Islamist groups in Algeria) are 
worth considering. Both these inspirations, predictably enough, come from Egyptian 
Islamism". The father of contemporary Islamism, Hasan al-Banna, is a first thinker 
of importance19. Al-Banna founded the first organised Islamist movement in the 
region in 1928 with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (which now has branches in 
several others states), in an attempt to bring the teaching of Islamic reform to a 
modern context. His main inspirations, Ibn Badis, Rashid Rida and Muhammad 
18 For an overview of the complex ideological sources underpinning political Islam as an 
regional movement, see Nazih Ayubi. i99i. Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab 
World. chapter 6. See also R. Hrair Dekmejian. 1995. Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism 
in the Arab World (2nd ed. ) Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. pp. 41ff. 
19 For an overview on al-Banna, see Nazih Ayubi. 1991. Political Islam: Religion and Politics 
in the Arab World. pp. 130ff. 
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'Abduh all advocated that Islam was not incompatible with the modern world. For 
them, as for al-Banna, greater integration of Islamic practice and institutions into 
modernity (as they saw it) would lead to a revival of the Islamic civilisation in 
political, religious and cultural ways. Unlike his predecessors however, al-Banna was 
prepared to use the tools of modern politics in a specific way: by creating a political 
party with structures, aims and a political programme to carry out this project. Al- 
Banna's innovative contribution lies in his insistence on the dual focus on the state 
and of regional unity. On a state level, forming a political party would foster unity 
among Muslims and reverse perceived secularising tendencies of the political elite. 
Influencing this set-up through political participation would have the potential to 
bring the Islamist political agenda at the fore of political debate, to ultimately create a 
truly modern Islamic state. Regionally, al-Banna's focus was once again on unity 
among Muslims20. The revival of the institution of the Caliphate was a long-term 
project culminating from the progressive unification of the Arab World. 
Independence from colonial occupation or influence were necessary preconditions for 
understanding national and regional politics, and provided incentives for 
emancipation from foreign domination while incorporating the positive elements of 
modernity. Such a sophisticated approach to the place of Islamist parties in the 
political sphere on several levels testified to al-Banna's willingness to take part in a 
meaningful debate on the role of Islam in the modern world. Ideologically, this will 
remain his most profound influence on subsequent Islamist projects. Just as 
important however was his input on the level of structural organisation of political 
parties, with the formulation of a basic political programme based on Islamic unity 
and the role of Islam in politics which remain the foundation of Islamism elsewhere 
in the region today. Organisational features based on the Muslim Brotherhood model 
remain the norm also: with a dual approach on integration/infiltration of state 
apparatuses and civil society institutions, and confrontation with the state when 
possible or appropriate. The choice of small groups size (for flexibility) and strategies 
of recruitment at the grass-roots level are final enduring influences. Even with the 
development of mass means of communication in the contemporary era, the formula 
for spreading the message remains fundamentally the same: through mosques, 
charitable organisations and educational facilities. 
Besides this template, many other ideologues have been significant in the 
development of the modern ideas and organisational features of Islamist movements. 
But no ideologue can claim as influential a position in this spectrum as Egyptian 
293 See Youssef Choueiri. 199o. Islamic Fundamentalism. London: Pinter. P. 48. 
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Islamist Sayyid Qutb21. Qutb represented a new slant on Islamism operating in the 
context of decolonisation and new independent states in the Middle East. In the 
Egyptian context, Sayyid Qutb belonged to a generation of Islamists who became 
disillusioned with the policies of Nasser after his accession to power, and tried to 
combat the secularisation of politics through various means including violence. 
Under the guidance of Qutb, the template of al-Banna's Muslim Brotherhood 
remained intact, but on the level of ideas, Qutb distanced himself somewhat from the 
legacy of the Reform movement and Salafism to launch a radical critique of the 
religion/politics nexus and new avenues for overcoming perceived ills in society22. 
Qutb's most important conceptual contribution comes with jahiliyya (which can be 
translated as religious ignorance). Jahiliyya is the cornerstone of Qutb's dual critique 
of modernity (understood in Western terms) and of the workings of politics 
nationally23. Historically, he identifies the emergence of jahiliyya as the result of the 
loss of civilisational leadership by the Muslim community, reflected by the Jewish 
and Christian lack of recognition of the superiority of Islam as a religion. This critique 
goes further than religious ignorance per se though. For Qutb, the dominance of such 
false belief underpins the secularisation of political life, leading to forms of 
democratic representation which aim to supersede God's law. This viewpoint is 
clearly antidemocratic in character, but it retains a profound civilisational component 
also. Based on such a critique, Qutb saw 'the West' as a civilisation without 
legitimacy, and thus one belonging to the 'realm of war'. The obligation of jihad in 
these circumstances provides the impetus for the invasion of non-Muslim states, a 
profoundly radical agenda reaching beyond the confines of the region. Qutb's 
indictment of society does not stop there however. For him, Muslim society have also 
sunk into jahiliyya, despite their continued faith and devotion to God, by allowing 
the rule of secularised elites to determine their fate. Muslims, in that sense, have 
forgone their basic religious obligations. Qutb proposes to remedy this situation by 
restoring Islam to its dominant position through four main ways: the severance of 
relations to non-Muslim states (and the refusal to reside outside the 'House of 
Islam'); the renewal of Islam in Muslim states to be illustrated by wide-ranging 
political and social changes; the promotion of unity among all Muslims in a common 
21 Ahmed Rouadja argues that both al-Banna and Qutb are said to have influenced Algerian 
Islamism in its more extreme forms, with more moderate infleunces at play with al-Afghani, 
Muhammad `Abduh and Rashid Rida. I would argue here that Qutb is a particularly radical 
version of Islamism influential in particular in the thought of Ali Belhadj. See Ahmed 
Rouadja. 1995 "Discourse and Strategy of the Algerian Islamist Movement (1986-1992)" in 
Laura Guazzone (ed. ) The Islamist Dilemma. Ithaca Press. p. 73. 
22 See Nazih Ayubi. 1991. Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World. pp. 134ff for 
a summary of Qutb's thought 
230n this concept, see Youssef Choueiri. 199o. Islamic Fundamentalism. pp. 94f. 
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ummah; and the development of the principle of shura (consultation) as the guiding 
principle of government under Islam. 
Beyond these common ideological and organisational themes, lie various ways in 
which basic principles have been applied, especially in the lived context of political 
competition. Chapter four pointed to rise in the 1970s of a discourse of Islamism that 
would increasingly go beyond the remit of traditional Islamic grievances to become a 
political force for contestation. Tactically, the greatest aspiration for the generation of 
Islamists engaging in political protest in the late 198os would be Mustafa Bouyali and 
his Movement Islamiste Algerien, a precursor to the FIS created in 198224. Despite a 
growing police crackdown on Islamists militants from 1982 onwards, Bouyali and his 
supporters would succeed in creating a forum for the Islamist ideals to become 
anchored in a nascent idea of civil society. Tactically, his defiance of the regime was 
the most important contribution to the movement, since his doctrinal contribution 
would remain limited to the dominant themes of Islamism outlined above, but 
applied to the Algerian context. As we have seen, the political setting the Islamist 
movement faced in the 199os changed dramatically, with direct consequences on the 
shape and aims of the movement. Yet, despite such an environment characterised by 
rapid change (which will be accounted for in more depth later on), a number of key 
discursive themes evolved within the movement. 
F;. 3.2. Discursive Themes 
Political imagination is not just discourse, or rather, it englobes and qualifies 
discourse, with a wider picture of strategies of communication, symbolism and 
utopia. It is thus a rather vague concept by definition, but one that is difficult to 
escape if the complexity of the Algerian `Islamist solution' is to be understood: 
The idea of politics as `a struggle about people's imagination' is a 
corrective to some conventional thinking. The notion of politics 
centered on power relations and `interests' does not take account of 
relations among individuals within a society or between societies 
that are based on what they think is right, just, or religiously 
ordained. More broadly, politics can be conceived as cooperation in 
and contest over symbolic production and control of the institutions 
- formal and informal - which serve as the symbolic arbitrers of 
society. Politics as Leviathan is thus deceptively in favor of politics 
24 For a summary on Bouyali, see Francois Burgat. 1995. L'Islamisme au Maghreb. pp. 164- 
170. For general context, see chapter four. 
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as symbol maker. Of course, this perspective involves 
understanding culture as contested, temporal and emergent25. 
Yet, it is perhaps through discourse that we have our most obvious and significant 
entry point into the Islamist political imagination, justifying the central place of 
discourse into our analysis. `Islam is the solution' is the main slogan underpinning 
the political programme of the FIS. An oppositional standpoint with regards to the 
monopoly on power by the postcolonial ruling elite is the dominant discursive 
strategies developed by the FIS during the period of political liberalisation and 
beyond. Besides such general trends, and the ideological inspiration for Islamism 
common to all Islamist groups (as outlined above), there is a case to be made for an 
Algerian political Islam displaying a complex array of themes and strategies in 
discourse. This section investigates this dimension. 
The FIS was created as a political front including many Islamist tendencies, some of 
which had substantially different political platforms from the others. The very 
existence of the FIS can be strongly linked to the context of political liberalisation in 
Algeria through the tactical expediency of unification under one banner. Generally 
speaking, the ideological stance of the FIS can be said to be the product of a lived 
tension between two broad poles in the party: the more conservative and pragmatic 
politics of Abassi Madani, a veteran Islamist, and the more radical (and less 
democratically-oriented) politics of the younger Ali Belhadj. A third, and more 
ideologically subtle influence would come from the more technocratic pole of the 
party creating a tripartite ideological structure. John Entelis provides us with an 
overall typology to reflect this complexity26. 
25 Dale F. Eikelman. 1997. "Muslim Politics: The Prospects for Democracy in North Africa and 
the Middle East" in John Entelis (ed. ) Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. p. 2i. In the original quote, Eikelman refers to the 
work of Pekonen, Cerny and Geertz. 
26 See John Entelis. 1997. "Political Islam in the Maghreb: The Nonviolent Dimension" in his 
(ed. ) Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa. p. 60. 
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Tale . i. Entelis' typology of Algerian Islamism 
Main Ideological Constituency Ideological Main 
Slant Influences Proponents 
Preachers/ Preaching as a Outside official Not stated Abassi Madani 
Reformers means to Islam Malek Bennabi 
moralising 
public life 
Radicals/ Frontal Assault Arabophone, Sayyid Qutb Abdelkader 
Revolutio- on `impious Petty bourgeoisie Chebouti 
-naries state' Radicalised in All Belhadj 
Prison Future GIA leaders 
Technocrats Not stated Upwardly mobile Scientific and Abdelkader 
toward modern Western Hachani 
technocratic elite: education, Rabah Kedir 
educators, socialised into 
scientists, Islamism on 
engineers... campus, not in 
mosques 
From: Table adapted from John Entelis. 1997. "Political Islam in the Maghreb: The Nonviolent 
Dimension" in his (ed. ) Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa. p. 6o. 
This type of table should not detract from the degree of fluidity among the various 
branches outlined here in terms of constituency and the overall discursive coherence 
of the movement though27. The dual leadership structure of the party (Madani- 
Belhadj) would allow, during the years of democratic participation, for many 
divisions within the party to be successfully managed. With the promise of access to 
political power through the ballot box, the more radical elements of the movement 
took no issue with playing the democratic game. The political discourse of the FIS is 
thus one based on consensus-building during the 1989-1992 period: r 
The FIS established a dual strategy combining conciliation and 
aggressiveness. It used a double language that appealed both to a 
segment of the intelligentsia and a majority of the population. It 
attacked the state bureaucracy - its corruption and nepotism - and 
the spread of unislamic practices, and focused on social welfare 
through acts of national solidarity and large political 
demonstrations to force the regime to consider some Islamist 
perceptions on matters of national concern28. 
27 See Ahmed Rouadja. 1995 "Discourse and Strategy of the Algerian Islamist Movement 
(1986-1992)" in Laura Guazzone (ed. ) The Islamist Dilemma. p. 74. 
z8 Mohammed Gharib. 1997. `The Algerian Islamist Movement" in Reza Shah-Kazemi (ed. ) 
Algeria: Revolution Revisited. London: Islamic World Report. p. 83. 
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As a result, the dominant discursive thematic of the FIS was on a principled 
opposition to the regime and the state apparatus from the perspective of an Islamist 
morality. This critique, in turn, was underpinned by a subtle strategy aimed at 
undermining the popularity of the regime further by providing a unifying, populist, 
alternative to it in ways grounded in authenticity culturally and effectiveness on the 
ground29 . Consensus within the party coupled with a strong oppositional stance to 
the ruling elite: such is the essence of the Islamist political bite and its success. But is 
what lies behind such a clear-cut picture as simplistic as this position suggests? 
5.3.2.1. The Political Programme 
The political platform of the FIS is one that is linked to the democratic process in a 
close way: many of the issues raised by Islamism previously are raised here, but the 
real possibility of accession to power (or at least widespread political change) gives 
the discursive articulation of the Islamist platform a confidence previously unseen. 
Key to this platform are issues of representation, freedom, justice and morality - the 
four underpinning elements to the Islamist understanding of political legitimacy. 
Rouadja summarises the 6 main aims/characteristics of the FIS as declared in their 
political platform of February-March 1989 in the following way: 
1. The FIS is working for the `unity of the ranks of Islam' and the 
coherence of the ummah 
2. The FIS sets itself up as a global and general alternative for the 
solution of all ideological, political, economic and social problems 
within the framework of Islam 
3. The FIS has adopted a moderate political approach 
4. It emphasises policies based on social solidarity 
5. It promotes the spirit of initiative in all aspects of political action 
6. It takes on the role of safeguarding the Message30. 
The document "Plateforme des Revendications Politiques du FISi31 is a telling 
illustration of these overall aims in terms of political practice. In some ways, this 
official pamphlet is not a remarkable document since it does not outline social policy 
in great detail, and does not establish the foundation for an Islamist state. But on 
another level, it is perhaps the most telling of all FIS-based discursive formations 
29 Despite this broad discursive base however, some Islamist groups would choose not to join 
the banner of the FIS during the democratic experiment. Here, the examples of EnNahdha 
and Hamas are of note. 
3° See Ahmed Rouadja. 1995 "Discourse and Strategy of the Algerian Islamist Movement 
(1986-1992)" in Laura Guazzone (ed. ) The Islamist Dilemma. p. 81 Summarised by author. 
From the FIS document Al-Jabha al-Islamiyya li al-Inquadh (1989). 
31 ElMounquid 16. Translation from the French below by author. 
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both in what it says and what it does not say. It is a document which is in essence a 
hybrid between a set of political grievances against existing state structures and 
policy and suggestions as to the solutions to these issues according to the FIS. The 
`encouragement' provided to the state to carry out the contents of this platform is 
ominous: it is half threat, half promise. In addition, the themes approached in this 
document range widely and they are thus worth listing, in summary form. 
Tale 5.2 The Political Platform of the FIS 
1. the planning of reforms 
2. the dissolution of National Assembly and elections 
3. the separation of political parties from the state apparatus to guarantee free and fair 
elections 
4. state guarantee of civil freedoms as drawn up in Islam (mentioning in particular the 
release of Islamist political prisoners and the protection from arbitrary prosecution) 
5. the creation of an independent body to adjudicate multiparty rule 
6. to reform of the armed forces and the police to make them serve the nation and its 
citizens 
7. the independence of the judiciary branch of power 
8. to end of state monopoly on information and creation of the freedom of the press 
9. to end state violence as it relates to its neglect of social protest and general lack of 
justice 
io. to address social problems such as unemployment, crime, drugs-related issues and 
rates of emigration 
ii. the implementation of the shari'a 
12. to protect the dignity of women through the preservation of Islam, their `honour' 
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From: "Plateforme des Revendications Politiques du FIS" in El-Mounquid 16. 
As a statement of political grievances, this FIS document bears a resemblance to the 
core elements to the. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for instance. The 
demands for political accountability, the separation of powers, judicial fairness, 
freedom of expression, and freedom from persecution are all key concepts to the 
formulation of various Bills of Rights and Constitutions in the democratic setting. 
This is thus a clearly liberal agenda in that particular sense. On the other hand, the 
moral issues linked to Islamist thought are also central to the formulation of this 
platform, without an account of how these two trends are to be combined in practice. 
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both in what it says and what it does not say. It is a document which is in essence a 
hybrid between a set of political grievances against existing state structures and 
policy and suggestions as to the solutions to these issues according to the FIS. The 
`encouragement' provided to the state to carry out the contents of this platform is 
ominous: it is half threat, half promise. In addition, the themes approached in this 
document range widely and they are thus worth listing, in summary form. 
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The implementation of the shari'a and ambiguity with regard to the treatment of 
women are of note. Finally, the international dimension of this document is striking, 
especially with reference to issues of education and foreign policy. That issues of 
foreign policy should be so central to such a document is surprising in itself, and it 
testifies to the regional - if not global - dimension of the Islamist aspirations. The 
welfare of Muslims abroad and in particular their rights as Muslims (to be free from 
persecution and to be respected as Muslims) work as counterpoints to the refusal to 
have the Algerian `culture' be infiltrated by foreign elements (an educational 
argument reminiscent of the policies of Arabisation of the Ben Bella era). This is clear 
point of tension in the logic of the FIS discourse of identity where notions of the 
nation and of Islam coexist, and where cultural affirmation abroad is not seen as 
contradictory with cultural `purity' at home. On the whole, many of the key aspects of 
the Islamist political discourse are alluded to here, but most of these ought to be 
expanded on further. 
5.3.2.2. The Religion /Politics Nexus 
Firstly, the Islamist interpretation of the connection between religion and politics is 
more complex than is generally understood. For the militants of the FIS, as elsewhere 
for Islamist groups, the importance of Islam in the political realm is based on a 
reading of Qur'an where the political aspect of the Prophet's rule are part and parcel 
of his moral leadership. Here Islam is interpreted as model for the `political' in terms 
that are both based on considerations of social welfare nationally, and part of a wider 
political project: 
As a political party, the FIS sees the Qur'an as its founding 
principle. For us, Islam is not only a religion of purification, a 
religion where one only has to do one's prayers and follow God's 
commandments. Islam is much more than this, it is our way of life, 
as the Qur'an teaches us, it encompasses the whole human being, in 
his/her dealings with God, his/her peers, and society. Islam offers 
us a model which we promise ourselves to follow according to a 
global political project3 . 
We can see the special place conferred to Islam as the moral guide for political 
behaviour in the Islamist political imagination: morality and political rule are thus 
strongly related in this type of analysis. But this standpoint is also strongly ingrained 
in a vision of postcolonial rule and of colonial times where the connection between 
a Ould Adda Abdeikrim interviewed in Patrick Denaud. 1997. Le FIS: Sa Direction Parle... 
Paris: L'Harmattan. p. 46. Author's translation. 
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the ruling elite and morality is assessed to have been insufficient. The idea that, 
under French rule, moral legitimacy would have been compromised by the 
domination of non-Muslims over Algerians is understandable - and it is the primary - 
and most symbolic - locus for the Islamist opposition to secular rule as perceived as 
foreign, arbitrary and inauthentic. This is more than emotional attachment to the 
liberational themes of the independentist movement though: the postcolonial regime 
falls under the same category as the colonial administration insofar it is perceived to 
have betrayed the Islamic and the liberational themes of the independence struggle. 
[We ask the regime to account for] the existence of persons in the 
state apparatus who are hostile to our religion, and who are only 
agents for plans thought up by colonialism. This situation has led to 
the proliferation of immoral acts and the loss of sense of 
responsibility at all levels of the institutions and aspects of the 
state33. 
Who these `agents' are remains implicit in this text, in part to avoid direct accusations 
that could lead to reprisals. In many instances, the link between colonialism/neo- 
imperialism on the part of the French and the moral bankruptcy of the Algerian 
regime is made obvious in this manner, as if such a connection was the delineating 
principle between legitimate and illegitimate rule. Secularisation is, in turn, the 
underpinning grievance of this aspect of oppositional discourse. The connection 
between religion and politics is thus principled in terms of Islamist thought, but also 
practically located within an understanding of Islamic culture and morality as the 
basis for legitimate rule in the postcolonial world and against foreign influence. In 
some ways, this is based on an interpretation of a return to a precolonial `Golden Age' 
of Islam in Algeria, but on the whole, the greatest consideration in applying `Islam' as 
the solution to the political problems inherent to the current political and economic 
crisis of the state is linked to cultural constructs of legitimacy. 
5.3.2.3" Democracy 
As an illustration of this, but also as a way to qualify this discursive framework, the 
question of democracy for Islamists in an interesting case in point. Generally, the 
Islamist attitude towards democratic rule has been seen as one of the most 
33 Ahmed Sahnoun, Abdellatif Soltani and Abassi Madani "L'Appel du 12 Novembre 1982". 
Sou'al (5). Reprinted in Mustafa Al-Ahnaf et al. 1991. L'Algerie par ses Islamistes. Paris: 
Karthala. p. 45ff. Quote from p. 46. This text was produced before the creation of the FIS as a 
political party, but one of its authors is none other than FIS leader Abassi Madani. The 
subsequent rhetoric of the FIS would tone down this aspect of the FIS discourse during the 
years of democratisation, for pragmatic purposes. 
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controversial elements of the Islamist platform on a regional level. Yet, as Kramer 
points out, analysts are often misguided in their assessment of political Islam as 
universally undemocratic: 
... the moderate pragmatic Islamists whom I consider to be the 
mainstream of the 198os and early gos have come to accept crucial 
elements of political democracy: pluralism (within the framework of 
Islam), political participation, government accountability, the rule 
of law, and the protection of human rights34 
In the Algerian case, such trends of convergence between representation in 
democratic terms and the importance of legitimate representation is also present 
insofar as the very creation of the FIS is predicated on a de facto, if not de jure 
acknowledgement of the moral legitimacy of democratic procedures35. Yet, this aspect 
of the Islamist standpoint also reveals a number of clear tensions among the 
personalities and the ideas making up the movement36. Ali Belhadj, for instance, was 
widely quoted for his strong, and well-researched, antidemocratic views: 
Democracy puts impiety and faith on the same level. 
The democratic idea is one of the adverse intellectual innovations 
which haunt people's consciousness. They worship it from morning 
til night, forgetting that it is a mortal poison with an impious 
foundation37. 
The foreign nature of the democratic construct is significant in its rejection, but other 
issues can be seen to come into play as well. For Belhadj, there is an intrinsic problem 
with the notion of democracy understood in its original version, `the rule of the 
people'. Conceiving of a system of representation where human representatives, as 
opposed to God, would work as the arbiter of justice and social policy, works to him, 
as a violation of the role of religion in society. Additionally, he echoes many doubts 
expressed in the region as to the benefits of majority rule, as opposed to more 
populist, unifying frameworks of representation. 
34 Gudrun Kramer. 1993. "Islamist Notions of Democracy" in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds. ) 
Political Islam: Essays from the Middle East Report. London: I. B. Tauris. p. 8o. 
35 See the political platform delineated in section 5.3.2.1. 
36 For a discussion of such ambiguities, see Yahia Zoubir. 1996: Algerian Islamists' 
Conception of Democracy'. Arab Studies Quarterly i8 (3 -Summer) pp. 73ff. 
37 Ali Belhadj "Un Coup de Massue porte au Dogme Democratique" El-Mounquid 23. 
Reprinted and translated into French in Mustafa Al-Ahnaf et al. 1991. L'Algerie par ses 
Islamistes. pp. 87ff. Author's translation into English. The text quoted here goes into quite 
some detail on the origins of the term and its application in a contemporary context. 
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By contrast, the official stance of the FIS as a political party not only accepted the 
necessity of electoral competition, but it also used the language of representation to 
articulate its struggle for political power against the state38. Additionally, it is in terms 
of democratic representation that the Islamist condemnation of the cancellation of 
elections was framed in the post-January 1992 timeframe. This of course could be 
seen as mainly tactical, since it is an election that was to bring Islamists to power in 
Algeria. Indeed, Islamists have often been accused only using the language of 
democracy insofar as it could bring them access to power without the concurrent 
commitment to the principles underpinning democracy. This should be qualified in 
two ways though. On a practical level, the Algerian case shows the strength of the 
democratic element of discourse, especially in terms of Islamist claims of 
representation against the illegitimate rule of the state. The cancellation of the 
electoral process reinforced the moral claims of the Islamist movement by proving a 
case in point of the Islamist case against the state. Secondly, there is a provision 
within Islamist course for dialogue and the importance of legitimate representation 
through the concept of shura39. Algerian Islamists working within the framework of 
the FIS have used this concept to normalise their ambiguous attitudes towards 
democratic procedures. Generally, then, the Islamist attitudes towards representation 
testifies to its ambiguous position as a political party borne out of the necessity of 
playing the political game of democratic competition, while putting forward a 
political programme where foreign domination (economically, politically or 
culturally) and secular constructs guiding politics are seen as illegitimate. This is a 
contradiction which the end of the democratic experiment allowed many Islamists to 
eventually bypass, but the absence access to official channels of power for Islamists 
does not fully rectify this ambiguity. 
5.3.2.4. Morality in Politics and Law 
The question of the enforcement of religiously-inspired moral codes of conduct and 
dress, a highly sensitive and symbolic issue for both Islamists and their critics at 
home and abroad, remains the source of much conflict and debate in many societies 
in the Muslim World. Two separate but mutually-reinforcing issues are at play: where 
and how a distinction between private and public morals is made and which morality 
can be seen as acceptable in a given situation. Here, a degree of cultural sensitivity is 
de rigueur, since the mores, values and customs called into play are not limited to the 
Islamist viewpoint but are often relevant to the Muslim way of life in general. For 
38 See previous section for examples. 
39 On Madani's position in this regard, and on the concept of shura in the Algerian context, 
see Mustafa al-Ahnaf et al. i99i. L'Algerie par ses Islamist es. pp. 84ff. 
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instance, issues such as the attitude towards the consumption of alcohol is one that is 
relevant to all Muslims. Even if it is not universally accepted, the Islamist insistence 
on the prohibition of the consumption of alcohol thus finds resonance culturally in 
the region, and it is echoed by legislation in this regard in Saudi Arabia, to name one 
example. In other words, it is a legitimate moral question in the Muslim world. In 
turn, what this means is that the moral alternatives under scrutiny are not a 'Western' 
morality pitted against an 'Islamist' morality, but a debate among the citizens of 
predominantly Muslim states as to the ways in which religious morality is mediated 
into the public realm40. The question then is not so much whether Islamists do not 
want to, or cannot separate religion from politics41 but the place that Islamists 
attribute to private morals in the political sphere. Why is the politicisation of morals 
so important to Islamist politics? 
In the Algerian case, the question of morality is tied to the politics/religion nexus 
outlined above insofar as it is the moral dimension of Islam, above all others, that 
brings its political bite to Islamist discourse. We have already seen that such 
questions are linked to conceptions of legitimacy of governance and representation. 
The connection with the moral dimension in Islam is more complex in character 
however. The main instrument of morality in politics for the FIS is the application of 
the shari'a to both the drafting of law and the formulation of social and economic 
policy, as all the founding texts and programmes of the FIS emphasise at length42 . 
For instance, one of the main issues the Islamist political programme puts forward is 
that of the relationship between Islamic morality and the workings of the trade and 
banking industries43. The Islamist standpoint here is a delicate balancing act between 
the pragmatic considerations of economic growth in a global market (especially after 
the experience of the failure of state socialism in the 1970s onwards) and the moral 
economy of social exchange where relationships of exploitation are frowned upon, 
especially in terms of profiteering through usury. Islamist banking as a principle 
40 Indeed, private mores are a matter of public discourse for Islamists, but that is hardly 
unique: pro-life campaigners in Western societies would argue, among other things, that the 
state should outlaw abortions because they are, in their view, morally wrong. They, too, find 
that it is the responsibility of the state to incorporate the set of moral standards they believe in 
into public law. These moral standards, in turn, are often (even though not always) religiously 
motivated. Thus, in Western societies also, the separation between morality, religion and 
politics is not unproblematic. 
41This is a difficult theological issue to solve in itself - especially when most analysts assume 
that Muslims cannot make this distinction because of the nature of their faith or simply take 
at face value the Islamists' claims to create a 'truly Islamic society without judging how truly 
Islamic their political programme actually is (or what such a programme should ideally look 
like). 
42 See for instance, FIS document. 1989. Al-Jabha al-Islamiyya li al-Inquadh. 
43 For a summary on this issue, see Alan Richards and John Waterbury. 1996. A Political 
Economy of the Middle East (2nd ed. ) Boulder: Westview Press. chapter fourteen, especially 
PP"35off. 
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reflects these tensions since it tries to reconcile the populist and moral underpinnings 
of the Islamic notion of community with the reality of the marketplace. The official 
economic programme of the FIS reflects this perspective: it deals with all three 
sectors of the economic spectrum (agriculture, industry and commerce) and 
emphasises: 
1. the shari'a as regulating principle for material relations; 
2. the role of the state as policy-maker respecting and advocating Islamic values and 
law, and as protector of the independence of Algeria from foreign influence; 
3. the need to foster small businesses; 
4. the protection of the business interests of Algerians vis-a-vis foreign interests 
5. private ownership and laissez-faire economics (with provisions for social welfare as 
advocated in the Qur'an)44. 
This is an ambitious programme which, by and large, focuses on past 
mismanagement as a focal point for opposition and does not draw specific policy 
statements. The moral component here is also of interest since it is designed to 
capture of the legitimacy of the platform proposed (with the implicit assumptions 
that corruption and mismanagement are at the root of Algeria's economic crisis). 
Overall, the way in which the moral dimension of political discourse for the FIS is 
framed is linked to issues of political legitimacy in terms of how to best represent the 
Algerian people. Islam here is not only the guide to morality in politics, it is also what 
confers on the FIS its moral authority for taking part in the political process. This 
dimension is also the most eloquent and obvious point of contestation with the 
regime in power for the FIS. The state is seen through the prism of impiety as an 
explanatory factor for its social, economic, and political failures. By contrast, the role 
of the army in this setting is not fleshed out in a systematically negative way. In fact, 
the official programme of the FIS ensures that the liberational/heroic credentials of 
the defence forces are suitably praised. The issue of the control of the state apparatus 
by the army remains largely implicit throughout the democratisation period. In fact, 
only point 8 of the FIS platform in this regard alludes briefly to what is in fact one of 
the central questions of representation in the Algerian context: 
The army should not be implicated in political questions so that it 
remains the army of Message, of the community and of the whole 
country. This way the clout of the army cannot but grow as it 
increasingly demonstrates its competence, its morality and its 
ability to defend the country45. 
44 "Programme Economique du FIS" reprinted in Patrick Denaud. 1997. Le FIS: Sa Direction 
Parle... pp. 291ff. 
45 "Progamme Officiel du FIS" - Pamphlet. 
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5.3.2.5" The West/France 
Another issue that illustrates tensions within the application of the question of 
morality within the Islamist framework is the oppositional stance of Islamist rhetoric 
not only in terms of the moral bankruptcy of the Algerian elites (through 
secularisation, corruption, etc. ) but also in terms of the overall bankruptcy of 
Western morality as a model for the `modern' in the political (and arguably cultural) 
realm. This is an aspect of the Islamist discourse on morality that is inherently 
relational: in other words, the relationship between Islamism and the West/France, 
as defined in Islamist terms, is set up in a dialectic relationship of opposition in moral 
terms. This is a complex framework where historical memory is intertwined with a 
consideration of postcolonial identity. The memory of colonial times works as a 
reminder of the illegitimacy of foreign domination and its lack of cultural authenticity 
in Islamic terms. Juxtaposed to this consideration is the idea that cultural neo- 
imperialism is at play in Algeria through the dual event of perceived deliberate 
cultural aggression by the French and the continued use of the French language by 
the elite and perceived economic and political links with France4'. In the first 
instance, the fear of neo-imperialism is clearly delineated in the discourse of the FIS: 
He who thinks that our problems with French colonialism ended 
with Algerian independence in 1962 is gravely mistaken. On the 
contrary, this colonialism, with its strong and ancient roots, is more 
than ever prepared to reinforce its presence in our land, in several 
ways, the most important of which being cultural presence47. 
Additionally, connection with `the French' for the regime can be framed as a way to 
delegitimise it in terms of its inability to overcome the colonial legacy and the 
reproduction of colonialist modes of exploitation. The term Hizb Franca (The party 
of France) is thus the strongest insult and most significant indictment of the regime 
in Islamist terms. 
This is an issue of identity within the polity in this sense, as well as an identity marker 
with regards to France (and `Western values' in general). The `enemies' in this 
framework are not simply seen as `French' or `colonialists' though. The Islamist 
imaginary combines this type of motif with blatant condemnation of perceived 
46 In that sense, this duality between the authentic and the inauthentic follows issues of class 
in the Algerian polity in ways that, even if implicit, are difficult to ignore. 
47 Faycal Tilani "Permanence de la Lutte contre le Colonialisme: El-Mounquid 3. Author's 
translation. 
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Marxist or Jewish influences on policy-making in France as the source of a campaign 
against Islam (in ways that remain completely unsubstantiated). France is seen as the 
victim of an international campaign by Zionism to control political opinion and create 
an atmosphere of hatred for Islam48. As a result, in Islamist terms, "This hateful 
campaign against the Muslim world as a whole has been orchestrated by an 
intellectual class educated abroad in Marxist-Leninist, or even Jewish milieus"a9 
There is a real sense of siege in the mentality expressed here, and a process which 
mirrors the type of `Islamic/Islamist threat' literature that previous chapters 
discussed. Picking up on the very terms used in the European and American media to 
describe them, Islamists turn the logic of the Islamic threat argument on its head by 
framing the Algerian Islamists as the victims of an anti-Islamic campaign. One author 
goes as a far deconstructing the Western discourse on Islam in ways that are 
reminiscent of Said's critique of Orientalism50. In particular, the portrayal of Islamic 
people as fundamentalist, `fanatical' and intolerant in the media, and the ways in 
which the issue of the hijab in French schools has been handled are emphasised in 
the Islamist literature51. As a critique to this type of discourse, the FIS posits the idea 
that debates on Islam in the French media are "wilfully orchestrated" as a "racist" 
form of discourse that is not interested in dialogue with the Muslim `Otheri52. 
The battle lines expressed here are between an authentic, and moral, Islamic world 
and what is variously termed the `West' or `modernity'. The interpretation of 
modernity here is also quite ambiguous: it is seen by one author as including 
manifestations ranging from "communism, socialism, capitalism, pragmatism, 
positivism, fascism, zionism, Arab nationalism, berberism, etc. s53 . One could argue 
that these various tendencies or ideologies are part of the modern world as we 
understand it, but the author's grouping of all these possibilities under the banner of 
the "cancerous growth of modernity"54 implies that all of them ought to disregarded 
altogether and replaced by an Islamic alternative. Yet the Islamist political framework 
does not aim to overcome capitalism for instance, and it plays upon themes of 
48 Fouad Benabdeihalim. "Les Veritables Ennemis de I'Algerie" El Mounquid 9. 
49 Fouad Benabdelhalim. "Les Veritables Ennemis de I'Algerie" El-Mounquid 9. Author's 
translation. 
50 Moussa Ait Embarek "La peur de 1'Islam: Entre 1'Occident et l'Occidentose" El Mounquid 
28. 
51 Fouad Benabdelhalim. "Les Veritables Ennemis de I'Algerie" EI Mounquid 9. 
52 Fouad Benabdelhalim. "Les Veritables Ennemis de l'Algerie" E1 Mounquid 9. 
Benabdelhalim uses the term `monologue' in this regard. Author's translation. 
53 Meryem Djamila. "Characteristiques et Consequences du Modernisme" El Mounquid 12. 
Author's translation. 
s4 Meryem Djamila. "Characteristiques et Consequences du Modernisme" EI-Mounquid 12. 
Author's translation. 
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Arabism against Berber identity constructs. These contradictions are not addressed in 
much depth. Instead, the main illustration of the adverse consequences of modernity 
is seen here through the prism of women's emancipation and the concurrent 
destruction of the family's. In addition, it can be noted that this concern goes beyond 
perceived cultural penetration by the French or fears of loss of Islamic values though: 
it also involves a very real fear of French invasion and neo-colonialism56 
In practice, there is an inherent ambiguity in how the FIS carried out its own 
relationship of the French `Other' in those terms57. As Omar Carlier points out: 
All Belhadj strongly indicts the Hizb Franca (the Party of France), 
while Abassi Madani spend large amounts of time being recognised 
and consecrated by TFi [a leading French TV channel]. The same 
Abassi Madani defines the struggle against the French language as a 
priority, but he is the first to put his children in Algiers' Lycee 
Descartes. Is the FIS banned? Its clandestine leaders rush to Paris, 
when only months before they used the myth of renewed conquest 
by France in their political discourse58. 
S.. ' Delivering the `Social' 
Beyond these principled commitments to a political imagination lies a practical 
critique of the inability of the regime to fulfil its social obligations. This is a stance of 
rupture of course - and one grounded in the increasing frustration of the Algerian 
population facing the regime monopoly on power. But this rupture is not one that 
questions the aims of the apparatus of the modem state, only the effectiveness of the 
state in delivering the `social', so to speak. In this setting, political Islam provides a 
discourse for social justice and social rights, coupled with a commitment for 
addressing existing social problemsS9. The idea of discourse takes on an almost 
mundane dimension here, but one that is of critical importance to the ability of the 
Islamist leadership to connect with the political experience of its constituency. 
Framing the political in ways that are not only about morality in general, and social 
justice in particular is an effective oppositional stance to the regime. The added 
55 Meryem Djamila. "Characteristiques et Consequences du Modernisme" El Mounquid 12. 
Author's translation. The fact that the author of this piece is a woman holding a PhD in 
philosophy is an interesting sideline also. 
56 See, for instance, "Peuple Algerien: Tien-toi sur tes Gardes" El-Mounquid io. 
57 On this process, see Francois Burgat. 1994. "Une Volonte de `Retour au Passe'? " in Serge 
Cordelier et al (eds. ) L'Islamisme. Paris: La Decouverte (Dossiers de 1'etat du monde). pp. 76- 
77- 
58 Omar Carlier. 1995. Entre Nation et Jihad: Histoire Sociale des Radicalismes Algeriens. 
Paris: Presses de Science Po. p. 353. Author's translation. 
59 See Lahouari Addi. 1995. "L'Islam Politique et la Democratie: La Cas Algerien" Herodote 
77(April-June). p. 70. 
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discursive strength of social dignity conferred by addressing issues such as 
unemployment, housing and sanitation ideally complements such a framework. 
5.3.. 3 Discursive Strategies: Introducing Symbolism 
To conclude on the analysis of Islamist discourse in Algeria, it is perhaps wise to 
summarise the main strategies that can be derived from the overview provided here. 
Arguably, a symbolic dimension of discourse is apparent in the use of the themes and 
discursive dynamics outlined above. In that sense, Islamist discourse intrinsically 
goes beyond the text per se to denote the political imaginary that underpins it. The 
question of political imagination comes to the fore at this point through our 
interpretation of discourse. 
This is complex picture fraught with ambiguities. In fact, the dominant dynamic of 
the Islamist political imagination, if seen through the prism of political discourse, is 
of ambiguity above anything else. This ambiguity manifests itself principally through 
the careful combination of discursive elements which are not easy to reconcile, such 
as: 
" Tradition vs. innovation: the Islamic tradition pitted against the moral excesses of 
Western modernity is contradicted by an attachment to the scientific aspects of 
the `modern' world. In addition, the Islamist platform is innovative in character 
and articulates a critique of the regime in terms that goes beyond traditional 
concerns (corruption exemplifies). Furthermore, the participation of Islamism in 
the debates on democracy, legitimacy and representation are bound to the 
contemporary context, even with the caveat of Islamic morality acting as a 
dominant guiding principle. 
" Populism vs. liberal economics: the economic platform of the FIS denotes an 
acceptance of the freedom associated with free-market capitalism and a vocal 
rejection of communism as an alternative to it. That being said, the importance of 
solidarity and social welfare for Islamists points to a continued faith in the idea of 
a welfare state acting to protect the weakest segments of the population and foster 
growth for small businesses. 
" Practical politics vs. divine law: this is the crux of the Islamist argument, but also 
the greatest area of ambiguity in discourse for Islamists. The focus on the shari'a 
as the basis for law denotes a commitment to divine rule as the basis for 
governance, but the acceptance of (if not demand for) the democratic process 
contradicts this somewhat. Here, we see that this tension was partially a result of 
ideological differences within the FIS. The fact remains however, that the practical 
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task of governance through representation, even through shura, is not equivalent 
to free and fair elections strictly speaking. 
The Islamist strategy for gaining popularity in the political competition of the early 
199os gives this type of ambiguity a pragmatic context: indeed, the inclusive nature of 
the party made such compromises and differences inevitable. Furthermore, the 
nature of the democratic process did not encourage the FIS to clarify its position with 
regards these types of ambiguity so as to retain it wide, and populist appeal. 
As second dominant strategy for Islamist discourse is the reliance on an affirmation 
of legitimacy based on authenticity and morality. On the one hand, morality is 
derived here from Islam as the regulating principle of the party (guaranteeing lack of 
corruption and commitment to social welfare, for instance). On the other hand, 
authenticity is based on a double articulation: Islam as a positive cultural basis and 
the rejection of colonialism/neo-imperialism, secularisation, non-Islamic mores. This 
is a political language rife with symbolic references to the identity themes that most 
Algerian can most strongly relate to (after all, most Algerians are Muslims). It is also 
a complex way of defining identity which highlights both what Islamism is and what 
it isn't. This duality, in turn, is the linchpin to the political imaginary underpinning 
the Islamist bid for power: a commitment to Islamist politics is by definition a 
commitment against a number of alternatives embodied by the regime, and the 
`enemies' of Islam abroad. The FIS is oppositional on the levels of political, social and 
economic issues, moral issues and cultural aspects of the political. Yet, beyond this 
practical dimension, the notion of rupture from the dominant discourses of the state 
deals with internal as well as external (if not global) issues of critique. It is a strategy 
aiming to engage with the principles and symbols received from the `West', itself 
interpreted in a reified way. Here, Islamists condemn the Orientalist readings of 
Islam, but in many ways they reproduce the strategies of `Othering' inherent to 
Orientalism. They aim for a complex understanding of the `Other' where 
colonial/neo-imperialist as well as secularised frameworks for understanding politics 
overlap, but on the whole, the monolithic nature of such a conception of `Western 
modernity' or `Western morality' remains. 
Strategically, authenticity in Islamist terms allows for a claim of monopoly over 
legitimacy - excluding both the regime in place for failing to live up to such 
expectations and potential political rivals for not meeting the Islamist standard by 
virtue of not being in the FIS. Therefore, the final ambiguity in this type of discourse 
lies in the populist slant of its claim to legitimacy. Despite support for the electoral 
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process, the aims of the FIS remain to create a common front for politics which 
encapsulates the various political issues and divergence into one framework. This 
strategy, in turn, is reminiscent of a single party rule based on a populist ideal, as 
illustrated by the leadership style of the FLN since independence. This, at the end of 
the day, is not a platform for pluralist politics. 
Overall, we can see that the political discourse the FIS displays characteristics of 
complexity and ambiguity that encompass pragmatic needs for access to power (and 
therefore some degree of opportunism) and the principled commitment to the 
Islamist world-view, with the ambiguities this implies. Symbolically, the FIS plays the 
card of religion and morality, but also inherently the game of cultural authenticity as 
the basis for political legitimacy. What remains to be seen, in this setting, is how such 
a discourse manifests itself on the level of political action. 
. 4. Violence as Political Imagination 
So far, our analysis has focused on the themes and strategies underpinning the 
production of political discourse by the main Islamist party in contemporary Algeria. 
Thus, our understanding of political imagination has been thus far limited to its 
expressions through political programmes and other forms of discourse, as well as 
the symbolic issues and dynamics underpinning them. Two areas of exclusion are 
implied here however: an account of the post-democratic developments for Islamism 
on the one hand, and the variety among Islamist groups on the other (especially but 
not only after the ending of democratic experiment in 1992). This section addresses 
the first issue, and section 5.5. the second. Here, the specific focus of analysis is 
placed on the inscription of political imagination in practice, focusing on political 
action. Looking at the application of the Islamist imaginary to the realm of political 
action, in turn, could be achieved in several ways. One could for instance focus on the 
contradictions and tensions inherent in putting an Islamist programme into practice. 
In the Algerian case, this would be of course arduous since the FIS never had to 
opportunity to put its programme to the test of governance at the national level. But 
my reluctance to go down this path lies beyond the specific Algeria setting; here, the 
importance of political action lies in the ways in which it actualises discourse. In fact, 
what I investigate is the idea that political action can be seen to work as an element of 
political imagination. In other words, the way in which the political is imagined by 
Islamists can be seen to be reflected in its carrying out of policy. 
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This is a wide question, which would necessitate more in-depth analysis that this 
chapter can afford. Still, a significant example of this process is analysed as 
illustration and substantiation for this argument. The discursive, and communicative, 
aspects of violence in the post-democratic setting are seen to testify to a dimension of 
struggle between Islamism and the regime which has strong symbolic components. It 
is one of the main expressions of the political gains and losses on the ground that 
translates the Algeria Civil war into practice, but it is also significant in its uses of the 
body as a site of inscription of competing political imaginations. In "Violence, Voice 
and Identity in Algeria", Michael Humphrey investigates the significance of violence, 
and in particular, what he terms `the production of corpses' in the symbolic dynamics 
of the Algerian Civil War60. He highlights the main issue at stake in an analysis of 
political struggle and violence that takes the context of political imagination into 
account: 
The tortured (wounded, mutilated or dead) body is the space in 
which power is being contested in Algeria today. Violence and pain 
are the basis for political contestation of the state, society and 
values61 
If we are to take the hypothesis that political struggle is framed through discourse 
seriously, then violence arguably becomes a privileged site of inscription for the 
struggle among political imaginations. It is the ultimate expression of competition for 
control over the legitimising tools of the lifeworld. This is an unsettling conclusion, 
but one worth unravelling further. Investigating Humphrey's assertion implies 
investigating the instrumentality of violence in concrete terms, and juxtaposing these 
terms with the symbolic meaning violence takes on. In other words, instrumentality 
in violence in our setting is hot simply about military gains: it is about the political 
gains it may also bring. In this sense who dies, when, and why is just important as 
how many people die. For instance, the assassination of a French engineer is 
meaningful because this target was chosen for political reasons. A woman being 
attacked for not wearing the hijab in an Islamist-controlled area implies more than 
violence against women per se. It implies that women are forced to wear the hijab in 
that area as a way to display the fact that it is under Islamist control. Violence has a 
function in performance: it can be a display of strength, or of territory -a way to 
communicate to an audience. It can also be used as a means to discredit one's 
opponent's claim to legitimacy. In dealing with political imagination, the question of 
the symbolism of violence is thus of importance, and worth examining in more detail. 
60 Michael Humphrey. 2000. "Violence, Voice and Identity in Algeria" Arab Studies Quarterly 
22. p. 1ff. 
61 Michael Humphrey. 2000. "Violence, Voice and Identity in Algeria" . p. 3. 
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On a concrete level, violence during the Civil War could be roughly divided into two 
broad types: violence perpetrated for the purposes of winning or strengthening one's 
position, referring to the killing of combatants as well as civilians (this could include 
political and symbolic gains as well as military gains on the ground) and violence 
related to lawlessness (such as rackets and delinquency). The second type seems on 
the surface to be more incidental, almost an inevitable by-product of the breakdown 
in law and order that accompanies a protracted civil war. Yet, it could also be argued 
that a degree of overlap between those two apparent types occurred in the Algerian 
case, since extra-legal activities - and the violence associated with them- worked as 
means to sustain the war effort economically for at least some of the protagonists 
involved. Even on this most general level, violence and its uses display elements of 
complexity. 
In turn, the attitude towards the instrumentality of violence among Islamists varied 
during the war. The place of violence in the Islamist political imagination is one that 
reflects the notion of change in the dynamics of the movement in the post-democratic 
setting. The balancing act between `moderate' and `radical' Islamism was offset by the 
ending of the democratic experiment in that the more `moderate' option for the FIS 
became by and large discredited. That being said, the advent of Islamist of violence as 
a consequence of polarisation displays characteristics of complexity once again. The 
FIS, and its armed branch the AIS, continued to prioritise the idea of legitimate 
access to political power after the beginning of the hostilities62. Violence, in that 
setting, is considered to be the only way to create the conditions for the return to 
democracy against the army-controlled state. According to one of the FIS leaders, 
this pragmatic attitude towards violence is what sets the FIS apart from other. 
Islamist groups involved in violent struggle against the state: 
The FIS has nothing in common with the GIA. First, because the FIS 
is a political party... the GIA, like the FIS resist existing power 
structures. But our aims as to the ends and means of this struggle 
are radically different. We see our current situation, involving 
armed struggle against the regime, as exceptional and situated in a 
specific context63 
This is perhaps a partial point of view, but it still makes a strong statement as to the 
uses of violence for the FIS. In this framework, the choice of victims and levels of 
62 See a statement to this effect by Ould Adda Abdelkrim, interviewed in Patrick Denaud. 
1997. Le FIS: Sa Direction Parle... P. 107. 
63 Ould Adda Abdelkrim, interviewed in Patrick Denaud. 1997. Le FIS: Sa Direction Parle... p. 
107. Author's translation. 
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violence are directly linked to political expediency geared towards the competition for 
power with the state. Targets including police officers, state officials and members of 
the army represents a choice of violence that avoids the inclusion of `civilians' as 
acceptable targets. This, in turn, is a qualified view on violence in Islam, as illustrated 
by Ali Belhadj's position: 
Some say `Islam is a religion which rejects violence and fanaticism, 
it is the religion of generosity, of tolerance and of peace'. I believe in 
these words, but with regards to whom? My attitude is now one of a 
fighter for God who sees that Islam is both the religion of generosity 
and tolerance, and the religion of force, of jihad and of the whip 
against he who is proud and stubborn. It is a religion that allies the 
just Book and the conquering sword" 
For the GIA groups, on the other hand, the obligation of jihad under Islam has a 
broader meaning as an intrinsic tool for accession to power and the creation of an 
Islamist state. The catharsis of violence as the foundational element to the chiliastic 
utopia of Islamism in those terms has greater significance. For the GIA, there is an 
incumbent duty on all Muslims to fight non-Muslims and bring greater glory for 
Islam in the process. A GIA communique states: "It is through [God's] teachings that 
the GIA has killed the infidels of all religions and ordered all infidels to leave the 
countrys65. Practically, the post-democratic violence of the GIA groups is linked to the 
process of purification of Algeria from the presence of `infidels' - targeting foreign 
nationals and cultural and media figures associated with the regime, or with 
perceived French cultural imperialism. The choice of victims is thus symbolically 
significant, but in different manner. We are thus looking at widely different types of 
Islamist violence, underpinned by different beliefs in the purpose of the use of 
violence. ý'' 
State violence, by contrast, also has its purposes. While analysing it in depth is 
beyond the scope of this work, the dialectic of violence characterising the 
Islamist/state relationship is worth elaborating on since it is the node connecting the 
discursive notion of political competition with its manifestations in the political 
realm. Violence can be seen here as a relationship that carries symbolic meaning. At 
the most general level, the question of agency in violence has a symbolic dimension 
for Humphrey which testifies to wider patterns in the political/social setting: 
64 Ali Belhadj "Qui est responsable de la Violence? " El Mounquid 9. Author's translation from 
the French version. 
65 GIA communique 43. reprinted in Patrick Denaud. 1997. Le FIS: Sa Direction Parle... P. 17. 
Author's translation. 
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Agency is ambiguous. Who terrorizes, the state, its Islamic 
opponents, or both? The audience is multiple and diverse. it is local, 
national and international. Is this the body of a patriot, martyr or 
traitor? In other words, death by unknown hands in contemporary 
Algeria is rhetorical and assimilated into a wider social world of 
uncertainty, insecurity and rumor66 
The notion of uncertainty is of particular importance to agency in a violent setting 
since both the uncertainty in the allocation of blame and uncertainty as currency in 
itself have their political uses. Responsibility becomes a site for political contestation, 
where propaganda on both parts comes into its full application. This is an area of 
ambiguity since violence can be a source of pride in some instances: dealing with the 
`Islamist problem' effectively for the regime and resisting the authoritarian rule of the 
regime for the Islamists. When civilians (and especially women, the aged and 
children) are massacred, on the other hand, responsibility needs to be shunned at all 
costs, for obvious reasons. Accusations of regime involvement in massacres to 
deligitimise Islamist groups are an example of this political war. Whether political 
players were actually prepared to commits acts of violence solely in order to blame 
the other remains controversial, but not beyond the realm of possibility. 
As a result, fear and uncertainty shape political allegiances according to who is 
believed. In that sense also, the actual violence perpetrated on bodies becomes 
subsumed under the exigencies of political gains. Death matters in its expression of 
political meaning: "Because bodies no longer speak the origins of violence and the 
passions motivating murder can never be known with certainty, the efficacy of 
violence (terror) then is not just the ability to cause harm but also to shape its 
meaning - i. e., what it substantiates"67. The prize of such a contest is the status of 
innocence, if not victim status. When the perpetrators of violence cannot be clearly 
identified, the game of politics comes into full-swing to shape how terror can be 
interpreted. On the other hand, positioning oneself as the potential solution to 
uncertainty in itself has obvious advantages. This is in essence a game that remains 
about political legitimacy in fundamentally the same way that the moral discourse of 
democratic competition was about grasping the upper hand in the stakes of 
legitimacy. There is in fact no greater contest for legitimacy than one inscribed 
literally on the bodies of the nation: there is no greater legitimacy than the one 
conferred by the saviour of the nation from terror. 
66 Michael Humphrey. 2000. "Violence, Voice and Identity in Algeria" . p. 4. 67 Michael Humphrey. 2000. "Violence, Voice and Identity in Algeria". p. 6. 
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Uncertainty is also a basis for the construction of a political setting where political 
alternatives are reified into extremes. This is a process that various Islamist groups 
and the state take part in equal measure to consolidate their claim to a position where 
each is the only alternative to terror. On the ground, the regime was more successful 
than its opposition in claiming a monopoly over the meaning of uncertainty, 
especially given its privileged position as the body of governance logically responsible 
for the maintenance of order. This should not detract from the fact that state violence 
was geared towards the political aim of discrediting Islamism throughout the Civil 
War; policies of `eradication' vs. `conciliation' should be viewed in conjunction with 
the strategic use of violence by the state as a form of political statement. 
Finally, violence helps identify the location of contestation and measure political 
control over geographical areas by the protagonists in the Civil War. In this way, 
corpses function as the `instrument for social mapping'68. For instance, Humphrey 
notes how violence against women works as the most potent example of bodies where 
discourse is inscribed: 
Algerian women's bodies have been appropriated by a rival politics 
of violence which has made them the symbol of retrieving cultural 
integrity or modernity (e. g., hijab or no hijab) between rival 
movements. The cultural amplification of their innocence has 
simply polarized their positioning69 
Women are seen here as the symbolic markers of morality, to reflect an imaginary 
where women are the silent bearers of societal propriety and men its gatekeepers'°. 
Traditionally, dressing in an Islamic way (the hijab, loose garments, etc. ) could be 
seen as a marker of modesty and piety which reflects positively on the whole family 
(and protect women from unwanted attention in the social sphere). This model sets 
out women's appearance as one serving a social function, and the fact that women in 
this setting are seen as largely passive is of course crucial. From the Islamist 
perspective, the pressure to return to this mode of dress is also about social signifiers 
as much as it is about modes of dress. The traditional model is seen here not only as a 
marker of Islamic faith (if not Islamist allegiance), but also as a choice to renounce 
the `Western' mode of dress and its connotations for Islamists (vulgarity, unbridled 
sexuality). During the years of democratisation, changes in women's dress quickly 
rose as one of the key symbols of the Islamist rise to popularity and relative power. In 
68 Michael Humphrey. 2000. "Violence, Voice and Identity in Algeria". p. 9. 
69 Michael Humphrey. 2000. "Violence, Voice and Identity in Algeria" . p. 17. 
70 See Marnia Larzeg. 1994" The Eloquence of Silence: Algeiran Women in Question. London: 
Routledge. 
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Islamist local constituencies, active steps to stop non-Islamic dress by women were 
taken at the earliest opportunity. This was designed to work as a marker of Islamist 
`territory', and as a potent symbol that the Islamist agenda went beyond empty 
rhetoric. The international media attention concerning political Islam in Algeria, and 
arguably elsewhere, has also focused on this symbol. 
When the Civil War began, women became rapidly caught in the political cross-fire 
because of their appearance: they were intimidated into wearing the hijab by 
Islamists, but also judged complicit to Islamist groups by the regime for doing so. 
That violence against women would become commonplace came as no surprise in 
this setting. Assaults, kidnappings and rape have been widely reported. Violence to 
force a woman the hijab was only one of motives involved though. Lawlessness 
allowed for women to be less protected from violent attack, and young women were 
kidnapped to work as se. < slaves in maquis where fighters stay isolated for a long 
time. In some ways, violence against women occurred for practical reasons: because it 
could. Beyond this however, violence against women, much like the state of women's 
dress was the medium through which political gains and losses were measured and 
demarcated. For instance, women were killed along with their children as a means to 
eradicate 'the future' of entire families. Killing off the `seed' means killing the 
offspring as well as the means to produce more. That women were massacred in some 
key geographical areas but not others is also of importance: their bodies suffered as 
retribution for the political allegiances of their husbands, brothers, or fathers. The 
sins of men were revisited on the innocence of their wives, daughters, and sisters. 
This is one of the main ways in which violence has found its symbolic significance in 
the Algerian setting. Women here are the ultimate symbolic carriers since they are 
seen as passive and innocent - not the makers of their fate. 
On the whole, and through this example, we can see how political imagination finds 
symbolic expression in the practice of politics, even (especially? ) in its extreme forms. 
Yet, one of the salient aspects of the analysis of violence provided here highlights the 
diverse attitudes of Islamist group uis-d-vis means for political action and thus an 
area of tension within the Islamist viewpoint. It is this dimension of dynamism within 
the movement that constitutes the final aspect of political imagination worth 
elaborating on. 
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5.5. Accounting for Diversity and Change: A Short Overview of Islamist Groups 
Assuming that the FIS and the GIA groups are the most potent representatives of the 
Islamist movement in Algeria reflects their political prominence (through political 
participation and violence respectively) in the political spectrum of the 19gos. This is 
only one part of the range of Islamist groups, ideological orientations, forms of 
political participation/action, and constituencies in the Algerian Islamist framework 
however. Without delineating the political programme of each in any great detail, it is 
still possible to talk of the evolution of an Islamist political imagination over time and 
according to a varied political spectrum. Two main periods of time are worth listing 
here: the flourishing of the Islamist opposition during the democratisation period; 
and the fragmentation of the movement in the Civil War years. In the first instance, 
the opening up of the political sphere allowed for political groups and cells to create 
bona fide political parties. Only some of the many groups became mainstream 
political players, often through the grouping of several groups or tendencies under 
one banner, so as to maximise chances of victory, as illustrated by the structure of the 
FIS. R. Hrair Dekmejian list four main tendencies other than the FIS involved in 
politics at that time: 
" Shanun's Rabitat al-Da'wa al-Islamiyyah 
" Jaballah's En-Nahda 
" Bin Kiddah's Harakat al-Ummah 
" Nahnah's Hamas. 71 
Chapter four showed that only En-Nahda and Hamas would register success in 
elections on a national level; in addition, Dekmejian posits the less confrontational 
('activist') nature of these associations, most of which are interested in grassroots 
Islamisation of society72. Still, both Hamas and En-Nahda represent the most 
significant Islamist alternative to the political programme of the FIS in the late i98os 
and early 199os -a fact compounded by their refusal to integrate with the Front in its 
early days. In both cases, but for different reasons, the Islamist message presented is 
less radical in its opposition to the regime and differs in its means for achieving the 
Islamisation of society. 
Haman, on the one hand, is a branch of Islamism based on Mahfoud Nahnah's 
`Guidance and Reform"' movement founded in the 196os as the main precursor to 
contemporary Islamism. Its defining characteristics are its close association both in 
tactical and doctrinal terms with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (and the work of 
71 R. Hrair Dekmejian. 1995. Islam in Revolution. P. 208. 
72R. Hrair Dekmejian. 1995. Islam in Revolution. P. 208. 
73 Jama'a al-Irshad wa al-Islah. 
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Hasan al-Banna in particular74). The differences with the FIS are however still 
notable despite these common origins and influences: 
Hamas, however, is in some respects at a disadvantage when 
compared to the FIS: first of all by virtue of its conciliatory attitude 
towards the powers that be and also because of its dealings with the 
movements connected with the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood - 
these are more inclined towards compromise with the regime in the 
eyes of FIS militants, who are themselves disposed towards 
confrontation; and secondly because of the social origins of its 
adherents, who generally come from relatively more prosperous and 
well-educated backgrounds than their counterparts in the FIS75. 
Also of importance is M. Nahnah's emphasis on concept of shura as a means to 
bridge the gap between Islamic practice and democracy in a way that is less 
ambiguous than FIS pronouncements. This gradual, and moderate, approach, in 
turn, implies the use of non-violent means exclusively and is underpinned by a strong 
platform supportive of women's rights. For instance, Nahnah insists that: "Woman is 
the equal to man in every way, she shares with him the same nature, the same 
obligations and the same destiny. Why make a differentiation? 06 
Third in line in terms of prominence in the movement is A. Djaballah's En-Nahda 
which shares Hamas' circumspection with regards to the populist rhetoric of the FIS. 
Instead, it focuses on the social and cultural aspects of political Islam rather than 
short-term acquisition of power per Se". This is a grassroots organisation used to its 
independent, if not clandestine status, and it focuses primarily on Islamisation in the 
Constantinois region. Al-Ahnaf et al. argue in this regard that the aims of En-Nahda 
in becoming a political party, and retaining its independence from the FIS, is 
strategic. Its political aim is to preserve the regional aspects of Islamism in the event 
of accession to power by the FIS (and thus the creation of an Islamist state)78. 
Overall, there have been doubts as to the degree of independence of these two 
movements from the regime, since their position is far more conciliatory than that of 
the FIS79. The differences between the FIS and those groups is however more one of 
degree, rather than a substantively different political programme. Here, variations 
within the political imagination occur along the lines of means for achieving 
74 Mustafa al-Ahnaf et al. i99i. L'Algerie par ses Islamistes. p. 38. 
75 Ahmed Rouadja. 1995. "Discourse and Strategy of Algerian Islamist Movements". p. 77. 
76 Mahfoud Nahnah. 199o. interviewed in Tribune D'Octobre. 16 January. 
77 Mustafa al-Ahnaf et al. 1991. L'Algerie par ses Islamistes. p. 43. 
78 Mustafa al-Ahnaf et al. 1991. L'Algerie par ses Islamistes. p. 43. 
79 John Entelis. 1997. "Political Islam in the Maghreb: The Non-volent Dimension". p. 61. 
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Islamisation of society: from above, or from below, through access to official channels 
of power, or gradually through the work of associations within civil society. 
Furthermore, it touches upon issues of symbolic significance such as the issue of 
women's status under Islam. 
In the post-democratic era, the patterns of Islamist activity become increasingly 
difficult to chart with the fragmentation of the movement into several tendencies and 
many small groups changing names over time. The two main non-FIS tendencies 
stayed by and large in the non-violent side of Islamism and participated in the 
political process when possible. Haman became the most powerful Islamist party in 
the institutional setting, since it remained a political party allowed to run for 
elections. The FIS was banned and thus split up into many groups, including violent 
precursors to the infamous GIAs. Small groups which had not joined the FIS out of 
suspicion regarding the democratic process had a new opportunity to gain a voice in 
Algerian politics, through violence. All groups at that time were predicated in 
oppositional terms to the state, although in different ways, and through the use of 
different means. In the area of violent uprising, early attacks on security forces by the 
`Afghan-led' Takfir wa Hijra in 1991 and more widely from 1992 onwards8° are 
notable. This movement became marginalised later on in the Civil War, but was one 
the precursors and strongest advocates of armed struggle in the name of Islam. 
Subsequently, four main Islamist tendencies became involved in violent struggle 
against the regime: 
" The AIS - (Armee Islamique du Salut), the armed branch of the FIS working 
towards the accession to power by the FIS (given its electoral near-victory in 1992) 
and as a means to protect the dominance of the FIS in the Islamist political 
spectrum. Its relationship to the GIAs was particularly tense and characterised by 
violent conflict. 
" The MIA (Mouvement Islamique Arme), lead by Abdelkader Chebouti, who was 
associated with Bouyali in the 198os, focuses on a rejection of the participatory 
tactics of the FIS and the necessity for armed struggle81. Severine Labat points to 
Chebouti's fear that participation in elections would expose the Islamist 
movement as a whole to state repression and only provide opportunities for co- 
optation. In the run-up to the elections of Dec 1991, Chebouti however left much 
institutional freedom for the FIS to operate82. Martinez points to its extreme 
8o Michael Willis. 1.996. The Islamist Challenge in Algeria. Ithaca Press. P. 268-269. 
81 Michael Willis. 1996. The Islamist Challenge in Algeria. P. 269. 
82 Severine Labat. 1995" "Le FIS a l'Epreuve de la Lutte Armee" in Remy Leveau (ed. ) L'Algerie 
dans la Guerre. Paris: Editions Complexe. pp. 89-90. 
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suspicion of infiltration by security services and secrecy as the bases for its 
progressive sidelining during the Civil War83. 
" The MEI (Mouvement pour l'Etat Islamique) - along with the GIA groups, it 
functions as a revolutionary guerrilla that aims to go further than the MIA and the 
AIS. Ideologically, its innovation lies in its leader, Said Makloufi's "Traite sur la 
Desobeissance Civiles84 which forms the basis for terror destined to educate the 
population as to the Islamist agenda and create a forum for rebellion against the 
regime. It too would be sidelined because of its focus on violence against `civilians' 
as opposed to the security apparatus of the state85. 
" GIAs (Groupes/Groupement Islamique Arme): uncompromising with the regime 
in the extreme, the GIA groups captured the imagination of the media at home 
and abroad through flamboyant acts of violence. it is characterised by its complete 
condemnation of the democratic process as illegitimate in Islamic terms, and its 
commitment to fight against all perceived enemies of Islam using all means 
necessary. It was created by a former Bouyalist, Mansour Meliani, whose GIA 
folded with his arrest in the first few weeks of its operation. The organisational 
set-up involved in the GlAs would however take on a dynamic of its own with a 
structure of cells emerging quickly and informally86. 
Efforts at unification among Islamist groups in early 1993 were undermined by 
operations by the security forces and the gradual emergence of the GIA groups as the 
leading force in the conflict, even if only insofar as it captured the publicity necessary 
for its status to grow87. Various other groups concerned with violent or non-violent 
struggle would come and go as well - and use various names - including the GSPC 
(Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat) and the Islamic League (Ligue 
Islamique pour la Da'wa et le Jihad), for instance. Overall, the fragmentary nature of 
the end of democratic process created opportunities for differences among Islamist 
groups to flourish. Once again though, the Islamist tendency retained its common 
political imaginary despite such a fragmentation 88 in terms of its general aims and 
vision for society. Differences as to the appropriate means for achieving those aims 
are the point of contention between the various branches of Islamism in that setting. 
83 Luis Martinez. 1998. La Guerre Civile en Algerie. P. 306. 
84 Reprinted in Patrick Denaud. 1997. Le Fis: Sa Direction Parle... pp. 287ff. 
85 Luis Martinez. 1998. La Guerre Civile en Algerie. P. 316. 
86 Severine Labat. 1995. Les Islarnistes Algeriens: Entre les Urnes et le Maquis. Paris: Seuil. 
p. 240- 
87 Luis Martinez. 1998. La Guerre Civile en Algerie. P. 301. 
88 Luis Martinez. 1998. La Guerre Civile en Algerie. P. 292 See title of section in particular. 
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Consequently, the range of themes and discursive strategies developed in our 
treatment of the FIS is by and large valid for the vast majority of the Islamist 
tendency in Algeria. That being said, the overview provided here should suggest also 
that diversity, under the wide umbrella of the Islamist political imagination, is a 
characteristic feature of the movement. 
5.6. Conclusion: Algerian political Islam as a Social Movement 
The main aim this chapter was to demonstrate how looking at the political 
imagination of Islamism in Algeria as the application of Islam to politics is simplistic. 
The importance of the postcolonial dimension in discourse showed the location of 
discourse, for instance. In trying to account for political Islam in a more complex 
way, as a result, several strands of argument were developed on. Firstly, the framing 
of political Islam as a social movement was seen as the overall framework under 
which the analysis of political Islam was to operate. The question of political 
imagination only provides a partial answer as to whether Islamist groups can be 
considered as such, but it is a useful starting point nonetheless. Secondly, our aim 
was to look at various strands of political imagination to unearth the complexity of 
political Islam in the Algerian setting (a combination of pragmatic/opportunist and 
principled elements cohabiting through ambiguity were of note). Thirdly, and as a 
way of adding to our analysis, both the issues of the symbolic referents of political 
action in political imagination and issues of variety were explored to some degree. 
In conclusion, therefore, we can go back to our general hypothesis as to the nature of 
political Islam, given the terms of imagination and operation defined here. On the 
whole, it can be argued that the FIS functioned as a political party when allowed, but 
that the bases of its contestation where laid long before the democratic experiment, 
and continued in various forms, after its end. Also, compared with Tunisia and 
Morocco, Algerian Islamism held a large degree of monopoly over the discourse on 
political opposition in the early 199os, which, for Burgat helps explain why its 
rhetoric could always afford to be more radical89. Our study of political imagination 
showed that the range and diversity within the movement is underpinned by a 
common political imaginary; as a result we can talk of an overall Islamist movement 
in Algeria. The `social' and `political' aspects of political Islam, on the other hand, are 
undeniable. Starting from the assumption that "The role of Islam in modem North 
Africa (and for that matter, in the Middle East as well) is as elusive as quicksilver"90, 
89 Francois Burgat. 1995. L'Islamisme au Maghreb p. 143. 
go L. Carl Brown. 1973. "Islam's Role in North Africa" in I. William Zartman (ed. ) Man, State 
and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib. London: Pall Mall. P. 31. 
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we can concur with one author who states that the Islamist movement in Algeria can 
be seen as "not theological", but "essentially sociological" in character9'. The 
oppositional stance of the movement, and its choice of tactics both in the institutional 
game of elections and the informal settings of Civil War denote that Islamism here is 
fundamentally about protest. Thus, as Eikelman and Piscatori argue, 
Protest is a useful, if ... general, term to refer to the spectrum of 
activities of Muslims, especially the politically active Muslims we 
refer to as Islamists. By definition, Islamist groups are involved in 
protest. They have resolved that the wrongs of society must be 
righted, but the corrective means are not restricted to one kind of 
activity92. 
Yet, as we are about to investigate, the story does not stop at rupture with dominant 
patterns of political imagination and structures of power embodied by the state. 
Areas of connection, including mimicry, in terms of tactics and discursive themes 
between Islamism and the state introduce the idea that Islamist political imagination 
may be a hybrid political formation 93 
91 Yahia Zoubir. 1996. 'Algerian Islamists' Conception of Democracy'. p. 66. 
92 Dale Eikelman and James Piscatori. 1996. Muslim Politics. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. p. lo9. 
93 Jan Nederveen Pieterse argues that "Relations of power and hegemony are inscribed and 
reproduced within hybridity". Here, power relations and hegemony are "not merely 
reproduced but refigured in the process of hybridization". Jan Nederveen Pieterse. 1995. 
"Globalisation as Hybridization" in Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash and Roland Robertson 
(eds. ) Global Modernities. London: Sage. p. 173. 
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Chapter Six 
Political Identity and Political Contest in Algeria: 
Continuities in Discourse 
Perhaps the most important contribution of the subaltern school to contemporary debates 
around modernity and the postcolonial nation-state lies in its insistence that we learn to read 
the history of the latter in terms of continuities and collusions rather than ruptures. These 
continuities and collusions concern the silent contract between colonial and postcolonial 
regimes (of knowledge, governmentality, intellectual and political positions) mediated through a 
shared commitment to the tenets of modernity. 
Sanjay Srivastava 
6.1. Introduction 
So far, our analytical focus has privileged the study of Algerian political Islam in 
terms of the areas of rupture from dominant patterns of political imagination it 
effects. As a contender for political power and legitimacy, Islamism proclaims not 
only its opposition to the ruling elite, but also disjunctures in terms of how it 
envisages the 'political'. The in-depth analysis of the political imagination of Algerian 
Islamists in chapter five thus attempted to draw a comprehensive and nuanced 
analysis of the place of Islamists on the chessboard of the Algerian political lifeworld. 
In the present chapter, my aim is to problematise this picture even further and go 
back to the historical 'drawing-board' to investigate areas of continuity in discourse 
between Algerian Islamists and their political opponents in terms of one of the most 
central components of the political lifeworld, that of political identity. The idea that 
the political imagination of Islamists is in opposition to dominant forms of political 
imagination should not obscure those areas of coherence, if not complicity, which 
bind both trends to the overall Algerian political lifeworld. My endeavour here 
remains analytical, but my focus is more historical, since an adequate treatment of 
areas of continuity in the lifeworld necessitate an analysis of the evolution of the 
dominant themes of this lifeworld. 
Consequently, this chapter will attempt to disentangle and historically trace the 
principal identity motifs which are at the forefront of both discourse and behaviour. 
Thus, the main themes I will try to explore are linked to the Algerian experience of 
political identity formation historically, and its place and role in the contemporary 
political setting. This is used to provide further insight into the underpinning 
dynamics which characterise the contest for political power and legitimacy between 
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the state and its Islamist opposition'. Three main lines of argumentation are 
investigated here to reflect these concerns. Firstly, it is argued that, in the case of 
Algeria, identity themes were central to the formulation of an anti-colonial discourse 
which framed the independence struggle and formed the building blocs in the 
construction of the post-independence Algerian political identity (or rather more 
accurately, identities). Identity issues, which are themselves central to the Algerian 
experience of colonialism, have framed the creation of the 'founding myths' of the 
Algerian nation (insofar as Algerian nationhood can be considered to be, to some 
extent at least, an 'imagined community'). This has been accompanied by the re- 
interpretation of such motifs over time - in social, cultural and political terms and 
terrains. These themes cover a range of historical and ideological symbols including 
the importance of independence and anti-colonialism, unity and consensus, Islam, 
Arabism, development, strong leadership, and an ambivalent relationship to French 
culture and language. Identity motifs are thus central to the articulation of the 
Algerian experience of the political (and vice-versa), be it through conflict or 
harmony. 
Secondly, this chapter elaborates on the main themes which have dominated the 
rhetoric anti-colonial movements as well as post-colonial identity discourse by the 
state. Three areas of historical continuity come to the fore as we unearth the 
development of identity discourse throughout the pre-colonial and colonial history of 
Algeria, and its symbolically charged decolonisation struggle: the prominence of 
foundational referents of political discourse, a referent of moral agency lying at the 
core of political legitimacy, and the relational character of identity formation. In turn, 
political contest for legitimacy and power can be seen to occur in terms of identity- 
based ideological constructs, which are debated and appropriated by different 
political forces in different ways. 
Thirdly, this symbolic core is transposed to the contemporary context of Algerian 
politics with particular reference to the ideological opposition between the Algerian 
state and its Islamist opposition in the 1988-1992 time frame. It is argued here that 
political identity motifs constitute the political tools modulating access to political 
power by framing the contest over the ownership of the moral dimension of 
legitimacy of governance'. This process implies the existence of a common political 
1 There are of course other opposition groups which have challenged the regime's monopoly 
on power, but these have proven less successful in challenging the state's monopoly on power, 
at least so far - their lack of success can be attributed to a number of factors, one of which is 
their reluctance to play the'identity' card. 
2 This process is not specific to the Algerian historical experience; it can also be seen to be 
relevant, in more general terms, to identity formation elsewhere. 
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imagination from which identity motifs can be derived, encoded and mediated into 
political discourse to suit specific political needs by all actors involved. In addition, 
the symbolic dimension of this struggle does not limit itself to discursive formation, 
but is also encoded the patterns of political action which characterise the state- 
Islamist relationship. Here, discursive strategies carry symbolic meaning and 
contribute to the definition of belonging and exclusion on which the conflict rests. In 
this sense, Islamism as a political movement takes on the mantle of the defender of 
the legacy of a war of liberation gone wrong. Its aims relate to promoting what early 
forms of nationalism failed to achieve in concrete terms, and what the postcolonial 
state `perverted'. In the Islamist political imagination, identity can be linked by a 
visible, and not so subtle, thread to existing themes in the political lifeworld dating 
back to early nationalist movements, through the political strategies of the nascent 
Algerian state, and the regimes that have ensued. 
The use of identity motifs in political discourse will be thus seen here as perhaps 
unavoidable, but inherently problematic, a theme developed in conclusion. But first, 
and as way of introducing our discussion of Algeria, the concepts of identity and 
political identity in particular, need to be conceptualised more clearly. 
6.2. Defining Political Identity 
When you remain within the established field of identity and 
difference, you become the bearer of strategies to protect identity 
through devaluation of the other; but if you transcend the field of 
identity through which the other is constituted, you lose the 
standing and identity needed to communicate with those you sought 
to inform.. Identity and difference are bound together. It is 
impossible ` tö reconstitute the relation to the second without 
confounding the experience of the first3. 
The Oxford English dictionary provides two definitions of identity which prove a 
helpful starting point to our purposes. Identity is defined there as 'the quality or 
condition of being a specified person or thing' and 'individuality, personality'. This 
condition thus implies both the affirmation of a specific set of qualities and functions 
and the concomitant differentiation from 'other' identities this specificity implies. The 
philosopher Charles Taylor investigates this process further to try to draw out how 
3 William Connolly. 1989. "Identity and Difference in Global Politics" in J. Darian and 
M. Shapiro (eds). International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern readings of World 
Politics. Lexington (Mass. ): Lexington books. p. 329. 
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personal identity is formed4. Taylor's definition of identity is pointing to the moral 
and spiritual aspects of identity formation and the complex relationship between the 
instinctual and cultural factors that underpin it: 
We are dealing here with moral intuitions which are uncommonly 
deep, powerful and universal. They are so deep that we are tempted 
to think of them as rooted in instinct, in contrast to other moral 
reactions which seem very much the consequence of upbringing and 
education... But like so much else in human life, this 'instinct' 
receives a variable shape in culture... So our moral reactions in this 
domain have two facets, as it were. On one side, they are almost like 
instincts...; on the other, they seem to involve claims, implicit or 
explicit, about the nature or status of human beings. From this 
second side, a moral reaction is an ascent to, an affirmation of, a 
given ontology of the humans. 
As a result, he defines identity in a way that approximates the idea of an individual 
moral choice reflecting self-definition, or'personhood': 
We speak of (identity) in these terms because the question is often 
spontaneously phrased by people in the form: Who am I? But this 
can't be necessarily answered by giving name and genealogy. What 
does answer this question for us is an understanding of what is of 
crucial importance to us. To know who I am is a species of knowing 
where I stand. My identity is defined by the commitments and 
identifications which provide the frame of horizon within which I 
am capable of making a stand6. 
This frame of horizon is where the individual stands in relation to others within and 
outside the group; it is a position and a choice. 
On this individual level, our definition seems clear and rather unproblematic, but two 
central questions remain: how does this idea of personhood relate to collective 
identity-building, and how does the passage from the individual to the collective 
operate (and vice-versa)? Shifting our focus to collective identity - be it cultural or 
political - creates a new set of issues and questions that are more arduous to tackle. 
How can we define political identity and what are its boundaries? What part does it 
play in politics? How is collective identity constructed, by whom and for what 
purpose? What is the place of the analysis of political identity in political science? 
4 Taylor's interest in identity stems, in part, from his concern with the philosophical 
components of modernity. Charles Taylor. 1989. Sources of the Self. The Making of Modern 
Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
5 Charles Taylor. 1989. Sources of the Self p. 5. 
6 Charles Taylor. 1989. Sources of the Self. P. 27. Emphasis added. 
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These issues have been debated widely by political analysts and philosophers, with 
renewed interest in the post-Cold War era and have led to a vast literature and 
protracted debates. Suffice it to say here that the issue of political identity goes to the 
heart of how both nationhood and ideology are constructed, thus mediating the place 
of the individual into the collective and defining both belonging and its boundaries. 
Thus, the processes of political affiliation, group dynamics, the role of ideology, and 
nation-building all spring to mind as examples of underpinning processes to the 
imagining of a collective identity. Perhaps more important still is the question of how 
these collective processes shape the identity of the individual in a political setting. 
In this context, it is worth acknowledging from the outset that concepts such as 
political culture, political identity and ideology are inherently hard to define, partly 
because their existence and influence on the political process is notoriously difficult 
to quantify through statistical and other quantitative methods, and partly because 
they all imply individual self-definition -a qualitatively subjective process par 
excellence. Yet, few contemporary analysts of politics would risk bypassing the issue 
of identity altogether: its consequences in the political sphere are all too obvious, be it 
through the study of ideology or that of political culture. Still, dealing with identity 
proves problematic on another level. Exclusive reliance on identity questions as 
explanatory tools for political behaviour often runs the risk of oversimplifying 
complex decision-making processes and community dynamics, thus producing a 
primordialist account of political behaviour unable to account for individual 
differences and socio-economic influences. One should also beware of the binary 
oppositions analyses of identity often reinforce instead of overcoming. In short, while 
most analysts have a diffuse (or not so diffuse) feeling that using cultural traits to 
characterise the political is an important part of the equation of political identity, and 
thus ultimately political behaviour, such an endeavour is fraught with difficulties. 
Contemporary authors on the subject of identity have therefore tended to focus on 
specific case studies of identity in politics to avoid the pitfalls of generalisation', but 
general theories on political identity are still critical to the debate on identity, as 
much for their limitations as for their insights'. 
One such attempt, and a good starting point for our analysis, is Benedict Anderson's 
classic Imagined Communities. Anderson's account attempts to link political identity 
to the concept of nationhood by emphasising the creative nature of the process of 
political identity-building in the frame of the 'nationi9. Anderson starts from a series 
7 This volume exemplifies this trend. 
8 See, in particular, the work of Ernest Gellner on nationalism. 
9 Benedict Anderson. 1983. Imagined Communities. London: Verso. 
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of perplexing questions, the most salient of which being why nationalism holds such 
significant power over individuals despite what he judges to be their ideological (and 
philosophical) poverty10. His answer to this question is 'anthropological': 
I propose the following definition of the nation: it is an imagined 
political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and l sovereign". 
Communities are imagined not only through Gellner's conception of invention - 
implying ideological manipulation and the use of historical motifs to serve political 
purposes12 - but also in a more positive sense - as a creation. Thus, "Communities are 
to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they 
are imagined"". In turn, this implies an understanding of political identity that is 
inherently relational: 
... the nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has 
finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No 
nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind14 
In this sense, political identity only holds by locating itself in opposition to its 
neighbours, or its alternatives: without its boundaries and its 'Others', political 
identity is impossible to define. What Anderson's approach underplays however is the 
dynamic re-interpretation of political identity over time within political communities 
(whether these are nations or smaller societal sub-groups)" .A political community, 
if understood in Anderson's terms, must be viewed as a lived phenomenon in which 
the production of a collective identity is an ongoing process through which history is 
re-interpreted, symbols re-appropriated, and legitimacy is contested and reaffirmed. 
Political identity is part of discourse and thus an active participant in the way in 
which power relations are codified, and sometimes challenged. Thus, the dialectical 
relationship between construction of Otherness in identity and the interactions of 
political actors for supremacy in the political sphere can help explain "the apparent 
incapacity to constitute oneself as oneself without excluding the other - and the 
1O Benedict Anderson. 1983. Imagined Communities. p. i4. 
11 Benedict Anderson. 1983. Imagined Communities. p. 15. 
12 Ernest Gellner. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. 
13 Benedict Anderson. 1983. Imagined Communities. p. 15. 
14 Benedict Anderson. 1983. Imagined Communities. p. 16. 
15 Furthermore, his account doesn't take into consideration the very real possibility of 
pluralism in political identity, and the lived contradictions in political identification lived by 
individuals at the margins of nationhood. 
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apparent inability to exclude the other without devaluing and, ultimately, hating 
him"16 
The question of power is thus one that lies at the heart of political identity, and our 
initial question of who controls the production of identity and for what purpose is one 
that needs to be addressed. The relationship between the production of ideology and 
power relations has been tackled with varying success in philosophical, political and 
sociological texts - with a special interest placed on identity contest, self-other 
relations and marginality. Three main strands of analysis have attempted to critically 
deconstruct the production of ideology in general and that of political identity in 
particular: post-structuralism, post-modernism and post-colonialism. While these 
analytical standpoints differ in many ways, they all share a concern for the process of 
identity-making, especially in relation to those people or categories of people such an 
'imagining' excludes. The work of Stuart Hall on identity is exemplary in this regard: 
Identity is a structured representation which only achieves its 
positive through the narrow eye of the negative. It has to go through 
the eye of the needle of the other before it can construct itself'7. 
Such a focus on the dynamics of the 'self-other' relationship can be seen to be derived 
from the work of continental thinkers such as Jacques Derrida (with his interest in 
relational identity linked to differance), but it ultimately finds its strongest 
inspiration in the work of the French sociologist Michel Foucault on health, the 
prison and sexuality. Foucault's careful deconstruction of the genealogy of such 
dichotomies as innocent/criminal and insane/sane point to a moral economy of 
structural differentiation in societies. Foucault's main contribution to the question of 
collective identity-making in the polity lies in his analysis of the nexus between 
knowledge (and more specifically to the intellectual production of categories) and 
power relations. Inspired by Nietzsche's Will to Power, this consideration displaces 
the process of imagining identity from the free, consenting individual described by 
Anderson, to structures of power and those who control them. Political discourse, 
which appropriates historical and sociological 'facts', is an apparatus for the 
construction of a regime of truth supportive a specific regime of power. Consequently, 
16 Cornelius Castoriadis. iggo. Le Monde Morcele. Paris: Seuil; p. 29. 
17 Stuart Hall. i99i. "The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity", in A. King (ed; ) 
Culture, Globalization and the World System. London: Macmillan. P. 21. 
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the task of the analyst of political identity, and its place in discourse is inherently 
linked to the problematic of power 18. 
As far as social and political identity is concerned, two processes have been identified 
by scholars inspired by Foucault's work in sociology as well as many gender and race 
analyses in cultural studies. On the one hand, the codification of power relations 
through mental categories of belonging defined by discourse can be seen, in 
Foucauldian terms, to strike at the heart of the imagining of political identity. As 
Stuart Hall shows: 
Precisely because identities are constructed within, not outside 
discourse, we need to understand them as produced in specific 
historical and institutional sites within specific discourse formations 
and practices, by specific enunciative strategies 19. 
On the other hand, this view implies that identity contest within the polity can be 
seen as the negotiation - through discourse - of these boundaries, thus affecting 
power relations. The application of this insight, in turn, is best exemplified by 
Edward Said's Orientalism20. Said's project echoes heavily of Foucault's own work on 
power/knowledge. Through a textual analysis of Western scholarship on the Orient, 
Said draws a parallel between the uneven power relationship between the centres of 
European power and the mostly colonised 'Orient' (interpreted widely), and 
concomitant distortions in the academic and journalistic accounts of the Orient 
destined at a readership in the metropolis. Said's discussion has the advantage of 
marrying a strong sense of how identity markers are crucial to the articulation of 
power, a theme of particular relevance to the issue of colonial power. But we do not 
need to focus exclusively on how colonial power was reinforced through external 
academic production for political purposes. Our primary interest here is to unearth 
the ways in which the colonial legacy has been interpreted by the post-colonial state 
to achieve its own political aims. Collective political identity, as a result, can be seen 
here as more than a mode of identification in the contemporary era. Following 
Foucault, I will look at identity issues and symbols as political tools which political 
actors use to gain power and build legitimacy. One area worth bearing in mind in 
conceiving of nation-building in the postcolonial setting also is Partha Chatterjee's 
18 Michel Foucault. ig8o. "Truth and Power" Interview conducted by Alessandro Fontana and 
Pascale Pasquino in Michel Foucault. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interview and Other 
Writings 1972-1977. New York: Pantheon Books, p. 133. Emphasis added. 
19 Stuart Hall. 1996. "Introduction: Who Needs Identity? " in Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay 
(eds. ). Questions of Cultural Identity. London: Sage. P-4. 
2O Edward Said. 1978. Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. Harmonsworth: 
Penguin. 
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conception of the nationalist imagination (in response to Anderson's work). As a way 
to put together the various theoretical strands on identity alluded to here, one quote 
from Chatterjee suffices: 
... the most powerful as well as the most creative results of the 
nationalist imagination in Asia and Africa are posited not on an 
identity but rather on a difference with the 'modular' forms of the 
national society propagated by the modem West21 . 
Finally, it is perhaps necessary to problematise the concept of political identity a little 
further. Beyond the post-colonial state, there have been and remain other ways in 
which collective identity is constructed in the polity. For instance, tribal links in 
Africa relate to political organisation and articulate identity in a radically different 
way to the state. We could also mention the question of cultural metissage and 
dislocation (within the polity) and look at the margins of identity, and, externally, at 
the question of identity in exile, especially for diaspora communities. In essence, we 
thus need to be careful in dealing with the 'other' - as neither the self nor the other are 
as clearly demarcated a set of categories as the political ideologues of identity would 
have us believe. But the very use of such categories in political discourse makes them 
politically relevant. 
6.3. Identity and the Experience of Colonialism in Algeria 
Once the 'jewel in the crown' of French colonialism, Algeria sought and won its 
independence through a brutal - and bitter - independence struggle immortalised in 
the public eye through Franz Fanon's Wretched of the Earth, and Pontecorvo's classic 
film The Battle of Algiers. Such a high profile (especially in the French-speaking 
world) has often coloured the public consciousness to create an image of an Algerian 
political history dominated by ruthlessness and violence. In effect, Algeria's descent 
into civil war since the aborted elections of December 1991-January 1992 only seems 
to confirm such expectations and to reinforce, perhaps too stereotypically, images of 
a post-colonial world rife with political instability coupled with economic dysfunction 
and the absence of political pluralism. To some extent, such images perform the 
necessary task of communicating the physical, political and emotional violence linked 
to colonialism and its aftermath. Still, it is worth bearing in mind that such recurring 
patterns are not mere by-products of history, unavoidable, tragic, and somehow 
linked to an unchangeable political culture of violence. Here I will try to bypass the 
21 Partha Chatterjee. 1993. The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial 
Histories. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press. p. 5. 
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stereotype of a violent political culture and thus a monolithic understanding of the 
question of political identity in Algeria and point to some of the principal areas useful 
to our understanding of the interaction between identity motifs and political 
outcomes. 
Historically, the process of political identity formation in Algeria cannot be divorced 
from the experiences of colonisation, colonial rule and decolonisation specific to the 
Algerian case22. The symbolic significance of conquest, oppression, and ultimately 
liberation, provides the foundation upon which a strong, independent idea of 
'nationhood' was built. Most nations' political lifeworld display such historically 
significant moments which come to crystallise individual and collective fantasies 
concerning the value of political citizenship, comradeship, justice and freedom (the 
French, American and Russian Revolutions are powerful examples). In the case of 
Algeria, such motifs derive their primary significance from the experience of 
colonialism - which comes to symbolise lack of equality, justice and freedom, the 
division and thus defeat of the Algerians in the face of colonisation, and the political 
disenfranchisement this process implies for the individual and collective entity. It is 
perhaps most interesting to note the juxtaposition of basic French education in 
Algeria emphasising the founding myths of the French nation (liberte, egalite, 
fraternite) and the practice of the opposite of such principles, despite Algeria's 
special status as departement, for 130 years23. This is only one of the contradictions 
of colonialism though. If we are to look at the political and cultural metissage such 
forceful penetration implies, the ambiguous legacy of the French era becomes 
apparent. The French colonial regime systematically sought to destroy pre-colonial 
identity motifs (which were acquired and transmitted through kinship, tribal and 
other local ties and expressed through indigenous cultural and religious 
manifestations), while excluding Algerians from having access to full French 
citizenship which criteria they, by definition, could only fail to meet. It is in this 
double eclipse that contemporary Algerian political identity was born, and it is in 
identity terms that independence was ultimately fought for. 
During the colonial period, the native Algerian attitude towards independence is one 
that evolved slowly, and as a result of the failure of the French colonial project to 
22 Obviously, it would be reductionist, and somewhat unfair, to argue that only the colonial 
experience matters to the formation of political identity. What i would argue here is that the 
colonial moment has helped frame the identity dimension of politics in a crucial way which I 
will concentrate on. Others factors have contributed to the formation of that identity, but they 
have often tended to be explained or articulated in terms of motifs which arose as a result of 
decolonisation. 
23 Benjamin Stora. 1998. Algerie: Formation dune Nation. Paris: Les Colonnes D'Hercule- 
Atlantica. p. 20. 
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assimilate its subject population in an acceptable way. Revolts against colonisation 
were initially common, especially during the 1830-1847 time frame, but the growing 
acknowledgement that French presence would not be easily overcome (as colonial 
policies of massive European immigration, vast land acquisition and bureaucratic 
and legal means for making Algeria French reached their peak in the late 19th 
Century) led to a variety of native attitudes towards assimilation. At the turn of the 
Century, few were those that advocated full independence from France; in fact the 
most prominent social movement dealing with the issue of political identity from a 
native standpoint at the time, the Young Algerians movement, advocated equal 
human and political rights for Algerians so as to make assimilation possible24. It was 
the growth of nationalism in the early 20th Century that started to reverse this trend 
and to articulate the idea of an independent political identity for Algerians. In 
particular, the creation of the Etoile Nord Africaine Movement (ENA) in the 1920s 
marked a rupture from earlier articulations of political identity. Interestingly enough, 
the ideological slant of the ENA grew from the Algerian workforce's experience of life 
in metropolitan France and through the exposure of immigrant workers to civil 
protest by trade unions, and in particular the French Communist Party. It is difficult 
to say whether independentist ideas developed at that time because of changes in the 
ideological terrain brought in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, or primarily 
through the experience of the reality of French life outside the colonial model. But 
one thing is for certain, this turning point in the self-conceptualisation of some native 
informants living in the metropole opened the gate for the growth of new political 
movements (culminating in the creation of the FLN), and led to the birth of the idea 
of an independent Algerian nation-state underpinned by its own, untainted, political 
identity. The political discourse of the ENA's main spokesman, Messsali Hadj, made 
the implications of such identity claims quite clear: 
We are also the children of the Algerian people and we will never 
accept our country being attached to another against its will; we do 
not wish, under any pretext, to jeopardize the future, the hope for 
national freedom of the Algerian people25. 
24 This attitude can be at least partially explained by the distorting effect of French education 
and cultural values during the colonial period, as growing numbers of Algerian became 
inspired by the French ideals of freedom inspired by the 1789 Revolution, in stark contrast to 
the reality of colon rule underpinned by legal discrimination through the Code de L'Indigenat 
and unequal political representation. Many native critics of the time saw assimilation as a 
means to gain access to this ideal of France, and the integration of Algerian identity into the 
French framework was seen to require more equal rights. 
25 Speech delivered at the Algiers Municipal Stadium on August 2,1936. Quoted from Claude 
Collot and Jean Robert Henry. Le Mouvement National Algerien, see pp. 83-85. 
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Self-definition against the definition imposed by France here forms the linchpin and 
ultimate justification for independence. The ENA was banned in France several times 
for its emancipatory message, but kept reappearing under different names, such as la 
Glorieuse Etoile Nord Africaine, and the well-known Parti du Peuple Algerien (PPA) 
well into the 1930s. In fact, it was only with the outset of World War II that the 
momentum of such movements was momentarily abated. 
In Algeria itself, native public opinion became severely divided on the subject of 
independence by the 1930s. One well-documented debate, which divided Algerian 
public opinion on the subject of the 'Algerian nation', illustrates this phenomenon 
clearly. In a famous article in Entente in 1.936, Ferhat Abbas, then one the leading 
figures of assimilation through equal rights, announced: "there is no Algerian 
fatherland". Such a comment would have been typical of a number of young 
intellectual Algerians who still hoped for full inclusion into the French Republican 
ideal, and who clearly differentiated between two Frances - colonial France and its 
oppressive government on the one hand, and Republican France, itself partially 
imagined through the lens of a French education emphasising the human rights 
ideals brought forward by the French Revolution26. As a response to Ferhat Abbas' 
rejection of the national ideal, his main political opponent, Abdelhamid Ben Badis, 
himself inspired by the religious Reform movement, replied in al-Shihab that the 
Algerian nation "is not France, cannot be France and does not wish to be France"27 . 
The Ulemas Reform movement had been critical in articulating the idea of an 
Algerian identity that married the scientific gains of French modernity with 
traditional Islamic values and social practices. As such, it functioned as a bridge 
between religious ideas of belonging and the development of nationalist ideas in 
Algeria. While the immigre ENA and its successor the PPA had provided the 
nationalist rhetoric and impetus for the birth of an independence movement, the 
Reform movement at home provided the identity basis on which this movement 
could be built. In this vein, it also is worth noting that the future slogan of the FLN 
was derived almost word for word from Ahmad Tawfiq al-Madani's classic quote, 
"Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my fatherland". It can thus be 
seen that, from early on, the idea of an Islamic culture was used as an alternative base 
for political identity and thus the platform upon which independence could be 
secured, a theme that will be explored in more detail later on. 
27 For original quotes, see Claude Collot and Jean Robert Henry. Le Mouvement National 
Algerien, p. 67. 
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The individual role of each movement to the development of the idea of an Algerian 
nation is thus notable, but so are such early divisions among militants. The ENA 
activists heavily borrowed from the French Communist party in terms of its 
organisational structure and it developed a language for emancipation akin to other 
nascent forms of nationalism of the time. The Reformists were almost exclusively 
based on Algerian soil, they operated from various orders primarily located in the 
countryside and functioned as the repositories of cultural and moral opposition to 
French colonialism. The evolues, who were advocating assimilation, on the other 
hand, were mostly based in large cities and predominantly in Kabilya, and 
represented a small lumpen-bougeoisie which had only been partially assimilated and 
who longed for equal rights under French law. Such widely divergent aims, 
backgrounds and viewpoints meant that these early efforts failed to lead to any large- 
scale or co-ordinated Algerian response to the question of colonialism. That being 
said, such nascent forms of political protest should not be dismissed as pointless on 
such grounds: on the contrary, it is through this variety in views and societal projects 
that the idea of an Algerian nation progressively took shape, and it is through the 
different fates these three movements faced that the future of Algeria was decided. 
The evolues placed their faith in the liberal and reformist ideas of the 1936 Front 
Populaire government in France and the reforms which they had been invited to 
contribute to by Prime Minister Leon Blum and his Minister of State Maurice 
Violette. Such faith proved misplaced when under tremendous pressure from 
conservative and colon political figures in the metropole, the severely toned down 
and timid Blum-Violette laws failed to pass the parliamentary test in France (these 
had been designed to widen French citizenship to a token number of Algerians 
without prior renunciation of their Muslim status, normally a requirement for the 
accession to citizenship). This event had a tremendous effect on Algerian public 
opinion in Algeria and in metropolitan France; it ended the illusion that assimilation 
into Republican France on equal terms would ever occur and therefore pushed an 
ever greater number of activists into the camp of the independentists. Ferhat Abbas 
moved from assimilation to emancipation but retained his belief that the most 
effective way of achieving such a result would be through the framework of French 
citizenship. He created another movement, the Union Populaire Algerienne in July 
1.938, with only limited success. Understandably, the ranks of nationalists grew 
rapidly at this time, with new division lines being drawn with activists based in 
France and those based on Algerian soil. But evidence of such divisions and 
ultimately of the strength of the nationalist movement despite them would only 
surface partially in 1945 and fully in 1954. World War II helped putting such pressing 
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questions aside, as many Algerians joined the war effort, out of solidarity, and out of 
necessity28. 
From this short overview, we can see that the idea of independence has strong roots 
in the Algerian political psyche - and deservedly so. Far from being an overnight 
phenomenon, the idea of what an independent political identity would resemble 
occupied hearts and minds throughout the colonial period, and especially in the 20th 
Century. Notwithstanding this great vibrancy in debate however, the portrayal of the 
independentist struggle and its meaning was to be systematically distorted and re- 
appropriated by the war's main victor, the FLN29. The most vibrant political 
movement of the post-war era was not in fact the independentist PPA (the FLN's 
precursor), but Ferhat Abbas' various political movements: first, Les Amis du 
Manifeste de la Liberte (AML) enjoyed great success with the general Algerian 
population and many members of the PPA defected to join it, but it was dissolved in 
the aftermath of the May 1945 uprising in Setif and the Northern Constantinois and 
the massacres of Algerian natives which occurred in response. In the context of 
renewed antagonism between the two populations, Abbas pressed on with a new 
party, L'Union Democratique du Manifeste Algerien (UDMA) which went on to win a 
majority of seats in the native section of the segregated Constituent Assembly. Alas, 
the use of official channels for promoting independence was also unsuccessful as 
Abbas' plans to turn Algeria into a republic failed. Instead, a fairer but still uneven 
system of representation through the National Assembly was put into place. It is at 
this point of unique opportunity, and with the UDMA in .a position of weakness, that 
the PPA decided to re-enter the political arena as a contestant after various boycotts. 
Its new party, Le Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertes Democratiques (MTLD) 
went to win a majority of Muslim seats in the Assembly, despite its staunch 
independentist rhetoric. The MTLD became the most prominent independentist force 
from that point onwards, but it should be pointed out that internal divisions, 
especially with regards to the status of Kabylia deepened over the next few years. In- 
addition, the MTLD political wing fostered the creation of a parallel military 
organisation the Organisation Secrete (OS) to carry out direct political action, often 
of a violent type, ending with intense police crackdown in March 1950. In this 
context, three factions appeared: the centralists (named after their allegiance to the 
Central Committee), the Messalists (named after their leader Messali Hadj) and a 
28 It is often forgotten that North Africa was one of the terrains on which WWII was fought 
with disastrous human and financial consequences. The French defeat in 1940 lead to 
isolation and financial hardship; but more importantly the Vichy government and its pro- 
Hitler stance galvanised the colon population to undermine Jewish rights on Algerian soil and 
reinforced their powerful position with regard to metropolitan France. 
29 See the discussion on the importance of unity as a symbol for more detail. 
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third group, Le Comite Revolutionnaire dUnite et dAction (CRUA) dedicated to 
reconciling the other two. Ironically, it is this third faction which would take action 
on November ist, 1954 and spark the beginning of the independence war. Six internal 
members of the organisation and three former OS operatives in exile took leadership 
of the armed struggle, and on October 31st, the CRUA officially announced the 
creation of a new revolutionary movement, Le Front de La Liberation Nationale, or 
FLN. 
The liberational rhetoric of the FLN, which became the dominant independentist 
force of the war, came to reflect the concerns of previous nationalist movements in 
several ways. The greatest strength of the FLN during and after the independence war 
was its uncompromising commitment to expel the French using whatever political 
and military means necessary. While this represented a pragmatically sensible 
platform to adopt for a nascent political force, it was also the reflection of the need to 
expel the French in more ways than physical removal suggests - it meant cultural, 
social and emotional cleansing as well. The political discourse of the FLN was thus 
culturally and politically emancipatory in character. Its chief symbolic motif was the 
return to pre-colonial political and cultural values through independence, a return to 
Islamic mores and cultural practices (identified as an ideological alternative to 
French culture and political values), and cultural and linguistic Arabisation30. This 
return to a partially imagined past was meant to reflect a more authentic mode of 
being - in opposition to the super-imposed values of the coloniser. Thus, as far as 
political identity is concerned, the independence movement defined itself by 
comparison - and in opposition - to the dominant political discourse. It drew from a 
cultural and symbolic set of motifs which was indigenous to re-create an identity 
judged lost, to foster the unity needed for success . against the French, . and . to provide 
the foundations for a viable, coherent Algerian nation-state. To achieve this, the FLN 
reiterated its predecessors' identity claims and added a revolutionary twist to their 
poignancy in the context of growing tensions with the French after the Second World 
War and the beginning of hostilities in October 1954. The 1956 Soummam 
declaration made the political platform of the FLN very clear: "The historic mission of 
the Algerian Revolution is to destroy the odious and decadent colonial regime which 
30 It is worth noting that the FLN was not the first emancipatory political force to use such 
motifs: the Federation des Elus indigenes, the Islamic Reform Movement, L'Etoile Nord 
Africaine, and the Algerian Communist Movement were all ideologically powerful movements 
of the pre-World War Two period which the FLN was ideologically and symbolically indebted 
to. For a summary of the activites of such movements in English, see John Ruedy. 1992. 
Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of A Nation. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. Chapter Five. 
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stands to prevent progress and peace"31 . As two of its main conditions for a cease-fire, 
the FLN leadership stated the following: 
1. the recognition of an indivisible Algerian nation. This clause aims 
to overcome the 'French Algeria' colonial fiction. 
2. the recognition of the independence of Algeria and its sovereignty 
over all aspects of its affairs, including national defence and 
diplomacy32 . 
Needless to say, the French authorities were not willing to accede to such demands 
and only gave up on the idea of French Algeria after almost eight years of conflict. 33 
Despite this coherent and ultimately successful response to the problem of 
nationhood, the FLN always played down the important role which political forces 
other than itself had played in bringing about the independence of Algeria, and the 
divisions which continued to plague the independentist movement during the war 
and in the months that followed it. Even before the insurrection had begun, the 
Messalist faction of the MTLD has created an alternative to the FLN, Le Mouvement 
National Algerien (MNA) which, despite the growing popularity of the FLN, 
continued to resist assimilation. Internal changes and resulting tensions also came to 
fore at the Soummam conference: the wave of continuing violence pushed moderate 
UDMA members towards a pro-FLN stance and they joined the movement, so did 
former centralists, thus creating a coalition of forces around the CRUA-FLN. By 
contrast, the external (exiled) leadership of the CRUA became increasingly isolated 
from the centre and was excluded from the formation of the first executive of the FLN 
central committee, Le Conseil National de La Revolution Algerienne (CNRA), thus 
creating a schism among the original membership of the FLN. Another example of 
such tension was the assassination of Ramdane Abane, one of the leaders of the 
Battle of Algiers, by FLN leadership in obscure circumstances in December 1957. As 
the power balance between the original CRUA members and a new class of army 
officers of the ALN (the army wing the FLN known as l Armee de Liberation 
Nationale) shifted, a progressive purge of the original membership of the movement 
occurred. With the original external members (Ahmed Ben Bella, Mohamed Khider 
and Hocine Ait Ahmed) intercepted and jailed, and many of the original internal 
31 Soumman Declaration, EI Moudjahid, special edition no 4.1956. El-Moudjahid remained 
the official journal of the FLN after the independence war and one of the most comprehensive 
sources of political discourse. 
32 El-Moudjahid, special edition no 4.1956. Emphasis Added. 
33 On the war of independence, see Alistair Horne. 1977. A Savage War of Peace : Algeria 
1954-1962. (Second Edition). London: Macmillan. and Bernard Droz and Evelyne Lever. 1991. 
Histoire de la Guerre d Algerie. (second ed. ) Paris: Seuil (Points Histoire). 
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leadership killed in combat, the prominence of officers based externally in Tunisia 
and Morocco, such as Houari Boumediene, increased. Yet, despite these divisions, the 
FLN succeeded in creating broad enough a consensus to set up a second, more 
comprehensive executive in the fall the 1958. This new organisation, named le 
Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne (GPRA) was designed to act 
as a political interlocutor to the French executive headed at that time by General De 
Gaulle. Designed to be inclusive of previously marginalised FLN leaders, it succeeded 
in portraying the FLN as a united front, and as the only independentist force worth 
negotiating with. The FLN was successful in achieving such a recognition in the end, 
but divisions among internal and external leaders, among liberals, Marxists and 
Islamists, and between the leadership of different regions (or wilayas) only became 
more entrenched. At the heart of such division were class divisions, ethnic divisions 
(with the Kabyle question), and issues of personal differences. But most important 
perhaps was the fact that power-sharing became an increasingly significant issue 
when the outcome of the war started to tilt in the favour of the independence 
movement. As John Ruedy argues: 
By the early lg6os, thousands of Algerians who had played 
leadership roles of many different kinds in the revolution could lay 
claim to a share of political power, but no mechanism had been 
created to adjudicate and apportion such claims. If the years 1954- 
56 witnessed a progressive coming together of nationalist 
leadership, the years 1957-62 witnessed an ever greater 
segmentation of the elites. This was in contrast to the society as a 
whole, which through the shared experiences of the war and 
repression, had developed the clear sense of identity referred to 
earlier... 34 
From this overview, we can see that the formation of political identity in Algeria 
cannot be divorced from the history of the development of the Algerian nationalist 
movements and the war of independence, and that their relevance to our discussion 
is crucial but far from straightforward. 
6.4. From Colonial Legacy to Political Identity in the Postcolonial Era 
The postcolonial history of Algeria35 can be best characterised through the large 
degree of political stability it enjoyed until the late i98os. Upon independence in 
1962, the consolidation of the state under the FLN leadership meant internal power 
34 John Ruedy. 1992. Modern Algeria p. 181. 
35 For a concise account of post-independence history, Benjamin Stora. 1994. Histoire de 
l'Algerie depuis l'Independence. Paris: Reperes La Decouverte. 
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struggle within the movement and with other nascent political groups, but within a 
few months the post-colonial state became solidified under the leadership of Ahmed 
Ben Bella under single party rule. In time, economic pressures, coupled with Ben 
Bella's mismanagement of the relationship between the political establishment and 
the powerful military, lead to a (relatively) bloodless coup d'etat in 1965 and the 
accession of colonel Houari Boumediene to power, a rule which lasted until his death 
in 1978. Boumediene's rule was, due to its length and success in the early years, 
critical to the patterns of institutionalisation of the Algerian state, including the 
solidification of existing economic patterns through the development of a socialist 
economic policy, the involvement of the military at the heart of the decision-making 
process, and the establishment of laws and constitutional arrangements supporting 
single party rule. In turn, the power transition after Boumediene's death was smooth, 
but in the context of growing economic problems typical of the Third World in the 
198os, the legitimacy of the state became increasingly challenged by wide segments of 
the population. These culminated in the 1988 food riots which prompted rapid 
democratisation and emergency economic changes, and allowed, for the first time 
since independence, political parties outside the FLN to be formed and for the press 
to operate outside state control. This evolution of the political scene, which is not 
untypical of the postcolonial world, can be seen to explain much of the setting and 
factors underpinning the continuing crisis of the Algerian state. But before we launch 
into our analysis of the role of identity in explaining the crisis, it is perhaps necessary 
to look at the issue of political discourse, and its historical evolution in the Algerian 
setting, more closely. 
Here, the colonial era in general, and the decolonisation period in particular are 
critical in identifying the'founding myths' which helped create and solidify the idea of 
a postcolonial nation-state. The thread linking nationalist and postcolonial identity 
themes is already apparent: unity in struggle, Islam as the basis for a common 
identity, left-wing politics would all find their place in the postcolonial lifeworld. Such 
'founding myths', which the independence war helped creating, constitute the 
framework for understanding politics in Algeria, and provide a set of criteria for 
judging which political behaviour is acceptable, and which one is not, according to 
how closely it matches the standards set up by this mythology. In that sense, 
assessing political behaviour is intrinsically an identity issue since it is based on a 
notion of belonging to a specific political pedigree. In turn, while an exhaustive list of 
such 'myths' is difficult to draw, a number of key themes are worth developing on36 
36 For a discussion of the postcolonial tenets of political culture - with special reference to the 
underpinning influence of the army in political affairs, see I. William Zartman. 1973. "The 
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Independence is an obvious and main theme: it reflected the willingness to overcome 
the legacy of French colonialism in political, cultural and socio-economic ways. It 
positioned itself in systematic opposition to what was identified as French values, and 
aimed at reversing the effects of colonialism by returning to a pre-colonial 'Golden 
Age'. Upon independence, such themes were ingrained in the constitution and were 
explicitly used by the regime to couch its legitimacy: independence was here 
underpinned by a triple alliance of socialism, Arabisation and a focus on Islam, all 
seen as sites of fracture with the colonial ideal. Such a focus is reflected by the 1963 
Constitution which asserts that the Algerian state is socialist with Arabic as its official 
language and Islam as its official religion. Socialism was partially inspired by the 
(largely unacknowledged) influence of early nationalist movements, and especially 
the Etoile Nord Africaine. But it was also seen to play a key role in creating an 
alternative to a continued form of economic dependence on the former coloniser (a 
theme which is consistent with various Third World nationalist themes of the time). 
Islam, which will be dealt with in more detail later, provided a comprehensive, 
intelligible, viable, and most importantly authentic cultural, social and political 
alternative to the French model. Arabisation, on the other hand, helped solidify the 
myth of a ethnically and culturally homogeneous Algerian nation and to overcome, in 
very practical ways, the legacies of French culture. More subtle is the Constitution's 
articulation of the role of the nascent Algerian state in those terms. Here, the 
Constitution highlights both the importance of socialism as a way to create and 
guarantee economic self-sufficiency for Algeria, and an official pledge by the state to 
fight imperialism at home and abroad37. 
In practice, such an ideal of independence was translated into a tripartite policy of 
differentiation from previous cultural and political practices judged tainted by their 
association with French culture. The linchpin of this policy was the progressive and 
comprehensive Arabisation of the education system which was ultimately to be 
reflected in hiring practices, particularly in the public sector. This was to be 
accompanied by an official attempt to set up a `distance' between the Algerian nation 
and the French nation, ideologically, in diplomatic terms, and in terms of economic 
links. The application of such policies was however not as clear-cut as the official 
state rhetoric of the Ben Bella and Boumediene administrations seem to suggest. The 
Algerian Army in Politics" in I. William Zartman (ed. ) Man, State and Society in the 
Contemporary Maghrib. extracts from pp. 211-224. 
37 For an overview of the main themes raised by the 1963 Constitution, and its context, see 
John Ruedy. 1992. Modern Algeria, P. 200-201. It is no coincidence that socialism and the 
central powers of the state under the aegis of the FLN are articulated in terms of 
independence. The theme of socialism is developed on in more depth later on. 
227 
policy of Arabisation was progressive and selective and it tended to focus on rural and 
working class pupils while the elite and some middle class children attended French- 
speaking or bilingual schools, thus creating a dual education track with - widely 
different outcomes. Within one generation, it became clear that French-educated 
children were at a comparative advantage when accessing tertiary education and, 
ultimately, the job market. Such differences only worked to reinforce (and came to 
symbolise) class divisions within the Algerian polity. To be part of a political and 
economic elite was associated with being unduly influenced by the French. In short, 
being associated with the French culturally became a vehicle for criticism, a way of 
inscribing class divisions within a discourse of authenticity. Such associations found 
resonance in the ambiguous position of the state towards France in diplomatic terms. 
Official policy meant that the full normalisation of diplomatic relations took two 
decades to achieve, but unofficial and informal relations between the Algerian 
political elite and the French state remained strong due to common economic 
interests. Such informal relationships among politicians and powerful industrialists 
blossomed during the first few years of the post-independence era, chiefly through 
the exploitation of Algerian natural resources and import of French manufactured 
products onto the Algerian market. In that sense, the importance of independence 
symbolically was offset by the need for economic development, especially for the 
economic elite which had vested interests in a continued relationship to the former 
colonial power. Yet this relationship became increasingly unstable as the balance of 
power between the trading partners changed. The Evian accords38 marking 
independence had guaranteed French economic interests in a variety of sectors for a 
minimum of six years, but following this period, and after the coup which deposed 
President Ben Bella (himself a proponent of such a continued economic link), the 
Boumediene administration began to alienate its French partners through a wave of 
nationalisation of existing industry and the setting up of a set of economic 5 year 
plans (based on the Soviet model)39. Thus, the development of socialism as the 
linchpin of political ideology and economic policy in the post-colonial era is 
38 The Evian accords of 18 March 1962 marked the official end of the war of independence. In 
addition to formal political independence, the French made key economic concessions to the 
nascent state: most importantly, it gave up its claim on Southern parts of Algeria where oil 
reserves had recently come under exploitation. But the French managed to secure a series a 
contracts offering them monopoly over the some markets and industries, including oil, for a 
period of at least six years. 
39 The French resorted to punitive measures by scraping Algeria's preferential import 
treatment regarding the wine industry and the vegetables trade leading to the progressive 
disappearance of viticulture in its former colony. Yet, despite this measure, the Boumediene 
government continued with its programme, maintained trading relationships with France and 
continued to provide labour for France, while diversifying its trading base with other 
European states and the United States. In fact, the Boumediene administration's own 
negligence of the agricultural sector in its economic plans, led to a stagnation and eventually 
to the slowing down of the whole primary sector with serious consequences. 
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intrinsically intertwined with the importance of being independent, as opposed to 
just gaining formal independence. In this sense, the political development of 
ideology and economic policy can be linked back to this identity requirement in a 
fundamental way. 
Officially though, the theme of national independence was inscribed within the larger 
framework of developmental political discourse prevalent at the time and thus put 
Algeria on the map of the Third World. Symbolically, independence was coupled with 
the acknowledgement that the International Order would have some bearing on the 
future development of Algeria: hence belonging to the non-aligned movement in the 
early years reflected Algeria's reluctance to be influenced by outside players due to its 
traumatic colonial past. Additionally, non-alignment allowed Algeria to deal with 
both superpowers in a position of strength during the Cold War. In effect, Algeria's 
non-aligned status was somewhat compromised by its informal links with the Soviet 
Union, who provided Algeria with most of its weapon capabilities, but Algeria refused 
to let the Soviet Union develop military bases in its territory and retained its political 
and economic independence from the Soviet bloc. In fact, Algeria sought allegiances 
of a different kind, which once again, reflects both its colonial past and the 
aspirations delineated by the political and cultural project of the nascent nation state. 
Algerian leaders felt a natural association with the developing world (as the post- 
colonial world and the Third World often overlapped), and it rapidly became a 
powerful Third World player known for its commitment to the New International 
Economic Order designed to redefine the Third World's relationship to more 
powerful nations and negotiate a better deal as a result. While diplomatically Algeria 
became quickly known as a neutral power useful in mediating disputes among states, 
its commitment to the issues faced by the Arab World grew quickly. For instance, 
Algeria was one of the most vocal supporters of the Palestinian cause. There is a 
number of factors underpinning Algeria's growing association with the Arab World: 
cultural commonalties, especially given the pro-Arab stance of the regime at the 
expense of the Berber minority, is an obvious instance. In the context of the growth of 
Arab nationalism region-wide, which echoed Algeria's own independence project, the 
desire to belong to a regional entity while retaining one's independence found natural 
locus in the Arab World. With many shared cultural and religious values, and with 
common economic interests and dilemmas (especially in relation to the exploitation 
of oil), the largest Maghribi nation state found a reliable set of allies in the Fertile 
Crescent. It is worth pointing out that such a framework of belonging came as a viable 
and culturally consistent alternative to the French framework of assimilation which 
had been seen as structurally violent and unequal. A freely chosen, equal relationship 
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to the Arab World can thus be seen to symbolise Algeria's accession to a normal 
status in the international community. Such a stance also proved helpful in masking 
the regional divisions and tensions Algeria faced in the Maghrib. Initial territorial 
disputes with Tunisia and Morocco were eventually solved, but Algeria's involvement 
in the Western Sahara dispute in opposition to Morocco created a gulf in interests 
which still affects Maghribi relations today. 
As a whole, we can see that the task of building an independent and strong Algeria in 
the postcolonial era was indubitably an arduous and multi-faceted task, involving the 
development of a discourse of political independence based on a new articulation of 
identity, accompanied by the development of policies at home and abroad which 
could underpin such a project. Despite tensions and disputes among the political elite 
(and eventually Ben Bella's dismissal), the Algerian regime was successful in 
understanding that such a move required a vast and carefully planned array of 
changes touching upon the political, social, cultural and economic spheres of life. In 
addition, it understood clearly that it was through the articulation of a sense of 
identity and belonging that political allegiances could be created and maintained and 
political legitimacy ultimately justified. However, there were inherent tensions in how 
this was achieved in practice: indeed, symbolic expectations and political realities are 
not always easy to reconcile. 
The return to Islam is another central theme in Algerian identity discourse that can 
be traced back to the foundation of the state. Religiously and culturally, Islam was the 
strongest factor fostering national and communal unity. It provided an already- 
existing, and historically validated, alternative to what was perceived as the French 
way of life - including language, culture, education, and societal structure. In other 
words, it constituted the foundation for an alternative, post-colonial identity. Islam 
was also a fundamental rallying call under which the FLN gathered public support for 
the revolution - and thus is linked to the legitimate overthrow of illegitimate rule4o 
This historical claim helped frame Islam as a factor in the success of the 
independence struggle, and thus a necessary constituent to political legitimacy and 
success of post-colonial regimes. There is little new in this appropriation of religious 
motifs and their application to the political realm in the Algerian setting however. For 
instance, the mythical figure of Abd Al-Qadir dominated the political imagination of 
the resistance to French invasion until 1847 and continues to exercise a strong 
symbolic influence on Algerian politics. The idea of the holy warrior fighting for a 
jihad precedes the era of Al-Qadir of course, but the example of resistance to French 
40 Ahmed Rouadja. lggo. Les Freres et la Mosquee. Paris: Karthala. p. 6. 
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invasion in the name of Islam was a symbolic referent of great political value for the 
FLN, partially because it stood as testimony to the fact that there had been a strong 
resistance to the French upon invasion, and partially because it represented a vital 
link between religion and its political role as a (anti-colonial) tool of emancipation. As 
mentioned above, Islam was officially enshrined as religion of the state through the 
1963 Constitution, a move which subsequent legislative amendments were not to 
question41. Islam was also constructed as a political tool which, to successfully 
underpin the regime in place, was to be carefully controlled and nurtured to work as a 
currency for legitimacy. As a result, the activities and settings of mosques came under 
the control of the state and its ministry of religious affairs42. With the creation this 
'official' Islam, and with the gradual incorporation of various associations and labour 
organisations into the FLN party machine, the state hoped to gain control over all 
avenues for political expression and thus of potential challenge to its power in 
ideological terms. The added benefit of such a policy in terms of discursive coherence, 
was that such a centralisation of cultural expression, in the name of the party and that 
of Islam, helped perpetuate the illusion of societal homogeneity under one body of 
command. 
Unity was thus a crucial component to the post-colonial understanding of the nation - 
with all that this implies for consideration of individual and community identity43 
One of the great themes underpinning the birth of the Algerian nation, unity was 
understood as unity of the people, under Islam and against the French. In the early 
independence years, this emphasis helped link Islam with the political and economic 
espousal of socialism -a populist, communitarian ideology par excellence. During the 
war, the structural organisation of the FLN articulated identity within the struggle in 
a collective, as opposed to individual, manner, a theme which is indicative of the 
subsequent FLN position towards identity: 
... the Algerian revolution was, 
from the beginning, a movement of 
collectivity: of collective leadership, of collective suffering, and 
collective anonymity44 
41 The 1976 Charter, set up by the Boumediene government with an unprecedented degree of 
popular consultation, somewhat deviated from the staunch socialism of the Ben Bella era. But 
the commitment to Islam (interpreted both as a religion and as a cultural system designed to 
tie Algerian identity to a more general Arab identity) remained constant throughout. 
42 For a study of the importance of mosques as a political space since independence, and 
especially in the context of the of rise of political Islam, see Ahmed Rouadja. 199o. Les Freres 
et la Mosquee. 
43 For a developed argument on the Unity theme, see Lise Garon. 1993. L'Obsession Unitaire 
et la Nation Trompee: La Fin de 1 Algerie Socialiste. Sainte-Foye (Canada): Presses 
Universitaires Laval. Chapter 6. 
44 Alistair Horne. 1977. A Savage War of Peace p. 15. 
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Unity in political and societal terms had underpinned the victory against the French 
in direct ways: colonial oppression was interpreted as the failure of Algerians to unite 
against the oppressor. The divisions within the FLN during and directly after the 
independence war were in turn severely underplayed in the political discourse and 
historical testimony produced at the time to promote this ideal45. Unity in struggle 
was glorified not only as a factor in the success of the independence war, but it was 
also subsequently used as a means to justify single party rule under the banner of the 
dominant FLN46. The cultural need for unity justified lack of democratisation after 
independence under the banner of a populist social contract (where pluralism was 
sacrificed to more pressing developmental needs), eliminating alternative political 
forces and projects existing at the time, and perhaps even more importantly, 
underplaying existing social, cultural and ethnic differences. The 'need' for Algerian 
unity successfully masked the emergence of post-colonial political and economic 
elites and eclipsed the question of the place of Berber identity within the framework 
of the postcolonial state, to name but two examples47. Additionally, such an emphasis 
was used to camouflage the distinctive Marxist underpinnings of the FLN 
revolutionary rhetoric and tactics - and to help frame the subsequent socialist 
doctrinal slant of the FLN in power within the framework of an Algerian identity. 
Unity, equality, strong and collective leadership not only figured prominently into the 
discourse of the Boumediene era, but also continue to hold a privileged place in 
political discourse, functioning as a veritable rallying call in support of the 
government in times of legitimacy crisis. As Benjamin Stora points out, such reliance 
on a monolithic understanding of Algerian identity allowed the regime a large degree 
of ideological flexibility, as well as a privileged position as the sole mediator of 
societal conflicts and differences4 -. That being said, this official position in no way 
reflected the reality of the power relations that actually developed in the post-colonial 
period. Ruedy talks of the creation of a political myth where: 
45 See Monique Gadant. 1988. Islam et Nationalisme en Algerie. Paris: L' Harmattan. pp. 9- 
10. 
46 Benjamin Stora. 1991. La Gangrene et L'Oubli: La Memoire de La Guerre D'Algerie. Paris: 
La Decouverte. Chapter 11. 
47 The French historian Benjamin Stora summarises this process well when he highlights how 
the post-colonial obsession of the regime with the commemoration of the war helped mask 
the cleavages that had characterised the development of the nationalist movement before the 
war, and the often violent clashes among FLN forces and between the FLN and its main rival 
nationalist force, the MNA. See Stora. 1993. Histoire de la Guerre d Algerie. Paris: La 
Decouverte. P. 4. For an overview of such nationalist dashes, see chapter 4. 
48 See Benjamin Stora. 1994. Histoire de IAlgerie depuis ('Independence. P. 4. Stora writes: 
"L"unanimisme nationaliste reste le support d'une ideologie fluctuante. 11 devient une sorte de 
remede aux vertiges de definitions identitaires, tente de gommer les differences linguistiques 
et regionales, se fait "reconciliation", negation des affrontements sociaux, apparent correctifs 
des maux de la modernite". 
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... the party, separate and 
distinct from government, was the 
guarantor of the nation's ideological purity and the articulator of its 
major policies. According to the myth, it was an avant-garde 
revolutionary elite expressing the will of the working masses, and as 
such, it bore responsibility for policing the bourgeois infected state 
bureaucracy, one of the more unfortunate legacies of colonialism. 
Yet, by 1964, the FLN had itself become a vehicle for upward 
mobility for Algerians anxious to improve their material and 
community standing49 
Thus, far from being a factor in harmonising community interests, the party quickly 
grew as a way to canalise and thus control class and other societal divisions. 
In terms of discursive coherence, unity as a theme had another key purpose: that of 
issue linkage between the traditional aspect of political identity (Islam), its key 
political feature (independence) and the political programme which was set to 
underpin it in practice: the development of a populist form of socialism adapted to 
recently de-colonised societies. The unity of the ummah could be equated to the idea 
of unity against the colonial oppressor, and unity against the colonial oppressor lead, 
after victory, to the idea of a united people in socialist terms. Socialism was an official 
feature of the political discourse of the FLN after independence and remained the 
linchpin to political, social and economic policy until Boumediene's death in 1978. 
Both Ben Bella and his successor made socialism one the key components of their 
respective Charters: in fact, Ben Bella went as far as stating, in a tour de force of 
ideological reshuffling: "Islam is a socialist religion, it is a religion of equity". The 
political shrewdness of this ideological statement is worth pausing on, for it goes to 
the heart of how what was seemingly a foreign ideological construct could be adopted 
in a state so reluctant to accept outside influence. Socialism was equated with Islam 
to make it more politically acceptable: socialism was posited as a culturally valid and 
thus legitimate construct. Additionally, making Islam 'like' socialism erased the 
foreign origins of this ideological construct, thus reinforcing its legitimacy in terms of 
authenticity. This was a sensitive issue for a nascent political identity as any 
connection to ideological themes reminiscent of colonial era were by definition 
excluded50. As a result, it is easy to understand why "Throughout the first thirteen 
49 See John Ruedy. 1992. Modern Algeria. P. 205. 
50 The references to the Soviet Union in this regard could have been seen to undermine the 
independent status of Algeria, as the status of the states of the Soviet bloc illustrated. More 
subtle was the possible connection to the development of early nationalist movement and the 
ENA's connection to the French communist party in particular. The connection with a 
nationalist era that had been conveniently glossed over upon independence was one not to be 
cultivated. 
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years of independence, the leadership worked assiduously to demonstrate the 
compatibility of Islam and socialism, even going as far as to claim on occasion that 
Muhammad himself was the founder of socialismi51. Later on, Boumediene's 
National Charter of 1976 posited socialism as an irreversible position" designed to 
further the process of nation-building independence had started. Here, issue-linkage 
was articulated not so much in relation to Islam as it was to the legitimising function 
of history in its most symbolically powerful expression: that of the war of 
independence. In both cases, the process remained one of assimilation of socialism as 
a social, political and economic project into the political imagination of the nation. 
In practical terms, this political stance led to the rapid heavy industrialisation of the 
economic sector and the formation of politicised civil society groups controlled by the 
party53. Despite this apparent stability however, socialism was far from a monolithic 
doctrinal stance of the regime; in fact, its evolution as an ideological guide to political 
and socio-economic affairs is indicative of its varying degrees of appeal for the public, 
and more importantly, for the elite over time. Initially, socialism bore the promise of 
a real distantiation from the colonial model by promising to create the conditions for 
self-sustaining development. The initial success of the Algerian government in 
generating capital (through the development the hydrocarbon industry in particular) 
boosted its standing in the international community (where it became a model for 
development along decentralised socialist lines) and with the Algerian population. 
The growing economic crisis linked to the failure the five-year plans instigated by the 
regime came to a head in the mid-1970s when the first large-scale forms of political 
dissent became noticeable. The year 1972 is one of two key breaking points in our 
understanding of the regime's commitment to socialism. With the creation of socialist 
brigades (dominated by left-wing university student groups) dispatched by the 
regime to encourage an 'agrarian revolution' in the countryside, the regime hoped to 
mobilise the political energies of a new generation. But it is the same regime that 
would allow the growing number of Islamist students in universities to become 
politically active in competition with the left-wing groups from the same epoch. By 
1976, our second key date, the regime had frozen its support for the brigades and 
effectively allowed the Islamist opposition to eradicate the political potential of left- 
wing groups in university settings54. Whether this move came as a result of the 
51 John Ruedy. 1992. Modern Algeria. p224. 
52 In French, "option irreversible". for a summary of the Charter's main points on socialism, 
see Benjamin Stora. 1994. Histoire de IAlgerie depuis 1'Independence. pp. 30-31. 
53 The socialist political ideology which underpinned the Boumediene era came to involve the 
development of large scale industrialisation projects which were designed to guarantee the 
economic development and future economic independence of Algeria. 
54 Ahmed Rouadja. 199o. Les Freres et La Mosquee. pp. 32-36. 
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unpopularity of the 'agrarian revolution', or more as a result of the fear of the regime 
to see its grip on the civil society lessen, is difficult to ascertain fully. One fact remains 
clear though; the regime clearly benefited from manipulating the various emerging 
voices from civil society to promote its political agenda, but in order to preserve its 
legitimacy, it could not disavow its commitment to the socialist ideal without 
embarrassment. Indeed, the regime was still holding on to socialism as its guiding 
principle after it has become obvious that both the 'agrarian revolution' and the 
industrialising plans were in crisis". The example of the brigades therefore helps put 
the ideological commitment of the regime to socialism into perspective. 
The final theme worth alluding to in our overview of the dominant discursive motifs 
of the postcolonial political imagination complements the triptych of Algerianism 
through independence, Islam, and unity through socialism that we have now drawn. 
Arabism is cultural theme which fords resonance both with Algeria's attempt to find a 
new place in the region and its concern with cultural and political homogeneity. Once 
again, despite the existence of a culturally distinct Berber minority56, Arab themes 
were glorified as the foundation (along with Islam) of an Algerian nationalism that 
would fit into regional patterns of pan-Arabism. The need to see the Algerian nation 
as one is a theme we have identified as constitutive to the development of post- 
colonial political identity. Arabism, in turn, solidifies that claim in relation both to the 
external notion of the Other (inclusion in the Arab world as a factor of exclusion of 
the former coloniser's culture) and its internal manifestations (in relation to Berber 
culture and language in particular). The denial of the existence of a particular Berber 
ethnic, cultural and linguistic identity would be complete in the post-colonial era. In 
practical terms, this was concurrent with policies of Arabisation. In terms of political 
discourse, the message was spelled out clearly by various representatives of the;, 
regime. Most famously, the Minister of Culture and Information, Ahmed Taleb- 
Ibrahimi, wrote in 1973 that: 
When reading all that has been written on the Arabs and the 
Berbers in Algeria, on realises that much has been done to divide 
the Algerian people. For instance, to argue that the Algerian 
s5 see footnote 49. It is only after Boumediene's death that the regime gradually disengaged 
itself from its socialist commitments. The Chadli Benjedid regime gradually pushed Algeria 
toward economic liberalisation, privatisation and a more energetic search for solutions to the 
growing problem of international debt. 
56 On ethnic and cultural diversity in Algeria, see J. P. Durand and H. Tengour. 1982. L'Algerie 
et ses Populations. Brussels: Editions Complexe. 
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population is composed of both Arabs and Berbers is historically 
false57. 
Such a standpoint was put into question most prominently in 1980 with what has 
now been termed the 'Berber Spring'. Upon the interdiction of a conference on Berber 
language in the university of Tizi-Ouzou, a wave of political protest erupted on 
university grounds, leading to a general strike in Kabylia. The response of the regime 
in this regard was as swift as it was repressive, but the 'Berber question' was never 
overcome in the post-colonial years. It thus came as little surprise to most observers 
when upon the democratisation of the political system in 1989, the Berber 
community would have its own party, the RCD (Rassemblement pour la Culture et 
La Democracie). 
Overall, we have seen that a number of key themes were developed by the Algerian 
regime since the end of the colonial era as the foundation of the idea of a nation, and 
of national identity, which would overcome the legacy of colonialism and create (or 
re-create) identity links to cultural and religious forms seen as more authentic. But 
we have also seen the contradictions ingrained in the constructions of such themes 
and their inclusion in the political language of the state in practice and in relation to 
the real divisions characterising Algerian society. Despite such ambiguities however, 
political identity was one of the driving factors underpinning the strength and 
versatility of the postcolonial state: in looking for a postcolonial national identity, the 
FLN leadership emphasised those themes which were both culturally relevant and 
politically useful. This process was creative in nature and involved the encoding of 
identity motifs in political discourse, a dimension of identity discourse we now turn 
to. 
6.5. Encoding Identity into Political Discourse 
Collective identity formation is a delicate process and requires 
continual investments58. 
As Jean-Claude Vatin and Jean Leca have pointed out, the legitimacy of the Algerian 
regime in the post-independence era was never linked to a democratic conception of 
political representation. Its legitimacy was based on its historical link to the 
57 Ahmed Taleb-Ibrahimi. 1973. De la Decolonisation ä la Revolution Naturelle. Algiers: 
SNED. Own Translation. Taleb-Ibrahimi instead argues that Arab-Berber mix was issued 
from a common love of the land see p. 225 
58 Alberto Melucci. 1989. Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in 
Contemporary Society. London: Hutchinson Radius. p. 34. 
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independence warS9. I would add that the distinctly populist position of the regime 
(through the use of the themes of socialism and unity) created the practical 
underpinnings for such a lack in popular participation. The above discussion has 
shown which themes and symbols were used by the successive Algerian regimes to 
create and sustain political legitimacy and to underpin domestic and foreign policy- 
making. The selection process which mediates these identity themes' access into 
official political discourse is not as direct or as unproblematic as the above list of 
themes suggests however. A distinct process of encoding of general identity themes 
into discourse has always been matched by an effort by the state to shape the political 
culture of the population, a lesson in population control from the French era that was 
duly learnt. This process is highly selective, and it varies in its emphasis according to 
the political context in which it occurs. For instance, the complete eclipse of the role 
of nationalist movements other than the FLN (and in particular the influence of 
Messali Hadj) from the official historical record was a highly political process in 
nature. Bypassing real dissension among nationalists, and the struggle during and 
shortly after the independence war between nationalist factions, the regime 
effectively monopolised the discourse on history to create its political legitimacy and 
exclude others from any claim to it by the same gesture60. Our understanding of 
political encoding should thus posit history as a privileged discursive site where: 
Collective identity involves the achievement, by individual actors or 
by social groups, of a certain coherence, cohesion and 
continuity... The cohesion of collective identity must be sustained 
through time, through a collective memory, through lived and 
shared traditions, through the sense of a common past and heritage. 
It must also be maintained across space, through a complex 
mapping of territories and frontiers, principles of inclusion and 
exclusion that define 'us' against 'themi6 . 
De Certeau shows that history functions as a mechanism underpinning how 
communities imagine themselves - and thus that the representation of history has a 
political value which varies over time, making the production of historical knowledge 
an unstable endeavour62. Such an analysis send us back to Hobsbawm and Ranger's 
conception of the 'invention of tradition' where different societal groups manage their 
access to the control of the institutions which produce identity so as to monopolise 
59 Jean Leca and J. C. Vatin. 1975. LAlgdrie Politique: Institutions etRegime. Paris: FNSP. 
6o See Benjamin Stora. 1991. La Gangrene et L'Oubli. Chapter 8 deals with the diversity of 
nationalist movements, chapter ii with the creation of a discourse of historical selection. 
61 David Morley and Kevin Robins. 1995" Spaces of Identity. p. 72. 
62 M. de Certeau. 1983. "History: Ethics, Science and Fiction" N. Haan, et al. (eds. ) Social 
Science as Moral Inquiry. New York: Columbia University Press. 
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identity claims63. In this sense, tradition is not a fixed set of beliefs but as Wright 
argues, a dynamic set values which are used for political purposes: mobilisation of 
selected aspects of tradition to create political outcomes". From this perspective, 
three main patterns can be seen to be at play: appropriation, re-interpretation and 
silencing" 
Firstly, the use of identity motifs in political discourse involves the appropriation of 
key events of history, and especially the historical period surrounding the 
independence war of 1954-1962. As the epicentre of the national consciousness, the 
symbolically-charged history of Algeria provides a reliable and plentiful source of 
legitimising tools for accessing or retaining political power. Having participated in 
the armed resistance to the French was originally a key element to political 
legitimacy: this can explain, in part, the key role played by members of the military 
after independence, and their popularity with a constituency heavily composed of 
former FLN combatants. Yet, one would expect that, with the coming of age of a 
constituency in the 1970S which could not remember the war of independence, the 
balance would shift toward a wider range of legitimising motifs, such as economic 
success, ideological sophistication, etc. In reality, the regime showed remarkable 
consistency in retaining its strategies for underpinning its political power. Its 
monopoly on the political, cultural and religious spheres of expression through the 
control of the party and official Islam helped prevent, or at least distort, the creation 
of an autonomous civil society, and the creation of vast clientelist networks further 
disabled the potential for political opposition. Overall though, the official discourse 
on political legitimacy remained by and large anchored in the legacy of the war of 
independence". One explanatory hypothesis in this regard could be that the use of 
historical validation is more of about identity than it is about political expediency, 
strictly speaking. Pocock is one author who has explored this theme fully by arguing 
that there is a nexus between state power and the production of an historiography to 
underpin it: "a community writes its own history when it has the autonomous 
political structure needed if it is to command its own present, and typically, the 
63 Eric Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds. ). 1983. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
64 P. Wright. 1985. On Living in a Old Country. London: Verso. 
65 For a good overall account of the processes underpinning the manipulation of history for 
political purposes by the postcolonial state, see Gilles Manceron and Hassan Remaoun. 1993. 
D'Une Rive a l'Autre: La Guerre d Algerie et la Memoire de l'Histoire. Paris: Syros. Chapter 
Two "En Algerie, l'Histoire sous Surveillance". 
66 The legitimising claim of being Islamic, while crucial, lost some of its poignancy once the 
non-Muslim occupier was expelled after the war. To be legitimate, the regime would have to 
be Muslim, but how and, how much, it could be expected to fulfil the political and social 
expectations that came with the affiliation with Islam only became an issue with the growth of 
political Islam in the i97os. 
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history it makes will be the history of that structurei67. This analysis shows a double 
link: no historiography can be produced without sovereignty, but no identity can be 
constructed without historiography either, making the construction of history an 
element of nation-building. Here, in essence, laying a claim to the war of 
independence represents a claim to belong to a certain group, the winning camp, and 
thus by contrast, not being a harki, a term used during the war to denote those who 
Algerians who collaborated with the French army or enlisted in it. Post- 
independence, being harki became associated with the general idea of being a 
collaborator, a traitor, influenced by the French, in a word, foreign. The regime was 
always shrewd in using strategies of exclusion involving the rumour that a particular 
political figure was a harki, or influenced by the French, as the means to discredit 
them politically and personally, with a great degree of success. More widely, the 
appropriation of the key historical moment of the 'revolution' sends back to the 
instant of birth of the nation, painful and cathartic, and thus to all the other themes 
which have been sown together as the founding myths of the nation. In the case of 
Algeria, historical claims are thus both identity claims and cultural claims in terms of 
the motifs outlined above: independence, Arabism, unity and Islam. Not only could 
political legitimacy be derived from the association with Islam the war of 
independence conferred, but being a good Muslim could also be proven/measured by 
one's involvement in the war. 
The regime's discursive strategy does not stop at staking a claim in the historical 
process though. In addition, this process involves the simplification and re- 
interpretation of such selected historical facts to make them more politically useful. 
This involves the simplification of political events to facilitate the transition form 
'fact' to political symbol. Here, historical metaphor is of particular importance as it 
provides more elasticity in interpretation than 'mere historical fact': it is the symbolic 
meaning of historical events rather than the events themselves that are debated and 
appropriated to validate political structures and behaviour. A classic example of such 
simplifying measures concerns the post-colonial depiction of France by the regime 
both in its political discourse and with its tight control over the production of 
historical record. This was achieved in two chief ways in the Boumediene era: first, 
through the plethora of independence celebrations controlled by the regime and used 
as clear opportunities to reinforce existing power structures68; secondly, through the 
tight political control of the work of Algerian historians by the regime (and the 
concomitant rejection of non-conforming versions of history produced outside 
67 J. Pocock. 1991. "Deconstructing Europe" London Review of Books i9 December issue. p. 8. 
68 As mentioned by Stora in his introduction to his short volume on the independence war. see 
Bejamin Stora. 1993. Histoire de la Guerre d'Algdrie. p. 4. 
239 
Algeria)". Eriksen develops on this idea of historical commemoration and delineates 
a particular role for it in the functioning of society. For Eriksen, commemoration 
functions as memory expressed through performance to underline "the cohesion of 
society, its moral values and the legitimacy of authorityi70. This focus on the control 
of history resulted in the polarisation of history into almost caricatural sides, and a 
sense of historical progress which framed the victory of the FLN as complete, 
inevitable and not be shared with anyone. For instance, the condemnation of those 
associated with French culture assumes that all French people are the same, when in 
fact, the Algerian experience of 'the French' is very particular in nature. No attempt in 
this depiction of history is made to elaborate on the idea of a pieds-noirs (colon) 
culture or politics (nor to discuss the differences among pieds-noirs); and no attempt 
at comparing this culture to that of the French metropolis was attempted by the 
regime. A clear dualism between the Algerian and the French is designed to clear 
demarcate between the legitimate and the illegitimate, the brother and the harki. This 
system of validation of political identity allows for key debates in Algerian history to 
be bypassed altogether. These can be seen to include, for instance, the history of the 
harkis in Algeria and massacres after the war, the sheer diversity of the attitudes 
toward the Algerian relationship to French culture, identity and citizenship in the 
early loth Century and the heterogeneity of Algerian identity itself in ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic and class terms. Relationships of clientelism within Algeria and with France 
continued, if informally at times, and despite the exclusionary discourse of French 
influence in all aspects of political and economic life. The selection of what is relevant 
to the discussion of history is intrinsically linked to what can be identified as 
politically valuable to highlight or to hide. 
Thirdly, and as a reflection of the issue of selection, this process involves exclusion - 
or silencing - not only of differences inside the group, but also of outside claims to 
either similar identity motifs or to a voicing of difference. In these terms, identity 
plays a distinct political function since it is an active participant in defining truth, 
meaning, and relevance. Exclusion is of course a powerful political tool for retaining a 
monopoly on power: it has the double advantage of maintaining the myth of perfect 
representation (if the nation is unanimous, one voice to represent it suffices) and 
practically allowing for civil society to be controlled, distorted or plainly forbidden. A 
number of areas of heterogeneity have been highlighted in our discussion already, 
69 See Benjamin Stora. 199i. La Gangrene et L'Oubli. pp. 229ff. Stora shows how as early as 
1966, the regime endeavoured to gain control over the historical process. This is best 
exemplified through the 1974 decision to ban all historical research not cleared by the regime- 
controlled Centre National des Etudes Historiques (CNEH). 
70 T. H. Eriksen. 1995. Small Places, Large Issues: An Introduction to Social and Cultural 
Anthropology. London: Pluto Press. P. 126. 
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with the prominent example of the Berber community. This is not the sole area of 
occultation this system of political representation implies though. It is apparent here 
that the silencing of diverging voices by the regime since independence operated on 
three inter-related levels: on the most basic level, silencing of difference is designed 
to preclude the existence or possibility of difference. The identity need for unity 
reflects the political need for unanimity: thus not acknowledging the potential/actual 
difference of the Berber community, or of women as a social group, allows those in 
power not to have to deal with the consequences such an acknowledgement would 
bring in terms of its legitimacy and its social policy. A second layer of silencing comes 
from the need to hide those 'differences' which serve the regime by keeping it in 
place. The masking of political and economic interests of the regime, the role of 
political elites and relations of clientelism can all be masked through a prism of 
identity where the issue of class is not problematised at all. Finally, the monolithic 
image of political discourse helped mask the emergence of alternative ideological 
constructs and the repression of potential contenders for power since independence. 
By setting up a political game whereby the identity motifs monopolised by the state 
are the only forms of political imagination which can be legitimately appealed to, the 
state effectively silences those opposition groups which want to function outside this 
model. 
In sum, we can see that the production of an identity discourse has had its continued 
uses in the political sphere in the post-colonial era. In addition, identity themes have 
permeated the political consciousness to the extent that they have become the prism 
through which politics is constructed. The question remains as to which dominant 
legitimating motifs have dominated the inclusion of identity into political discourse. 
As a result of this process of encoding, a number of areas of consistency have evolved 
historically in the case of Algeria. These constitute a set of identity referents, or 
categories, to which political claims of legitimacy have systematically referred to since 
independence and can thus be seen as forming the platform upon which political 
competition is played out. The first one of these is the foundational component of 
political discourse, an issue of particular relevance to a post-colonial state. Here, 
political discourse refers back to the symbolic origins of the state, in others words, the 
conditions of its birth and the utopia which it set out to realise. In the case of Algeria, 
such a foundational element is rooted clearly in the transition from colonial rule 
through armed struggle and is thus symbolised by the 'founding myths' of the 
struggle for independence, the importance of the FLN, of specific historical leaders, 
and of sacrifice for the cause of liberation. Adequate association with a foundational 
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theme or symbol confers legitimacy in the present and in the future. Political success 
rests on showing fidelity towards the ideals of the independence movement - but how 
these ideals are interpreted and appropriated by the state and its opposition varies 
according to political needs once again. Obviously, the role of interpretation of 
history is particularly relevant to this dimension of identity discourse: the search for 
legitimation through foundations is a way of laying a claim on history, of justifying 
one's actions by claiming lineage with an idealised past to which no political player 
can justifiably object to. By being the follower of a distinguished tradition, one hopes 
to escape criticism. Correspondingly, one could also argue that beyond the 
manipulation of identity discourse, the postcolonial regimes since Ben Bella never 
fully overcame the "historical conditions under which they came into being", the 
experience of a violent overthrow of the colonial order highlighting and creating a 
tradition of "military primacy, absence of democratic legitimacy, and the violent 
exercise of authority"71. The historical referent of political identity is thus more than 
strictly discursive, it is also lived. 
Secondly, the 'moral' referent of political discourse is the adjudicator through which 
political legitimacy is achieved. Moral legitimacy - understood through the prism of 
Islam by almost all political actors in the Algerian political sphere, albeit in different 
ways - is in turn the second main foundation for political legitimacy. This moral 
referent associates itself not only to the moral conduct of individual leaders 
themselves, but also and more importantly to the 'moral' behaviour of the state 
apparatus. Economic efficiency, the provision of welfare, issues of corruption are all 
legitimate topics of moral assessment. The question of whether the state's institutions 
and its leadership are legitimate 'rulers' can thus be framed in terms of whether they 
are fulfilling their Islamic obligations. In this context, the aim the state is therefore to 
monopolise the religious symbols of legitimacy to proffer upon itself political 
legitimacy, while the opposition must try to disrupt this monopoly by either 
questioning the state's success in living up to its promises, and/or by trying to reclaim 
the moral high-ground for itself by providing an alternative to the current leadership. 
Thirdly, the identity referent of Algerian political discourse can be seen to be 
relational in nature: beyond the silencing of the voices of difference within the state 
(non-Arabs, non-men, non-Muslims, non-FLN), the political identity promoted 
through state rhetoric constructs its 'Others'. Here, we have seen that the symbolic 
colonial legacy is one that has proven useful to the regime in creating its enemies and 
justifying it authenticity in relational terms. The primary Other of the post-colonial 
71 Benjamin Stora. 1994. Histoire de L'Algerie depuis L'Independence. P-4. own translation. 
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regime has remained 'the French' throughout the postcolonial period. Ironically, 
opposition groups have also framed their criticism of the state in relation to is 
real/imagined connection to the French state economically, politically, culturally or 
linguistically. The Islamist labelling of the FLN/regime supporters as Hizb Franca 
(The Party of France) from the mid-198os onwards is noticeable in this regard. It 
would also be naive to think that such identity motifs are posited in relational terms 
for matters of simplicity only. As our definitional section pointed out, such binary 
oppositions are tools for enacting relationships of political power which are far from 
benign. It is clear here that political acceptance (legitimacy) or rejection (illegitimacy) 
are direct functions of an association with identity motifs (or lack thereof). Identity 
motifs glorifying national attributes against real and imagined others are of course 
not unique to Algerian setting (and nor is the primacy of identity motifs to the 
creation of the nation), but there is a final use for the 'Orientalisation' of France 
which is often underplayed in the analysis of identity worth mentioning; the issue of 
political responsibility. The success of the regime in gaining independence and 
building a nation-state was always interpreted in identity terms. Similarly, the 
allocation of blame for political, economic and social failures is often framed in terms 
of identity motifs (the Islamist movement certainly used this technique to condemn 
the regime in terms of 'Western/French' influence). What is silenced here is the 
possibility that political events could have developed in a different way for the 
regime, and that political and economic successes (or failures) are often a function of 
other factors than identity. 
In sum, through such methods, identity works as the underpinning discursive 
function of power, it becomes the way in which power is expressed and political 
relationships are articulated. In that sense, it is possible to articulate the conditions 
under which political opposition against the Algerian regime has emerged (one could 
almost argue, had to emerge). In the contemporary setting, we can thus look at the 
identity dimension of political imagination in Algeria as a double-edged sword, which 
can legitimise the regime, but also opens up the possibility that political power can be 
disputed, albeit in identity terms. My final contention here is that the emergence of 
Islamist politics in Algeria is a function of the progressive loss by the regime of its 
monopoly on the production of discourse of identity, and its loss of control of the 
space in which this discourse was created. 
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6.6. Contesting Identity in Contemporary Algeria: Re-Drawing the Context of 
Political Islam 
The above discussion suggests that identity motifs not only figure prominently in the 
political discourse of the Algerian polity since independence, but also that identity 
has acquired, through the process of decolonisation, an emancipatory and 
legitimising quality which no political player wanting to gain access to official 
channels of power can afford to ignore. In consequence, we can re-examine the ways 
in which the current crisis in the Algerian political sphere is to be articulated. It is my 
contention here that it is around identity motifs that ideological contest between 
political forces in Algeria occurs in the 'contemporary setting. While political, socio- 
economic and military issues have been critical in explaining the rise of the Islamist 
movements in Algeria since the mid-1970s, the identity dimension of the conflict has 
thus far been limited to analyses of Islamist discourse. My aim here is to 
contextualise this discourse within the wider political discursive practices outlined 
above. The hypothesis that needs investigating is whether themes and process 
outlined so far find resonance in the Islamist political imagination. The study of 
various instance of written and oral discourse should be indicative. 
The evidence supporting the thesis that political contest in Algeria is modulated by a 
specific identity discourse is curtailed by the lack of powerful, well-organised or high 
profile political opposition to the Algerian state prior to 1988, largely as a result of the 
effective monopolisation of the political process and the media by the state apparatus 
up to that point72. The 1988-1989 period is more telling in this regard: the sudden 
and largely unmediated opening of the political process to democratisation in the 
, wake of the October 1988 riots provided full opportunities for alternative political 
ideologies to develop with little state control over legitimising identity claims. Until 
the reversal of this democratisation process, the 'founding myths' outlined above 
became open to re-interpretation, not only as founding principles, but also as guiding 
principles. 
The main contender for political power in the 1988-Jan 1992 period, the FIS, 
questioned the political legitimacy of the state, its economic efficiency, and its moral 
and religious credentials. As part of its critique of the state, and in the context of 
electoral competition at the local and national levels, the FIS articulated its 
credentials, its position and its political programme using not only identity motifs 
72 The 'Berber Spring' and the progressive rise of political Islam since the 1970s are notable 
exceptions. But the Berber Spring was short-lived through intensive political repression, and 
the Islamist card became most relevant by 1988 than ever before. 
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with which electors could identify with, but the identity motifs which had been so far 
monopolised effectively by the state as the legitimising tools for power. A number of 
such themes are worth developing on in this regard. 
Once again, Islam figured prominently in political discourse; it constituted the basis 
for moral legitimacy and modulated other identity themes such as unity, welfare, and 
strong leadership. Islamists succeeded in questioning the state in moral terms 
through the prism of Islam (i. e. by seeing the corruption of the state in terms of its 
failure to live up to its Islamic rhetoric). In addition, they used their privileged 
position at the grass-root level, and in popular areas, to perform key welfare functions 
that the state had been unwilling or unable to perform. This approach to direct 
political action led to a belief that Islamists were 'closer to the people', were more 
caring about the plight of the dispossessed, and ultimately were more responsive, 
more responsible and, in any case, incorruptible. This process was accompanied by 
the state's progressive loss of control over religious discourse. Since the mid-1970s, 
the number of mosques outside state control had proliferated, especially in Algeria's 
major cities and suburbs. These openings in civil society (for these can be interpreted 
as such73) in turn facilitated the rise of an alternative and critical political discourse 
on social issues and morality in a free space. Algeria has a strong tradition of political 
protest articulated in religious terms and religious orders have always had a special 
role to play as the vehicles for this process. In the case of political Islam, the 
connection between the regime and its Islamist opposition was closer than the 
current civil strife suggests. The regime had played a central role in the birth of the 
Islamist movement through its post-independence policies of Arabisation which 
brought a large number of Egyptian Muslim Brothers into Algeria as primary and 
secondary school teachers, thus implanting the seeds to Islamism within the 
education system. The fact that Islamists were encouraged in their political activism 
to undermine the strength of left-wing groups, especially in universities in Algiers 
and Constantine is worth reiterating also. In fact, the struggle for the identity motifs 
of Islam began in the 1970S when Islamism began to reprise the religious themes of 
the regime to overtake it in the legitimacy stakes. As early as 1970, it was the regime 
which began re-borrowing the identity discourse of Islamists, prompting change in 
state policy in terms of religion. This implied a greater attention placed on religious 
education, a step up in the moral discourse of the state in religious terms, and key 
73 For an in-depth discussion the relationship between the growth of Mosques outside the 
control of the state and the rise in Islamist discourse, see Ahmed Rouadja. 199o. Les Freres et 
la Mosquee. 
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concessions to the Islamist political agenda to try to overrun its new ideological rival, 
or at least to neutralise it74. 
In terms of symbols of unity, the use of Islam was once again critical symbolically and 
practically. Because of its grass-roots programme, the Islamist movement managed to 
capture the symbolic'upper-hand' by using a unifying framework of politics "Islam is 
the solutioni75, which through its vagueness could be seen to overcome the gender, 
class, ethnic and other social divisions which a more specific political programme 
could have spawned. Such a tactic is reminiscent of the populist, unifying discourse of 
the FLN following independence. The analogy does not stop there, though. The link 
between the FLN and its 'offspring"' is multi-dimensional: first, the FIS, despite 
some internal dissent, acknowledged the necessity to play the political game in terms 
dictated by the state. This commitment was reflected by the FIS' acceptance (despite 
its early rhetoric") of democratic elections - and thus its tacit acknowledgement of 
the necessity of accountability to the people, a theme which it used against the 
authoritarian state as a means to undermine its legitimacy. Whether this choice was 
pragmatic or principled, the fact remains that the FIS did not attempt to radically 
break from established patterns of political action. Instead, it concentrated on 
challenging the regime in ideological terms. Here, the strategy of Islamists was to 
capture the liberational themes which had underpinned the independence war78. By 
using essentially the same political discourse as the FLN during and directly after the 
independence struggle, the FIS aimed at making the state look like a moral impostor 
that had perverted the values of the 'revolution' such a freedom from oppression, 
equality and development79. The FIS then claimed these values for itself. 
74 See Ahmed Rouadja. 199o. Les Freres et la Mosqu& pp. 21-23. Rouadja quotes the 
Minister for Education and Religious Affairs, Mouloud Kassim Nait Belkacem 'instigating ä! 
campaign against moral degradation' by condemning the adoption of Western mores leading 
to the break-up of marriages, alcoholism, cosmopolitarianism, snobbish attitudes and topless 
bathing. See the main organ of the FLN, ElMoudjahid, 29 Sept 1970. 
75 a common slogan for Islamists in the whole region. For a discussion of this concept in 
relation to the Algerian example, see Mustafa Al-Ahnaf, Bernard Botiveau and Franck Fregosi. 
1991. L Algerie parses Islamistes. Paris: Karthala. pp. 79ff. 
76 based on a pun in French, where FIS and fill, which means'son', are homonyms. See, for 
instance, Rachid Boudjedra. 1992. FIS de la Haine. Paris: Denoel. 
77 See Ali Belhadj: "In Islam, divine law rules; with democracy, the people, thieves and 
charalatans rule. What is forbidden is forbidden, even if laws came from all the parliaments 
on the earth. The people only have the right to choose the Muslim sovereign who governs 
according to the sharia". EI Mounquid no. 23. Own translation. 
78A good example of an pamphlet discussing civil disobedience against the state is Said 
Mekhloufi. 1991. "Fondements et Buts de la Desobeissance Civile", quoted in Patrick Denaud. 
1997. Le FIS: Sa Direction Parle.... Paris: L'Harmattan. pp. 287ff. 
79 The FIS had to be careful in how it was condemning the regime, so as not to alienate the 
military and frustrate the development of the fragile democratic process. This attack was thus 
framed in terms of a condemnation of moral laxity in society and of communism, both of 
which to could be considered the responsibility of the regime. See, for instance, Ahsan Saidan. 
"Societe Musulmanne ... et Societe Communiste". E1 Mounquid no. 5. Saidan states: "For a 
246 
Pragmatically, this position made sense for a political movement intent on 
challenging the authority of a regime identified as corrupt and inefficient. But the 
ideological tour de force of this type of critique is that it effectively corners the state 
into a defensive position where it has everything to prove, and where Islamists can 
position themselves and as both doctor and cure without having to provide much 
support for their own credentials. The lack of experience of power by Islamists, on the 
other hand, exempts them from such scrutiny, thus making the rejection of their 
political platform, or of their worth as a political force, a moot point. 
Third, the FIS reprised the anti-French discourse promulgated by the nationalist 
movements of the inter-war period and the FLN during and after the war of 
independence. With the added dimension of anti-Westernism thrown in the balance, 
the Islamist discourse on its 'Others' incorporated both rejection and blame: 
France knows that that the secular West cannot work as a 
civilisational model for Muslims. The West has certainly managed 
to send a man on the moon, but is it capable of healing a sick 
society? Criminality, alcoholism, drugs, prostitution, suicide, 
individualism and despair are the price of secularism, and the loss 
of faith in absolute values80. 
Fourth, in the same way that the successive post-colonial regimes (and in particular 
the Boumediene government), developed a new kind of economics through their 
development of Algerian populist socialism to redress the social injustices of the 
colonial era, the Islamists of the FIS promised a new, moral way of, administering 
economic and social affairs through the prism of 'Islamic economics': 
In Islamic countries, we have learnt from the developmentalist and 
materialist economic policies which do not take into account the 
spiritual and cultural elements of Muslims, and which, through 
their centralised administration of capital, do not differentiate 
between Muslims and non-Muslims. They go against the Islamic 
shari'a, in its elements and in its aims. Why should man obey the 
law of the market, or the notion of merchandise capitalism 
advocates? " 
long time, communists have played up with with this pernicious ambiguity: they began by 
fighting Islam and exterminating its followers, but when they realised this only lead Muslims 
to being even more attached to their religion and unity, they attempted to posit that 
communism does not contradict Islam! " Own Translation. 
So Abou-Zeineb. El Mounquid. no. 26. Own translation. Another good example can be found 
with Fouad Benabdelhalim. "Les Veritables Enemis de 1'Algerie", EI Mounquid, no. 9, which 
virulently condemns the involvement of France in assessing the Islamist alternative. 
8i Bachir Mustapha. 199o. "Economic Reform following Islamic Criteria". Al-Irchad. April- 
May. Own Translation. 
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This is clearly a different economic project to socialism, but the idea that morality can 
be linked to economic policy is not: this focus on social justice was the underpinning 
connection between socialism and Islam for the FLN. 
Fifth, the FIS took on many of the tactical choices of the independence fighters of the 
FLN (through terrorism, guerrilla warfare in the countryside and urban guerrillas) as 
its tactics after the breakdown of the democratic process. The analogy does not stop 
at methods: in both cases the violence was part a larger dynamic of conflict, and in 
both cases, violence took on sociological aspects of a similar nature. The idea that a 
political culture of violence could have been established in Algeria is an attractive one 
for its conceptual simplicity. It implies endless cycles of violence, where conflict is 
seen as an appropriate, legitimate way of gaining power because of its proven record 
of effectiveness. Most authors on the subject are careful enough not to fully tread 
such a line though, fearing that such an encompassing model leaves little to be 
explained by other factors, and in any case fails to account for the possibility of social 
change. One of such authors is Omar Carlier, who, in his well-regarded Entre Nation 
et Jihad, talks of a 'culture of violence' derived from the foundational act of war 
accompanying the birth of the Algerian state82. The quasi-sacralisation of the war of 
independence has underpinned the continued relevance of this culture to the idea of 
national identity, but he is quick to point also, that such an evolution works as part of 
the socio-economic dynamic which has framed the rise of political Islam83. Luis 
Martinez qualifies this further and shuns the expression 'culture of violence' as such. 
He talks of violence as an established means for political expression and proven 
avenue for gaining upward social mobility, personal prestige, and wealth84. In this 
setting, the FIS thus does not merely re-create the actions and rhetoric of the FLN; it 
clearly makes it own mark according to political circumstances. Yet, it does not 
emancipate itself from the post-colonial legacy of the FLN (which itself had not 
overcome the legacy of colonialism and the war of independence). 
Sixth, it should be noted that on a symbolic level, the FIS made a number of 
contentions destined at enacting visible societal change to make Algerian society 
more moral - by making it seemingly more Muslim. The issue of the veil for women, 
and women's behaviour, is of particular importance here as Algerian Islamists confer 
82 Omar carlier. 1995. Entre Nation et Jihad: Histoire Sociale des Radicalismes Algeriens. 
Paris: Presses de Sciences Po; pp. 393ff" 
M Omar carlier. 1995. Entre Nation et Jihad, pp-398f84 
Luis Martinez. 1998. La Guerre Civile en Algerie. Paris: Karthala. p26. This is his overall 
thesis, see introductory chapter. 
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symbolic importance to women's appearance as a canvas for depicting societal 
mores85. The question of the veil, itself a complex issue for all Muslim women to have 
to negotiate in their respective societies, becomes somewhat reified as the terrain on 
which political gains and losses in terms of political support at the grass-root level 
can be measured. But the issue of women's status is not a new political score card in 
Algeria. The importance of the role of women during the independence war has been 
codified by the post-independence rhetoric of the state as one of glory and sacrifice, 
but the real gender issues highlighted by the special place of women as freedom 
fighters, often at the frontlines of the conflict, and their subsequent sidelining in the 
postcolonial political chessboard, have set up the scene for women being the actual 
and symbolic bodies on which political struggle is played out, as opposed to one of its 
actors86 . More recently, the 1984 family code, itself seen as a major early concession 
to the growth of Islamism through its repeal of many key women's rights, showed that 
playing a shrewd political game against the Islamist opposition was, even back then, a 
priority for the regime. It is indeed my contention that the state's decision to 
implement the 1984 family code was linked to the need to retain its moral legitimacy 
in Islamic terms rather than a change of heart over women's rights under Islam. 
There is thus a discrepancy between the actual roles of women in Algerian society 
(which vary considerably - some Islamists are women, and some of the fiercest critics 
of Islamism in Algeria have been women as well) and their symbolic role. 
Finally, one should note that, for the FIS in the 1989-1992 period, identity discourse 
was more than a tool for gathering power (or keeping it). It was considered by its 
leaders as a way to monopolise the power of the state against both the FLN and the 
other possible contenders for power. Also, despite its populist discourse, the FIS did 
not specifically attempt to provide a platform for empowering - all previously 
marginalised sections of the population equally. Its anti-state rhetoric was matched 
by a discourse on non-Muslims, women, and ethnic minorities (such as the Berbers) 
which was, at best, ambiguous87. 
85 for a discussion of the role of women in society, according to the FIS, see Mohamed El Arbi. 
"Femme Eman-Chipie? " El-Mounquid no 11. 
86 Aiwha Ong and Micheal Peletz state, in relation to the symbolic role of women's bodies, that 
"discursive constructions of bodies are frequently plotted against divisions that maintain 
social order, and that women's bodies in particular are commonly used to symbolise and 
threaten transgressions of social boundaries". in their introduction to Ong and Peletz (eds. ). 
1995. Bewitching Women, Pious Men: Gender and the Body Politic in Southeast Asia. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. p. 6. This analysis can be argued to be similar for our 
example. See also, in more theoretical terms, Anne McClintock. 1995. Imperial Leather: Race, 
Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Context. London: Routledge. 
87 See, for instance, "La Write sur L'Egalite entre l'Homme et la Femme" El-Molmquid no. 3. 
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6.7. Conclusion 
Overall, the choice of framing politics in terms of identity motifs linked to morality by 
Islamists was shrewd as it forced the FIS' political opponents to discuss political 
issues according to that identity framework, a line of debate the state was unprepared 
for88. In particular, the FLN-dominated political elite was put in the position to have 
to reaffirm its religious, moral and populist credentials in terms which were imposed 
by its opposition. That being said, it could also be argued that it was the state that set 
itself up for such criticism through its own continued use of the identity card in the 
post-independence era. That it would be called into account for its failure to live up to 
the identity themes it had set up was only a matter of time. This type of societal 
rupture has echoes of the independentist fracture with the French also. It emphasises 
an identity nexus binding the nation and religious identity to promote a 'new' kind of 
nationalism which cannot but reflect old dichotomies between the pious and the 
impious, the authentic and the colonial, the legitimate and the illegitimate. The locus 
of political contest thus remains firmly anchored in the symbolic nature of identity as 
opposed to a radical departure in the ways politics has been understood since 
independence. Our starting point for understanding the historical development of the 
FIS, its relationship to the state, and the ensuing descent into civil war in Algeria, 
should thus account for the ways in which the game of politics is played in Algeria. 
The slogan "Islam is the solution" may sound a little simplistic, but what it does not 
reflect is a simple game of opposition between pragmatic politics and identity politics. 
The identity dimension of politics is firmly anchored in the tradition of Algerian 
political discourse, dating back to the colonial era (and probably beyond). One should 
thus take great care in using the term 'identity politics' to describe movements such 
as political Islam in Algeria and elsewhere. I hope to have shown here that the 
identity dimension of politics is one no actor in Algerian politics has managed - or 
even attempted to - escape. Perhaps it is instructive to note here that despite being 
labelled post-Cold War revivalist forces, Islamist movements in the Middle East and 
North Africa are the product of a long tradition of political dissent in the name of 
Islam anchored, in the case of Algeria, in the colonial encounter: 
The history of modern Algeria does not begin in 1962. The FIS does 
not spring from nowhere, but originates from a complex past, which 
88 Mustafa Al-Ahnaf, Bernard Botiveau and Franck Fregosi. i99l. L'Algerie parses Islmnistes. 
P"9" 
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is still relevant to the present. To understand this history allows us 
to overcome such simplistic images89. 
There is little new about this 'new' nationalism, and conceptions of political Islam as 
a distinctively post-Cold War force in politics, or as a unified global threat need to be 
reconsidered somewhat. As for Islamism in Algeria, it remains a force in politics, not 
only because political violence is still commonplace despite the return to some degree 
of democratisation, but also because the state has felt the need to include some 
Islamists in that process. 
Finally, it is also worth considering that political Islam does not propose a radically 
different political identity to the Algerian people, but offers to fulfil the promise of 
that identity. Whether such a project is one capable of providing a solid basis for the 
growth of a unified yet pluralist Algerian nation in the post-colonial era is another 
matter 90 
89 Benjamin Stora. 1991. La Gangrene etL'Oubli. p. 311. 
90 Jean-Francois Bayard warns that manifestation of political imagination which claims a 
monopoly on authenticity could easily lead to totalitarianism, as all claims to differences can 
be interpreted as a threat to identity. For any political ideology wanting to compete on the 
Algerian political scene, this is also worth bearing in mind. See Jean-Francois Bayart. 1996. 




If Islamic movements are essentially and invariably authoritarian and anti-democratic, what explains 
their sustained popular support and why have they won elections in Turkey and Algeria, only to be 
kicked out of office by the military to the applause of Western democrats? Continuing our query, why 
is the Islamic presence so visible in the infrastructures of the new global system, that is, in the 
commercial networks, electronic communication systems and migrant communities within the global 
cities of Europe and North America? Haven't these Muslims read Fukuyama's The End of History? 
Paul Lubeck "The Islamic Revival"' 
7.1. Introduction: The Failure of Political Islam? 
In his celebrated book the Failure of Political Islam, Olivier Roy highlights what he 
sees as the central problems facing contemporary Islamist politics. Challenging the 
claim that the growing influence of political Islam poses a serious threat to existing 
power structures, he argues that, despite the effect political Islam has had on public 
mores and local conflicts, the state and society advocated by Islamists is no more than 
an illusion. For Roy, the failure of political Islam is both ideological and political. It is 
an ideological failure because Islamists have been unable to develop an intellectual 
framework and policies which can shape the political environment, and it is a 
political failure insofar as Islamism has failed to transcend existing power allegiances 
and structures2. Roy is careful in pointing out that his analysis does not inscribe itself 
within the Orientalist position early on, and uses both intellectual arguments and 
case studies to substantiate his position. On an abstract level, he untangles some of 
the contradictions of the Islamist political position and asserts: 
In my view [political Islam] has failed because Islamist thought, at 
the end of an intellectual trajectory that tries to integrate modernity, 
ultimately meets up with the `Islamic political imagination' of the 
tradition and its essential premise: politics can only be founded on 
individual virtue3. 
I Paul Lubeck. 2000. "The Islamic Revival: Antinomies of Islamic Social Movements under 
Globalization". in Robin Cohen and Shirin Rai (eds. ) Global Social Movements. London: The 
Athlone Press. p. 150. 
2 Olivier Roy. 1994. The Failure of Political Islam. London: I. B. Tauris. pp. ix-x in preface. 
3 Olivier Roy. 1994. The Failure of Political Islam. P. 21. Roy argues that Islamist political 
thought rests on the premise that Islamic virtue is the guiding principle of political structures 
and action, thus destroying the innovative elements of political Islam. See Olivier Roy, the 
Failure of Political Islam, pp. 61-64. 
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Additionally, Roy's argument implies that the religious rhetoric of Islamists 
movements is a facade for existing power interests and thus that "Today's Islamist 
movements, like the Algerian FIS, do not offer a new model for society"4. They fail, 
for Roy, to produce a genuine `Third Way' for politics. Following the logic of this 
argument, and discussing the recent history of the Middle East, he thus concludes 
that: 
Neofundamentalism is seeking its devil in a different god, but does 
not see the desert within. 
How has this argument held to the test of time, given that Roy's account was first 
published in France in 1992, before Algeria's descent into Civil War, the accession to 
power in Afghanistan by the Taliban and Erbakan's Refah party's election to power in 
Turkey? Can political Islam be said to be the mere reflection or articulation of socio- 
cultural trends, or has it developed as a political force (or set of political forces) 
capable of challenging existing political orders? It should be pointed out that while 
Islamists have not succeeded in achieving widespread and undisputed power 
throughout the region, political Islam has left its mark on political structures and 
events, on public morals and emerging conflicts as a key political player. The case of 
Algeria where the confrontation between Islamist groups and the state has led to a 
multifaceted civil war exemplifies the potential for the Islamists 'wild card' to become 
politically, if not militarily relevant for many states in the region. In fact, political 
Islam cannot be seen as the mere political expression of an abstract ideology (whose 
credentials in terms of coherence and applicability are indeed worth debating); it is 
also a broad-based social phenomenon deeply ingrained in a broad-based 
constituency, and, to some extent, the reflection of the values and opinions of some 
segments of civil society. 
Still, the way Roy articulates his argument is more sophisticated than my short 
summary gives it credit for. The question of whether the contradictions of the 
Islamist political imagination are ultimately too salient to make Islamism a realistic 
`Third Way' is crucial of course. Yet, insofar as Islamists believe that there are no such 
contradictions, and given the few opportunities Islamists have had to gain access to 
political office unhindered (and thus to be potentially discredited), this question 
remains one that can neither be proved nor disproved. As such, the point is not so 
4 Olivier Roy. 1994. The Failure of Political Islam. p. 194. 
5 Oliver Roy. 1994. The Failure of Political Islam. P. 203. 
much whether political Islam is a political failure waiting-to-happen, but how crucial 
is it proving to be in shaping politics in the Middle East and North Africa. 
More recently, Ibrahim Karawan has redeveloped a similar argument which attempts 
to take on board new historical developments as benchmarks for assessment. He 
acknowledges that: 
Since the mid-1970s, Islamists have posed a considerable challenge, 
both to regimes and to other opposition forces. The political impact 
of Islamism has been felt on national and regional levels, and its 
diverse manifestations in Arab societies cannot be ignored. Effort to 
eradicate Islamism as a political force - including repression - will 
not succeed, and it will not vanish or wither away in the foreseeable 
future. Although some astute observers differ over whether the 
phenomenon is declining or expanding, a sound analysis of Arab 
and Middle Eastern politics must take Islamists seriously'. 
Still, Karawan's conclusions emphasise that "Islamists do not represent the force of 
the future in Arab politics'" and that "their increased social presence has not 
translated into political powers". For him, even though Islamists have succeeded in 
influencing the policies of most regimes, the Islamist challenge has been successfully 
contained, leaving Islamism in an impasse: 
Islamist movements face obstacles along three main paths to 
political power. Assassination removes a leader, but does not 
undermine the regime - which subsequently becomes more 
repressive. Working within a system undergoing controlled political 
liberalisation is compromised since the process is influenced more 
by the managers than the managed. Finally, military take-overs are 
difficult to achieve since most armies in the Middle East are no 
longer the small institutions which made coups a frequent feature of 
Arab politics during the 195os and 196os9. 
This assessment is intrinsically more contextualised and up to date than Roy's; an 
impasse is not a failure. Indeed, the main strength of this argument is that it 
recognises that the dynamic relationship between regimes and their Islamist 
opposition is a dominant explanatory factor in explaining the relative success/failure 
of Islamist movements in a variety of settings'o 
6Ibrahim Karawan. 1997. The Islamist Impasse - Adelphi Paper 314. London: IISS. P. 65. 
7lbrahim Karawan. 1997. The Islamist Impasse. p. 66. 
8 Ibrahim Karawan. 1997. The Islamist Impasse. p. 66. 
9Ibrahim Karawan. 1997. The Islamist Impasse. p. 67. 
1OIbrahim Karawan. 1997. The Islamist impasse. see chapter 2. 
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That being said, Karawan's analysis still measures possible success in terms of access 
to official channels of political power. This denotes the central blind spot of this type 
of explanation, where Islamists are not going to be the force of the future in the Arab 
world because they have not/will not acquire widespread political power by 
controlling the state. This is perhaps a justified standpoint since most analysts in 
Western Europe and North America are most concerned by the consequences of an 
Islamist-controlled state or set of states on the region, and ultimately globally. Still, 
Islamists in Egypt for instance have shown that there are other ways to gain access to 
political power than elections (through various associations from civil society 
influencing policy in indirect ways), and one could also point out that there are 
different forms of power, some of which Islamists are more interested in than others. 
Not all Islamists groups in fact seek control of the state per se, and even those who do 
want it for a set of purposes which vary from case to case but which invariably imply 
widespread change in the dominant political, cultural and religious values of the 
polity. This implies changing the way the political realm functions and how it is 
imagined. Only the most cynical of analysts would see the Islamists' focus on moral 
values purely in terms of political opportunism. This exclusive focus on power 
excludes the most formidable strength of Islamists: that of change at the level of 
ideas. On that level, as acknowledged by Karawan, Islamists have been successful and 
are likely to remain so. 
Perhaps neither Roy nor Karawan are wrong in presenting political Islam's primary 
importance in cultural/religious terms, but they are wrong in assuming that the 
category of ideas is less important or relevant than holding control over the polity. 
Arguably, ideas are the most powerful long-term tools for changing society. And in 
this context, do Islamists still succeed if they don't get power but reshape society 
according to their model nonetheless? Indeed, the record of Islamists in accessing 
political control of the polity directly is patchy, but their steady rise in setting the 
political agenda and often imposing Islamist solutions to various issues is 
unmistakable. 
Ultimately, this dissertation has attempted to explore this dimension of political 
Islam in more depth, and in the context of a specific case study to investigate the 
significance of political Islam beyond mere considerations of political power. And it is 
argued here that ideas is where we need to start to see what the meaning(s) of the 
confrontation between Islamists and the state is/are. 
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7.2. Summary of Findings 
7.2.1. Conceptualising Political Islam 
This dissertation attempts to both fit into current debates on the Islamist question (or 
should I say questions? ) in the Middle East and to present an original set of research 
findings and conclusions. To fulfil these purposes, our first aim was to investigate the 
theoretical underpinnings which could support a balanced analysis of Islamist 
political discourse and its place in the political life-world relevant to the society in 
which it develops. Concurrent to this aim was the analysis of the way in which 
political Islam has been framed in the literature and the media. From this discussion, 
an assessment of how political Islam can be defined academically (and how it 
shouldn't be defined), as well as ways in which the analysis of this phenomenon could 
be conducted, were developed. Such a precise focus on concepts, theory and 
methodology is an intrinsic part of PhD research, but it is also particularly important 
to the analysis of a phenomenon which is as complex and controversial as political 
Islam. In recent years, the literature on Islamism has been prolific - in general, and 
with reference to Islamist politics in Algeria. The media has also reported extensively 
on Islamism, especially when relating to the violent tactics of some Islamist groups, 
and in particular terrorism. Despite such a large set of discussion pieces, the field of 
Islamist politics remains open to further discussion and alternative interpretations 
and foci to those thus far adopted. This in turn can be explained through a number of 
factors. As our analysis in chapter three pointed out, the end of the Cold War has left 
a vacuum in the academic consciousness and for policy-makers as to where the next 
threat to Western interests and security might spring from. The Islamic threat has 
figured prominently on the agenda of such discussions (along with the renewal of 'the 
politics of identity' as a destructive force in politics in general). Needless to say, such 
a limited framework of understanding of the structure and dynamics of the 
international system leaves out other factors at play in the making of international 
relations. Worse still, the risk of self-fulfilling prophecies looms large when an actor 
or state is defined and treated as the enemy. Such a factor has proven to be of 
importance in the making of antagonistic relations between the superpowers during 
the Cold War, fuelling mistrust and entrenching misperceptions. In our current 
context, the labelling of Islamist politics as the 'green menace' has only worked to 
reinforce a sense of siege and victimisation on the part of Islamist leaders and 
militants. It is thus worth bearing in mind that analyses of political Islam in Western 
Europe and North America do not function in abstraction from the real world; 
instead, they participate in shaping it. Islamists read Western newspapers, watch 
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satellite television programmes, and consult academic publications about themselves 
and will react to these stimuli both in terms of their views on 'the West' and in terms 
of self-definition in a global context. Simplistic labelling of Islam, Islamic people (not 
to mention Islamists) as underdeveloped, obscurantist and violent will only result in 
greater numbers joining the banner of 'Islam is the solution' against the West. 
One of the main aims of this dissertation was to step away from a description of 
Islamist politics as a threat that should be managed, and to embrace an approach 
defining Islamism as a political actor of contemporary relevance, with an important 
role to play in the game of regional, global, and national politics. This choice is not 
unique to this work: a significant body of literature has developed since the 198os to 
explain, in context, the rise of political Islam in the Middle East. In the 199os, such 
types of analysis developed further to correspond to the continued (if not increasing) 
relevance of Islamism to politics in the region, and in response to the 'Islamic Threat' 
literature of the post-Cold War era. This dissertation acknowledges the poignancy of 
the struggle many academics have to face in trying to escape such simplistic 
frameworks of analysis and to overcome the legacy of Orientalism. The analysis 
developed here attempts to inscribe itself within the terms of this struggle. In the case 
of Algeria, such battle lines are as entrenched as elsewhere in the field, but an 
additional political dimension complicates matters further. The main body of 
literature on Algeria (be it in history, sociology, economics or politics) remains based 
in France (and tends to be produced by Algerian, French, or more generally North 
African scholars). The work produced on political Islam in Algeria and the civil war is 
no exception to this trend. In principle, there is no reason to be suspicious of this 
phenomenon. After all, Algeria was a colony of France for 132 years and so until fairly 
recently. It is to be expected the French scholars (or North African extraction or not) 
or French-speaking Algerian analysts would take such a strong interest in a former 
French dominion with strong remaining economic and politics links with its former 
coloniser, as well as an extensive number of Algerian nationals living on French 
territory. A useful parallel would be the interest taken by British analysts and 
journalists in the politics and culture of the Indian subcontinent. 
Still, it can be noted that, while a large body of excellent work on Algeria is produced 
in French (and in France), an equally large amount of highly polemical, politically- 
motivated work is also published, often even if it is academically flawed". Complete 
neutrality in this regard is probably impossible to achieve, but an attempt to 
11 See, for instance, Arslan Humbaraci. 1966. Algeria: A Revolution that Failed: A Political 
History since 1954. London: Pall Mall. Humbaraci's often astute analysis of socio-economic 
trends is overshadowed by his highly polemical treatment of Ben Bella. 
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transcend and -reject inflammatory political discourse on Algeria is part of the 
endeavour academics ought to pursue. One way to achieve this is perhaps to identify 
the source of such differences in academic quality. In part, this dichotomy stems from 
academic/media developments in France during the Algerian war of independence. 
High level of state censorship at the time made the publication of testimonies of war 
by French and Algerian individuals the only possible articulation of alternative 
'truths' about the conflict in a highly volatile environment. The question of torture by 
French forces became the focal point of the fight for free speech at that time, and the 
only way to speak of a war, where the French government spoke of an intervention to 
re-establish order. Hence the importance of personal testimony and the proliferation 
of first hand, first person accounts by Algerian nationalists, French conscripts, 
French colons and eventually officers of the French army willing to 'set the record 
straight'. The production of historical accounts of war were considerably enriched by 
this trend, and it remains a dynamic field today. The cost of this development, 
however, is the enormous variation in quality and integrity in the literature, and the 
integration of political debates within pieces posing as academic work on history. 
This continues today in the production and publication of material on Islamist 
politics, with similarly uneven results12. The use of an academic forum to air 
disapproval of the Islamist alternative cannot be discouraged on free-speech grounds, 
but the overall blurring of the line between opinion and academic analysis remains a 
dangerous slippery slope. 
Another avenue for understanding this heterogeneity in the production of work in the 
French-speaking academe lies in the articulation of the role of intellectuals in France 
since the May 1968 cultural and political wave of protest spearheaded by intellectuals 
and academics. Nowhere is the enduring Wt problematic influence of intellectuals 
and the cultural elite over the political sphere more evident than in France. As self- 
appointed defenders of truth and integrity, intellectuals have tended to outgrow the 
limits of the their specific academic or cultural competence to claim the status of 
social and political commentators with the special duty of acting as the social 
conscience of the nation13. This is perhaps noble in most cases, but one needs to bear 
in mind that academic qualifications in one field do not guarantee competence in 
another. The example of the French philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy's intervention 
in the media to affect political outcomes with regards to the responsibility of the 
12 See, for instance, Hassan's deeply polemical piece in defence of Boumediene's presidency 
(to explain/contrast it with the contemporary era) in Hassan. 1996. Algerie: Histoire dun 
Naufrage. Paris: Seuil. 
13 For a good discussion of the role of French intellectuals in politics, especially with reference 
the Agerian war of independence, see Philip Dine. 1994. Images of the Algerian War: French 
Fiction and Film 1954-1992. Oxford: Clarendon Press. especially the introduction. 
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Algerian regime in the massacres of civilians during the 199os is telling in this regard. 
As a distinguished member of the French intellectual elite, Levy used his high media 
profile to strongly deny increasing evidence of regime involvement in patterns of 
violence in the troubled state. In a political environment where increasing pressure 
from civil society on the French government to lift its unconditional support for the 
Algerian regime in the wake of several damning reports by Amnesty International 
and other human rights' organisations, intellectual debates on the Algerian situation, 
and the role of France in it, opened up. Levy's contribution in this regard manifested 
itself by a visit to Algeria, with the blessing of the regime in place, to 'investigate' the 
truth of the matter14. Whatever his political motives were, the result was one of 
support of the Algerian ruling elite and the French government's position, thereby 
crushing mounting criticism and cancelling out the need for a debate on the matter. 
Levy's short visit to Algeria (and the control of his access to information by the 
regime) could not have afforded him the knowledge, and therefore the authority, to 
make definitive pronouncements on the situation. Yet, his position as an intellectual 
allowed him to make claims which played in the hands of the political interests and 
the financial commitments of the French and Algerian elites. Here, his philosophical 
credentials did not necessarily imply that his knowledge of the situation at hand 
would lead to a balanced and careful analysis of the dynamics of violence. His dislike 
of what he saw as violent, obscurantist and intolerant blinded him to the possibility 
that violence in Algeria might be multifaceted. Most importantly, his 'crusade for the 
truth' worked to undermine discussions on the issue of human rights and political 
participation in Algeria - and of the place of Islamist politics-, instead of fostering 
further analysis or debate on the subject. In sharp contrast, those French analysts 
concerned with political Islam in Algeria held a much lower media profile and their 
academic publications emphasised the difficulty in allocating blame in a clear-cut 
way, as well as the complexity of the dynamics underpinning political developments. 
Overall, being an influential intellectual in this setting created the possibility of being 
manipulated by the very power interests free-thinking intellectuals are supposed to 
keep in check. 
Levy's naivete has been noted elsewhere. What is of importance here is the complex 
relationship between politics and academia in France when it comes to the 
emotionally-charged issue of Algeria. Many prominent members of the recent or 
current political elite were linked to the process of decolonisation in Algeria, 
including the late Francois Mitterand. Jean-Marie Le Pen's controversial role during 
the war (and accusations of torture in particular) have often been argued to colour his 
14 He has also reported on trouble-spots such as Bosnia and Afghanistan in the last few years. 
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National Front's tough stance on North African immigration. Both left and right- 
wing parties have had to deal with the aftermath of the decolonisation struggle, and 
with their responsibilities as former colonisers. A vast number of intellectuals and 
artists, ranging from Albert Camus to the rising stars of Rai have strong links with 
Algeria and have often articulated through art, music or literature their sense of 
dislocation and of loss. Algeria thus permeates the national consciousness of political 
as well as intellectual elites, with the recent notable rise in Algerian immigre 
influences. Politically, the attitude of the French government with regards to the 
current Algerian crisis and its immigre population remain highly controversial. The 
French interior ministry went as far as refusing refugee status to Algerians fleeing the 
violence on the grounds that there was no civil war in Algeria, only residual terrorism, 
echoing almost word for word the position of the Algerian regime. The mass trial of 
Algerian immigres accused of collaborating with or being Islamists (and bringing 
violence to France) was also marred in controversy due to legal irregularities. The 
very need felt by Islamists to 'internationalise' the conflict by carrying out acts of 
political violence on French territory testifies to the perception of a close relationship 
between the two regimes. The possibility that such a sensitive position, and the 
debates which are bound to arise from it, would trickle down to academia is of little 
surprise. 
It is in this tumultuous environment that this dissertation finds its place. Along with 
other analyses produced in the French-speaking world, the English-speaking world, 
as well as Italy and Germany for instance, this piece emphasises the importance of 
focused analysis of (trends, events, and material which goes beyond political 
partisanship and interests, and personal preference. 
That being said, chapter two has shown that rigorous analysis does not lead to 
unproblematic accounts of history or political situations. The issue of interpretation 
is a central question facing the methodology of the social sciences, and one that 
cannot be bypassed easily. Our overview of the philosophy of the social sciences 
showed how problematic the questions of authorship and objectivity can be, and the 
example of Orientalism illustrated this difficulty. Still, the methodology used this in 
this piece tried to acknowledge the strengths of positivist projects and their place in a 
pluralist methodological framework. Conversely, interpretive studies were identified 
as the providers of key analytical tools for the analysis of political discourse, identity, 
and legitimacy. The works of Jürgen Habermas and Paul Ricoeur in particular were 
seen as important bridges between interpretation as a mode of encounter with the 
subject and critical analysis as a mode of systematising our understanding. Despite 
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this relative level of abstraction, chapter two tried to stay close to the question of 
methodological tools for analysing political Islam. The case of Algeria here was seen 
as one where postcolonial studies should be coupled with concepts developed through 
the study of political Islam in the Middle East to provide a comprehensive set of 
analytical concepts. It is thus why Islamism in Algeria was analysed through the 
prism of competing political imaginations articulated through political discourse and 
institutions, and competing within a broad conception of politics (known as the 
lifeworld) for political power and symbolic legitimacy. Bearing in mind the research 
results developed in later analytical chapters, it is perhaps wise to go back to our 
original concepts and discuss how empirical analysis illustrates them and how such 
themes can be brought together to form a general set of conclusions with regard to 
Algerian political Islam. 
7.2.2. Research Findings 
On the whole, our analysis showed that the political imagination of Algerian Islamists 
reflects the complexity of the political and social setting in which it is ingrained, it 
reflects the aims and contradiction of the nation-building themes developed by the 
postcolonial state, and it displays elements of rupture, as well as elements of 
continuity and hybridity in how it formulates political discourse. Here, it can thus be 
established that political discourse by Islamists and their place in the political 
spectrum of Algeria are not as straightforward as originally anticipated. In-depth 
analysis of the Islamist political imagination highlights the legacy of the colonial era 
and the imprint of attempts by the postcolonial state to shape the Algerian political 
lifeworld according to a specific set of identity themes underpinning the notion of the 
nation, the requirements of legitimacy and, to a certain extent, the conditions for 
governance. As such, Islamism does not constitute a radical alternative to the way the 
political is imagined in Algeria, but works as an ambiguous heir to the articulations of 
the political developed since independence. 
More generally, our analysis hoped to forgo the assumption that political discourse, 
because of its propaganda uses, is not a helpful tool in understanding political 
motivations. The public agenda contained in official forms of discourse is laden with 
strategic considerations of power acquisition and often reflects political ambitions as 
opposed to a strict ideological stance. That being said, such an occurrence remains 
analytically fruitful in conveying the struggle for ideological dominance in the 
Algerian political life-world. In turn, mapping this 'war of words' helps better 
understand the ways in which the political competition for power in Algeria has been 
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played out during the short period of democratisation of 1989-1992 and its direct 
aftermath. It is a central contention of this dissertation that the identity dimension of 
the competition for power between the state and Islamists at that time is central in 
understanding the dynamics underpinning the conflict that has ensued, in 
association with economic and socio-political factors. The discursive dimensions of 
this political exchange are far from monolithic in nature and both Islamist and state 
discourses have shown remarkable adaptability and resilience in the face of a 
multifaceted conflict. Political imagination modulates the articulation of political 
aims and frames the modalities of access to official channels of power. Thus, political 
imagination in this setting, as elsewhere, is malleable to manipulation on the part of 
the participants in political contest, but only to a certain extent. The boundaries 
imposed by this framework are flexible, but they exist nonetheless. Many of the 
current 'rules of the game' were originally played on and institutionalised by the 
postcolonial regimes of the ig6os and 1970s. Now seen as veritable 'founding myths 
of the nation', these rules are taken on, and their underpinning identity themes are 
used, by all political players attempting to gain political power on a national level. 
Despite these areas of continuity however, strong elements of rupture from 
established modes and types of political discourse can be recorded for Algerian 
Islamism in the early 199os. Of course, this rupture is constructed for political 
purposes so as to draw out a political alternative to the status quo offered by the 
state, but it also presents elements of originality both in how it responds to the 
political imagination of the state and in how it formulates its own political 
credentials. Chapter four was the first of three analytical chapters which dealt 
specifically with the case study of Algerian Islamism. It served as an introduction to 
our analysis of the Islamist political imagination by plotting the development of 
Islamist (and to a certain extent Islamic) ideas in the political sphere since 
colonisation. The outcome of our analysis at that point was that, far from being a 
historical aberration, or a unique occurrence, Islamism in Algeria is historically 
contingent and has strong roots in a tradition of political protest in the name of Islam 
dating back to early colonial revolts15. Additionally, chapter four showed the changes 
the contemporary Islamist movement has undergone over the past thirty years, in 
terms of constituency, strength and types of groups involved. 
Chapter five developed on this idea of diversity in turn to explore the complex array 
of discursive patterns in the Islamist political imagination. Starting with an overview 
15 This era of continuity within the political sphere can also be linked to discursive strategies 
and themes developed in the post-colonial era, an issue which was developed on in more 
depth in chapter six. 
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of the key themes underpinning the Islamist political discourse, our analysis moved 
on the other components of political imagination to challenge the assumption of that 
Islamism is ideologically abstract and hollow. The second part of our chapter looked 
closely at the evolution of the ways in which Islamism in Algeria has drawn its 
discourse as a form of rupture from dominant patterns of political imagination, both 
over time, and among groups. A vast degree of adaptability in the drawing up and 
acting out of discursive strategies was highlighted here and the main reason for such 
changes, was, predictably enough, changes in the fortunes of the Islamist movements 
and of course state policy with regards to Islamism. This flexibility could however be 
argued to have boundaries for mainstream political groups such as the FIS (and its 
armed branch), as well as small independent cells such as the GIAs, even though 
information on the relationship between GIA groups' policies as opposed to their 
discourse is difficult to gather with great accuracy. Despite these differences though, 
the oppositional nature of the Islamist political imagination (in discourse, symbolism, 
utopia and deed) was unmistakable, if ambiguous at certain key periods. Chapter five 
concluded with the argument the political imagination of Islamism in the Algerian 
case re-framed our understanding of Islamism to go beyond the definitional 
framework delineated in chapter three. Not only is political Islam embedded in the 
societal fabric in which it evolves, but its participation in the realm of political ideas 
give it a unique place as a social movement16 
Chapter six turns this logic on its head to a certain extent, and works a historical 
backdrop to the ways in which nation-building in postcolonial Algeria has been 
constructed in terms of political identity. Identity is here seen "in ways that do not 
reinstate it as a finite, smoothed out and always already coherent narrative... I 
understand identity formation as a process that produces both sameness and 
difference"". Our main area of investigation was the sites of collusion between 
Islamist discursive strategies on identity and previous/current dominant patterns 
and themes in identity-building. Identity is only one way in which commonalties in 
terms of political imagination could be systematised, but it is a telling example as it 
forms the basis for the symbols and themes developed in political discourse, as well 
as the 'rules of the game' of politics in the postcolonial setting. While, at face value, 
treating areas of dissonance and developing a historical treatment of the roots of 
16 Chapter six problematised this position in terms of ambiguity, and chapter seven 
approached this set of questions from the angle of locality and discursive hybridity to 
introduce the idea of the global to the idea of social movement. Such issues are brought 
together, in the context of an overall assessment of political Islam in the global era in section 
8.4. 
17 Anne-Marie Fortier. 2000. Migrant Belongings: Memory, Space, Identity. Berg: Oxford. 
p. 2. 
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complicity between Islamism and official forms of political discourse may sound like 
a contradiction in terms, the connection between these two trends should be 
conceptualised in a more complex way than simple contradiction. In order to gain 
political relevance and 'bite', Islamism must distance itself enough from regime 
rhetoric to be seen as a genuine alternative to its policies. On the other hand, with 
regime monopoly on the motifs of political identity since independence, the use of 
widely different motifs to imagine politics, let alone identity, would prove too 
dissonant to appeal to the majority of the population. Besides, such motifs have 
become ingrained into the political culture of all Algerians to a great extent, to 
include Islamists themselves. This is through this delicate balancing act that the 
Islamist political imagination is formulated and draws its strength. 
Overall, this discussion allows us to substantiate the central hypotheses set up in the 
introductory chapter. Our main contention was that Islamism, as a social movement, 
is embedded in the contemporary Algerian political lifeworld. In various ways, our 
analysis showed how political Islam is responsive to economic and socio-political 
changes, but we have also seen that beyond this tactical consideration, it has been 
shaped in response to the discursive practices of the state. Islamism draws its 
strength from it oppositional stance to state monopoly on power, but uses the 
symbolic and ideological resources of the state to proclaim itself as an authentic and 
legitimate alternative to the regime. Political imagination is thus central to our 
understanding of the mechanism of the state-Islamism relationship because it 
represents a set of tools and images which can be used to frame what constitute 
legitimacy in the political realm. Islamism is the logical heir to the authoritarian 
regimes of the postcolonial era in Algeria. Its revolutionary rhetoric is inspirational to 
supporters and voters desperate for political change, and its suggests a commitment 
to a radically divergent political imagination to that of the state. The reality of the 
connection between dominant and Islamist political imagination is more nuanced 
though, suggesting subtle but pervasive forms of hybridity in discourse and flexibility 
on both parts to reflect the changes in the power relationship between the 
competitors for power over time. Beyond struggle for political power lie power plays 
and exchanges; making the notion of opposition between the political imagination of 
the state and that of the Islamist opposition less clearly defined as anticipated. 
7.3. Policy prescriptions 
It is perhaps imprudent to assume that a definite set of policy predictions can be 
derived from the analysis of political Islam in the context we have drawn here. After 
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all, one of the main motivations underpinning this dissertation is an attempt to 
contextualise political Islam to unearth its complexity and flexibility, suggesting that 
such predictions might be self-deluding. Our account also steps away from recent 
historical analyses focusing on the causes and dynamics of the Algerian crisis and is 
probably ill-equipped to draw conclusions as to the prospects of conflict resolution in 
a rapidly evolving environment. This should not mean that the conclusions outlined 
above have no practical applications to the scholarly treatment of political Islam in 
the Middle East, and in Algeria in particular though. Our preoccupation with political 
imagination denotes a wider interest in patterns of state-building in the postcolonial 
context, and it thus defines the political contest for power in Algeria in terms of the 
modalities of governance which underpin it. Furthermore, shifts in the assessment of 
the role of political Islam in the definition of what constitutes the political in the 
Middle East has practical implications in terms of policy-making from a Western 
European perspective. 
7.3.1. Conflict Resolution 
This section examines possible avenues for long-term conflict resolution in Algeria. I 
hope to show here that, despite the cessation of large-scale violence, conflict 
resolution is still a valid form of policy for Algeria in the context of 2001. Conflict 
resolution measures involve both internal and external measures, thus highlighting 
the policy implications for Western European powers the issue of Islamism brings. As 
such, this analysis hopes to highlight the range of conflict resolution techniques 
available to reduce residual conflict and promote long-term solutions for governance 
in Algeria, as well as the pragmatic difficulties and obstacles involved in this process. 
Firstly, and without tackling the problem of violence in Algeria in any great depth, 
several general points can be made to integrate concepts of conflict resolution into 
the Algerian context. As a starting point, it can be said that, like most post-Cold War 
'complex emergencies' and internal conflicts, the Algerian crisis has been a complex 
and dynamic phenomenon and in which many actors are not clearly defined. 
Therefore, claiming to know who exactly is responsible for which act of violence is a 
problematic endeavour. What is possible is to convey a range of possible practical 
avenues to stop violence altogether, build confidence into state institutions and tackle 
the problems underlying the crisis to build lasting peace. While is process is 
understandably fraught with ambiguities and difficulties, it does not exclude the use 
of language of conflict resolution altogether. On the contrary, it is in crises such as the 
Algerian civil war and its aftermath that conflict resolution and nation-building need 
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to be brought into the debate. As far as conflict resolution is concerned, it must be 
stressed from the outset that any long-term involvement by external powers, one way 
or another, ought to be based on Algerian needs and priorities18. Conflict resolution 
cannot be artificially imposed by a Western force or to promote foreign interests. 
Also, international initiatives must be matched by local and state-sponsored 
programmes in order to reach their full potential and form the foundation for long- 
lasting stability and eventually peace. This applies to Algeria as it does to any other 
state. 
The common wisdom on the Algerian civil war states that the spiral of violence was 
set into motion by the halting of the democratisation process in January 1992. Is this 
statement accurate strictly speaking though? The army take-over on power, state 
repression of Islamism and armed rebellion of Islamist militants were certainly the 
catalysts of the civil war, but as our analysis of the history of Islamism shows, the 
roots of the conflict were more complex in character and the scene of the conflict was 
set slowly through the patterns of nation-building and policies of the state in the 
postcolonial era. Additionally, many questions remain unanswered as to who really 
dominated the regime at which point and how fragmentary the Islamist opposition 
really was at the height of the conflict in the mid-199os. The factionalisation of all 
sets of actors, including the army, as well as the growth of semi-independent local 
armed militias blurred the distinction between the 'oppressors' and the 'victims'. The 
progressive return to partial democratisation, and the inclusion of some Islamists in 
the political process, have been accompanied by the relative decrease in hostilities 
suggesting that the conflict has run its course. Still, the controversial plans of 
President Bouteflika to pardon imprisoned Islamist not guilty of 'blood crimes' and 
the passionate, debates in civil society this unleashed in turn suggests that tensions in 
various political camps and throughout society are still running high, with many of 
the issues of governance and human rights still unresolved. 
In this fluid environment, what would conflict resolution imply? Most conflicts 
classically tend to 'resolve themselves' by running their course; one side 'wins', or all 
parties have reached a point where peaceful settlement becomes a more viable option 
than continued fighting. This framework is particularly relevant to interstate conflict, 
but in a post-Cold War environment where low-intensity and internal conflict are the 
18 When discussing the Arab/Israeli peace process, Richard Falk argues that 'peace-from- 
below' approaches are often more adapted and efficient than external initiatives. This is a 
consideration worth bearing in mind in any context. See Richard Falk. 1994. "World Order 
Conceptions and the Peace Process in the Middle East" in Elise Boulding (ed. ) Building Peace 
in the Middle East: Challenges for States and Civil Society. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. pp. 
189ff. 
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dominant patterns, combatants are not always easy to identify and patterns of 
violence at the local level can re-emerge sporadically over many years and spark a 
renewed crisis. Intervention generally involves UN peacekeeping forces using their 
clout and neutrality to keep factions apart and promote negotiations. Ideally, this 
would also involve a long-term plan for peace-building based on a thorough 
examination of the roots of conflicts and the means and political will to address them. 
Thus, the basic notion underpinning conflict resolution is that states or populations 
engulfed in violence suffer from more than violence itself. Often linked to conflicts 
are underlying problems of state legitimacy, structures of governance, socio- 
economic problems, social divisions, etc. 19. Post-conflict reconstruction, as a result, 
can only occur through a combination of measures emphasising the halting of 
violence per se, political and social reconstruction, economic restructuring and 
development and individual healing and the rebuilding of trust in the community20. 
Typically, these dimensions imply a combination of external factors and a local 
willingness to achieve long-lasting peace. Three levels of initiative can be identified to 
achieve peace: grass-root involvement, state-sponsored work, and external efforts 
underpinning the other two. Such an international dimension must be combined with 
indigenous solutions, and if the use of an international peacekeeping or peacemaking 
force is involved, clear rules of engagement are mandatory to success. In the post- 
Cold War world, four types of external strategies for intervention to bring peace have 
come to the fore: military/peacekeeping intervention (including mediation), 
diplomatic action involving pressure, sanctions and inducements, humanitarian relief 
and/or monitoring and finally informal international campaigns by pressure groups 
and/or through the media. These initiatives, in turn, can be combined or substituted 
for one another if circumstances on the ground change. Internal efforts are more 
difficult to classify given the diversity of initiatives observed, but they generally 
involve support from foreign powers/institutions in the following areas: investment, 
the creation of new institutions for governance, law and the distribution of goods, the 
setting up of peace and reconciliation committees, and psychosocial healing for 
communities touched by violence, and individuals involved in the violence as well as 
their victimsZ1. Overall, third party involvement can be categorised in two ways, with 
concomitant techniques. 
19 For an overview of Conflict Resolution, see P. Wallensteen. 1988. "Understanding Conflict 
Resolution: A Framework" in P. Wallensteen (ed. ) Peace Research: Achievements and 
Challenges. Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 119ff. 
2O For an overview of such techniques, see Richard Wendell Fogg. 1985. "Dealing with 
Conflict: A Repertoire of Creative Peaceful Approaches" Journal of Conflict Resolution. 29(2). 
pp"33o-358. 
21 Chaiwat Satha-Anand notes that, on a cultural and religious level, Islam contains many of 
the basic tools needed to underpin the practical avenues for peacemaking. Such a perspective 
is helpful is overcoming the idea that a culture of violence in Islam fuels conflict in the region - 
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Tale 7.1. Techniques for Third Party Involvement in Conflict Resolution 
Coercive Non-Coercive 
Enforcement Pure Mediation 
Non-Forcible coercion, such as sanctions Conciliation Problem-Solvin 
Mediation with Muscle, 
using incentives and threats of sanctions 
Good Offices 
From: Table adapted from fig 1.4. in Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsotham and Tom Woocthouse. 1999. 
Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Cambridge: Polity Press. p. 11. 
From this broad overview of the avenues for third party conflict, we can derive a 
number of key issues which can be seen to be use in the Algerian case. Here, the 
conflict resolution 'needs' that we can identify are multifaceted to reflect the 
complexity and ingrained roots of the conflict. A summary of the changing patterns of 
violence in the state-opposition nexus since the early 199os provides major clues as to 
where, beyond the basic economic and political causes of the rise of political Islam, 
the mechanisms of the conflict lie. Our analysis isolates six main sets of factors: 
" the social and economic conditions allowing for Islamism to flourish 
" the structure of and strategies for nation-building of the postcolonial state 
" the mishandling of the Islamist opposition in the 1970S in the first instance, and 
in the post-1988 period; 
" the fragmentation of Islamist forces after the ending of the democratisation 
process in the first instance, and the changing fortunes of specific groups during 
the conflict; 
" the fragmentation of the regime (including military) and elite forces in the later 
years of the conflict; 
" the external dimension: including the role of international organisations (namely 
the limits of international law on human rights in the context of sovereignty), 
economic questions in the global economy (and their divorce from issues of ethics 
in the international system - to be contrasted with the use and aims of economic 
sanctions in Iraq), and the question of aid as factor in the reinforcing of the war 
economy. 
Any successful plan for long-lasting stability in Algeria ought to derive lessons from 
this recent history and tackle the diversity of participants and their specific 
motivations. These dynamics nearly brought Algeria to the brink of state collapse and 
there have been noticeable consequences of this crisis for changes in patterns of 
and it changes the parameters of our assessment of political Islam in religious terms. See 
Chaiwat Satha-Anand. 1994. "Core Values for Peacemaking in Islam" in Elise Boulding (ed. ) 
Building Peace in the Middle East. pp. 295-302. 
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political behaviour in Algeria, namely changes the way political liberalisation has 
been handled to prevent another anti-regime landslide. That being said, the basis for 
governance in the postcolonial setting has not fundamentally changed insofar as the 
basic relationship between the regime and its constituency remains strongly 
controlled by the army, even though its presence has been felt in a less obvious way in 
the last three years. Violence has subsided for the most part, making one the most 
prominent aspects of conflict resolution obsolete (intervention in 1993 for instance 
would have dramatically changed the dynamics of the state-Islamist opposition, even 
though the consequences of such a policy are difficult to predict). Still, successful 
conflict resolution implies all parties involved in the hostilities being part of the peace 
process, as well as the drawing of new 'rules of the game' for post-conflict politics. In 
the absence of such initiatives at key times of the civil war, at least one major 
participant has been excluded for the most part from the new 'deal'. In the short- 
term, an anti-Islamist backlash in civil society resulting from many years of violence 
mostly attributed to Islamist groups, may keep political opposition to the regime in 
check, but the 'Islamist question' has not been resolved to any extent, and the reasons 
for the success of FIS in previous elections have not been addressed in any significant 
manner. The lesson of unbridled democratisation has been learnt by the army in 
particular, but the issue of legitimacy in representation does not stop at careful 
control of partially free elections (even assuming that those are fair). Political Islam 
should remain a question of genuine political relevance among all citizens and their 
current representatives. With the gap left by the FIS, new forms of political 
opposition will emerge in ways which may not be as timid as those currently 
observed. The current status quo in Algeria is more than a cease-fire though, and not 
only because of the relative weakness of the Islamist movement. The state has 
regained control of the means of adjudicating. legitimacy in political life through 
political discourse backed up by the means of keep control of the state through all 
means necessary. 
For conflict resolution scholars however, this would not constitute a solid basis for 
long-lasting peace. The differentiation between positive and negative peace is helpful 
in illustrating this concern. Negative peace is simply achieved through the cessation 
of large-scale acts of violence, typically through a cease-fire followed by successful 
negotiations for a peace settlement. Positive peace, on the other hand, runs deeper 
than this short-term process to address the conditions that have led to the conflict so 
as to lay the economic, social and political foundations for long-term conflict 
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resolution22. For our case study, while it is arguable that, by and large, negative peace 
has been de facto achieved (with the regime regaining control of the polity and the 
disbanding of most of the Islamist movement), the conditions for positive peace are 
far from present. In fact, it is the very circumstances leading to the current cessation 
of hostilities that may bring recurrent civil unrest. Conflict resolution techniques have 
a role to play in overcoming such issues in two main ways. Firstly, the language of 
conflict resolution brings with it the acknowledgement by all parties involved 
(including external players) that the civil war should be called by its own name. In 
other words, post-conflict reconstruction23 implies a conflict, with sides, and deeds. 
The vocabulary of demonisation must be forgone for more constructive discussions 
on the place of power-sharing and genuine political change. Secondly, the far ranging 
practical avenues for overcoming the legacy of conflict match the root causes of the 
Algerian conflict in a close way. Positive peace means that the socio-economic and 
political sources of conflict are addressed in a meaningful and practical way. These 
initiatives can imply economic restructuring, institutional changes, local initiatives to 
rebuild communities, confidence-building measures with regards to political elite, 
education, social policy in terms of training, employment, distribution of wealth, 
town planning and housing as well as changes in the structure of political 
representation. From this far-reaching agenda, we can deduce that Algeria would 
benefit from most of these areas of conflict resolution in the short and long-term. 
Endemic unemployment and underemployment problems, economic decline coupled 
with soaring population growth, housing shortages, and socio-economic relations 
between the elite and the population are all contributing factors in the rise of the 
form of political Islam observed most prominently in the 198os onwards. Dealing 
with these issues means more than preventing the growth of political Islam again 
though (conflict resolution does not require that political Islam should necessarily be 
considered to be a illegitimate form of political expression); it deals with the nature of 
political protest from the grassroots up, and thus challenges the kind of populist 
social contract which, in the eyes of many Algerian voters, has failed. The alternatives 
to this contract should arise in an indigenous context, with the acknowledgement by 
the elite in power that changes are necessary given previous forms of political protest. 
In turn, this leads to potentially far-reaching changes in the way the demands of civil 
society are accommodated by the state, and the very structure of political 
22 This is based on Johan Galtung's definition of peace and violence. For him, peace is the 
absence of violence but his definition of violence is encompassing of what he terms structural 
violence - including forms of social and economic exclusion as much as interpersonal violence 
per se. See Johan Galtung. 1969. "Violence, Peace and Peace. Research" Journal of Peace 
Research. pp. 167-191. 
23 For an overview of this aspect of conflict resolution, see chapter 7, 'Post-Settlement 
Peacebuilding" in Hugh Miall et al. 1999. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. pp. 185ff. 
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representation in Algeria24. In that sense, and as this dissertation illustrates, the 
political dimension of the conflict in Algeria not only takes on discursive forms, but 
also these discursive forms take on identity issues which articulate and thus mediate 
the conditions for conflict. Meaningful settlement of the political situation in Algeria 
thus implies a reinterpretation of the 'rules of game' in the political lifeworld of the 
postcolonial state in terms of identity, power relations, and legitimacy of governance. 
This is an ideal model of course, and one which ignores the realities of power both in 
Algeria, and among the international political players which could set up avenues for 
positive peace in Algeria. In fact, it could be argued that it is precisely because the 
conflict resolution 'needs' of Algeria are based on an understanding of positive peace 
that such initiatives are bound to be unwelcome by the regime. The obstacles to the 
possibilities outlined above are many, and not all of them are bound to the power 
interests of elites. The case of Algeria in the 199os distinguishes itself from many 
post-Cold War crises/civil wars by the lack of conflict resolution initiatives and 
pressures from international organisations, and foreign powers. Only independent 
organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch raised the 
issue of intervention during the conflict, pointing in particular to the wide range of 
extralegal violence by the state. Unilateral initiatives by European states such as 
France and Italy have had little impact. On the contrary, the perception that the 
French state has remained firmly supportive of the regime despite human rights 
issues finds strong substantiation. Condemnation and questions by international 
bodies such as the OSCE, the UN and the EU have been episodic and focused on 
matters of 'concern' rather than intervention. Proposals for international 
commissions of inquiry were also all rejected by the regime. Two fact-finding 
missions (one of which was headed by European Parliament representatives) were 
allowed into Algeria at the height of the civil war, but only to be closely monitored by 
the regime and directed at blame for violence as opposed to a wider assessment of the 
political situation in Algeria. Besides questions of political will and economic 
interests, the structure of the international system had a part to play in the failure to 
implement a peace plan during the civil war years. The Algerian regime called upon 
its right as a sovereign power to define and deal with any internal 'disturbance' in the 
manner it saw fit without having to be held accountable to international bodies of 
governance. The preponderance of the concept of state sovereignty in the 
24 This perspective implies that violence performs particular social and political functions 
within the parameters of conflict which need tobe overcome for long-lasting peace to be put 
into place. For this type of analysis, see Raimo Vaytynen. 1991 "To Settle or To Transform? 
Perspective on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts" in Raimo Vayrynen 
(ed. ) New Directions in Conflict Theory. London: Sage. pp. 1-25. 
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international system allowed for human rights concerns to be seen as secondary to 
the rights of the Algerian state under international law. Any UN resolution in this 
regard would also have been unlikely to be backed up by force under the aegis of the 
Security Council where France is a permanent member. 
This failure to intervene at the height of the conflict is useful to our analysis insofar as 
it illustrates the main obstacles to implementation of peace plans, and by extension, 
positive peace measures. These include having the means and the political will to 
intervene; to have the international structures and law backing up decision-making; 
the ability to make decisions on the basis of neutrality and for the purpose of human 
rights preservation. These obstacles are great, as the growing literature on the 
problems of intervention has illustrated25. One concern is worth elaborating on 
slightly here: the question of whether intervention is a long-term solution to the 
problems underpinning a civil war. To a certain extent, this will remain a moot point 
in the Algerian case given the present state of affairs. Yet, positive peace, because of 
its wide-ranging set of initiatives and its focus on the causes underpinning conflict, 
only becomes more important in this setting. The obstacles to military intervention 
remains just as relevant in the case of post-conflict reconstruction though, and even 
perhaps more so. The Algerian regime is unlikely to agree to foreign involvement and 
scrutiny into its affairs, especially if it is likely to result into its loss of control over the 
political process in any significant way. Questions of political will are thus crucial 
here since intervention in these matters against the will of the regime would require a 
commitment to an 'ethical' foreign policy few powerful nations would embrace, 
especially for a state such as Algeria. Economic incentives have been offered and 
accepted and are likely to contribute to a relative easing of the economic strains 
underpinning the crisis. But the complete control by the regime over patterns of aid 
and investment has been shown to be contributory factors to the institutionalisation 
of the civil war from 1994 onwards. Further investment in this regard is unlikely to be 
tied to issues of accountability. Issues of psychosocial healing are also unlikely to be 
developed internally in a meaningful way, even though the regime has made efforts to 
normalise its relationship to political Islam and offer pardons to imprisoned 
Islamists, suggesting efforts at reconciliation in the vein of a 'truth commission'. 
Despite these efforts however, it remains clear that the state has regained full control 
over the production of historical truth and is therefore unlikely to approach the 
process of healing from the standpoint of acknowledging and dealing with the legal 
and moral responsibilities linked to the civil war. 
25 For a clear overview of the limitations of International Law in this type of conflict, see 
Richard Falk. i99i. "International Law in a Fragmented World: The Challenge of New Issues 
and New Actors" in Raimo Vayrynen (ed. ) New Directions in Conflict Theory. pp. 79ff. 
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Overall, the practical dimension of policy prescriptions described here under the 
banner of conflict resolution highlight a number of problems linked with the specifics 
of the Algerian case. Additionally, it underpins most of the current discussions on the 
obstacles to intervention by third parties and conflict resolution techniques in cases 
of civil war given the current set-up in the International System. The prognosis is 
therefore very limited in its possibilities and extensive in its assessment of obstacles. 
The question of violence itself has been partially resolved in Algeria, and a process of 
greater democratic participation has been put into practice. However, as pointed out 
here, many factors underpinning long-term positive peace are absent in the Algerian 
context, suggesting that a resurgence of political Islam or other (also potentially 
violent) forms of protest is likely to occur in the next few years. For its part, Islamism 
has found its new martyrs, and it also has not had the chance to be discredited 
through the practice of political power, and it remains, by and large, an attractive 
oppositional option for many. That being said, the regime will be a lot more careful in 
its handling of political opposition in the future. In this setting, Islamists are likely to 
go for a more Egyptian style of contestation (with varying and careful strategies for 
undermining the state). From the perspective of a Western power trying to negotiate 
policy with regards to Algeria in an 'ethical' way, the options remain limited and very 
much tied to the ability of the Algerian regime to retain control of the political process 
while appearing to make compromises to pluralism. Economic interests in the area of 
oil and natural gas resources are likely to continue playing the role of moderator of 
international public opinion, regardless of media attention and human rights 
organisations' work. As observed with the case the US-China relationship, issues of 
human rights have not gained the clout to dictate foreign policy over strategic 
economic interests. And the continued emphasis on the free market on a global scale 
is unlikely to alter such priorities. The question of political Islam goes beyond 
potential intervention to curb regime excesses though. One area that remains open to 
positive changes in policy with regards to Algeria, as well as elsewhere in the region, 
is the approach of European and North American powers to the importance and role 
of political Islam in the region (and within 'Fortress West' in diaspora communities). 
Creating a system where pariah status in the New World Order is reserved for 
Islamist groups/states in the future is likely to create conflict as opposed to prevent it. 
Helping regimes fight Islamist groups will only intensify to ideological gap between 
Islamists and what they theorise as the West also. Thus, one crucial area where 
changes in policy-making are likely to alter the antagonistic stance of many Islamist 
groups is change in the definition of the Islamist factor to undermine binary 
oppositions on both sides, and eventually to acknowledge the part political Islam 
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plays in the political spectrum of Middle Eastern politics and its contribution to the 
global conversation on politics and modernity, an issue we now turn to. 
7.3.2. Political Islam and the Global Conversation on Politics and Modernity 
Chapter three, our overview of political Islam as a region-wide phenomenon, began 
with an analysis of the global dimension of political Islam in the recent literature on 
the New World Order. Reassessing this set of issues here, in light of our analysis of 
the political imagination of Algerian Islamists, is the second area of policy-related 
issues this conclusion addresses. The consequences and meaning of globalisation 
have been discussed in depth elsewhere, but the specific connection between global 
institutions, an idea of the 'global' and movements such as political Islam is worth 
pausing on26. The New World Order has meant a re-negotiation of our understanding 
of territorial borders, through challenges to existing state boundaries. More deeply 
though, the importance of the issue of borders in the post-Cold War world illustrates 
the re-negotiation of the boundaries of identity that the processes associated with 
globalisation imply. In this context, one could raise the question of whether the 
perception of a post-Cold War wave of ethnic and religious revivalism has denoted a 
process of fragmentation which undermines both the idea of territorial integrity of 
states and emergent ideas of the 'Global Village'. Suffice it to say here that, at first 
sight, the issues of political Islam and globalisation make uneasy bedfellows. As 
Lubeck argues, 
Even more challenging to Enlightenment theory is the fact that the 
triumphal expansion of global forces appears to be correlated with 
the intensification of Islamic practice as well as the simultaneous 
migration of Muslim communities into new states and regions via 
the new global infrastructure. In turn, this gives rise to Islamic 
social movements of great diversity, complexity and 
contradictoriness... By becoming the voice and assuming the 
leadership of anti-imperialist nationalist movements... Islamic 
movements have now largely displaced secular nationalist and 
leftist movements as the primary mobilizing force of resistance 
against real and imagined Western political, economic and cultural 
domination27. 
26 For an introduction to surrounding debates, see Akbar Ahmed and Hastings Donnan (eds. ). 
1994. Islam, Globalization, and Postmodernity. London: Routledge, and Bryan Turner. 1994. 
Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism. London: Routledge. 
27 Paul Lubeck. 2000. "The Islamic Revival: Antinomies if Islamic Movements under 
Globalization". in Robin Cohen and Shirin Rai (eds. ) Global Social Movements. London: The 
Athlone Press. pp. 14$-149. 
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We have suggested that, in the Algerian context, political Islam is the offspring of the 
process of post-colonial nation-building. Political Islam nonetheless remains a 
region-wide phenomenon and despite its complexity and varied incarnations, it 
retains a large degree of overall coherence in those terms. Thus, our first, and most 
central, question ought to be: is political Islam as it can be currently observed a 
precursor to an alternative to current patterns of cultural/political globalisation? And 
if this is the case, in what way to does it participate in the global discussion on the 
political and the concepts of modernity which surround it? We are looking here at a 
double problem: how the political imagination of political Islam is influenced by and 
influences globalisation in the field of political ideas, and whether the issue of 
political Islam can help us identify some tensions in the way globalisation is defined 
and theorised upon, especially in the context of the Middle East. 
The discussion of political Islam's place as the potential global challenger to the New 
World Order occurs in a context where a number of new ethnic and religious 
movement appear to take on a threatening role with regards to the Westphalian state 
system in fundamental ways. But the place of Islamism within this premise is doubly 
confusing - while other sub-national groups are seen as destructive to the unity of 
particular states, Islamism has been seen to bring in the added bonus of being a 
global challenger to the International System itself. This view is based on the region- 
wide currency of Islamism as well as the transnational links observed between 
groups, as illustrated by the influence of the infamous Islamist supporter Osama Bin 
Laden. So, from the perspective of the academic literature and the media in Western 
Europe and North America, current constructs of the globalisation in cultural terms 
seems to be on a collision course with the political agenda of Islamists. This is an 
ambiguous opposition, because it assumes, in its purest form, that globalisation 
ought to be understood in terms of the free propagation of ideas (be these cultural, 
religious or political in nature) as part of a 'global village' freed from the cultural 
constraints and limitations of nationhood. Political Islam would, in this setting, be 
entitled to participate in this global conversation freely and on its own terms. Of 
course, one could question the neutrality of such lofty ideals on the other hand, when 
the freedom of expression characterising the global village is seen in terms favourable 
to the cultural constructs of the 'West' (and especially the USA), and especially when 
such exchanges often underpin the less idealistic and more unequal workings of the 
global trade system. That political Islam should be seen as a threat to the New World 
Order may not be so absurd after all in these circumstances. If political Islam is 
interpreted as an emergent voice of the developing Muslim World challenging the 
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constructs of globalisation and proposing a radical - and globally-oriented - 
alternative to this model, it is indeed, in that sense, a 'green peril'. 
The connection and interaction between dominant constructs of the global and the 
Islamist political imagination is thus worthy of a closer examination. Determining the 
place of Islamist politics in Algeria can be tied back to understanding how Islamism 
can be defined, and the role it can play, in the region and globally, as a challenger to 
existing constructs of political modernity, an issue of radical importance in the post- 
colonial setting. Political Islam does not function independently from the pressures of 
the global order either: it influences its forms and is shaped by it to some extent. The 
reaction of Islamist groups to the portrayal of the Muslim World in terms of a 'Clash 
of Civilisations' and the assessment of political Islam as a threat to regional and 
global stability has brought greater focus and a sense of place within the international 
order to the movement in these terms. A sense of siege on the part of Islamists has led 
to a greater sense of unity and purpose among groups and individuals. It has also 
sharpened the Islamist position as an 'anti-Western' force, culturally and politically, 
and sometimes in terms of armed struggle. But the Islamist way of engaging with the 
global does not stop at this oppositional stance between a monolithic 'World of Islam' 
(spearheaded by Islamists) and the equally monolithic 'West'. Be it through their 
understanding of an Islamist form of cultural, political and religious globalisation, or 
their ways of dealing with current patterns of globalisation, Islamists are far from 
isolated from the debates revolving around their place in the New World Order. 
In fact, Islamists in Algeria and elsewhere have quite strong ideas as to what the 
global order should look like in Islamist terms. Islamist discourse is universalist in 
that it often focuses on the return to a united and powerful Islamic ummah. The 
theme of global community is very strong in the pamphlets and speeches of the`vast 
majority of groups in the region. The House of Islam is defined as the centre stage 
upon which cultural and political renaissance is to occur. Based on the revolutionary 
thought of Sayyid Qutb in particular, this view has been interpreted by most (but not 
all) groups as creating the obligation of Jihad (through varied means) to change 
society internally, but also to 'export the revolution', so to speak, to other parts of the 
region, and beyond. Regional issues such as the question of Palestine have created 
further impetus for unity among Islamist groups as well - in other words, they can see 
themselves as fighting for a common cause of which Palestine is the most poignant 
example. On this level, it is possible to see political Islam as a force in politics that 
goes beyond borders in its scope and influence (as cross-border financial, tactical and 
ideological exchanges are common, if only informally). While it currently does not 
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have a global reach, it is within its premises to attempt to acquire one. Imagining a 
world where Islamist ideas have global currency may sound far fetched, but the 
current revival of the Islamic faith in the United States for instance, reminds us of the 
potency of Islam as a religion, and thus the potential for political Islam to reach new 
constituencies in the future if the right conditions arise. 
Nevertheless, these suggestions should not obscure the ambiguities and problems 
associated with viewing political Islam purely in this light. Firstly, the discourse of 
Islamists has remained wilfully ambiguous, as our case study illustrated. The creation 
of a stateless ummah is a prominent theme, but the main concerns of most Islamist 
groups remain tied to the political setting of existing states. Each group has a 
particular agenda which is predicated upon local circumstances. Hamas in Palestine 
is just as concerned with the issue of Palestinian independence as Hezbollah is 
concerned with the withdrawal of Israeli troops from South Lebanon. Egyptian and 
Jordanian groups have questioned the inefficiency and legitimacy of their respective 
state apparatuses. The Algerian FIS has had to tackle political liberalisation more 
closely. Also, while there seems to be an agreement among Islamists as to the creation 
of an 'Islamic state' nationally before regional expansion can occur, not all groups 
agree as to what this state should look like. For instance, moves towards relative 
political liberalisation in Iran have prompted quick condemnation by Islamist groups 
keen on developing their own model for an 'Islamic state'. On the whole, one could 
say that there is an inherent tension between advocating the creation of an Islamic 
state and the questioning of the existence of states which the Islamist rhetoric seems 
to imply. Islamist groups have not clarified their position in this regard and/or have 
modified it over time, and it is arguable that this ambiguity has always worked to 
their advantage. 
Informal links between groups do exist, there is co-operation in terms of intelligence 
and training, funding goes across borders (with groups, individuals and sometimes 
states acting as patrons), and diaspora communities often offer vital links, but the 
international dimension of political Islam should not be overestimated. So far, there 
has been no actual evidence to support the thesis that political Islam is an integrated 
supranational force in politics - let alone a global power. By contrast, Islamist groups 
have so far concentrated most of their efforts on gaining political power within the 
boundaries of existing states. Whether they will expand their focus onto the global 
stage when, or if, they do consolidate power internally remains to be seen. 
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On the other hand, it is also worth mentioning that the attitude of Islamist groups 
towards globalisation has been equally ambiguous. Islamism has dealt with 
globalisation in the way that it has dealt with the issue of modernity: through a two- 
pronged approach. The cultural dimension of globalisation has been rejected as 
Western neo-imperialism and the cultural values carried by such a process have been 
described as morally bankrupt. By contrast, Islamists have been more than willing to 
take on board the technological gains of globalisation. In particular, they have learnt 
to use the global tools of communication to harness regional and diaspora support 
and to propagate their message nationally and across borders. Perhaps surprisingly, 
international patterns of trade have not been questioned thoroughly by Islamists 
however, especially for groups operating in oil-producing states. That being said, 
their support for international capitalism is not unqualified, since clientelist networks 
leading to uneven distribution of wealth by the state often find their origins in the 
international trading system. The exploitation of oil and trading outside the region 
have never been rejected, and foreign aid and investment has not been rejected 
outright as a future option for an 'Islamic state'. Finally, Islamist criticism of 
capitalism has tended to focus on un-Islamic banking practices nationally and 
internationally, focusing on the question of usury. Islamic banking is one area that 
Islamists have supported as a workable alternative to current patterns, preventing 
isolation from international patterns of trade while respecting Islamic principles. 
Islamists can thus be seen to have adopted a qualified and pragmatic attitude towards 
most observable manifestations of globalisation. Culturally, the moral high ground in 
Islamist terms remains a viable option, but economically, Islamists remains all too 
aware of the dilemmas typical of the Third World many Middle Eastern states have to 
face. 
What I have illustrated through this rough overview is that movements such as 
Islamism can help us illustrate areas of tension in the ways globalisation can be 
thought of, helping us challenge simplistic understandings of what globalisation 
means, and to acknowledge the variety of ways in which it is perceived and how it can 
affect people. In this context, we can go back to more general questions concerning 
the value of globalisation in its various forms. It is important to remind the reader 
here that globalisation as a process is far less structured and more controversial a 
phenomenon than catch-phrases such as 'our global village' and 'the era of 
globalisation' seem to suggest. There are different aspects to globalisation (such as 
culture, politics, technology and economics) and as an ongoing process, it affects 
different regions of the world in different ways . The basic definitions of globalisation 
seem to suggest the idea of a world that is getting progressively smaller, a world that 
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is easier to reach and comprehend, and where borders and cultural barriers are 
increasingly under stress. In that sense, globalisation trends seem to have been in 
place for some time: the invention of the telegraph, the telephone, and the aeroplane 
can all be seen as significant precursors in this regard. But what 'we mean' by 
globalisation today often seems to imply more than improved means of travel and 
communication (even though these remain central to it). Acknowledging the 
difficulties in defining globalisation with precision, and in the context of debates 
concerning its relevance and shape, David Held et al. build a overall framework of 
understanding stressing that: "Globalization can be taken to refer to those spacio- 
temporal processes of change which underpin a transformation in the organization of 
human affairs by linking together and expanding human activity across regions and 
continents"28 .A number of features characterise this process to give globalization its 
current direction(s): 
... globalization can be thought of as a process (or set of processes) 
which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of 
social relations and transactions - assessed in terms of their 
extensity, intensity, velocity and impact - generating 
transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, 
interaction, and the exercise ofpower. 29 
Here, there are four main aspects of the discourse on globalisation worth considering 
(and these are not necessarily mutually exclusive)30 . The first way of interpreting this 
trend is the metaphor of the'global village' - this implies a smaller world, but also one 
where heterogeneity of experience works in harmony with disappearing boundaries" 
. The second way of looking at globalisation focuses on the expansion of the capitalist 
global economy where trading and production patterns lead to the erosion of 
economic barriers. Thirdly, the erosion of the state system is another way of engaging 
with the idea of the global. Globalisation here functions in terms of supranational 
institutions slowly gaining control over the state and ultimately making it 
redundant32. Examples here include super-states in the making such as the EU, 
powerful trading conglomerates, or financial institutions such as the IMF and the 
28 David Held et al. 1999. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. p. 15. 
29 David Held et al. 1999. Global Transformations. p. 16. 
30 For an overview of the processes of globalisation, and their complexity, see David Held et al. 
i9g9. Global Transformations. Oxford Polity Press. 
31 This is referring back to Ohmae's influential introduction to the context of the "borderless 
world". See Kenichi Ohmae. 199o. The Borderless World. New York: Collins. 
32 This idea has been criticised by, among others, Stephen Krasner, who views globalisation as 
too complex and amorphous phenomenon for sovereignty to be undermined. Stephen 
Krasner. 1999. "Globalisation and Sovereignty" in David A. Smith et al (eds. ) States and 
Sovereignty in the Global Economy. London: Routledge. chapter 2. 
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World Bank. Finally, globalisation could be seen as a vehicle for 'Western' cultural 
hegemony underpinned by the economic profits associated with increased 
consumerism in new markets. The acceleration of the process is a central feature of 
the contemporary era where the results of global changes are increasingly noticeable, 
if asymmetrical: 
That we are on the cusp of entering the second millennium under a 
ruthless, unregulated, polarizing regime, one that simultaneously 
integrates the more advanced and marginalizes the weaker regions 
of the world, is surely now indisputable. Like it or not, globalization 
is the determinant material and social force of our time... 
globalization is never linear, for its impact is always mediated by 
specific, historically situated local institutions... Nor is globalization 
continuous: rather it is characterized by rapid spurts of growth, 
followed by tension, resistance and stagnation" 
The attitude of academics and policy-makers vis-a-vis globalisation have been varied 
to reflect variations on these basic possibilities. In our case, assessing briefly the 
relevance and impact of such models on the Middle East can help us better 
conceptualise of the place of Islamism in this context. Here, it is obvious from the 
outset that the uneven results of globalisation have been felt keenly in the region. 
Little support for the idea of a global village is to be expected in the first instance, 
since the processes of state-consolidation and regional balancing are still undergoing 
major changes34. Questions of political identity, as well as political realities in the 
region (linked to rivalry and. economic priorities) make the idea of a global village a 
luxury most Middle Eastern states cannot afford35. Our second theme finds more 
resonance on the region however, as the consequences of the globalised world 
economy have reached in Middle East in unambiguous ways. That being said, uneven 
trade relations linked to issues of development persist and take precedence over long- 
term financial projects of global significance arising from the region. In other words, 
a free global economy has not lead to an even global economy. The state system has 
not been eroded by globalisation at this stage, to refer back to our third theme. In 
fact, the state has proven remarkably resilient to efforts to create a more integrated 
EU-type regional forum. If anything, it is internal instability that states have had to 
33 Paul Lubeck. 2000. "The Islamic Revival". pp. 146-147. 
34 This issue is also linked to critiques from the Middle East as to the issue of representation of 
the Middle East/Arab World/Muslim World in dominant frameworks of globalisation. See for 
instance, Hassan Hanafi. 1998. "The Middle East, in Whose World? " paper from The Middle 
East in a Globalizing World Conference in Oslo 13-16 August 1998. paper published online by 
the Nordic Society for Middle Eastern Studies. 
35 For a similar argument on Sub-Saharan Africa, see Julius Nyangoro. 1999. "Hemmed in? 
The State in Africa and Global Liberalization "in David A. Smith et al (eds. ) States and 
Sovereignty in the Global Economy. chapter 14. 
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deal with - as the case of political Islam illustrates. Fourthly, cultural hegemony is an 
issue of importance in Middle Eastern societies, and globalisation is often associated 
with this problem. Islamists have highlighted the social and cultural dilemmas 
brought on by high levels of cultural exposure to 'Western culture', but they are by no 
means the only critics of this phenomenon. 
Here, the cultural and economic aspects of globalisation seem to have had the 
greatest impact on the region, but the legacy of this impact is not wholly positive. 
Global trade patterns and access to satellite television can often work as reminders of 
the inequalities in the international system that globalisation has not overcome 36 
Political Islam, in that context, can be seen as one of the elements of protest against 
this process. Of course, our analysis has shown that the roots of political Islam are by 
and large anchored in the national realm, but such national circumstances are, in 
turn, tied to the international dimension brought on by the transition from 
colonialism, patterns of trade and debt, as well as cultural penetration. Additionally, 
political Islam's position on the 'West' has evolved over time to reflect the evolution 
of globalisation. It is now more than the reflection of anti-colonialism, or resentment 
over the loss of traditional values for a seemingly more modern/'Western' lifestyle in 
Middle Eastern societies. These processes go hand in hand, and anti-Western 
attitudes evolve in conjunction with whatever images and influences are received 
from the outside. Political Islam is a player in the global matrix of cultural exchange 
in a dual way: it adapts to globalisation to sharpen its critique of a certain way of life 
and set of values, but at the same time, it is a reflection of the hybridity and sense of 
ambiguity it carries with it (even if those remain largely unacknowledged). As Ngaire 
Woods reminds us, we can identify three core elements to current patterns of 
globalisation: "The expansion of markets; challenges to the state and institutions; and 
the rise of new social and political movementsi37 . Islamism belongs to this third 
category. Current forms of political Islam are thus, in part, an expression of 
globalisation and one of the consequences from it one ought to expect. Most 
significantly though, political Islam illustrates the identity dimension - and locality - 
of new social movements on the global stage38 . The politics of 
location operate in a 
lived tension with the extensity of globalisation to produce an overall framework, 
36 Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods. 1995. "Globalisation and Inequality" Millenium. 24(3). 
PP. 447-470. 
37 Ngaire Woods. "The Political Economy of Globalization" in Ngaire Woods (ed) The Political 
Economy of Globalization. London: Macmillan. P-3. 
38 For more details on such movements and their relationship to the global, see P. Waterman. 
1998. Global Social Movements and the New Internationalisms. London: Mansell. and J. 
Smith et al. (eds. ) 1997. Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity 
beyond the State. Syracuse: Syracuse University press. 
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which Roland Robertson argues would be more accurate to term "glocalization"3y. 
Stuart Hall also dwells on this new type of articulation between locality and globality 
to warn that political and cultural identities are not about to disappear under the 
banner of one construct. For him, globalisation can just as easily "lead to a 
strengthening of local identities, or to the production of new identities"'. 
While it is premature to say whether political Islam will have a detrimental affect on 
current patterns of globalisation, one thing is for certain: groups such as Islamist 
movements help us question the particulars of globalisation as a process. Their 'pick 
and mix' approach highlight the fact that globalisation cannot be assumed to be a 
universal, unquestionable good. If seen as a vehicle for perceived Western hegemony, 
cultural globalisation is met with contempt, and thus part of the dynamic that gives 
political Islam its political relevance. That being said, Islamists would probably not 
take issue with cultural globalisation if it were used to propagate Islamist ideas 
globally. Global means of communication have made the success of political Islam 
possible and will continue to function as one of its main assets. Far from being an 
anti-modernist aberration, political Islam works as an illustration of the forms of 
contestation which are bound to the experience of the global, with the distinctive aim 
of Islamising modernity. This implies engaging with what the current forms of 
modernity have to offer in political, economic and cultural terms, as opposed to 
escaping modernity altogether41. And, in that sense, Islamism functions as a 
contestatory global social movement grappling with the contradictions of North- 
South relations in the global era to formulate its version of the postcolonial condition. 
It is a global social movement insofar as its theorises upon its own sense of locality 
within the polity (in each case), while partaking in the regional setting of politics and 
defining its place in the global setting. 
Understanding this context, in turn, has the potential to change policy in order to 
better deal with such movements, as well as to anticipate the negative aspects of 
globalisation trends so as to have greater control over the process, especially with the 
prospect of the emergence of a coherent idea of global ethics42. 
39 Roland Roberston. 1995. "Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity" in 
Mike Featherstone et al (eds. ) Global Modernities. London: Sage. pp. 30-35. 
4o Stuart Hall. 1992. "The Question of Cultural Identity" in Stuart Hall et al (eds. ) Modernity 
and Its Futures. Cambridge: Polity Press. p. 3o8. 
41 See Fred Halliday. 1994. "The Politics of Islamic Fundamentalism" in Akbar Ahmed and 
Hastings Donnan (eds. ) Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity. p. 91. 
42 For a consideration of such prospects, see Vincent Cable. Globalization and Global 
Governance. London: Chatham House papers (RIIA). conclusion. 
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7.4. Conclusion: Islamism in the Postcolonial Context 
By now, it is probably obvious that the previous section on policy prescriptions plays 
a trick on the reader by dealing with policy per se only in a peripheral way. To some 
extent, this is unavoidable due to the resilience of the Algerian regime and its ability 
to use the tools of sovereignty provided by the International System. My suspicion of 
policy prescriptions in general and of predictions in particular runs deeper than the 
brief assessment of the obstacles to long-term conflict resolution in Algeria however. 
What the Algerian case shows us in rather unambiguous terms is the pitfalls of 
foreign involvement in domestic problems, however grave these may be. Hence an 
ethical quagmire remains unavoidable: while the arguments presented by 
organisations such as Amnesty International in terms of human rights are both sound 
and thought-provoking, the reality of foreign involvement and 'responsibility' 
remains often tied to policy debates where a balance between economic 
considerations and human rights concerns is difficult to reach. 
Our second section, in keeping with our overall analysis of political Islam in the 
Algerian context, also points to the challenging nature of the political imagination of 
Islamism beyond specific borders. The issue of a cultural clash between policy makers 
in Western Europe/North America and Islamists in the region only works to add a 
dimension of antagonism to the policy-making process. The general assessment that 
political Islam remains a potentially explosive political option for Middle Eastern 
states, with destabilising consequences for the patterns of global trade touching the 
region, has prompted democratic states in the 'West' to continue providing de facto, if 
not de jure, support to non-democratic regimes. Despite vocal assurances concerning 
commitments to global democracy, ethical foreign-policy making and human rights 
protection, Western foreign policies in this regard remain underpinned by a narrow 
understanding of what constitutes the national interest. In this setting, discussing 
policy options from a UK perspective, for instance, remains futile if it is based on the 
domestic 'needs' of Algeria (assuming that determining such needs from our 
perspective is even possible). For such an endeavour not to be futile, our analysis 
would have to focus on the possible policy gains from the perspective of the UK. 
Still, it is perhaps too cynical to discount the potential role of academics, the media 
and policy-makers altogether. Our focus on the question of ideas that underscore 
political Islam as opposed to a focus on political violence suggests that greater 
understanding of the societal mechanisms underpinning political Islam can lead to 
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positive changes of attitudes in our societies as well as societies in the Middle East. 
Tackling the question of the place of political Islam as part of the process of 
globalisation is seen here as a starting point in this regard and it hopes to inform 
further discussion and debates. Beyond this, the task of this dissertation has been 
practical insofar as an in-depth discussion of the political imagination of Islamism in 
Algeria (and thus an analysis of its place in the political lifeworld and the identity 
ramifications of its relevance) is a missing link in the academic literature on the 
subject. Tying in political Islam to its context, and linking its patterns of political 
imaginary to questions of nation-building in the postcolonial setting, helps give its 
voice a substance that is often missing from the literature. 
Additionally, looking at political Islam in this way opens up new questions (and/or 
reopens old wounds) concerning the political process in the postcolonial world. With 
the Cold War power games largely overcome, and several decades of independence 
for most post-colonial states, the urgency of state consolidation has given way to new 
aspirations for emerging civil societies. These can be the fruit of the dashed hopes of 
revolutions gone sour, or simply reflect new frustrations with developmental hurdles 
and perceptions of neo-imperialism on the part of former colonial powers. In any 
case, the populist case for governance has lost much of its appeal in states like 
Algeria, because of the demise of communism on the one hand, and the failure of the 
elite to secure prosperity for and legitimacy with regards to the population on the 
other. The appeal of alternatives claiming to recapture the themes ingrained in the 
founding of the postcolonial nation lies in the dual-track policy of keeping the gains 
of independence intact (even sometimes in populist terms), while partaking in the 
national and global political arena in more legitimate ways. It is in this mixture of the 
old and the new that political Islam finds its place. While it is a reflection of the 
failures of postcolonial states in some ways, it can also be inscribed within the 
broader framework of the continued argument as to what modernity means in 
political and cultural terms in a global environment, and from a postcolonial 
perspective. 
Central to our contentions, as a result, is the idea that political identity, as a 
expression of political imagination, is the locus upon which political contestation is 
played out. Political violence has human ramifications worthy of our attention and 
compassion, but this should not obscure the complexity of the mechanisms which 
bring political violence into the fore as a form of political expression. The Algerian 
civil war involves political Islam, but it is not defined by it. The civil war, like political 
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Islam, is part of the map of the political imagination of contemporary Algeria, for 
better and for worse. 
Political Islam, it has been argued, has been an attempt to emancipate the Algerian 
political lifeworld from the monopoly on political thought, imagery, and expression 
effected by the dominant party since independence. By reclaiming the tools for 
defining authenticity, political Islam has done more than effectively challenge the 
power of the state, it has attempted to redefine the very bases of legitimacy that 
underpin political power. But as our analysis showed, political Islam never really 
emancipated itself from the legacy of the postcolonial state - in fact, the success of its 
methods has rested on its manipulation of existing political motifs to undermine the 
regime and claim legitimacy for itself, without fully drawing a radical - if not 
revolutionary - political agenda. 
It is through this act of borrowing 'the master's tools to dismantle the master's house' 
that political Islam has managed to capture the imagination of the Algerian public 
during the short democratic experiment of the early 199os. But it is also because of 
this compromise that political Islam has fallen victim to the ruthlessness of an army 
unwilling to give up its power and privileges, and to the implacable logic of 
authoritarian rule. It is perhaps comforting to think of political Islam as a dangerous, 
potentially totalitarian, promise of theocracy, as it conveniently hides the reality of an 
Algerian postcolonial condition where none of the dreams of freedom and 
emancipation have come to fruition. It is comforting for us to feel that, in any case, an 
authoritarian, army-controlled state is the lesser of two evils. It is comforting for the 
Algerian population, after almost a decade of insecurity, if not terror, to feel that 
authoritarian rule is better than Islamist terror also. But this experiment in Orwellian 
doublethink is only one more stone in the construction of a political imagination 
where historical facts, and political realities, are distorted and re-appropriated to 
serve the needs the state. It is doublethink to unerringly believe that the founding 
myths of the nation reflect the reality of postcolonial politics. Freedom from colonial 
oppression means little if sovereign power is not accompanied by freedom from the 
abuses of the state, freedom of expression, and political participation. It was after all 
in those terms that the struggle for independence was fought, and for this precise 
reason that colonial rule had become untenable. It is doublethink to rework the 
history of the past ten years to see political Islam as an aberration carrying with it the 
slippery slope of intolerance and violence, because it sets up the political chessboard 
of Algeria in a way where the ordinary citizen is given the illusion that she/he has 
made a choice between freedom and oppression. No such choice was ever given. 
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Thirteen years ago, Algerians forced the authoritarian regime to democratise. When 
given a choice in a vote, they chose Islamism. And that choice may have been more 
oppositional than Islamist in character, but perhaps that is what matters the most. 
Algerians voted against single party control, against corruption and clientelism. They 
voted against arbitrary arrests, state control of the press and lack of opportunity. It 
was the army that cancelled the 1992 election, and it did do not so to save Algeria 
from itself, but because it could not allow an election that it might not win. The army 
arrested and interned the members of its opposition in desert camps reminiscent of 
the Gulag. It committed extralegal arrests and killings, as well as other human rights 
abuses. Regardless of the responsibilities of Islamist activists in the civil war (which 
are indeed significant), the responsibilities of the regime remain unchanged. 
The political reality of post-civil war Algeria is one where the regime has claimed 
moral legitimacy over the Islamist alternative by virtue of winning the war. The 
regime used all the tools of war at its disposal to destroy and deligitimise political 
Islam, including the (successful) use of propaganda at home and abroad. It is the 
victor's privilege to speak of civil concord, and of pardon. But, by placing 
responsibility for the civil war squarely on the shoulders of Islamism, the state has 
already indicted it. By returning to a democratisation process where the legal and 
political safeguards are in place for the regime not to lose, the state has compounded 
its victory. And finally, by co-opting the remaining Islamist groups into positions of 
relative power and placing civil society in a situation where the illusion of 
representation through democratic means is in place, the regime has anchored its 
power more securely than ever before. 
The civil war may be over, but the relative calm of the past three years belies 
something perhaps even more monstrous that civil strife: it carries with it the slow 
process of institutionalisation of a lie, and the acceptance of it. In that sense, the 
Algerian situation bears the hallmarks of an Orwellian nightmare. 
Lost in this nightmare is the importance of re-claiming history by civil society, a sense 
of belonging within that history, and a place in the modern world as it is. The 
freedom to undermine the fiction of the French mission civilisatrice is the same 
freedom to recognise that a social contract ultimately underpinned by terror is no 
social contract at all. It is also the freedom to recognise international double 
standards of morality. It is only in those circumstances that one could talk of a 
postcolonial condition living up to the ideal of overcoming the legacy of colonialism, 
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as opposed to merely chronologically following it. Or as Winston Smith, a somewhat 
disgruntled employee of the Ministry of Truth, would put it: 
Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four. If that 
is granted, all else followsa3 
Completed in St Andrews, 31 August 2001. 
Minor Corrections completed in St Judes, Plymouth, April 2002. 
43 George Orwell. 1949. Nineteen Eighty-Four. (1990 ed. ). Harmondsworth: Penguin. p. 84. 
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